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ABSTRACT 
 
In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation established the Southern Flank, a 
strategy for the defence of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving 
Greece, Italy and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to 
mobilize Greece and Turkey as allies and integrate them into the Western defence 
system. Throughout 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959, it 
was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the 
temporary settlement over Cyprus. These events are the focus of this thesis. It 
examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern 
Flank‟s structure and function and relative value in NATO‟s overall policy, and its 
response to the challenges of the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War. It 
explores not only the military aspects of the Southern Flank (e.g. the establishment of 
its headquarters and NATO‟s command structure; the special role of each member 
state; military planning and the lack of unity in command) but also the more 
controversial political aspects. Hence, it analyses the admission of Greece and Turkey 
to NATO, the short-lived military cooperation between these states and Yugoslavia 
during 1953-55 and the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 due to 
Cyprus. It also focuses on the part played by other major members of the alliance, 
principally the United States and Britain, in Southern Flank politics and strategy. 
Thus, it considers how the US and UK viewed the power balance between the three 
Southern Flank members and how the Americans sought to influence affairs through 
financial, military and technical assistance, including the construction of US bases in 
Greece and Turkey. More generally, the thesis also assesses the threat posed to the 
Southern Flank at various points by rising tensions in the Middle East.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The subject of this thesis – „The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military 
Strategy or Political Stabilisation?‟ – is defined chronologically. The Southern Flank 
was created in 1951 by the NATO powers and initially comprised only of Italy. There 
were, however, concurrent negotiations for its expansion to include Greece and 
Turkey once those states had been admitted to the Atlantic Alliance. Once that had 
been achieved, the strength of the Southern Flank was jeopardised until a short-lived 
settlement of the Cyprus problem enabled a temporary revival of Greek-Turkish 
relations and the restoration of normalcy in the region by the end of the 1950s. These 
are the events at the centre of this thesis which is a historical study focusing on 
political-diplomatic as well as a military history. It covers the many aspects that 
occupied NATO‟s Southern Flank in its first nine years. Among them are the reasons 
why NATO sought its enlargement just three years after its formation; the various 
stages of the negotiations held in 1951-1952 leading to the final admission of Greece 
and Turkey and the part played by other major members of the alliance, such as the 
United States and Britain; the creation of Southern Flank‟s headquarters and NATO‟s 
structure in this area; the function of the Greek Armed Forces within the framework of 
a military alliance of the major Western states, only few years after the end of the 
Greek civil war; the role and particular importance of each member of the Southern 
Flank (Italy, Greece, Turkey) in NATO‟s strategy; the offer of American military, 
financial and technical assistance to the above three states and the construction of the 
American bases on their soil; the military planning for the role of the Southern Flank 
in the event of crisis or conflict with the Eastern bloc; the impact of the lack of unity in 
13 
 
 
 
the command of the Southern Flank and the comparison with the other NATO 
commands; the level of integration of the armies of the Southern Flank, which did not 
appear to be satisfactory; the short-lived military cooperation of Greece and Turkey 
with Titoist Yugoslavia during 1953-1955, a unique phenomenon of formal alliance 
between a communist and two Western states in the Cold War; and the impact of the 
dramatic deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 onwards because of the 
dispute over Cyprus.  
This thesis puts emphasis not on the national policies of the members of the 
Southern Flank but on the structure and function of the Southern Flank as a whole, the 
relative value of the Southern Flank in NATO‟s overall policy, the alliance‟s response 
to the challenges of this specific region, and the role of the Naples Headquarters. The 
existing literature on these subjects is far from extensive: relevant texts either focus on 
only one country (for example, Greece) or on one aspect (Greek-American relations). 
Although there has been an interesting research on Greece and Turkey and their 
relations with the alliance, this work deals with the level of national policy rather than 
with the function of these states within the structure of the alliance. The same applies 
to the Italian case. It should be stressed that the aim of this thesis is not to give a full 
account of all aspects and events. Rather, the ultimate goal is to provide, to the extent 
possible, a comprehensive narration and analysis of the Southern Flank politics and 
strategy in the 1950s, which might serve as a starting point for the research of more 
specific subjects in the future. Moreover, this thesis does not deal with issues such as 
communal relations and friction between US personnel serving in (or visiting) Italy, 
Greece, and Turkey and the local population, or the economic or social consequences 
of US presence in the Southern Flank countries. Hopefully, these interesting matters, 
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which have received very little, if any, research so far, will be studied by other 
historians. 
NATO‟s history has not yet been served by an extensive literature and the 
few books are mainly general histories of the alliance.
1
 Historians have concentrated 
even less on the Southern Flank. Firstly, scholars have largely been interested in 
transatlantic relations, in US-UK relations and NATO-French relations, in the role of 
Germany, and in nuclear affairs. Secondly, historians of the early Cold War period 
focused on the Middle East and the Cyprus question rather on the Southern Flank as 
such. However, the history of the Southern Flank in the 1950s is colourful. To name 
three examples, NATO proved more or less unable to devise an effective defensive 
strategy for the region to cover Italy, Greece and Turkey and relied almost exclusively 
on nuclear deterrence; therefore, NATO remained militarily weak in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Moreover, in 1951-2 Anglo-American differences over the command 
setup in the southern region clearly demonstrated that the US-UK „special 
relationship‟ should not be taken for granted in the early Cold War period. Last but not 
least, the deep rupture in UK-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations over Cyprus after 
1955, which constituted the first intra-NATO crisis, and NATO‟s inability to intervene 
and mediate successfully, revealed the alliance‟s political weaknesses early on in its 
history. 
During the Cold War the security problems of NATO‟s Southern Flank were 
particularly complex and profoundly different in military and political terms from the 
Northern and Central areas of the Atlantic Alliance. First of all, in northern and central 
Europe NATO and the Soviet bloc (from 1955 the Warsaw Pact) were facing each 
                                                          
1
 For more details, see Vojtech Mastny, „The New History of the Cold War Alliances‟, Journal of Cold 
War Studies 4/2 (spring 2002), pp.55-84. 
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other along a well-defined geographic, political and military dividing line. On the 
contrary, the boundaries between the two alliances were less clear-cut in the Southern 
Flank, not only because of the existence of neutral Yugoslavia, but also because some 
states of the Middle East bordering with Turkey, though not members of one or the 
other coalition, proved open to Soviet political, economic and military penetration. 
Moreover, in the Southern Flank, contrary to the situation in Western Europe, serious 
internal differences and disputes emerged from 1955 to early 1959 (and again in the 
following decades) between two members of the alliance, Greece and Turkey, which 
often paralyzed the Southern Flank.  
One of the primary aims of this thesis is to utilize as many archives as 
possible. Of particular importance is the full use of the NATO archives in Brussels 
(International Staff – the political archive of the alliance, and Military Staff – the 
alliance‟s military archive). Until this point, very few studies (either articles or books 
and theses) have made use of the NATO archives, despite the fact that its holdings are 
easily accessible and well classified in both the digital and printed guides. As this 
thesis deals primarily with NATO, its official records are of paramount importance. As 
will be seen, the material found at the archives is very significant, not least because 
since NATO is a multinational alliance, the NATO archives illuminate, at least to 
some extent, the attitude of all members of the alliance towards the Southern Flank 
and its problems. 
The British National Archives constituted the other most important archival 
collection. Foreign Office (FO) and Ministry of Defence (DEFE) records have been 
used extensively. In addition, significant information has been found in Cabinet 
(CAB) records and the papers of the prime minister (PREM), as well as in Admiralty 
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(ADM) and War Office (WO) files. There is no need to establish here the usefulness 
of research in the UK National Archives at Kew. Britain had traditionally been a major 
power in the Mediterranean and in the 1950s, although eclipsed by the United States in 
Europe, still had a variety of interests in the region, including the holding of the 
NATO Mediterranean command. Furthermore, London tried to shape developments in 
1951-2, without much success, to regain some of its decreasing leverage in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and achieve some coordination between the Southern Flank and the 
defence of the Middle East. Britain also had extensive connections with the policy-
making elites of the three members of the Southern Flank and therefore an important 
amount of vital information. Last but not least, Britain was a key actor during the 
Cyprus dispute in 1954-9 which nearly brought the Southern Flank to the brink of 
dissolution (the National Archives hold an enormous amount of material regarding this 
issue).  
Another primary actor in NATO and the Mediterranean was, by dint of its 
superpower status and interests, the United States. US documents are extremely 
important in this thesis, because the United States was the leading power of NATO, it 
exerted influence in all three members of the Southern Flank, it provided military and 
economic aid to them, while the US Sixth Fleet played a major role in the military 
planning of the alliance in the Mediterranean region. The records of the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, were very helpful, especially the 
Eisenhower, Dulles, Gruenther and Norstad papers, as well as various National 
Security Council (NSC) records. Furthermore, a vast amount of evidence was found in 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, Maryland. 
Emphasis was placed on State Department papers (of both decimal and lot files) and 
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on papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (specifically of its Chairman in 1953-7, Admiral 
Arthur Radford). On the other hand, the published collection of the US government 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes was a valuable supplementary 
source. Selected documents of the DDRS (Declassified Document Retrieval System) 
e-sources were also used.  
Finally, research for this thesis was extended to published and unpublished 
Greek archival sources, including the Historical Archive of Greek Foreign Ministry, 
which is accessible till the year 1954 (although now material for subsequent years is 
being released). Other unpublished document collections include the Athanasios 
Politis Archive, which is deposited in the Historical Archive of Greek Foreign 
Ministry (Athanasios Politis was the Greek ambassador in Washington from 1950 to 
1954 – and beforehand served in Moscow), and the Ioannis Politis Archive (Ioannis 
Politis was a prominent leading diplomat and permanent Under Secretary of State in 
1950-1), both of which are deposited in the Mpenaki Museum. There is also a sizeable 
twelve-volume published collection of selected documents in Svolopoulos, 
Konstantinos (ed.), Konstantinos Karamanlis: archeio, gegonota kai keimena 
[Constantinos Karamanlis: archive, events and texts]. Unfortunately, this Greek source 
base has not been matched by a Turkish equivalent as no Turkish archival sources are 
accessible to historians for the period after 1910s. Moreover, this thesis has not used 
Italian material given its central focus on NATO sources, those of the alliance‟s two 
leading powers (the UK and US) and the two states which initiated most of the 
Southern Flank‟s military and political history in the 1950s. 
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i) The role of geography in the Southern Flank and the consequent strategic 
implications 
Allied strategy in the Southern Flank region was influenced disproportionately by 
geography and this was always mirrored in the assessments of the NATO officials. 
The area of responsibility of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) did not 
present a unified theatre and the development and implementation of a single and 
comprehensive strategy was a herculean task.
2
 On the Southern Flank the sea 
predominated over the land factor, and the two blocs had common land borders only 
on the Greek-Bulgarian, Turkish-Bulgarian and Soviet-Turkish frontiers.
3
 In essence, 
the Southern Flank was divided into three major land compartments and the „greater‟ 
Mediterranean Sea (meaning the Mediterranean itself, along with the Aegean Sea and 
other bodies of water adjacent to Southern Europe, the western Middle East and 
eastern North Africa). The three main land sub-regions were the Italian Peninsula, the 
Balkans and Eastern Turkey, and although related, they were operationally separate. 
The common factor was that throughout almost the whole of NATO‟s Southern land 
frontier, the terrain is mountainous; only in the Northern Italian Plain, in Thrace and 
on the Anatolian Plateau it was (and still is) suitable for large scale land operations 
and the deployment of mechanized formations.
4
 
 Italy had no frontier with enemy territory, and a land attack against it was 
only likely through Austria or Yugoslavia into the Northern Italian Plain. In the North 
                                                          
2
 John Chipman, „NATO and the Security Problems of the Southern Region: From the Azores to 
Ardahan‟, in John Chipman (ed.), NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London 
& New York: Routledge, 1988), pp.8-52. 
3
 Leopoldo Nuti and Maurizio Cremasco, „Linchpin of the Southern Flank? A General Survey of Italy 
in NATO, 1949-1999‟, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years (London, 
2001), v.3, pp. 317-37. 
4
 David Shlapak et al., Sample Campaign Plans and Staff Assessments for NATO’s Southern Region 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1989), p.1. 
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this plain was covered by the wide and easily-defended Italian Alps, but to the East the 
defence of Italy was prejudiced by the fact that the Julian Alps, with their strategic 
gaps lay beyond the Yugoslav border.
5
 The most vulnerable sector of the Italian 
frontier was the „Gorizia Gap‟ (known in antiquity as the „Barbarian Gate‟) which was 
the coastal narrow plain at the northern corner of the Adriatic Sea. This was accessible 
through Ljubljana and Rijeka (Fiume) and offered the only terrain suitable for large-
scale tank operations in the border regions. The only continuous frontal obstacle was 
the lower Isonzo River.
6
 Therefore, though the Isonzo River offered a secondary 
defence line in Italian territory, the course of events in Northern Yugoslavia would 
greatly affect the defence of Northern Italy in case of war. 
The coastal zone of the Northern Aegean Sea linked Greece and Turkey, 
covered their flanks, and provided access to the Mediterranean. This zone in Greek 
Thrace, in the West, was dominated by the mountains of Southern Bulgaria, but was 
also too thin and lacked depth for effective defence. The principal land approach to 
Greece, and Salonika in particular, ran through the Vardar (Axios) Valley in Southern 
Yugoslavia, while the secondary one ran from Bulgaria along the Struma River in 
Greek eastern Macedonia. According to NATO analysts the Soviet bloc‟s effort in the 
Balkans was likely to be directed first at the Danube Valley against Yugoslavia. It was 
estimated that after the drive in Yugoslavia, attacking Soviet bloc forces would be 
directed through North-western Yugoslavia towards Italy and through Southern 
Yugoslavia towards Greece, aiming to secure bases on the shores of the Mediterranean 
from which Allied sea communications could be seriously threatened. The latter drive 
would probably be coordinated with forces attacking Greece directly from Bulgaria. 
                                                          
5
 NATO/M.C.14/1(Final), Report on Strategic Guidance, 9-December-1952. 
6
 Faringdon, Hugh, The Map of Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p.189. 
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Though Yugoslavia was unlikely to be able to hold its Northern Plains, it was 
expected to withdraw effective forces into the mountains and continue fighting. 
Turkish Thrace was highly exposed both by thrusts of armoured and mechanised 
forces from Bulgaria and by seaborne attack from the Black Sea.
7
  
As regards mainland Turkey, the NATO officials considered that the Soviets 
would probably devote considerable effort to the conquest of the country, to deprive 
the Allies of the air bases and other facilities in Turkey and undermine their 
dominating position on the Black Sea; moreover, by striking at Turkey they could 
interdict or at least harass the direct approaches to the Middle East. The possession or 
neutralisation of Turkey would give the USSR access to the Mediterranean and greater 
freedom of operation against the Middle East. In particular, it would threaten 
important Allied oil producing areas, as well as extend the Soviet bloc‟s air warning 
cover and the range of its air operation. It was estimated that simultaneous enemy 
attacks on Turkey would consist of a main attack in the Balkans into Turkish Thrace 
with the object of making an assault crossing of the straits and a drive into Anatolia 
while another thrust from the Caucasus should be expected; a further threat, in the 
form of seaborne operations across the Black Sea against Samsun, was also regarded 
as possible. The danger of possible envelopment by enemy forces moving through 
Persian Azerbaijan and turning westwards across Northern Iraq and Syria towards 
Iskenderun was also apparent.
8
  
The main strategic factor which influenced NATO‟s strategy on the Southern 
Flank was that the only element which unified the three main sub-theatres of the 
                                                          
7
 NATO/M.C.14/1(Final), Report on Strategic Guidance, 9-December-1952; also Shlapak et al., 
Sample Campaign, p.1. 
8
 NATO/M.C.14/1(Final), Report on Strategic Guidance, 9-December-1952. 
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region was the Mediterranean Sea, where NATO enjoyed naval and air superiority. 
Indeed, the Mediterranean embraced allied territories in Western Europe, Southern 
Europe and Turkey. The security of allied sea and air lines of communication with 
those territories and with North Africa and the Middle East depended on the control of 
the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Sea also afforded great opportunity for 
exploiting the flexibility of the naval arm in support of the land battle, both by 
amphibious operations and by the employment of naval striking forces. Except 
possibly in Albania, the Soviets could not possess any naval or air bases on the 
Mediterranean coast and apart from any submarines already deployed in the area, 
Soviet naval vessels would have to penetrate the narrow entrances from the Atlantic or 
the Black Sea, and would therefore become easy prey to the powerful Anglo-American 
naval and air forces. The enemy air threat over the Mediterranean, however, was likely 
to be significant. The strategic concept governing the employment of allied forces in 
the Mediterranean Sea would therefore be to control its waters, to defend the littoral of 
allied and friendly territories (including the islands of Crete, Sicily, Corsica and 
Sardinia) and to employ available forces, both offensively and defensively, in support 
of the overall strategy in Southern Europe and Turkey.
9
  
During the 1950s, the US Sixth Fleet remained the most powerful allied force 
in the Southern region. This was consonant with the US Navy‟s effort not only to 
support the allied ground forces but also to develop long-range strike capabilities that 
would enable it to contribute significantly to a prospective (land) war against the 
Soviets.
10
 For this last purpose, the use of inland seas (like the Mediterranean) was 
imperative. The USN had realised very quickly the potential of atomic weapons in 
                                                          
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Jakub Grygiel, „The Dilemmas of US Maritime Supremacy in the Early Cold War‟, The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28/2, (April 2005), pp.187-216. 
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enhancing the firepower and destructive effectiveness of the US maritime aviation.
11
 
The adoption of such a new role would secure a primary position for the US Navy in a 
new geostrategic environment which had changed drastically after 1945.
12
 Although 
until the early 1950s atomic weapons were too large and heavy to be delivered by 
carrier-based aircraft, soon NATO acquired sea-based nuclear capability in the 
Mediterranean: by the end of 1951 atomic bombs had been deployed to the carriers of 
the Sixth Fleet. In the event of war these would be delivered by P2V-3C and AJ-1 
aircraft. The potential targets were various Soviet military facilities and war sustaining 
resources within 600 miles distance of the Mediterranean, mainly around the Caucasus 
(this was the case particularly from 1954 onwards, when NATO strategy came into 
line with the US government‟s „New Look‟ strategy). Moreover, technological 
developments, such as the laying down of the Forrestal class super carriers from 1954 
onwards (which were able to launch jet aircraft), and the construction of smaller and 
lighter atomic devices, enabled the Sixth Fleet‟s naval aviation to launch tactical 
atomic airstrikes, as well as to perform conventional close air support, in order to blunt 
any Soviet-bloc advances in NATO soil.
13
 
However, the role and value of the US Sixth Fleet and NATO domination in 
Eastern Mediterranean, though crucial, should not be overestimated. Land power must 
always be confronted on land, and control of the Eastern Mediterranean alone was 
insufficient to defeat a Soviet-bloc land campaign in Greek and Turkish Thrace and 
eastern Anatolia: the Greek and Turkish land and air forces had the task to check a 
                                                          
11
 Joel Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age. The United States Navy and NATO 1949-80 (London & 
New York; Routledge, 1991), p.58. 
12
 Grygiel, „The Dilemmas‟, pp.187-216. 
13
 Sokolsky, Seapower, pp.58-59; Grygiel, „The Dilemmas‟, pp.187-216; Dean Allard, „An Era of 
Transition, 1945-1953‟, pp.290-303, and Floyd Kennedy, „The Creation of the Cold War Navy, 1953-
1962‟, pp.304-326, in Kenneth Hagan (ed.), In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval 
History, 1775-1978 (Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 1978). 
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Soviet (and/or Bulgarian) advance towards those two AFSOUTH‟s land sub-theatres 
but could only count on very modest US/NATO support.
14
 Although those two 
countries (and Italy) had quite numerous armies – especially in comparison to other 
NATO members – their armed forces lacked advanced weaponry and technical staff 
throughout the period under examination. Furthermore, despite the emphasis which the 
US Navy was placing on power projection ashore, one could justifiably doubt the real 
capability of the Sixth Fleet‟s naval aircraft to contribute decisively to NATO 
campaign in Eastern Mediterranean, at least during a crucial initial phase. A hundred 
and eighty or so aircraft would probably make no real difference, at least in a 
conventional campaign, against the powerful Soviet and satellite air forces, 
particularly since most of the naval aircraft would be kept for the Sixth Fleet‟s self-
protection. The same applies to the actual value of the fleet‟s amphibious element 
(comprised of two thousand men of the US Marine Corps). 
Indeed, the experience of the Second World War had demonstrated that naval 
aviation could efficiently project power from sea to shore by undertaking „traditional‟ 
missions such as close air support, interdiction and interception, on the condition that 
it enjoyed considerable numerical superiority and/or that the opponent air force was 
neutralized. Conversely, land-based aircraft could inflict massive damage to a fleet 
lacking adequate air cover – and warships, in particular capital ships, are high-value 
assets that are difficult to replace.
15
 It is important to stress that at least until the mid-
1950s, overall NATO air forces were weak, particularly as regards the shortage of 
                                                          
14
 John Chipman, „Allies in the Mediterranean: Legacy of Fragmentation‟, in John Chipman (ed.), 
NATO’s Southern Allies, pp.53-85. 
15
 Ian Speller, „Naval Warfare‟, in David Jordan et al., Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge: 
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fighters and the inadequacy of the air control and warning (AC&W) systems.
16
 
Therefore, in the event of war with the Soviet bloc, the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) and the Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) would most 
likely decide to withdraw the Sixth Fleet West of Sicily to avoid a Soviet air attack 
and prepare for a counterattack.
17
 In any case, it should be stressed that regarding the 
tactical air support mission of maritime aviation, from the early 1950s until the mid-
1960s emphasis was given to nuclear strikes than to conventional bombing.
18
 In such a 
context, the establishment and maintenance of NATO naval supremacy might prove 
irrelevant to the actual defence of mainland Greece, the Straits, and Anatolia, should 
war occur. With the increased possibility of retaliatory nuclear strikes by the Sixth 
Fleet against the advancing Soviet-bloc forces within Greek and Turkish territory, this 
made NATO‟s strategy in the Southern Flank unattractive to the Greeks and the Turks. 
In fact, during the 1950s NATO and the Sixth Fleet were unable to defend Greece and 
Turkey. The alliance and the United States based their strategy on deterrence by 
punishment.
19
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ii) Historical framework: The early Cold War in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1945-
1950 
Greece and Turkey (as well as Iran) were the first points of East-West friction and 
antagonism after the Second World War. In essence, the first episodes occurred even 
before the end of the war. After German withdrawal from Greece in October 1944, the 
Greek communists clashed with the pro-western forces (and British paratroops) during 
December 1944 and January 1945, until a truce was signed in February. Furthermore, 
on 19 March 1945 the USSR denounced the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and 
Neutrality of 17 December 1925, stating that the treaty did not correspond to present 
circumstances and should be revised. The real shock came on 7 June, when Soviet 
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov demanded significant Turkish concessions in 
order to conclude a new Soviet-Turkish treaty: those included the return to the USSR 
of the former Armenian districts of Kars and Ardahan, ceded to Turkey in 1921, the 
establishment of Soviet bases in the Straits area, and a bilateral (and not international) 
agreement on revision of the Montreux Convention. Molotov also implied that if 
Turkey reoriented its foreign policy towards the USSR, the fulfilment of the above 
demands would become unnecessary.
20
   
Meanwhile, Turkey sought for British advice and support (bilateral relations 
had been uneasy until late 1944 due to Turkish refusal to declare war against the 
Axis), and Britain decided to intervene in Moscow. It proposed to the United States a 
joint approach to the Soviets, but at that time the State Department did not favour an 
Anglo-American demarche, for fear that this would further damage the Soviet-Turkish 
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relations. Then London acted unilaterally and indicated to Moscow that the Straits and 
the other issues raised by the USSR should not be regarded as a matter of exclusive 
Soviet and Turkish interest. For their part, the COS insisted that Soviet demands for 
bases on the Straits should be resisted strongly.
21
 The Straits issue was discussed at the 
Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August 1945) but the Big Thee were unable to agree 
on the revision of the Montreux Convention. It should be noted that during 1945 the 
US leadership had not yet formed a coherent policy for the Eastern Mediterranean and 
the Near East and preferred to avoid a quick and deep American involvement in (and 
thus commitment to) the region. Therefore, the Turks failed to stimulate US support at 
that stage.
22
   
However, by the end of the Second World War, the United States had 
acquired long term interests in the Mediterranean. It had contributed significantly to 
the liberation of northern Africa and Italy, and US policy makers were becoming 
increasingly aware of the region‟s crucial place in protecting American and Western 
interests in the Middle East; the latter started to assume a focal position in 
Washington‟s considerations. Despite this, the Americans regarded the whole basin as 
a British sphere of influence (their own role being just „a supporting one to the 
British‟) and therefore in 1945 they effectively withdrew their military and naval 
forces from the Mediterranean.
23
 
US military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and specifically Turkey, 
dated back to 1943. During 1943-5, the United States established a military transport 
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and radio communications station in Adana, in South-eastern Turkey. The Adana 
station was a first demonstration of Turkish strategic importance in the mind of US 
policy makers, while it also laid the groundwork for the construction of the first joint 
US-Turkish air base after 1950-1, at Adana (in 1958 it was renamed the Inçirlik air 
base).
24
 After the end of Second World War in Europe and for approximately nine 
months the Americans virtually ceased their military presence in Turkey. However, 
continuing Soviet pressures to Iran and other developments led to a gradual reappraisal 
of US policy. As post-war US strategic thinking evolved, it was announced on 6 
March 1946 that the body of the deceased Turkish ambassador to Washington, 
Mehmet Ertegün, would be returned to Istanbul on the battleship Missouri; this was a 
clear signal of US support to Turkey.
25
 Soon afterwards, a considerable increase of 
American naval presence in the Mediterranean occurred, although for the time being 
the US policy makers decided to dispatch certain vessels in small units to cruise across 
the Mediterranean and show the flag, instead of forming a powerful fleet or task 
force.
26
 
Meanwhile, contemporary British and US military planning in the aftermath 
of the Second World War suggested that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle 
East should be retained by the West. The Middle East would constitute, along with 
Britain, the main platform for the launch of a US-UK strategic offensive against Soviet 
industrial and military targets, while the Mediterranean would become the major 
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theatre of concentration and of naval operations at the start of a general war.
27
 US-UK 
fears stemmed from Soviet desire to fill existing or emerging power vacuums in 
Southern Europe and the Near East. For example, during negotiation of the Italian 
peace treaty, the Americans, even more than the British, defended the Italian interests, 
particularly regarding Italy‟s territorial claims in Venezia Julia and in Trieste. The US 
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, and the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin 
resisted Tito‟s efforts to annex the whole city and its hinterland. Back in Washington, 
US policy makers decided to remain firm on the Trieste issue, since until the Tito-
Stalin split in 1948, Yugoslavia was considered the closest ally of the USSR. The US 
Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, insisted that the Trieste area, along with the 
whole Eastern Mediterranean, should be defended, even though for the time being the 
US Navy could dispatch only moderate forces to the Mediterranean. In any case, 
Molotov appeared conciliatory at the Council of Foreign Ministers and, despite Tito‟s 
protest, accepted that Trieste should be turned into a free port under UN tutelage. In 
early August tension was heightened since the Yugoslavs shot down two US aircraft 
which had violated Yugoslavia‟s airspace.28 It was at that juncture that in August 1946 
the Soviets sent a diplomatic note to Ankara, demanding joint Soviet-Turkish control 
of the Straits.  
During the second half of 1946, neither the Turkish nor the US policy makers 
feared that the Soviets might resort to military action against Turkey. What worried 
them was that Moscow‟s demand for bases in the Straits would constitute the first step 
towards the rise of Soviet presence and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
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Near East. Due to the advent of airpower, bases in the Straits would not suffice to keep 
them open in case of conflict between the USSR and the United States and Britain, and 
therefore the Soviets might soon ask for more bases in the Aegean and the Eastern 
Mediterranean (for example, in the Dodecanese islands or Tripolitania). The rise of 
Soviet influence and the augmentation of power projection capabilities in the area 
could seriously threaten British lines of communication and oil supplies, and 
ultimately jeopardise the strategic bombing offensive against the USSR in case of 
war.
29
 
Therefore, the United States decided to adopt a firm policy and fully backed 
Turkey to resist Soviet pressure. State, War, and Navy Department officials argued 
that Soviet claims should be resisted, „with the full realisation that if Russia did not 
back down ...it might lead to armed conflict‟. President Truman concurred.30 US naval 
forces proved a very valuable strategic asset and offered great flexibility to American 
foreign policy. Indeed, although by the end of 1945 and until mid-1946 the US 
Mediterranean fleet comprised of one light cruiser and two destroyers, and in August 
1946 included three cruisers and four destroyers, its strength was augmented 
significantly in subsequent weeks. By late 1946 Task Force 125 of the Twelfth Fleet 
consisted of one carrier, three cruisers, and eight destroyers. Furthermore, its 
operational area of responsibility had expanded and included the whole Mediterranean, 
the Black and Red Seas, and the Persian Gulf. The above commitment of the US Navy 
was well publicised, or propagandised, by „showing the flag‟ along the Mediterranean 
(for example, the carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Piraeus in September 1946). 
Furthermore, Forrestal, perhaps the staunchest anti-communist figure within the 
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Truman Administration, announced on 1 October 1946 that the US naval forces would 
be maintained permanently in duty in the Mediterranean in support of American 
interests and policies in the area.
31
  
As the Greek Civil War had broken out between the Communist Party and the 
pro-western forces, and as the financial situation in Britain continued to deteriorate, 
Whitehall decided that the British could no longer support economically and militarily 
Greece and Turkey.
32
 On 21 February, London informed Washington that by 31 
March assistance to the Greeks and the Turks would be terminated, and British troops 
would be withdrawn from Greece; hopefully, the United States would assume the 
responsibility to continue the provision of aid to Athens and Ankara and contain 
Soviet influence in Eastern Mediterranean. US officials, particularly of the State 
Department (including the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and the Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William Clayton) as well as Forrestal, were 
ready and eager to undertake action. A communist victory in Greece might have 
broader political and psychological repercussions, since it would probably boost the 
Italian and French Communist parties. Of course, additional concerns included the fear 
that the USSR might gain a foothold in the Mediterranean and manage to threaten the 
flaw of raw materials (such as Middle Eastern oil), critical for West European 
economic recovery.
33
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In any case, the Greek problem set in motion a whole process, since 
Washington recognised that the situation in Greece constituted just part of a much 
larger problem. Western and Southern Europe was exhausted and disheartened and the 
Near East in turbulence. It was understood that it was imperative to present a clear 
message that the United States would make a strong commitment to the preservation 
of „freedom‟.34 The United States should assume, to the extent necessary, Britain‟s 
responsibilities and demonstrate their determination to resist communist drive in 
Greece.
35
 In fact, in early 1947 Greece presented a good opportunity for the Truman 
administration to implement its, still evolving, strategy of „containment‟. Therefore, on 
12 March 1947 President Truman requested from Congress $400 million for aid to 
Greece and Turkey. This initiative was widely known as the Truman Doctrine. The 
goal was the total defeat of the Greek communists and to this aim Washington 
delivered military and economic assistance of approximately $1 billion and dispatched 
a military mission (JUSMAGG) with extensive power, but also nearly assumed full 
control of the Greek state machinery and armed forces.
36
 In addition, the US policy 
makers, civilian and military, favoured the extension of aid to Turkey. First, Greece 
and Turkey formed one geostrategic unit. Second, Turkey possessed a large (though 
ineffective) army which, if reinforced and modernised, might play a significant role in 
slowing down a Soviet advance in the Middle East, should a general war erupt.
37
  
Meanwhile, from the spring of 1947 onwards Turkish officials were 
advocating the formation of an Eastern Mediterranean defence pact composed by 
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Turkey, Egypt and Greece and backed by the West; this pact could be associated 
closely with another, Western Mediterranean, pact formed by Spain, Italy and France. 
By August, Ankara was favouring the US and British full inclusion into such a pact. 
Therefore, it was obvious that Turkey sought to get fully tied with the West. Contrary 
to the Second World War, neutrality could not be a viable option.
38
 Moreover, Turkey 
endeavoured to get additional US economic aid, both from the Marshal Plan and from 
private investors. Progressively, Ankara tried to transfer an increasing portion of the 
aid from the military field to the purely economic, so as to finance Turkish 
development programmes. Turkey‟s constant demands for additional US financial (as 
well as military) assistance became a permanent factor in the following years, not only 
in the country‟s foreign policy, but also in the domestic scene (it should be 
remembered that the first multiparty general elections were held in July 1946).
39
 
Indeed, the issue of which party could best achieve increased US aid soon became a 
point of domestic debate, particularly between the Republican and the Democratic 
parties. Generally, the same applied to Greece as well. 
As regards post-war Italy, both the civilian and military leadership recognised 
that the country should not enter a major conflict without the help of powerful allies 
(that is Britain and especially the United States), that it should never try to place 
emphasis on military force as the key element of Italian foreign policy, and that 
reconstruction of Italian armed forces could only occur if Washington (and London) 
provided the necessary hardware. By early 1947 the Americans had to replace the 
British as the main supporter of the Italian armed forces, and, despite the conclusion of 
the Italian Peace Treaty (which provided for a degree of demilitarisation), in 
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December 1947 they decided to provide secretly a large amount of equipment. By 
then, the Italian policy makers had concluded that a close relationship with the United 
States would consolidate stability in the domestic scene at a time when communist 
influence was significant, and bolster the country‟s position against Yugoslavia. At the 
same time, UK-Italian relations were somewhat problematic.
40
 Subsequently, in 1948 
and early 1949 the Foreign Office and the COS believed that Italy should not be 
included in either the Brussels or the Atlantic Pact: Italy‟s accession to the western 
defence organizations might have a positive effect on the stabilization of the internal 
situation in the country (particularly on bolstering the position of Alcide De Gasperi, 
the Italian centre-right, pro-Western prime minister); but militarily, any Italian 
association with the western defence pacts was unsound. On this point the British were 
at odds with the Americans.
41
 
In the second half of 1948 discussions between the United States, Canada, 
and the Brussels Pact countries (Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) broadened and the establishment of a North Atlantic security system 
was considered.
42
 Then the issue of Italian inclusion became a matter of debate and 
controversy. Geographically Italy lies outside the Atlantic area, while it was common 
view that militarily it would become a liability rather than an asset, because it could 
contribute very little and was subject to military limitations imposed by the Italian 
peace treaty.  However, Italy‟s strategic position was very significant to the West, and, 
equally important, its alignment with the Western powers should be affirmed and 
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cemented. At that point the threat of internal subversion in Italy by the Italian 
Communist party (PCI), which was one of the largest in Western Europe, appeared 
real.
43
 Indeed, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and influential US diplomats 
viewed that it would be politically dangerous to exclude Italy from the main Western 
security pact. The country did not have any formal connection with the United States, 
as had Greece and Turkey after the proclamation and implementation of the Truman 
Doctrine, and Rome‟s isolation might encourage Soviet penetration.44 Therefore, the 
Americans decided to insist on Italian inclusion to NATO and Italy became a founding 
member of the alliance on 4 April 1949.   
Since the focus of the talks between the Brussels Pact countries and the 
Americans and Canadians was on the Northern Atlantic area, the Eastern 
Mediterranean (and therefore Greece as well as Turkey) was not intended to be 
included. Although Greece was too weak to demand its admission to NATO and was 
preoccupied with the final defeat of the communist insurgents, the Turkish 
government explicitly expressed its interest. The Truman Doctrine did not constitute 
an alliance, and the duration of US commitment and economic aid remained uncertain. 
What Ankara (and Athens) wished was a formal US security commitment (followed 
by a long-term programme of military and economic aid). Last but not least, the Turks 
in particular were eager to participate in any Western defence scheme, and ultimately 
in NATO, to consolidate their position in the West, be recognised as integral part of 
Europe, and demonstrate their willingness to commit themselves to the defence of the 
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West – Turkey‟s reputation as a trustworthy ally had been undermined due to its 
neutrality during the Second World War.
45
  
However, in the late 1940s, Washington, and particularly the European allies, 
considered Greece and Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole, too remote 
from the important centres of power in Europe. NATO was supposed to cover those 
centres, and an expansion to the South-east would dilute the already limited defence 
capabilities of the West.
46
 Therefore, the Americans rebuffed Turkish attempts to link 
directly or indirectly NATO with the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty of 1939, but tried to 
reassure the Turks that the absence of a formal US commitment to Turkey did not 
mean a decrease in US support for the latter.
47
    
Meanwhile, in 1947-49 discussions were being held between the US and the 
British policy makers on how to coordinate more effectively their policies in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. The British Commanders-in-Chief Middle East 
met periodically with US Admiral Conolly, Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces 
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM).
48
 During the same period, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorized CINCNELM to formulate and coordinate with 
the British Naval C-in-C Mediterranean combined plans for allied operations in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Those plans should also include details of 
proposed command structures. It is interesting that no approach to other Western 
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nations for the initiation of joint planning with the Americans (and the British) would 
be made.
49
  
Nevertheless, Anglo-American military cooperation and coordination from 
the late 1940s to the early 1950s proved a thorny issue. The Americans and the British 
held widely divergent views on the primary aim and role of sea power. The two navies 
had faced quite different experiences during the Second World War, and in the post 
war period possessed rather asymmetric resources and capabilities. Therefore, the US 
Navy emphasized on the retention of a strong carrier force to project offensive power, 
while the British favoured a more defensive role and focused on the protection of the 
sea lines of communication (SLOC).
50
  
Moreover, in 1947 the US military and civilian planners, aware of the 
strategic value of the Middle East (and thus of the Eastern Mediterranean), had been 
ready to commit considerable forces for the defence of the area. However by 1949 the 
JCS had reversed course and made plain both to the British and to the State 
Department that irrespective of the strategic importance of the Middle East and the 
Eastern Mediterranean, in the event of a Third World War the „big job... first, last, and 
always... was to win the battle in Europe‟. Deeply troubled by the lack of sufficient 
forces in peacetime and worried about a possible overextension of US military 
commitments, the JCS continued to oppose the assumption of more responsibilities 
beyond Europe.
51
 This US-UK divergence of views continued in the early 1950s, and 
as we will analyse later on played a significant role in future developments. 
Significantly, the US decision to press for Greek and Turkish membership to NATO in 
                                                          
49
 TNA/DEFE/4/19, J.P.(49)5 (Final), 25-January-1949. 
50
 Grove and Till, „Anglo-American Maritime Strategy‟, pp.271-303. 
51
 Michael Cohen, „From “Cold” to “Hot” War: Allied Strategic and Military Interests in the Middle 
East after the Second World War‟, Middle Eastern Studies 43/5 (September 2007), pp.725-48. 
37 
 
 
 
1951, was not irrelevant to the above arguments. A primary reason for their admission 
was that both countries kept numerous, though antiquated, forces under arms and were 
willing to contribute to NATO‟s defence effort. It was at that point that the outbreak of 
the Korean War gave a decisive impetus to the notion of Greek-Turkish accession to 
NATO. 
The study proceeds on a chronological basis and is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter one deals with the decision-making and the negotiations which led to Greek 
and Turkish admission to NATO during 1951 and early 1952, including the US 
decision to press its allies for the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the alliance, 
Britain‟s effort to link those two countries with the defence of the Middle East, as well 
as the views and policies of other member states, particularly France and Italy. Chapter 
two analyses the command reorganization in the Southern Flank area after the final 
placement of Greek and Turkish land and air forces under Commander-in-Chief 
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and the final settlement of the US-UK dispute over 
command arrangements, particularly on sea. This chapter also discusses the initiation 
of tripartite Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav cooperation, the failure to link the defence of the 
Middle East with that of the Southern Flank, as well as NATO‟s actual inability to 
defend the southern region, particularly the Balkan frontier. Chapter three deals with 
the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance during 1953-4, the political-diplomatic and 
military posture of each Southern Flank country, and also gives a thorough account of 
NATO strategy in the Southern Flank during the era of „New Look‟.  
Chapter four accounts for the disintegration of the south-eastern frontier of 
NATO in 1955-6 due to the actual decay of the Balkan Alliance and, particularly, the 
rapid deterioration of Greek-Turkish and UK-Greek relations owing to the eruption of 
38 
 
 
 
the Cyprus dispute; this proved to be the first intra-NATO dispute, and the alliance 
proved unable to deal with it. An appraisal of the Southern Flank‟s defence 
capabilities in 1955-6 is also given. Last but not least, the chapter discusses 
developments in the Middle East affecting the Southern Flank‟s position, notably the 
conclusion of the Baghdad pact. Chapter five deals with the continuing Greek-Turkish 
crisis and NATO‟s inability to intervene effectively to break the Cyprus imbroglio, 
goes through developments in the Balkans and particularly the Middle East which 
directly affected the politics and defence position of the Southern Flank, and analyses 
the military-economic aspect of the Southern Flank‟s defence. The last chapter, 
chapter six, examines the events of late 1957 to late 1959, and attempts to explain how 
the Southern Flank escaped from the brink of dissolution in late 1958 and was 
temporarily revived, due to the short-lived settlement of the Cyprus question in early 
1959 and the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Moreover, chapter six analyses NATO‟s 
response (or non-response) to regional pressures in the Balkans and the Middle East, 
the incomplete application of the new NATO strategy (as envisaged in M.C.70 
document) on the Southern Flank due to economic/financial impediments, and the 
issue of the placement of nuclear weapons on the Southern Flank countries. 
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1.  THE ROAD TO NATO’S FIRST ENLARGEMENT 
From the Association of Greece and Turkey to NATO  
to their Full Admission, January 1951 – February 1952 
 
The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 set off a US-UK debate regarding 
the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, while Greece sought, 
and Turkey demanded, to get a direct US guarantee, preferably through their 
admission to NATO. However, in the aftermath of the shock of Communist 
aggression against South Korea, the West was mainly preoccupied with the quick 
organization of the defence of Western Europe; both the United States and Britain 
estimated that Greece and Turkey were too far from Western Europe, and that the 
West could not extend its commitments (and limited resources) to the south-east.   
Meanwhile, the British were preoccupied with their effort to retain their 
predominance in the Middle East and to maintain some prestige as a leading western 
power, and wished to incorporate the Greek and particularly the Turkish forces in a 
British-led Middle East Command (MEC). Moreover, the issue of Greek and Turkish 
inclusion into NATO or another western defence pact was further complicated, 
because it was linked with US-UK disputes over command arrangements in the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean. At the same time, the hesitation of several European 
countries to accept NATO‟s enlargement created additional difficulties.  
However, the Turkish government under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
followed a very active policy and kept pressing the major western powers for 
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Turkey‟s adherence to NATO. After some consideration, key figures of the US 
political and military leadership (not least officers holding NATO posts) emerged in 
early 1951 as strong advocates of Greek and Turkish inclusion into NATO. Indeed, 
other alternatives, including the establishment of a Middle East or Mediterranean pact 
did not seem viable. Therefore, by May 1951, the Truman Administration was 
officially endorsing NATO‟s enlargement towards the south-east, and during summer 
1951 Washington sponsored Turkey‟s and Greece‟s admission to NATO. Thus, the 
door opened for the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the alliance. Still, the issue of 
the suitable command setup to include the Greek and Turkish forces proved a thorny 
one, as every interested party sought to satisfy its national political goals – which 
often stemmed from psychological or prestige considerations. In this context, military 
strategy was often subordinated to the national political needs of the main actors. 
 
i) Turkey’s appeal for admission to NATO and the association of Greece and Turkey 
with NATO military planning, May 1950-early 1951 
The outbreak of the Korean War set off a process of rearrangement and put an end to 
cordial Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East. British officials argued 
during bilateral talks in Washington in late July 1950 that Britain should be relieved of 
the „primary responsibility‟ for the military defence of the Middle East. The British 
sought a considerable US military contribution, a request which was turned down by 
the Americans. In addition, divergence of opinion arose regarding military planning to 
defend the region. The US planners disagreed with the British plan of defending only 
the “Inner Ring” because this would constitute a defence of Egypt, not the Middle 
East, and could not become a basis of joint US-UK planning. Instead they 
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recommended the implementation of the Outer Ring strategy which would give 
Turkey (and Iran), rather than Egypt, the highest priority in allied military planning 
(thus reflecting the fact that the Americans had been reinforcing the Turkish armed 
forces and improving facilities in Turkey); the JCS expected Turkey to play by far the 
most important role, contributing the bulk of the allied ground forces. However, 
Washington had been still unwilling to extend its military commitments in the region; 
although the recently approved US strategy (based on the NSC-68 document) and the 
Korean War provided for a massive US military build-up, the American military 
perspectives and attitudes towards the Middle East were scarcely changed in early 
1950s.
52
    
In the meantime, Turkey had taken the initiative and approached the United 
States and Britain in the hope of joining NATO. Turkey aimed either at its inclusion 
into NATO or at obtaining some form of direct American security guarantee in 
addition to the guarantee afforded by the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939. 
However, the United States and Britain rejected at the end of May 1950 a new, 
pressing Turkish appeal for admission into NATO; Greece, following Ankara, had 
applied as well. The Americans were not prepared to give Greece and Turkey any 
direct US guarantee, while the British wanted to associate Turkey with their Middle 
East defence plans.
53
 In fact, until 1950, concerning Turkey‟s security, the goals of the 
United States and Turkey were not identical. Washington‟s priority was to strengthen 
Turkey‟s resistance in case of Soviet attack and to use military assistance as a lever to 
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bring Turkish military planning into line with US objectives, while Ankara sought to 
obtain direct guarantee of US assistance as a deterrent against a Soviet attack.
54
 
The outbreak of the Korean War worked as a catalyst: Both Turkey and 
Greece (the latter was still not actively pressing for admission due to its political-
diplomatic weakness, but strongly desired to join NATO) sent troops to Korea in the 
hope of strengthening their case for admission to NATO. Concurrently, the Turks 
began again to press the United States and Britain for admission to NATO or at least 
for some kind of formal security guarantee. State Department officials could find little 
evidence that the Soviet Union was threatening Turkey and even Turkish officials 
acknowledged that to some extend it was due to domestic politics that they were 
pressing to join NATO. Nevertheless, the Americans knew that from a geopolitical 
perspective the Turks had always the option of neutralism, while Turkey and Greece 
were indispensable for Western security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East. Moreover, both the Americans and the British acknowledged that for 
political and geostrategic reasons, if Turkey was accepted into NATO, Greece would 
have to be accepted too.
55
 
The primary reasons for Turkey‟s strong request for admission were its desire 
to participate in the principal defence organisation of the West, with the hope of 
obtaining additional arms, and the commitment of allied support in the event of war, 
and the belief that membership in NATO would deter Soviet aggression. Although 
Greece was not pressing the matter at present, preferring to wait and see the reaction to 
the Turkish request, the Greek interest in the pact was based upon the same 
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considerations. The Americans (and the other officials of the other major NATO 
powers) were aware of those motives.
56
 Regarding Greece, various allied diplomatic 
circles hinted to Greek officials that Athens‟ policy quietly to link its interest in 
joining NATO with the Turkish claim without proceeding with demarches, demands 
and complaints was wise, since it did not face the consequences of a diplomatic defeat, 
while it could fully benefit from the military talks which were taking place regarding 
Eastern Mediterranean defence.
57
   
The US position concerning the issue of the admission of Greece and Turkey 
into NATO evolved from July 1950 to spring 1951, when Washington finally opted 
for the full membership of the two states. It seems that the US diplomatic 
representatives in Athens and Ankara were from the beginning positive to the idea of 
adherence to, or at least association with, NATO. First, they appreciated the fighting 
capabilities of the two nations – which were considered to be better than that of many 
larger nations with whom the US were allied in NATO – and especially their forces in 
being, which at least in short term would be distinct military assets. Second, they 
believed that Washington had undertaken since the 1947 proclamation of the Truman 
Doctrine a deep moral commitment to defend Greece and Turkey from communist 
aggression. Third, if Greece and Turkey were excluded, it would probably bolster 
neutralist and defeatist sentiments in those countries; on the contrary, their inclusion in 
(or association with) NATO would facilitate Greek-Turkish military understanding.
58
 
One of the first considerations of the State Department was the fear that if, as 
members of NATO, Greece and Turkey realised the fact that the NATO powers, with 
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their existing – limited – capabilities, could not commit substantial forces to the 
defence of Greece and Turkey in the event of an external aggression, their admission 
would then prove more harmful than beneficial. Another worry was, in case of Greek 
and Turkish admission to NATO, what measures could be taken to assure Iran for 
continuing US interest for its independence and integrity.
59
  The State Department 
believed that the problem was more political-diplomatic than military, although it did 
not underestimate the military and strategic aspects. Then, on 31 August 1950 the 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asked from the Defense Secretary, Lewis Johnson, 
and the JCS, to consider the problem of Turkish and Greek connection to western 
defence planning and express their views as soon as possible.
60
 
The US diplomacy estimated that the decision concerning the admission of 
Greece and Turkey into NATO involved various considerations. For instance, to what 
extent they would add military strength to NATO, how far their inclusion would 
provoke or deter the USSR, the organisational and planning problems which would 
arise due to the pact‟s enlargement, and the extent to which the USA and the other 
NATO powers would be able to assist effectively Greece and Turkey in the event of 
war.
61
 At this early stage, other alternatives to the adherence of Greece and Turkey to 
NATO were considered. One of these was the establishment of a new security pact 
initially consisting of Greece, Turkey and Iran, under which the United States, Britain 
and France might either enter into reciprocal commitments (on the NATO model) or 
give a non-reciprocal commitment assuring the above countries that no aggression 
against them would be tolerated and that any possible support would be provided; 
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however, the problem what Western military aid – particularly air support – could be 
promised them in the event of attack remained unsolved.  
Another alternative was that Greece and Turkey could attend the meetings of 
a Mediterranean section of NATO on a consultative basis rather than as full-fledged 
members. Such an arrangement would obviously be only a delaying device, since 
Greece and Turkey would not remain satisfied for long with anything less than direct 
and full participation in NATO. Alternatively, another option was to seek persuading 
Ankara not to join the Atlantic pact but to assure it that the United States would be 
prepared to make a clear, strongly-worded non-reciprocal declaration that it would not 
tolerate any aggression against Turkey; moreover, that US military aid in the 
maximum amount possible would be granted to Turkey. Such an arrangement with 
Turkey would probably require a similar one with Greece and Iran. Britain and France 
had been committed, since 1939, to aid Turkey in the event of invasion and therefore 
they might consider joining with the United States in giving similar assurances to 
Greece and Iran.
62
 
The US proposals were discussed by the representatives of the United States, 
Britain and France (these countries constituted the Standing Group of NATO – the 
permanent steering body of the alliance)
63
 in Washington in late August-early 
September 1950. It was agreed that the problem posed by the Turkish demand for 
admission into NATO should be further discussed and that the Standing Group powers 
should seek to reach an agreement among them prior to consideration of the Turkish 
demand in the North Atlantic Council. Significantly, it was also believed that the three 
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powers should also consider the broader question of Near Eastern security, of which 
the Turkish (and Greek) issue had been but one aspect.
64
 Therefore, as early as mid-
1950, the issue of the Greek and Turkish admission became interconnected with the 
whole allied defence planning in the Near East.  
For its part, the Defence Department recommended the granting of associate 
status to Turkey and Greece so that both countries could participate without delay in 
coordinating planning. However, it indicated that the full admission of Greece and 
Turkey to NATO would negatively affect the latter‟s military progress then occurring. 
Their admission would be desirable only insofar as it would facilitate coordinated 
military planning for the NATO and Eastern Mediterranean area. Therefore, the 
Defense Department considered that maximum benefit would be obtained and, 
concurrently, the disadvantages minimized by according Greece and Turkey a special 
status in NATO short of membership; this should provide for the collaboration of 
Greece and Turkey in appropriate military bodies in NATO, so that a coordinated 
defence of Western Europe, the Mediterranean and, to a lesser degree, the Middle East 
might be effected.  
This associate arrangement would not involve any particular organisational 
and administrative difficulties.  Once the defence of the member states of NATO was 
assured, raising the question of full membership for Greece and Turkey in the alliance 
should be considered. Iran, however, should not be given either consultative or 
associate member status in NATO. Moreover, the Defence Department would not 
object, from the military point of view, to the United States, the UK and France giving 
a joint informal assurance to Turkey as well as Greece and Iran. it nevertheless 
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opposed the establishment of a new Middle East defence pact which might involve 
further formal commitments of military assistance to Greece and Turkey (and also 
Iran). In any case, the fear that association with NATO military planning would 
disclose to Greece and Turkey the limited defence capabilities of the alliance, 
therefore seriously affecting Greek and Turkish morale, was persistent.
65
  
Therefore, in early autumn 1950 the US and NATO authorities favoured 
some kind of association, though not full adherence, of the two countries with 
appropriate phases of NATO military planning concerning the defence of the 
Mediterranean area; it was expected that this would be both acceptable and desirable 
from the Greek and Turkish point of view. As early as October 1950 the Standing 
Group was authorized to examine the issue of this association, notify Greek and 
Turkish officials of any arrangements related to military planning, and report its action 
to the Military Committee.
66
  
At the same time, in autumn 1950 and winter 1950/51 an extended 
reorganization of the temporary military structure of NATO was taking place; so, any 
discussion and proposal concerning the association of Greece and Turkey with NATO 
should go ahead within the framework of the above changes and the establishment of 
NATO‟s command organizations and operational planning. At this point it should be 
pointed out that the issue of the admission of Greece, and, especially, Turkey into the 
alliance would become highly dependent on and closely interlocked with regional 
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command issues, such as the allied naval Mediterranean Command and the allied 
Middle East Command.
67
 
Indeed, the Standing Group, despite the short time available, gave urgent 
consideration to the problem of Greek and Turkish association to NATO‟s military 
planning; on the first occasion, it proposed that contact should be established with the 
Greek and Turkish military authorities through their military attachés in Washington.68 
Moreover, the NATO bodies decided to invite the Turkish and Greek governments to 
send a military representative to discuss with the Standing Group the issue of 
associating – where appropriate – Turkey and Greece in North Atlantic defence 
planning in the Mediterranean; of special importance was the definition of the areas 
wherein participation and planning would be mutually advantageous to NATO and 
Greece and Turkey, and of the machinery through which such planning could be 
achieved.
69
  
In fact the British believed that regardless of what the NATO machinery was 
doing about the Turkish and Greek association, it was not particularly in the UK 
interest that any progress should be made until the US and British Chiefs of Staff had 
decided on a common line, and this in turn was dependant on the outcome of their 
discussion about command and planning responsibilities in the Middle East generally. 
However, the British could not obviously demonstrate their real motives, and had to 
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make it appear that they were prepared to hasten the consideration of the Turkish and 
Greek association through the NATO machinery.
70
 
In November 1950, the Standing Group met separately with the Turkish and 
Greek representatives. It was decided that the Turkish and Greek military authorities 
would require liaison both with the Standing Group and the NATO Mediterranean 
Command, when the latter would be established. The Standing Group also 
recommended that the Greek and Turkish governments should establish an adequate 
system of security, before any matters of a classified nature could be discussed. As for 
the areas wherein NATO, Greece and Turkey would associate themselves in defence 
planning, the Standing Group stressed that although NATO planning had so far only 
included the Western Mediterranean whereas Greece and Turkey were interested in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, it might be convenient to extend the NATO area to cover the 
whole sea with the establishment of a Mediterranean Command. As regarded the 
aspects of strategic importance deriving from this association, emphasis was given to 
the denial of Greek and Turkish territory to enemy forces, denying the passage of 
enemy naval units through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, utilising the Greek and 
Turkish naval and air bases and maritime forces (especially to facilitate the protection 
of the sea lines of communication in the Eastern Mediterranean), and establishing air 
warning systems linked with other warning systems in the defence of the area. 
However, it was also emphasized that „as long as the resources of the North Atlantic 
Treaty countries are stretched to the limit to provide their own defence, it is 
undesirable that we should become involved in detailed discussion in the denial of 
Turkey and Greece to enemy forces or in discussions involving the defence of the 
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Middle East. It is suggested that these home territories should remain the 
responsibility of the national authorities‟.71 
The NATO authorities proceeded in early 1951 with a security survey in 
Greece and Turkey, whose object was be to obtain an accurate assessment of the 
security organisation and standards of Greece and Turkey, namely the whole national 
security machinery; this survey included security procedures in any government 
departments or ministries likely to handle NATO material. Such security checks in 
Turkey and Greece seemed indispensable, because preliminary surveys undertaken by 
the British had demonstrated serious deficiencies in the security machinery of the two 
countries, especially that of Greece.
72
 The report by the Security Coordination 
Committee on the security survey in Greece and Turkey was submitted to the Standing 
Group in mid-February 1951.
73
 
 
 
ii) Washington’s decision in favour of Greek and Turkish full accession and the role 
of the British, January 1951-July 1951 
Meanwhile, the Turks continued to press for full admission to NATO or at least for 
some kind of formal US guarantee, while the whole issue of the military planning and 
the command structure in the Mediterranean and the Middle East became a top priority 
for Britain and the United States. Turkey in particular constituted the linchpin between 
Europe and the Middle East, two areas that US officials began to consider as 
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interdependent. Since the importance of Middle Eastern oil was constantly mounting 
for NATO nations in peacetime as well as in case of war, Turkish troops and airfields 
would help tie up large numbers of Soviet troops, prevent the Soviets from seizing the 
Persian Gulf and the British base at Suez and help the Allies launch strategic air 
attacks on Soviet petroleum resources and industry. Moreover, Turkish cooperation 
and assistance would be necessary to close the Straits to Soviet submarines, to protect 
NATO‟s lines of communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and destroy Soviet 
shipping in the Black Sea.
74
 
Regarding the southern region of NATO, during this period the plans of 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Dwight Eisenhower in case 
of war in Europe provided for the application of air and sea power from the two flanks 
(northern and southern) of the European theatre against Soviet ground forces in the 
center. The southern region (namely, at this stage, Italy) could be used to attack Soviet 
oil facilities in Romania and the Caucasus and to defend the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the Middle East or, at least, to force the Soviets to divert considerable resources to 
this front and lessen the pressure in the centre.
75
 
By the end of 1950 and into early 1951, the State Department moved towards 
a more active policy in the Middle East. In early 1951, officials, in particular those of 
Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) headed by the Assistant Secretary of State, George 
McGhee, adopted a more coherent regional view concerning the Middle East: the 
country-by-country approach to the problems „had repeatedly proved inadequate as a 
basis for the expression of our [US] policies‟. They also believed that the British could 
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no longer protect the Middle East by their own means and that there was a need for 
active Anglo-American cooperation in the development and implementation of plans 
in the region. In addition, they were eager to bolster the morale and defence 
capabilities of the indigenous peoples to avoid their turning into neutrality. According 
to the National Security Council (NSC), the region was „vital‟ to US interests; 
nevertheless, until that point the US actions had not reflected the above justification.
76
 
Furthermore, although the United States was doing so much about Greece and Turkey, 
it had not yet incorporated those two countries in a coherent view regarding the 
defence of Eastern Mediterranean.
77
 These policy makers also considered linking 
Turkey, which McGhee reasoned as „the keystone of Near Eastern Defence‟, with the 
Arab world, while the Greek-Turkish barrier ought to provide the basis upon which 
not only „a defence-in-depth‟ but also „a stability-in depth‟ should be established. 
Acheson adopted those views to a considerable extent.
78
 Therefore, by February 1951 
the State Department was moving towards „bringing even closer the relationship 
between Greece and Turkey and the North Atlantic defence‟.79  
However, although McGhee stressed only the need for a „regional effort‟ 
under US-UK sponsorship and recognized that the UK and the Commonwealth should 
remain primarily responsible for the defence of the Middle East, the JCS were 
unwilling to make the slightest commitment of US forces to the defence of the region. 
They considered linking the defence of Greece and Turkey to Western Europe (rather 
than the Middle East) and, when the time was ripe, perhaps bringing them into 
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NATO
80
. By doing so, some kind of link would be established between NATO and the 
Middle East (something that might also satisfy the British efforts for the establishment 
of a Middle East Command), while the US commitment would remain limited
81
. 
Furthermore, both the military and the State Department officials pointed out that they 
„looked at Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey not as an area into which we should put 
forces, but as an area that we can find forces‟.82 This would remain a basic concept of 
the Southern Flank throughout the 1950s.  
The idea of establishing a MEC re-emerged early in 1951, when Anglo-
American military leaders devised a British Supreme Allied Commander of Middle 
East (SACME) in an attempt to assuage British dissatisfaction with the probable 
nomination of a US Admiral to the newly established post of Supreme Allied 
Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). The MEC project had serious politico-military 
implications because NATO had been concurrently establishing a Southern Command 
under SACEUR, whose jurisdiction might well include the Eastern Mediterranean.
83
  
During January and February 1951, many important US officials such as 
George McGhee and other State Department experts, Admiral Carney (the new 
CINCNELM and Commander of the US Sixth Fleet) and the Secretary of Air Force 
Thomas Finletter visited Turkey and held conversations with the Turkish leadership; 
moreover, a conference of the US Middle East Ambassadors took place in Istanbul on 
14-21 January of 1951. The British Commander-in-Chief Middle East Land Forces 
(CINCMELF), Sir Brian Robertson, in an effort to balance the mounting US influence, 
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also visited Turkey and had discussions regarding the prospects of British-Turkish 
military coordination in the Middle East.
84
  
At that time, since the association with NATO did not seem to make any 
significant progress, the Turks wished that joint military planning should be embarked 
upon the prompt implementation of the British-Turkish alliance of 1939. The Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, considered a visit 
to Turkey by General Robertson most important because the British wished to know 
Turkish war plans and ensure that the Turkish Command looked to Commanders-in-
Chief Middle East (and not the Americans) as the coordinators of defence in the 
region. However, the British did not respond immediately, hoping to gather forces 
from the Commonwealth to justify the leading role which they wanted to assume.
85
 
Furthermore, Foreign Office and military officials believed that it was highly likely 
that during the UK-Turkish military talks the British and allied weakness would be 
relieved; General Robertson even argued that in case of war, the British should not 
help Turkey by troops, to avoid putting in danger their base in Egypt and the British 
line of communication and supply.
86
 Indeed, the British acknowledged that „direct 
British aid, apart from limited air support is unlikely to be provided until Dominion 
troops can arrive in the theatre from Australia and New Zealand‟ when it would be 
probably too late.
87
 General Robertson finally visited Turkey and held discussions 
with the Turkish leadership on 23-24 February 1951. 
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Although the Turks were pleased by the attention they received, in February 
1951 they made it plain to the Americans that they wanted a clear security guarantee 
as a credible deterrent against the USSR. If the United States wanted to have Turkey‟s 
full cooperation during peacetime and assure its co-belligerency in the event of a 
general war, a US security commitment to Ankara should be granted. Without a US 
security commitment, the Americans feared that Turkey might drift towards neutrality, 
as Iran appeared to be doing at the time under its Prime Minister Mossadegh. Finally, 
a US security commitment to Turkey would constitute the most effective deterrent to 
Soviet aggression against not only Turkey, but along the entire Northern Tier.
88
 
When the formation of a Mediterranean pact was excluded for fear of 
command confusion and probable difficulties in the US Congress, the JCS (especially 
its Chairman, General Omar Bradley, and the CNO, Admiral Forrest Sherman) 
emerged in April-May 1951 along with the State Department and SACEUR General 
Dwight Eisenhower as strong advocates of Greek and Turkish inclusion into NATO. 
The movement to include Greece and Turkey in NATO had considerable bi-partisan 
support both inside and outside NATO.
89
 Although at that stage the US officials also 
took the Turkish participation in the MEC project as granted, the US military 
recognised the critical role Turkey could play in protecting the West‟s right flank in 
Europe, in diverting large numbers of Soviet troops to the Turkish theatre, and in 
facilitating the defence of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. If the Soviets 
decided to sweep around Turkey through Iran and Iraq and if Turkey opted for 
neutrality, military planners recognised that the West would have great difficulty 
implementing its strategy and defending the region. The prospect of wasting the 
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millions of dollars that had already been spent on the construction of airfields in 
Turkey was also alarming. Therefore -and since Washington considered Greece and 
Turkey as one geostrategic entity- the US policy makers decided in May 1951 to 
pursue the full admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO.
90
 the Americans also 
judged that Iran, which would not receive any guarantee, would be less disturbed by 
Greek and Turkish membership of NATO than by direct US guarantees to these 
countries.
91
  
For their part, the British expected that the MEC should and would serve as a 
vehicle to bolster the faltering British position in the region. London‟s primary 
concern was to put Turkish (and possibly Greek) forces under a British Commander 
and involve a US element in the defence of the Middle East. The British did not wish 
Turkish membership to NATO because they worried that Turkey „will be drawn into 
the SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] orbit at the expense of 
Middle East defense‟ and they informed the Americans accordingly: it was the British 
position that the Greek and Turkish forces had to be placed under SACME, not under 
Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH).
92
 Moreover, the British 
proposed the creation of an allied naval Mediterranean Command which would 
encompass all naval forces in the region (including the US Sixth Fleet) and would be 
headed by a British Supreme Commander. The aim was once more primarily political: 
The British government and the military services were trying to bolster the British 
position in the Mediterranean in an attempt to tie it in with the British position in the 
Middle East and increase UK influence in the whole region. London was desperately 
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seeking to retain its predominant role there and was trying to reverse the post-war US 
military and political ascendancy in the area.
93
  
Thus, an Anglo-American debate was taking place as to whether Greece and 
Turkey should be associated with the European or the Middle East theatre of 
operations; a division of opinion had emerged between the British and the US military 
planners, particularly over the role of Turkey. The British argued that Turkey was a 
Middle Eastern state and favoured Turkish association with a Middle East Command, 
which would in turn be connected to NATO through the Standing Group of the 
Alliance
94
. Britain was facing enormous difficulties to attract any Middle East state to 
a Middle East security pact: the British decline had become obvious, the Arab world 
was highly suspicious of Britain due to the latter‟s recent imperialist past, while the 
Arabs regarded the Israelis rather than the Soviets as the main threat. Therefore, the 
British believed that the establishment of such a pact linked with NATO might attract 
some Middle East states to join it, perhaps even Egypt. Therefore, they hoped that the 
connection of Turkey, and perhaps Greece, with a Middle East security pact and, 
indirectly, with NATO, could offer a simultaneous solution to the issues of the 
establishment of MEC and the association of Greece and Turkey with NATO.
95
 
The Americans claimed that the European theatre should have priority and 
regarded Turkey as a Mediterranean power useful for the support of NATO‟s Southern 
Flank. Its commander, US Navy Admiral Robert Carney argued that as the United 
States provided the great majority of arms supplies to Turkey, the latter should enter 
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NATO and be placed under his command. Furthermore, Carney, along with other 
American officials, accurately assumed that the Turks (and the Greeks) were not only 
anxious to join NATO, but if they were included to any form of collective defence 
pact, they would be unwilling to place their forces under British command. However, 
the Turks assured the British that once Turkey had joined NATO, they would be ready 
to consider and undertake their part in Middle East defence.
96
 
Despite those divergences of opinion between the US and UK officials, the 
British remained adamant in their belief that a common policy with the United States 
should be achieved; they wanted to commit the Americans to joining the defence of 
the Middle East and to „giving advice to the Turks under the aegis of a British Middle 
East Command‟.97 Meanwhile, the British realized that the Americans were 
determined to proceed with the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO.
98
 
Furthermore, they assumed that Turkey‟s inclusion into NATO would draw the United 
States closer towards the Middle East and that Turkey would become less reluctant to 
join a defence pact for the Middle East; thus, the advantages of Turkish membership in 
NATO would outweigh any disadvantages. However, in summer 1951 the British, and 
particularly the Chiefs of Staff, kept insisting that Turkey (and Greece) should not be 
part of Eisenhower‟s European Command (SHAPE), but be placed under a British 
Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (SACME).
99
 They also claimed that without 
reaching an agreement upon allied Command in the Middle East area, the problem of 
Command in the Mediterranean could not be solved; only then it would be possible to 
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reach a final solution as to how Greece and Turkey should be linked to or fitted into 
NATO. This was the official British view until July 1951.
100
 
Regarding the allied Middle East Command, the British military believed that 
it should be an integrated command and its headquarters should include US, UK, 
French, Commonwealth and Turkish officers, under a British Supreme Allied 
Commander and placed, if necessary, elsewhere than in Egypt. It was understood that 
the United States would not be committed at this point to make forces available for the 
defence of the area in peacetime. As regards the question of whether such a command 
should be a NATO command directly responsible to the Standing Group (and not to 
SACEUR), or an independent command only associated somehow to NATO, several 
pros and cons existed: on the one hand, in case of establishment of a new NATO 
command, this would avoid the necessity for the negotiation of a new organisation, it 
would make available for the Middle East defence the potential of NATO and would 
automatically solve the issue of Turkish admission to NATO. On the other hand, there 
might be considerable political difficulties in the enlargement of NATO in an area 
where many members of the alliance had no interest and would therefore object to 
such an extension of their obligations. At any rate, from the military point of view, 
such a command would be largely dependent upon and should be linked with NATO. 
It was essential to ensure that only those NATO states which had a real interest in the 
Middle East would participate, or have a strong say, in this command, and also that 
non-NATO countries which had special interest in the defence of the area, like certain 
Commonwealth countries, would be associated with that command.
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Concerning the allied naval command in the Mediterranean, whose 
establishment, according to the British Chiefs, had to follow that of the MEC, the UK 
proposed the following arrangement: under the British SACME should be a British 
naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who would control the British forces and 
bases throughout the Mediterranean, be responsible for the convoys to the Middle East 
and therefore have particular interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, the 
CINCSOUTH, who was also C-in-C US naval forces Mediterranean, would control 
his own forces and bases throughout the sea to secure SACEUR‟s Southern Flank and 
would have certain interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean in addition 
to his main responsibilities in the western and central Mediterranean; he would also 
make special arrangements to safeguard vital French interests in the western 
Mediterranean concerning the movement of shipping between North Africa and 
Southern Europe. According to the British officials, Turkey ought to be admitted into 
the MEC, but, since the CINCSOUTH would be closely interested in the defence of 
the Dardanelles and the Aegean, the Turks should be also represented at the Allied 
Forces South (AFSOUTH) headquarters by a liaison mission. Greece, however, ought 
to form part of CINCSOUTH (and therefore of SACEUR) and be represented at the 
MEC headquarters by a liaison mission.
102
 
However, the Turks were clearly unwilling to accept Britain as their potential 
security guarantor, especially after General Robertson had informed them in February 
1951 of the British inability to defend the Outer Ring. In early July the British 
concurred, not without reluctance, to accept Turkey‟s admission to NATO and 
informed Ankara that this was conditional on Turkish contribution to the MEC. 
Turkey was infuriated and took the position, informally at first stage, that it would 
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participate in the MEC only when admitted to NATO.  While the Americans still 
desired to place the Turkish forces under a British commander, they dissented from 
London‟s attitude and claimed that Turkey‟s admission to NATO should be 
unconditional and that Turkish views on the command arrangements in NATO and 
MEC should be respected.
103
  
In mid-May 1951 the US representative in the NATO Council Deputies (this 
comprised of the official representatives of each member state at NAC, and from 1953 
onwards they were called Permanent Representatives, or, more commonly, 
Ambassadors to NATO) claimed that the question of the relationship of Greece and 
Turkey to the alliance be discussed as soon as possible. He also made plain that 
Washington was favouring Greek and Turkish full membership. Nevertheless, the 
initial response of the other members was generally chilly, and reservations were 
expressed by the Dutch and Belgian representatives, while the Norwegian and Danish 
reservations were already known.
104
 Initially, Portugal also had reservations for the 
Greek and Turkish admission to NATO. Lisbon did not object to the inclusion of the 
above countries per se, but strongly desired that Spain be admitted as well; if the latter 
were not included, Portugal favoured the formation of a Mediterranean pact under US 
auspices to include Greece and Turkey, but not a NATO enlargement.
105
 
Except for the US, which was pursuing the issue of full Greek and Turkish 
membership to NATO, the other member-state that strongly favoured NATO‟s 
enlargement was Italy. It argued that the inclusion of the two states into NATO and 
their full integration in the Western military machine would constitute a substantial 
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addition of forces and enhance NATO‟s military capabilities, especially in Southern 
Europe. Therefore, the Italian government, confronted with those vital considerations, 
considered that such questions as whether Greece and Turkey were, geographically, 
part of the Atlantic area or whether their cultural/political characteristics qualified 
them for membership of NATO were of secondary importance. On the contrary, the 
Italian position was that NATO‟s extension to Greece and Turkey would be 
compatible with its regional character, would complete Mediterranean defence and 
initiate the settling down of the Middle East defence organisation. It was also stressed 
that Greece had in the past few years withstood prolonged internal and external 
Communist pressure, and that Turkey, when subjected to Soviet diplomatic pressure 
for a new settlement on the Straits status, had stood firm. Furthermore, Rome believed 
that the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO would break the deadlock in the 
Near East, strengthen the West and check neutralist tendencies in Turkey.
106
  
Meanwhile, on 18 June the establishment of NATO‟s Southern European 
Command (including just Italy, for the time being) and the appointment of Admiral 
Robert Carney as Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) was 
formally announced by SHAPE. Carney continued to command the US naval forces in 
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (including the US Sixth Fleet). Moreover, the 
Italian General Maurizio Castiglione was appointed Commander Land Forces 
Southern Europe (COMLANDSOUTH), while the USAF Major General David 
Schlatter was appointed Commander Air Forces Southern Europe 
(COMAIRSOUTH).
107
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In summer 1951 the negotiations between the three major NATO powers, and 
especially the United States and Britain, regarding the problems of Greek and Turkish 
admission and the command arrangements in Mediterranean and the Middle East, 
culminated. These negotiations were taking place both in the Standing Group (with 
France‟s participation) and on a bilateral basis. The United States were pressing for 
Greece‟s and Turkey‟s full admission to NATO as equal partners, without reservation, 
and regarded the above decision as primarily a political one – contrary to the British 
view. Moreover, the US officials opposed the formation of a separate Mediterranean 
pact/command, which the British favoured. Indeed, the NATO bodies seemed finally 
to acknowledge that the primary concern was to solve the political question; once this 
had been done a suitable and effective command structure could be established, the 
general lines of which would not vary much whatever the political solution might 
be.
108
  
Although the Standing Group and the Military Representatives had expressed 
the view that, in principle, proposals for a military organization should follow and be 
based upon political arrangements, it was also recognized that the NATO members 
ought to have an outline of the military organisation into which Greece and Turkey 
might fit before they could come to the decision on the admission of these two 
countries. Therefore, in late August of 1951, without prior consultation with the 
Greeks and the Turks and prior to the NAC meeting at Ottawa, the Standing Group 
submitted a preliminary study (the S.G.80/4) to the national General Staffs of the 
NATO members. This outlined a probable military organisation and command setup in 
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the Mediterranean and the Middle East, into which Greece and Turkey might fit in the 
event of their adherence to NATO.
109
  
According to S.G.80/4, the defence of the Middle East was a matter which 
concerned all NATO nations and, although certain NATO countries did not wish to 
assume obligations in Middle Eastern affairs, an Allied Command for the Middle East 
Theatre should be established. Turkey‟s primary strategic interests lay in the Middle 
East, and it was in this area that it could make its most valuable contribution to allied 
defence; naturally, it was also recognised that Turkey had significant interests in 
Southern Europe: by controlling the Dardanelles it would contribute significantly in 
the defence of Southern Europe. Therefore, Turkish defence arrangements had to be 
linked with those for Southern Europe. Greece, on the other hand, was more closely 
tied to Europe than to the Middle East; if Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO, 
both should be members of the NATO Military Committee and the Military 
Representatives Committee, but Greece should form part of SACEUR‟s Southern 
European Command while Turkey, although a NATO nation, should be primarily 
associated with defence arrangements for the Middle East. Moreover, a Supreme 
Allied Commander and Headquarters should be established (consisting initially of US, 
UK, French, Turkish and Commonwealth officers) to command the Allied Middle 
East Theatre. The Supreme Allied Commander Middle East should be British. The 
allied Middle East Command should be divided into two sub-commands, a northern 
sector under Turkish Command which should be effectively co-ordinated with 
SACEUR‟s Southern Flank in view of the Dardanelles‟ importance, and a southern 
sector under British Command. Finally, it was proposed that two principal allied Naval 
Commands in the Mediterranean be established (each consisting of several sub-
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commands), one subordinate to SACEUR and the other subordinate to SACME, each 
primarily responsible for the support of its respective Supreme Commander.
110
 
The proposals of S.G.80/4 raised various issues especially in the light of 
developments in the Ottawa NATO summit held from 15 to 21 September 1951, 
where Greece and Turkey were invited to join NATO. First of all, the British declared 
that they would unconditionally support Greek and Turkish admission provided that 
previously there would be a Tripartite US-UK-French agreement on the MEC. 
Furthermore, the French were eager to give their approval under the condition that a 
French general would be appointed to the Middle East and that a French naval 
command in the Western Mediterranean would be established.
111
  In addition, the 
Italians expressed the desire that they and the Greeks be represented on the Middle 
East Military Committees and that they might decide to participate in the MEC.
112
 
Moreover, although the Greeks recognised that they did not have direct interest in 
Middle Eastern defence and wanted to avoid undertaking extra responsibilities, there 
were thoughts in Athens that it would be advisable to participate in a MEC, if ever 
established; the main concern was the future of Cyprus, and Greece feared that the 
future close cooperation of Turkey with the three (or four) main western powers might 
drive Turkey to encourage British intransigence over the future of the island. In any 
case, the Greeks were not eager to assume the initiative but only to follow the Italians, 
if the latter decided to join MEC.
113
 Most significantly, the Turks were not ready to 
accept S.G.80/4 as a solution. Finally, some representatives of non-Standing Group 
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nations, particularly the Dutch, expressed doubts about SG.80/4 at Ottawa and these 
have been repeated in the Council Deputies.  
Therefore, the Standing Group decided to consider other solutions as well, 
and balance the relative advantages and disadvantages of S.G.80/4 and of the 
following additional alternatives: a) the setting up of a new Balkan Command 
consisting of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia (or of a new Aegean Command to 
include Greece and Turkey) either under Admiral Carney or directly under the 
Standing Group; b) the setting up of a new Balkan/Eastern Mediterranean Supreme 
Command, consisting of Greece, Turkey and the Middle East, under a British Supreme 
Allied Commander; c) the integration of Turkey into SACEUR‟s Southern Flank; d) 
the establishment of a separate Turkish Command directly under the Standing 
Group.
114
 
  
 
iii) The Greek and Turkish admission, September 1951-February 1952  
Following these developments, numerous discussions and intense negotiations took 
place during the last three months of 1951 regarding the command arrangements in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East and the final inclusion of Greece and Turkey to 
NATO. In October, General Omar Bradley, Field Marshal William Slim and General 
Lecheres, Chiefs of the US, UK and French armed forces respectively, visited General 
Eisenhower‟s Headquarters in Paris, and then Athens and Ankara where they held 
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discussions with Greek and Turkish officials. In Paris General Bradley, Field Marshal 
Slim, General Lecheres and General Juin held discussions on the military problem of 
the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO with SACEUR Eisenhower and his 
chief of staff, General Alfred Gruenther. They reached agreement on the French naval 
sub-command in the Western Mediterranean, which would be under Admiral Carney. 
Then, General Eisenhower said that he was willing to accept Greece under his 
command, since the defence of Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia were pretty much tied 
together, although such a development would extend considerably the Southern Flank; 
he would also need additional air and naval support. He expressed great admiration for 
the Turks but felt that they were too far away to include them in his command; they 
rather had to be in MEC or in another command directly under the Standing Group. 
Moreover, he stressed the importance of the bases in Egypt, which would greatly 
strengthen his flank and rear.
115
    
Afterwards, the Chiefs of the armed forces of the Standing Group powers 
went to Greece, and then to Turkey. At that moment the British pursued two goals: 
firstly, irrespective of the place of the Greek mainland in the NATO command 
structure, to ensure that the Greek naval forces and the Aegean islands would come 
under SACME; secondly, to persuade Turkey that its proper place in the command 
structure was in MEC and not in a European Command.
116
 The British failed to 
accomplish these two aims, though.  
In Greece, the three Chiefs held discussions with the Greek military 
leadership. The Greeks expressed their strong desire to be part of SACEUR‟s 
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command, because they believed that Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia were SACEUR‟s 
right flank.
117
 The three NATO Chiefs presented certain operational requirements and 
discussed Greek capabilities to meet them. The Greek military stressed the necessity 
for close cooperation with Yugoslavia, even to the extent of admitting Yugoslavia into 
NATO. Moreover, they hoped to coordinate military planning with Belgrade so that 
such planning would readily tie in with Greek defence. Regarding the Greek Navy, the 
Greek officials claimed that in case it had to operate under, or with, another command 
(namely the MEC through a British-led Mediterranean Command as it was envisaged 
in S.G.80/4), a considerable surplus of forces was needed, because Greek naval forces 
were inadequate. The necessity of screening the Greek personnel and using secure 
means of communication were also discussed. Finally, the Greek military emphasized 
their potential if they only had the arms and the means of strengthening their army. 
The three NATO Chiefs were impressed by the Greek friendliness and determination 
to resist any aggressor who might try to invade Greece.
118
 
Then Bradley, Slim and Lecheres went to Ankara to exchange views with the 
Turkish authorities as to the most effective role Turkey could play in the NATO 
defence arrangements and to obtain Turkish agreement, at least in principle, to 
participate in the MEC project. During the Ankara meetings, the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Adnan Menderes, undertook an active role as a chairman for the meetings. 
When Slim mentioned that it was doubtful whether General Eisenhower could extend 
his front to include both Greece and Turkey, the Turkish leadership made it plain that 
they did not consider themselves as part of the Middle East; although they had agreed 
to the necessity for setting up a MEC and were willing to participate in it and 
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contribute troops, they considered their country as a Balkan, European and Western 
power, and insisted on being admitted to an existing NATO command. Menderes 
claimed that Turkey should become a member of NATO with equal rights with other 
NATO countries, and said that politically it would be impossible to place Turkey in 
the Middle East; to include Turkey in a MEC, which in Turkish view would be only 
associated with NATO, was equivalent to placing it in an inferior position vis-à-vis 
other NATO countries. Therefore, it was clearly demonstrated that the Turkish views 
were far away from those envisaged in S.G.80/4. So, it was agreed that Turkey (and 
Greece) should send a military representative to Washington to discuss the command 
organisation into which Turkey would be brought.
119
  
As negotiations continued during autumn 1951, the Standing Group was not 
in a position to submit recommendations for the command structure to be set up in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. 
Comments on the proposals made in S.G.80/4 were made by the Chiefs of the General 
Staff of several NATO countries. Perhaps the most important were those of the Italian 
military. They claimed that the defence of the Balkan positions and that of the Straits 
should be an integral part of the defence of Southern Europe and should remain under 
the unified command of CINCSOUTH in its existing structure. Moreover, concerning 
the division of the maritime zones, the Aegean Sea had to remain under 
CINCSOUTH. Furthermore, the Italians declared that „it is absolutely necessary that 
the command of land forces of Southern Europe should remain assigned to an Italian 
Commander‟ and that „this command should be an integrated command located in 
Italy under CINCSOUTH, and should have at its dependence the Command of the 
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Italian land front and the Command of the Balkan front which will be placed under 
SACEUR‟. However, the Standing Group did not consider that the command of the 
land forces in Italy and Greece could be under the same land force commander but 
visualised Greece as a separate command.
120
 
For their part, Greece and Turkey strongly opposed a possible placement of 
their land forces under an Italian commander. The reasons were political, 
psychological and military. For the Greeks especially, although the post-war relations 
with Italy had been friendly and the latter was strongly favouring Greek admission to 
NATO, the Greek government, military leadership and public were not ready to accept 
placing the Greek Army under Italian command only eleven years after fascist Italy‟s 
unprovoked aggression against Greece in 1940. The Greek military had little 
appreciation for the military virtues of the Italian officer corps. Moreover, any Italian 
direct or indirect military presence might have serious repercussions on Greek-Italian 
and Yugoslav-Italian relations. Therefore, the Greeks proposed that the best solution 
would be the creation of a separate South-Eastern land command under a US or British 
commander, placed under CINCSOUTH. Although the Italian leadership had 
approached Athens asking not to oppose the expansion of Castiglione‟s command, the 
Greeks received assurances from the Americans, the British and the French that the 
Greek forces would not be placed under an Italian commander.
121
 
Meanwhile, Greece and Turkey made further clear their views regarding their 
position in NATO command organisation and Western defence planning. By October 
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1951 the Americans and the British had accepted that Greek forces be placed under 
CINCSOUTH, but the Turks rejected the idea of being incorporated only in the MEC 
structure. In their eyes, this would make Turkish membership of NATO nominal. This 
position reflected their anxiety to be considered and treated as a European and not a 
Middle Eastern nation, as well as their calculation that Turkey‟s security would be far 
better enhanced through NATO, whose leading power was the United States, rather 
than through the British-led MEC. Last but not least, the Turkish leaders estimated 
that they would receive much more US military aid if placed in a US-led command.
122
 
The British were frustrated by Turkey‟s insistence to be placed under SHAPE which 
they believed had been encouraged by the US Ambassador Wadsworth and by the 
Chief of Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT), General 
Arnold. The British considered that Ankara had not grasped the importance of the dual 
role which it would be called to perform in relation to NATO on the one hand and the 
Middle East on the other.
123
   
The Turkish Foreign Ministry sent an aide memoire which pointed out that 
Ankara considered the issues of Turkish admission to NATO and of the establishment 
of a MEC as two distinct problems which should be dealt with separately and in two 
different stages. While NATO was an existing community, the rights and obligations 
and members of which were defined and which Turkey was about to join, the MEC 
was still a project. The Turkish view was that given this situation, the most normal 
course would be firstly to determine the place which Turkey was to assume within the 
framework of NATO, and subsequently to attempt to materialise a MEC. It was 
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pointed out that those NATO members who were to participate in the setting up of the 
MEC had already been placed within the framework of NATO. Therefore, the Turks 
indicated that if Turkey were to be integrated in a sui generis arrangement between 
NATO and MEC, which was then only a project, they would consider this as an 
exceptional and discriminatory treatment in comparison with the other NATO 
members. This would have serious negative repercussions upon the Turkish public. 
Furthermore, the Turks argued that whatever the form of a future MEC, it would tend 
to disperse the Turkish forces and divert and tie them to the Middle East which would 
burden Turkey with obligations over and above its prospective commitments within 
the Atlantic pact. In addition, they stressed the need first to assure their own security, 
since they were in contact with the potential aggressor, and then to extend the limits of 
the security area beyond their own boundaries; but if Turkey were included in 
NATO‟s European Command and its defence assured, it would be, due to its key 
strategic position, all the more in a position to safeguard the Middle East
124
. 
However, the Turks were careful enough to stress that they considered the 
establishment of a MEC as a necessary, urgent and important project. Since they 
realised that the United States was not willing, at least in the immediate future, to 
expand its commitments to the Middle East, it was all the more clear that Turkey had 
to take its place within a NATO command, in which all commitments would be finally 
specified, and only proceed to expand its obligations only after it had assured its own 
security.  
As to the question of the proper command to which Turkey should be 
attached within NATO, the Turks claimed that this should be SHAPE under General 
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Eisenhower. As they indicated, this was because Turkey dominated directly or 
indirectly all the principal routes from the east to the Mediterranean. In case of war 
with the USSR, counteroffensives directed against the latter could be launched by 
NATO forces from Germany, the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasus; on three 
out of the above four routes, Turkey occupied a position of primary importance, since 
it was the only [prospective] NATO country in a position to strike at Soviet 
communications through the Black Sea and the Danube. Turkey was also situated at 
the closest distance to Soviet industry centres, oil infrastructure and raw materials.
125
 
Concerning the argument that with the addition of Turkey the limits of the 
European Command would be overextended, the Turks claimed that the front would 
not increase in actual length but rather be advanced towards the East. They argued that 
a powerful element of defence both in terms of territory (especially the strategic depth) 
and military potentiality would be added in the Southern Flank. Upon Turkish 
inclusion, a new more defensible and compact front would be formed. Moreover, 
according to the Turkish view the perfection of modern weapons and means of 
transport could not justify an objection to the widening of the operational field of the 
European Command, caused by Turkey‟s inclusion. Consequently, Turkey was an 
integral and inseparable part of Europe which was facing „Russia‟ and, therefore, its 
forces had to serve under SACEUR for strategic as well as geographical reasons.
126
 
Greek views, especially regarding their adherence to the proper NATO 
command structure, were summarized by Lieutenant General Theodoros 
Grigoropoulos, Chief of the General Staff of National Defence. Although he 
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appreciated the important role which Greece could play in the defence of the Middle 
East by protecting communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western 
flank of Turkey and, primarily, by denying the occupation of its territory to the 
Soviets, he believed that the battle for the defence of Greece should mainly concern 
CINCSOUTH and should be coordinated with operations in Southern Europe. He 
argued that Greece, as part of the Balkans, was part of Europe and was not tied to the 
area of Iran, Iraq and Asia Minor, but, along with Yugoslavia, formed the natural right 
flank of the European front. Furthermore, from the Greek point of view, operations in 
the Julian Alps/Istria were clearly of greater and more direct concern than those of Iran 
or Iraq, while the Balkans seemed also to provide more favourable opportunities of 
counteroffensives – ideally into the Sofia plains by combined Greek and Yugoslav 
forces – than the Iran/Iraq area. Concerning Greece‟s importance specifically to 
CINCSOUTH, the Greek Chief argued that an attack against north-eastern Italy would 
be a preliminary or follow up action to one against Greece. Therefore, it would be of 
great interest to the Commander in Italy that Greece and Yugoslavia remain in friendly 
hands since from this area the left flank of any Soviet offensive against northern Italy 
could be threatened. In his view Soviet operations in northern Italy, Yugoslavia and 
Greece all formed part of one offensive, and defence measures should, therefore, be 
coordinated by one Commander.
127
 In any case, at this stage all NATO powers had 
accepted the affiliation of Greek forces to CINCSOUTH‟s command. 
Regarding the cooperation of Greek and Turkish forces, General 
Grigoropoulos claimed that it would not seem possible to maintain physical contact 
between Greek and Turkish forces in Europe unless the bulk of the Turkish army were 
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located north of the Straits. If and when sufficient Turkish forces could be 
concentrated in Europe, then a coordinated advance into Bulgaria by Greek, Yugoslav 
and Turkish forces would provide a good pattern for the counteroffensive. When such 
operations could be contemplated, then the Turkish, Yugoslav, and Greek forces 
should be in one Command. Under existing conditions, however, the Greek military 
did not consider that coordination between Greek and Turkish forces in Europe could 
be more than theoretical. The Aegean Sea was, however, of common interest and 
provided a reason for considering Western Turkey and Greece as one strategic area.
128
  
Athens favoured Turkey‟s affiliation to SACEUR because the Greeks did not 
wish to be alone at the end of NATO‟s Southern Flank.129 Greece was also greatly 
concerned to cover its right flank in Thrace, on the Greek-Turkish frontier, and hoped 
that if Turkey were integrated into a European, instead of a Middle East, command, 
the Turks would put more emphasis on the European theatre, rather on the eastern one 
(indeed, there were specific signs that both the Turks and the Americans, not to 
mention the British, were stressing the importance of the eastern Turkish theatre).
130
 
Finally, both the Greeks and the Turks feared that if Turkey were included in MEC, 
Greek and Turkish final membership might fall behind or even be put off, because of 
the probable revival of some member states‟ fears that they might be drawn into 
Middle Eastern affairs.
131
  
  Still, in October 1951 the Protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey to 
NATO was signed by the Council Deputies. It was decided that the US government, 
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on behalf of all NATO members, should communicate to the Greek and the Turkish 
governments an invitation to accede to NATO. Moreover, they agreed that when 
Greece and Turkey were formally invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, an 
explanatory note should be given to the two countries which would specify that the 
exact interpretation of the words „North Atlantic area‟ of the North Atlantic Treaty 
should remain unaffected.
132
 This was mainly to continue excluding Cyprus from the 
NATO area without expressly so stating, because the British wanted the island to be 
part of the Middle East, not of Europe, and seemed to wish to avoid the presence of 
NATO (that is, Greek) troops on Cyprus.
133
 However, it should be underlined that 
before the Ottawa summit the British COS had finally agreed that they would not 
object to the inclusion of Cyprus in the NATO area and instructions were accordingly 
sent to the UK delegation in Ottawa. After all, Cyprus was excluded from the NATO 
area because the French claimed that if Cyprus were included and covered by the 
alliance, Tunisia had to be included as well. Since this would have extended the 
NATO area to an undesirable degree, „the Americans pressed us [the British] to drop 
our claim for Cyprus‟. It was also decided by the Deputies that „there was no need to 
inform the Turks and the Greeks of this decision, since there is nothing in the Protocol 
to suggest that Cyprus is covered‟.134  
In late December 1951 and early January 1952 the Standing Group and the 
International Planning Team discussed with the Greek and Turkish representatives and 
their planning officers the command arrangements which ought to be established for 
the integration of Greek and Turkish forces in the NATO command organisation. The 
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Greek and Turkish proposed that, first and foremost, the military forces of Greece and 
Turkey assigned to NATO should operate under SACEUR through CINCSOUTH. 
Furthermore, under CINCSOUTH, and responsible to him, there should be a 
Commander Greek Land Forces and a Commander Turkish Land Forces. In addition, 
air and naval support for the operations of the Greek and Turkish land forces should be 
provided by CINCSOUTH from the forces assigned to him, including those of Greece 
and Turkey; if additional air and naval forces (other than those described above) were 
assigned for the support of Greek and Turkish land forces, those should operate under 
the control of CINCSOUTH during the period they would be so assigned. Last but not 
least, CINCSOUTH should be responsible for any possible coordination of the 
operations of the forces of Italy and Greece with those of Yugoslavia.
135
  
The other interested powers (the USA, Britain, France, and Italy) also 
expressed their views in January and early February of 1952 regarding the command 
arrangements on Greek and Turkish inclusion to NATO. The US position was that 
NATO should benefit fully and without delay from the Greek and Turkish forces, 
which were the dominant local forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, to strengthen the 
alliance‟s right flank; therefore, it was imperative that the necessary command 
arrangements should be worked out as soon as possible in order to be approved and 
established after Greece and Turkey became members of NATO. On the one hand, the 
Americans favoured the inclusion of the two countries in a NATO command, 
preferably that of SACEUR through CINCSOUTH, while the naval and air 
commanders under the latter should extend their responsibilities to include Greece, 
Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, they opposed the inclusion 
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of the Middle East area in a NATO command, because several NATO members did 
not wish to undertake commitments to this area. Furthermore, they pointed out that 
„while maximum satisfaction must be given to political and national considerations, 
the command structure is of such vital importance that an arrangement which is 
militarily unworkable cannot be accepted for political or prestige reasons‟.136 This was 
obviously a strike at British attitude and manoeuvres. 
In any case, until mid-February agreement had not been reached on the issue 
of the overall NATO command structure in the Mediterranean. Obviously, a complete 
solution could not be reached in the short remaining time before Greece and Turkey 
would become members of NATO at the forthcoming Lisbon meeting. The adoption 
of an interim solution for the integration of Greek and Turkish forces – politically 
acceptable to all nations concerned and militarily workable – seemed necessary. 
Therefore, NATO could carry out its responsibilities with respect to Greece and 
Turkey pending the solution of the overall Mediterranean command problem and 
would leave the task of linking NATO and MEC for resolution when the latter was 
established.
137
 
In the US view, such an interim solution had to be the extension of 
SACEUR‟s command to Greece and Turkey under CINCSOUTH, whose command 
organisation would remain as established, with such additions as might be necessary to 
accommodate the forces of Greece and Turkey.
138
 While their land forces assigned to 
NATO should operate under CINCSOUTH, their naval and air forces should report to 
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the established Naval and Air Commanders of the Southern European Command who 
would coordinate the naval and air support of all three ground force elements of the 
Southern European Command, by utilising the assigned air and naval forces of the 
Southern European Command plus those of Greece and Turkey; an alternative solution 
could be that the Greek and Turkish naval forces might, as an interim measure, remain 
under their respective national Chiefs of Staff. Regarding the British naval forces in 
the Mediterranean, the US proposed that they remained assigned under the COS and 
responsible for the protection of their lines of communication; in case of emergency, 
they should be available to support the land battle in Southern Europe. The means of 
coordination of British naval forces in the Mediterranean with those of CINCSOUTH 
had to be ultimately worked out when the allied MEC was established and its link with 
NATO determined.
139
  
For their part, the French believed that a partial solution to the wider 
questions of allied command arrangements in the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
should be reached to enable the full admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO at the 
Lisbon meeting and the prompt incorporation of their Armed Forces into a NATO 
command. Therefore, they proposed that the ground forces of Greece and Turkey 
assigned to NATO would operate under the overall command of SACEUR through 
CINCSOUTH, that the Greek and Turkish air forces assigned to NATO should report 
to the established Air Commander of the Southern European Command, and that their 
naval forces would remain under their national Chiefs of Staff; consequently, the only 
organisational change to the existing NATO command structure in the Mediterranean 
would be the addition of a Greek and Turkish Land Forces Command under 
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CINCSOUTH. Moreover, the French proposed that the command arrangements of 
SHAPE‟s Southern Flank should be worked out by SACEUR in agreement with 
national authorities and submitted to the Standing Group. They also stressed that the 
decision concerning the placement of Greek and Turkish forces in a NATO command 
should „not prejudice in any way the overall solution arrived at, on the problem of 
command in the Mediterranean and Middle East‟.140  
The Italians, through the Defence Chief of Staff General Marras, insisted that 
should Greece and Turkey be included in SACEUR‟s Southern Flank, their land forces 
should be placed under General Castiglione‟s Allied Land Forces Southern Europe 
command. Furthermore, should a Deputy Commander to CINCSOUTH were 
nominated, he had to be no other than an Italian general. Otherwise, Rome warned that 
„any other solution could not be acceptable to the Italian Government‟ and „very 
severe repercussions might arise from a solution failing to satisfy the Italian 
aspirations‟.141 
Therefore, by late 1951 it was common basis of all major NATO powers 
(including the British), that on their admission to NATO both Greece and Turkey 
ought to be placed in the command structure of SACEUR. Consequently, two 
solutions were considered: either the establishment of a fourth Theatre Command 
consisting of Greece and Turkey and directly responsible to SACEUR, or the 
expansion and reorganisation of the existing Southern European Command to include 
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Greece and Turkey. Both solutions were considered as militarily workable and both 
had certain pros and cons.
142
 
Regarding the first solution, it was argued that Greece and Turkey and their 
adjacent seas fell into one strategic area. Despite this, a campaign in the Caucasus 
would be more closely tied to the defence of the Middle East than to the defence of 
Greece and Western Turkey, but it was acknowledged that the geographical and 
operational division of Turkish territory and forces was politically unacceptable and 
had military disadvantages. However, it was emphasised that campaigns in the 
Balkans should be fully coordinated with any campaign on the Italian frontier and with 
whatever allies there might be in the area (i.e. the Yugoslavs); unified command 
throughout the Balkans would encourage Yugoslav support or active participation in 
the event of war. 
Concerning the second option, it was argued that if Greece and Turkey were 
included to CINCSOUTH‟s command, this would commend itself to the Greeks and 
Turks, would make planning for a coordinated defence of the Balkans and Turkey 
possible, would be an economical solution since an existing headquarters and 
personnel could be utilised, would not lead to another subdivision in the command 
arrangements for naval and air operations in the Mediterranean, and, last but not least, 
if in the future additional Balkan allies became available, such command structure 
could readily absorb them, thus forming a continuous front from Italy to the Caucasus. 
Against those advantages it was pointed out that the Southern European Command 
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would be greatly enlarged and that CINCSOUTH would undertake considerable extra 
responsibilities.
143
 
The British were fully aware of the US, Turkish and Greek views, but 
remained preoccupied with their plans for the defence organisation of the Middle East 
and the Eastern Mediterranean. However, they had accepted that Turkey should be 
placed under SACEUR. By early 1952 the British publicly as well as in the NATO 
bodies, tended to opt for Turkish inclusion in AFSOUTH.
144
 Despite this, the British 
had not abandoned their original plan of commanding both Greek and Turkish forces, 
this time within the framework of NATO. Therefore, irrespective of their public 
position, they opted for the establishment of an Aegean Command under its own 
Commander-in-Chief, in order to avoid „an extension of the Carney empire‟ 
eastwards. For their part, the JCS continued to favour the expansion of 
CINCSOUTH‟s command, but initially tried to devise a compromise by promoting the 
establishment of a new Aegean (or Eastern) command under SACEUR, whose 
commander (CINCEAST) would be British and would command the Greek and 
Turkish forces
145
. However, the Chairman of the JCS, General Bradley, had already 
stressed that strong political considerations existed which had to be satisfied in so far 
as it was possible; those to a large extent overrode the military arguments: „any 
proposals which were put forward could be of a tentative nature only until they had 
been approved by both Greece and Turkey‟.146  
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Indeed, the British wished to establish the Aegean (or Eastern) and Middle 
East Commands simultaneously and directly link them „at the earliest possible 
moment‟ by having one of SACME‟s subordinates as CINC Aegean with 
responsibility to SACEUR for the defence of the Aegean Command
147
. In January 
1952 the deputy SACEUR, Field Marshal Montgomery, justified the British view 
claiming that a possible extension of Carney‟s authority would make the situation 
more complex, since it would have been difficult for Carney to control a battle on the 
Italian front and one on the Turkish front at the same time. However, Montgomery 
believed that „when the Middle East Command is finally set up, this fourth command 
of SHAPE could be transferred en bloc to the Middle East Command, where it really 
belongs‟148. Nevertheless, few days later the CIGS Sir William Slim informed the 
Chiefs of the other services that the JCS had made a definite recommendation that 
Turkey and Greece should come under Admiral Carney
149
. 
The British tendency to merge, rather than coordinate, the Aegean Command 
with the MEC, aroused the fear of several smaller NATO countries that they would be 
entangled to Middle Eastern affairs, while the Turks and the Greeks strongly opposed 
to place their forces under a British commander even within NATO. Consequently, at 
the end of 1951, the US civilian and military officials, annoyed at British manoeuvres, 
decided to give Greek and Turkish admission to NATO top priority by incorporating 
their forces to CINCSOUTH‟s command and put aside the MEC, at least for the 
moment; they managed to prevent any further discussions until the full and official 
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admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO and efficiently blocked any further British 
attempt to raise the issue of commands either on a bilateral level or in NATO
150
. 
In early 1952, as the MEC project was not making any progress, the NATO 
Standing Group decided, on US insistence, that the Greek and Turkish land and air 
forces be placed under AFSOUTH. Although the British were infuriated by these 
developments, they could not do much. In January of 1952 the JCS reiterated their 
view that the Middle Eastern defence should be a British strategic responsibility, while 
the US leadership persuaded the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to accept 
the appointment of a US Admiral as SACLANT, thus depriving the MEC project of 
one of its main objectives since the British were faced with a fait accompli and their 
claim for a Supreme Allied Commander post became irrelevant.
151
  
 
 
Conclusion 
It can be argued that in late 1950 and in 1951, chiefly the British, but also the 
Americans as well, had as their first priority to establish their political influence and 
preponderance in the whole area of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
Moreover, in the process, they managed to antagonise each other. Despite the anti-
communism and the war scare in the West after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
Washington and London did not proceed as quickly as possible with the necessary and 
most effective measures to enhance the defence of Greece and Turkey and the whole 
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region. Although they were certainly concerned for the security of the region and their 
intense negotiations indeed reflected differences in military preoccupations and 
perceptions, it seems that the promotion of the various defence schemes, especially 
from the British side (the MEC and the Mediterranean Command projects and the 
Eastern/Aegean NATO Command), aimed to serve primarily national political goals. 
All the other interested parties, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey also sought to push 
their political objectives, several times at the expense of allied military effectiveness. 
All these took place at a time when the Cold War had greatly intensified and the 
West‟s insecurity had been exacerbated. It can therefore be concluded that the Western 
leaderships, though bound to prepare for any contingency, did not really believe that 
there was an imminent Soviet/Communist threat against the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the Middle East.   
Another issue was the fact that despite this antagonism, both the British and 
the Americans wanted, at least in principle, to cooperate with each other, settle their 
differences in bilateral negotiations – usually by reaching a compromise (more or less 
closer to US positions) – and then presenting their proposals to the other allies. This 
often caused the frustration of the latter, especially of France and Italy, and to some 
extent of Greece and Turkey. However, when the US-UK differences could not be 
bridged, the United States predominated; this was because the real power lay there, 
and the other allies (the NATO members, and Greece and Turkey) sided with 
Washington, rather than with London.  
Furthermore, although it was Ankara that assumed the initiative and strongly 
pressed for admission to NATO, while it was considered by the major NATO powers 
as the keystone to the defence of the whole area of the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
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Middle East, it was Greece which as early as in summer of 1951 was acknowledged as 
a prospective NATO member and as an integral part of the European Command. This 
was despite the fact that Athens had followed low-profile diplomacy and was weaker 
politically and military. On the contrary, Turkey‟s definite inclusion in the European 
Command was finally decided only in early 1952 after strong US support, when the 
MEC project was not making any progress and any other solution had been considered 
as impossible. This had not been only due to British persistence and US ambivalence 
as to where Turkey should be placed; as the long but at present unsuccessful case of 
Turkish admission to the European Union has demonstrated, many in the West 
considered that the hard factors of geography, history, culture and heritage indicated 
that Turkey was more Middle Eastern, rather than European country. 
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2. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO’S SOUTHERN FLANK 
Command Reorganization and Arrangements and Regional 
Defence, February 1952-March 1953 
 
In February 1952 Greece and Turkey were officially admitted to NATO. 
Consequently, there was a need to devise an appropriate command structure in the 
southern region of the Atlantic Alliance to integrate the land, air, and naval forces of 
the two new NATO members. This was not, however, an easy task, particularly due to 
its linkage with the issues of the Mediterranean Command and the defence schemes in 
the Middle East (the MEC and then MEDO projects), where the Americans and the 
British had different views and priorities. Furthermore, NATO had to deal with the 
even more arduous challenge of developing an effective operational planning in the 
Southern Flank area, and particularly the Balkan frontier, which was one of the most 
exposed areas of the alliance. However, favourable political and military opportunities 
existed as well, since there was always the possibility of cooperation with Tito‟s 
Yugoslavia. Indeed, the Standing Group powers as well as Greece and Turkey sought 
from late 1952 onwards to improve their relations with Belgrade, and ultimately to 
initiate some form of military cooperation with the Yugoslavs. Despite Tito‟s 
willingness to proceed, it soon became clear that membership in NATO complicated 
the situation not only as regards the commitments that Athens and Ankara might be 
able to undertake towards Yugoslavia, but also concerning the guarantees that 
Washington, London and Paris were able, or willing, to provide. Although by early 
1953 the West had failed to integrate Tito to the Western defence scheme, 
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considerable progress was being made towards the establishment of a regional Greek-
Turkish-Yugoslav entente, which paved the way for close tripartite military 
cooperation. With respect to developments in the Middle East, during 1952-early 
1953 the defence of the region was effectively separated from NATO politics and 
strategy. The Southern Flank‟s definition of command structure and the abandonment 
of the MEC/MEDO project appeared to make a link between the NATO and Middle 
East areas impossible, or even irrelevant. 
 
 
i) Greek and Turkish final inclusion into CINCSOUTH and the land, air, and naval 
command set-up in the southern region, February 1952- March 1953 
The Lisbon meeting in February 1952 was a significant turning point in NATO history. 
Apart from the official admission of Greece and Turkey as full members, the 
reorganization of institutional mechanisms of the alliance was also approved. The 
Council Deputies would be replaced by permanent representatives with increased 
responsibilities. Moreover, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to appoint a 
secretary-general, responsible to the council. Among his duties was to organize the 
work of the council and its agenda, to supervise the work of an international 
staff/secretariat and to chair the meetings of the permanent representatives. The first 
secretary-general was a British official, Lord Ismay, partly to compensate Britain for 
the transfer of SHAPE from London to Paris.
152
 In addition, the NAC set excessive 
force goals to enhance NATO‟s conventional capabilities as early as possible (fifty 
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divisions and 4.000 aircraft by the end of 1952, seventy-five divisions and 6.500 
aircraft one year later, and ninety-six divisions and 9.000 aircraft by 1954, with thirty-
five to forty divisions to be combat-ready). Of equivalent importance, a significant 
contribution of West Germany within the framework of a European army (the EDC 
project) was also approved.
153
 
When Greece and Turkey officially joined NATO, the question where to 
include their forces within the NATO command structure arose in an even more acute 
way. As already mentioned, in early 1952 an interim agreement to place their land 
forces under CINCSOUTH had been reached, but there were numerous practical 
matters to be settled. A fundamental difference continued to exist between the British, 
who were trying to place Greece, and particularly Turkey, in a Middle Eastern context, 
and the Americans, who were thinking purely on terms of the European theatre and the 
NATO area. Therefore, the British preference was still for the inclusion of the Greek 
and Turkish forces to the proposed separate Mediterranean or Middle East 
Command.
154
 However, when on 11 February 1952 the NATO Military Committee 
met to discuss and approve the Standing Group‟s report on the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, the result was the M.C.38/2 paper. This eventually dealt only with the 
incorporation of Greek and Turkish forces into the NATO command structure, and 
specifically under CINCSOUTH, while the set-up of the Naval Mediterranean and the 
Middle East commands was postponed pending their future resolution.  
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In November 1951, Italy had asked that an Italian general subordinate to 
CINCSOUTH should command the Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces, a claim 
which they reiterated during the Lisbon meetings in February 1952.
155
 However, as 
already mentioned, both Greece and Turkey were strongly opposed to that idea for 
political as well as operational reasons. In any case, Italy expressed its satisfaction with 
the incorporation of the Greek and Turkish forces into NATO and appreciated the need 
that they serve under the overall command of SACEUR. For their part, both the Greek 
and Turkish observers
156
 indicated the preference of their governments that the Greek 
and Turkish forces respectively should serve under CINCSOUTH without an 
intermediate command. Then, the Italians claimed that the problem was not yet ripe for 
solution. Finally, during the Defence Ministers‟ meeting on 21 February the Italian 
Defence Minister announced that his government was withdrawing its reservation 
expressed previously.
157
 
This was partly due to the close Greek-Turkish cooperation. During the 
Lisbon meeting Greece and Turkey „made a very special point that it would be most 
unsatisfactory to them to have their land forces under an Italian General‟, deputy of 
CINSOUTH Carney. Menderes had previously proposed to the Greek deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister, Sophocles Venizelos, that if the Americans wished to 
foster Italian prestige, a possible solution could have been the establishment of three 
deputy commanders (an Italian, a Greek, and a Turkish) who would constitute a 
committee under the chairmanship of the Italian officer. However, Venizelos dismissed 
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the proposal as unworkable. Therefore, the Greeks and the Turks decided to by-pass 
officially the issue of a possible (Italian) deputy commander, and to make clear their 
position to the Italians.
158
 
It was then decided that detailed command arrangements of the Southern 
European Command would be worked out by SACEUR in agreement with national 
authorities and be submitted to the Standing Group for approval by the Military 
Committee.
159
 Finally, it was agreed that the ground and air forces of Greece and 
Turkey assigned to NATO would operate under the command of SACEUR through 
CINCSOUTH, but that „pending settlement of overall naval command arrangements in 
the Mediterranean then under further discussion by the Standing Group, the Greek and 
Turkish naval forces will remain under their national Chiefs of Staff‟160.  Before that, 
the British side was very anxious to refute rumours that Britain was opposing the US 
suggestion for entry of Greece and Turkey into Admiral Carney‟s Command. London 
assured Ankara and Athens that it supported the inclusion of Turkish and Greek land 
forces in AFSOUTH.
161
 
Nevertheless, the three Standing Group powers did not manage to reach 
immediately an agreement for the final command structure of the Southern Flank. 1952 
saw the culmination of the Anglo-American negotiations for the establishment of the 
Mediterranean Command. The British wanted to get a major NATO command, mainly 
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for political reasons, and the Mediterranean seemed to offer an opportunity, since they 
still maintained significant forces and had traditional and continuing interests in the 
region.
162
 However, the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO and the US 
unwillingness to acquiesce in the establishment of a single Supreme Command in the 
Mediterranean under a British officer, would soon force Britain to moderate its 
demands. In late January 1952, the British representative at the NATO Standing 
Group, Air Marshal Sir William Elliot, had advised London to adopt a more flexible 
policy. If not, there was the danger of losing „the one possibility remaining to us in a 
command set-up which so far has developed thoroughly unsatisfactorily from our point 
of view‟. The British should not insist that there should be a British Allied Naval 
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean who would command both the Sixth Fleet and the 
British Mediterranean Fleet and would report directly to the Standing Group: on that 
issue „we should have almost the whole of NATO against us‟. Therefore, he 
concluded, the British might lose the opportunity of at least securing a major command 
post of the Mediterranean naval forces.
163
 
In fact, the COS remained firm for some time on their objective for the 
establishment of a British-led Naval Supreme Command in the Mediterranean which 
would include the bulk of allied naval forces.
164
 If necessary, the COS appeared willing 
to agree that the unified Mediterranean Command would not include the Sixth Fleet.
165
 
In sum, in early 1952 the British position regarding the Mediterranean Command 
problem was the following: Britain should accept the inclusion of all land and air 
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forces deployed in Italy, Greece and Turkey under Carney. Concerning the naval 
command setup, the best solution was for all naval forces in the Mediterranean to be 
placed „unreservedly‟ under the command of a British Commander-in-Chief Allied 
Forces Mediterranean, who would be directly responsible to the Standing Group. 
However, if this would be unacceptable to the Americans, then it should be proposed 
that under the Standing Group, the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean would be 
responsible to SACEUR and SACME for their support, with the reservation that the 
Sixth Fleet would not be used for operations other than in support of SACEUR‟s 
Southern Flank without the agreement of SACEUR.
166
 
But the Americans had other views. The NATO naval command to be 
established in the Mediterranean area had to be consonant with the fact that the Greek 
and Turkish land and air forces were part of CINCSOUTH‟s command under 
SACEUR, and that Greece and Turkey were in the areas of responsibility of those two 
commanders. Hence CINCSOUTH became responsible for the overall area of the 
Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, the Straits and the territorial waters of Turkey in the 
Black Sea. Therefore, to obtain maximum overall effectiveness of naval effort in 
coordination with the Southern Flank‟s land and air effort, all NATO naval and 
maritime air forces in the Mediterranean had to be assigned to CINCSOUTH‟s 
command, and not to another commander subordinate either directly to SACEUR or 
the Standing Group.
167
 General Eisenhower in particular favoured this idea. He 
expressed the view that all allied naval forces in the Mediterranean should be placed 
under a single commander, but was adamant that the US Sixth Fleet, „at least, must be 
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directly responsible to my orders through the Commander in Chief of the southern 
flank‟.168 
In February 1952, the British rejected an American proposal for an interim 
solution of the Mediterranean Command issue and of Greek-Turkish admission to 
NATO, until the establishment of the overall Command organization for the 
Mediterranean-Southern European area was finalised.
169
 The British made it plain that 
the American proposal was both politically and militarily unacceptable to them; they 
felt that an arrangement which would place all non-British naval and air forces under 
either CINCSOUTH or SACEUR – even as an „interim measure‟ – would prejudice the 
setting up of overall Mediterranean Naval and Air Commands.
170
   
In fact, the JCS did not have a clear and definite view on the final setup of the 
Mediterranean Command. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Fechteler, was 
worried that the British might insist on linking this issue with MEC (he himself 
recognized that in the event of war, the distinction between the NATO area and the 
Middle East would evaporate).
171
 Finally, it was agreed that Fechteler would travel to 
London on 5 May to discuss the issue with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rhoderick 
McGrigor; before that, he would first consult with SHAPE, the French and the Italians. 
For his part, McGrigor would also hold similar discussions.
172
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At that point, the British proposed that CINCSOUTH „would continue to 
command Italian, Greek and Turkish land and air forces; he might also have command 
of such naval forces as were allocated to him for supporting his own operations, and 
this might include command of United States Sixth Fleet. The allied naval 
Commander-in-Chief would, however, have to coordinate all naval operations in 
Mediterranean, including the support of Middle East theatre and lines of 
communication through Mediterranean to that theatre‟.173 When the meeting took 
place, it was clear that both the British and the Americans were in agreement that there 
should be one allied naval Commander-in-Chief for the Mediterranean. However, the 
question remained whether this Commander-in-Chief should be subordinate to 
CINCSOUTH (the American view) or whether he should be directly responsible to the 
Standing Group (the British view).
174
 The nationality of the allied naval Commander-
in-Chief was not discussed.   
Meanwhile, in May 1952 there were various reports that the French, Italians, 
Greeks and Turks had expressed to Admirals Fechteler and Carney their unwillingness 
to see their naval forces being placed under a different commander from their land and 
air forces. Carney in particular was endorsing (or even encouraging) these reactions. 
Thus, the British believed that „it seems unlikely that we shall get any unsolicited 
support from the Mediterranean NATO powers in our current struggle with the U.S. 
Chiefs of Staff over command in the Mediterranean‟.175  
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Faced with a stalemate and fearing that insistence on an inflexible policy 
might backfire, the British formulated new proposals in May/June 1952. They linked 
the establishment of a proper command set up for the inclusion of the Greek and 
Turkish land and air forces with the issue of the allied Mediterranean Command. Thus, 
Montgomery was the first British official who took the initiative and suggested that the 
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean should be responsible to SHAPE rather than the 
Standing Group. He argued that in the event of war the Standing Group was too far 
away to exercise effective control over the Mediterranean Command.
176
 Moreover, he 
proposed that Italy be incorporated in the central sector and that a new Southern sector 
be formed, consisting only of Greece and Turkey. Accordingly, CINCSOUTH‟s 
Headquarters should be moved from Naples to a more advanced and central position, 
e.g. in Athens or Izmir (but not Istanbul). In any case, all those proposals suggest that 
Montgomery clearly considered the command structure in Southern European 
Command as disastrous; if a war had to be fought under this setup, there would be 
complete confusion.
177
  
The British government and the COS adopted a similar view. They considered 
that the Southern Command should be comprised only of Italy, while a separate South-
eastern (or Aegean) Command comprising Greece and Turkey should be established. 
In essence, the British believed that since they were prepared to make a concession by 
placing the British Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean under SACEUR, rather than 
the Standing Group, they should insist on the establishment of a separate Greek-
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Turkish Command. Apparently, the ultimate goal was again to link this NATO 
command more closely to the Middle East, rather than to the European theatre. The 
Foreign Secretary, Antony Eden, pointed out the importance of the Middle East 
Defence Organization (the former MEC), because the British „required this 
Organization not solely or indeed primarily for military reasons but in order to bring 
about a stabilization of the Middle East and commit the Americans to taking an active 
interest in the area‟. For his part, Montgomery claimed that „if a separate Command for 
Greece and Turkey were set up it should act as an attraction for the Middle Eastern 
countries to the South, and in fact provide for the military defence of the Middle East‟. 
Eden remarked that this would mean the extension of US hegemony in the Middle 
East, which, however, „perhaps is no bad thing‟.178 In addition, Sir Pierson Dixon, 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State, commented that „A corollary of the possible eventual 
extension of the fourth sector to parts of the Levant is that… may be to extend U.S. 
hegemony to the Middle East. However, one of our principal aims in setting up a joint 
organization for the defence of the Middle East is to commit the United States 
permanently to the area‟.179 Moreover, the British believed that if a fourth command 
was established, it would become „even more illogical to put Mediterranean Fleet 
under Carney whose writ would not then run at all in Eastern Mediterranean‟.180  
These positions were part of a larger British view of military balances. In May 
1952 the British Cold War strategy was reconsidered by the COS in the Global 
Strategy Paper. This acknowledged the deterioration of British economic position and 
called for cutbacks in overseas commitments in regions including the Middle East. 
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However, the region remained vital for British and allied interests, although the COS 
felt that the Americans were so preoccupied with NATO and the defence of Europe 
that they excluded other „equally important strategic areas elsewhere‟.181 There was the 
hope that the establishment of MEDO would bring stability in the Middle East and 
compensate for the decline of UK military presence in the region, and that the United 
States would be fully committed to the defence of the region. Hopefully, the 
Americans would carry the real burden, while the British would retain as much 
prestige and world influence as possible.
182
 Anthony Eden was an advocate of this 
policy, which was later described as „power-by-proxy‟.183 Churchill also believed that 
it was of utmost importance to „get America in‟ the Middle East.184 However, during 
the following months it became apparent that the Americans had no actual interest in 
the military aspect of the Middle Eastern problem, and considered MEDO as „mainly a 
political task‟. Most importantly, it has been accurately noted that there had been no 
possibility of a US military contribution to a Middle East defence scheme in the early 
1950s.
185
   
The British acquiescence to place the Mediterranean Command under SHAPE 
proved a major concession which a few months later opened the road for a 
compromise. At that point, had their proposal been accepted, Britain would have been 
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ready to agree that CINCMED should be directly responsible to SACEUR, on the 
condition that its commander would be British, that it would include all naval forces in 
the Mediterranean (including the Sixth Fleet), and that it should have certain 
responsibilities to the MEC when the latter would be set up. „This is in fact a most 
advantageous “package” from our point of view. If we can solve the vexed question of 
the Mediterranean Naval Command in this context and on these conditions we will 
have secured our principal strategic requirements without making any vital 
concessions‟.186 The British thought that this proposal would be attractive to the 
Americans, because it would give SACEUR authority over the whole Mediterranean. 
At the same time, the removal of command of all allied naval forces in the region from 
Admiral Carney would benefit Britain.
187
 But this would soon prove not to be the case. 
During discussions held at the Standing Group in June 1952, Air Chief 
Marshal Sir William Elliot claimed that, considering the implications of Greek and 
Turkish admission to NATO and the consequent command arrangements, emphasis 
should be placed upon the strategic factors in the Middle East. Indeed, the British did 
not wish the command set-up envisaged in M.C.38/2 to become permanent. They 
apparently hoped that a probable establishment of a Middle East defence pact might 
link Greece and Turkey with such a pact. Of course, the British tried to justify their 
view not by disclosing their ultimate goal but by stating that an extension of the 
Southern Flank so far east would cause the creation of an unmanageable command.
188
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However, the US representative at the Standing Group, Vice Admiral Arthur 
Davis, rebuffed the British suggestion. He said that definite decisions had been reached 
at Lisbon and the only point remaining to be resolved was that of the allied naval 
Mediterranean Command. He did not object, together with the French, to asking the 
new SACEUR General Matthew Ridgway for his comment on the UK proposals. It 
was possible that favourable consideration might be finally given to the establishment 
of a South-eastern Command, although both the US and the French military leadership 
favoured the command set-up envisaged in M.C.38/2. But, on the issue of the allied 
Mediterranean Command, he stressed that no agreement could be expected on behalf 
of the JCS to a proposal that the Sixth Fleet be placed under an allied Command; it 
would remain under CINCSOUTH.
189
 The JCS also insisted that the CINCMED ought 
to be under the command of CINCSOUTH and not under SACUER.
190
 
At this point we should clarify another aspect of the presence and command of 
US naval forces in the Mediterranean. From the very start, the Americans were 
determined to retain exclusive national control in peacetime over their naval forces in 
the region. Therefore, the US Sixth Fleet officially formed part of CINCNELM‟s 
forces, though at the Lisbon meeting in February 1952 the Americans decided to 
earmark it for CINCSOUTH in case of war or of NATO manoeuvres in the 
Mediterranean. From June 1951 until June 1952 the posts of CINCNELM and 
CINCSOUTH were combined, since Carney held both in his headquarters in Naples.
191
 
But when Carney‟s jurisdiction was expanded to include Greece and Turkey in 
February 1952, he assumed too many responsibilities to be able to exercise all these 
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duties effectively. SACEUR Eisenhower in particular was convinced that Carney 
should keep only his NATO command and pressed to that direction.
192
 Indeed, a few 
months later, in mid-June 1952, Admiral Jerauld Wright became CINCNELM and his 
headquarters returned to London, while Carney retained his post as CINCSOUTH in 
Naples and his authority to exercise operational command as required for his mission 
over the Sixth Fleet.
193
 
Finally, the Standing Group recommended that the Military Representatives 
Committee approve the SACEUR‟s proposals concerning the command structure of 
the Southern Flank. However, the COS approved those proposals on the understanding 
that the propositions constituted only a partial and interim solution to the command 
problem of the Southern Flank. Therefore, the COS would reserve the right to have the 
whole question reviewed, in particular when a settlement of Command arrangements in 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East came in sight. It was recommended that the 
Military Representatives Committee communicate the above to SACEUR and the 
Secretary General of NATO.
194
  
   General Matthew Ridgway, who had been assigned as the new SACEUR, 
met with General Eisenhower in late May 1952. His main task and concern was 
primarily military rather than political-diplomatic, as had been the case during 
Eisenhower‟s tenure. The new SACEUR had to deal with the command organisation of 
NATO and US forces in Europe and the build up of NATO‟s forces. Regarding the 
southern area, the issues where to fit Greece and Turkey and the relationship of 
CINCSOUTH (and the US Sixth Fleet) to the British Mediterranean Command, had to 
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be addressed.
195
 Ridgway did not suggest anything about the Mediterranean Command 
issue, but proposed the Southern Flank‟s subdivision in an Italian Land Theatre 
Command under an Italian officer, and a Greek-Turkish Land Theatre Command under 
an American. Both these theatres would remain under CINCSOUTH.
196
   
As already mentioned, the British tried to justify their proposal for a 
completely separate Greek-Turkish Command on military grounds. They claimed that 
CINCSOUTH would not be able to command an area stretching from the Alps to the 
Caucasus, since Italy and Greece/Turkey were in effect separate theatres of operations. 
But in early July 1952 the British decided to break their „package‟ proposal into two 
parts: they dropped temporarily their proposals about the Mediterranean Command and 
focused on the Southern Flank‟s command structure. Since it did not expect any 
support from France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, London chose to stop pressing further 
for the establishment of a fourth command and accepted Ridgway‟s proposals, as only 
a partial and interim solution. The British also understood that they should be ready to 
accept that the Sixth Fleet, and perhaps the Italian fleet, should remain under 
CINCSOUTH.
197
  However, Britain stated that when the Mediterranean and a Middle 
East Command were set up, some readjustments of the Southern Flank arrangements 
should take place to ensure the best coordination between these commands.
198
 Finally, 
as the COS recognized that no unified Mediterranean Command solution was in sight, 
they accepted that the best, though once again „interim‟, solution was to retain the two 
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existing naval commands (i.e. the British CINCMED and the US CINCNELM) on an 
equal level and to foster cooperation between them.
199
 
At last, in August 1952 it was decided that a separate command entitled 
„Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe‟ should be set up to control the Greek and 
Turkish land forces, because Greece and Turkey were unwilling to place theim under 
an Italian general. This new command was subordinate to CINCSOUTH. The site 
chosen for this new headquarters, under the US General Willard G. Wyman, was Izmir 
in Turkey, with an advance post in Salonica, Greece.
200
 
Meanwhile, the Turkish government officially protested through its 
ambassador in London against the British reservation that this command set-up might 
be temporary. Turkey insisted that the NATO command system and the proposed MEC 
system were two entirely separate matters. Even when a MEC was established, this 
would not mean that the NATO south-eastern sub-command and the MEC would be 
unified. The Turks clearly stated that they regarded the established system as definite 
and final, since an attempt to transform the Greek-Turkish subcommand into another 
individual Command would not be in conformity with the Lisbon decisions.
201
 They 
also asked for a British statement that Britain recognized „that the present agreed 
arrangements for Turkey‟s inclusion in the Southern Command should be left 
undisturbed‟. Indeed, the Foreign Office complied with the Turkish demand.202 
Apparently, the Turks were determined to ensure that their terrain and forces would be 
part of the NATO area and forces, and not of a future Middle Eastern defence scheme. 
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The NATO Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe 
(HALFSEE), the Land Headquarters of the alliance for Greece and Turkey, was 
established in Izmir, Turkey, in September 1952. It functioned as an Army Group level 
headquarters with the mission of exercising operational command of the field armies of 
Greece and Turkey in the event of war. HALFSEE operated as a major subordinate 
command to Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) located in Naples, Italy. The 
staff, exclusive of signal and support elements, consisted of some 100 officers, mostly 
Greeks, Turks and Americans but also with British, French and Italian representation. 
The Commander was a US Lieutenant General, while a Greek and a Turkish high-
ranking officer (Major Generals according to the organizational tables, but in mid-
1950s in fact Brigadier Generals) served as assistants to the Commander. Nevertheless, 
they were not in the chain of command, since they did not assume command in the 
absence of the Commander. On the contrary, it seems that they were junior in rank to 
the Chief of Staff of HALFSEE, a US Brigadier General.
203
 
HALFSEE had no direct responsibility for sea and air operations. The Sixth 
Allied Tactical Air Force (hereafter: SIXATAF), established in Izmir at the same time 
as HALFSEE and commanded by a US Major General, was charged with coordinating 
NATO air operations in Greece and Turkey. SIXATAF was not under the command of 
HALFSEE but operated directly under the command of Air Forces Southern Europe 
(hereafter: AIRSOUTH) with Headquarters in Naples; and AIRSOUTH was in turn 
directly under the command of AFSOUTH. Since the NATO Mediterranean naval 
command structure was independent from AFSOUTH and even more complex, no 
unity of command existed in the Southern Flank of the alliance. The problem was 
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being exacerbated further, because there was no unity of command of the US military 
forces in the area. The relationship between HALFSEE and the US Military Missions 
in Greece and Turkey (JUSMAGG and JUSMMAT respectively) was never entirely 
clear.
204
 
Another great problem proved to be the language problem. Although English 
and French were the official NATO languages, the work at HALFSEE was almost 
entirely in English. It was supposed that only officers proficient in English were 
assigned there, but in fact few Greeks, and even fewer Turks, were proficient enough 
to be effective staff officers. Neither the Greeks, nor the Turks had sufficient number 
of English speaking officers to meet their increasing requirements. Consequently, most 
of the workload was assigned to the American and the British officers while their 
Greek and Turkish colleagues were frustrated, because they were not fully utilized.
205
 
Whatever the problems, a more or less satisfactory command structure for the 
Greek and Turkish land and air forces had been set, but the issue of NATO naval 
command structure in the Mediterranean required a final settlement. The CINCNELM, 
Admiral Jerauld Wright, approved, despite its disadvantages, the British concept of the 
existence of two major naval commands in the Mediterranean. He considered the 
proposal, „however much of a compromise‟, a definite advance, and urged SHAPE to 
seek the final settlement of the issue.
206
 In mid-November 1952 the Chief of the Air 
Staff, Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir 
Rhoderick McGrigor, flew to Washington to hold discussions with the JCS and the 
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French representative at the Standing Group, Admiral Nomy. The provisional 
settlement on the establishment of the Mediterranean Command was first reached at 
the Standing Group meeting in Washington on 20 November. It was agreed that British 
naval and air bases in the Mediterranean would be placed at the disposal of NATO; 
that the term „Mediterranean‟ should mean „the entire area of the Mediterranean and 
Black Seas except for national territorial waters‟; that a „Commander-in-Chief 
Mediterranean (CINCMED)‟, directly subordinate and responsible to SACEUR, would 
be appointed, and that this would be a British naval officer; CINCMED would 
establish a headquarters ashore with a fully integrated staff consisting of 
representatives of all the nations concerned; his command would be divided into areas 
with due regard to national responsibilities and the protocols already in force; 
recommendations regarding the delineation of areas would be made by SACEUR after 
consultation with all interested nations; within each area the Commander would be 
responsible to CINCMED for sea and area operations and CINCMED would establish 
the closest cooperation with adjacent commanders.
207
  
Even so, the British also conceded the US position regarding the Sixth Fleet: 
the Heavy Carriers, Amphibious or Support Forces of the Sixth Fleet, namely what 
became known as the Strike Force, should be exclusively under the command of 
CINCSOUTH and employed only for the support of the land battle in southern Europe, 
unless specially released by SACEUR to operate elsewhere in the Mediterranean.
208
 
Churchill himself strongly supported these proposals urging for their quick adoption 
and pressed the French government to accept them as well. He acknowledged that the 
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primary task of this Strike Force was to cooperate with the US Air Forces in the area in 
the strategic air attack to paralyze Soviet movements; the major strategic air attack had 
therefore to be under US command.
209
 This peculiar position of the Strike Force of the 
Sixth Fleet became an integral element of the final arrangement and was endorsed by 
the NATO Military Committee in December 1952: as General Collins noted, the Sixth 
Fleet was „an essential adjunct‟ to the command of CINCSOUTH and should remain 
under him.
210
 
Meanwhile, the Turkish leadership intervened and proposed that the naval 
forces of all the Mediterranean NATO nations operate under a single naval 
Commander-in-Chief. The Sixth Fleet should also be assigned to this Command, 
whose commander ought to be called Commander South European Naval Forces, and 
„in view of coordinating all the combat operations and activities in the Southern 
European area‟ it was considered that he should be „directly attached to 
CINCSOUTH‟.211 
Nevertheless, once the Americans and the British had reached a deal (and the 
French had accepted it), they were able to carry their point. Thus, after two years of 
intense negotiations, the setting up of the new Mediterranean Command was approved 
by the NATO Military Committee in December 1952. The new command was to be 
subordinate to SACEUR, and Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) was officially 
established on 15 March 1953, with Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Commander-
in-Chief. The headquarters of CINCAFMED (the former CINMED) were established 
in Malta. Concurrently, the Naval Forces Southern Europe Command under 
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CINCSOUTH was abolished and a new subordinate command, the Naval Striking and 
Support Forces, was activated.
212
  
Following this, the Mediterranean Command was established quickly. The 
representatives of Italy, Greece and Turkey were verbally informed of the agreement 
on the Mediterranean Command on the 24 November.
213
 Thus, the Standing Group 
paper on the Mediterranean Command was approved by the NATO Military 
Committee, and then by the North Atlantic Council with only minor amendments. 
Little further negotiation took place, since Italy, Greece and Turkey, as a result of 
combined US-UK pressure, eventually agreed to approve the paper without 
reservation. Furthermore, in December 1952 NATO started to prepare the naval force 
requirements necessary for the new area covered by the Mediterranean Command, 
while Greece and Turkey, which had maintained their naval forces under their General 
Staffs, were invited to make available to the Mediterranean Command those of their 
naval forces not required for operations within their coastal waters.
214
  
The December 1952 arrangement over the Mediterranean Command meant 
that the US view regarding the organization of allied naval forces had prevailed, with 
the British retaining the post of the Commander-in-Chief. Admittedly, this was small 
consolation for London, which had hoped to use the Mediterranean Command issue as 
a strategic lever in its efforts to retain its predominance in the Middle East as well. 
Even after December 1952 the British kept thinking that the Mediterranean Command 
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was closely linked with London‟s interests in the Middle East. Of course, British 
officials admitted that it was difficult for the NATO forces under CINCAFMED to 
intervene in disturbances in the Middle East outside the NATO area, since several 
NATO powers were unwilling to interfere in Middle East affairs. Even so, it was 
argued that CINCAFMED would still be Commander-in-Chief of the British forces 
under his command and „in the event of e.g. disturbances in Egypt [he] could employ 
them but not of course the forces of other NATO powers‟. Although some NATO 
countries might be unhappy if any forces assigned to NATO and under a NATO 
commander were committed in a crisis which would be no concern of NATO, 
„obviously, however, we cannot sterilise the British Mediterranean Fleet to the extent 
of stating that it would only be employed under the aegis of NATO‟.215  This, however, 
meant that London‟s aims with regard to the Mediterranean Command had not been 
met in full. 
The above had to do with the political dimension of the establishment of the 
Mediterranean Command and the overall command structure of allied naval forces in 
the region. As for the military situation and NATO‟s naval strategy, the task of the 
Striking Forces was to provide direct support to the land and air campaigns in the 
Southern Flank area with maritime aviation and amphibious forces. A key role of those 
forces was to launch tactical and even strategic nuclear strikes, acting as an extension 
of the strategic air force. The condition and effectiveness of the allied ground and air 
units in the southern flank was poor, and therefore the Sixth Fleet had to provide as 
much support as possible.
216
 Admiral Carney stated on 22 April 1952 that considering 
all elements of his command, the maritime situation was relatively good, or, as he put 
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it, the Mediterranean naval forces „were less badly off‟ than forces elsewhere. He was 
also very emphatic when he discussed maritime airpower, defending the role of aircraft 
carriers (which some critics had described as „sitting ducks‟) and making clear he had 
asked from SACEUR for as many carriers as he could get. Furthermore, referring to 
NATO‟s Southern Command as a whole, Carney stressed that his command „was 
desperately short of land-based airpower, the tactical types‟.217 
In any case, in the early 1950s the newly designated US Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean was considered the most powerful force under SACUER‟s command, 
not only due to its powerful maritime air arm, but also to its considerable amphibious-
counterassault capabilities.
218
 At that point it included two carriers, three cruisers, two 
destroyer squadrons and various supporting elements.
219
 And, although in decline, the 
British naval presence – including a battleship and two light carriers – in the 
Mediterranean was still significant.
220
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ii) Regional defence: The issue of military cooperation with Yugoslavia, NATO 
planning for the Balkan frontier, and the conclusion of the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav 
Pact of Friendship  
By early 1952, negotiations had been in progress between Greece and Turkey in an 
attempt to coordinate their defence plans, while during the spring of 1952 Greek-
Yugoslav military talks were held.
221
 The first who had toyed with, and soon 
advocated, the idea of a tripartite alliance was the Greek military as early as 1949.
222
 
By 1952 even the Italians, who were still at odds with the Yugoslavs over Trieste, 
acknowledged that the integration of Yugoslavia with the Western defence system was 
a matter of great importance and interest to NATO, and Italy in particular. Rome 
wanted to know whether the defence plans of Yugoslavia had been taken into account 
by the Standing Group in the establishment of NATO operational plans, especially 
with regard to the exposed Ljubljana Gap.  Moreover, in August 1952 Greece and 
Turkey were asked to keep the NAC informed about the progress of the Greek-
Turkish-Yugoslav negotiations and their results. The Greek and Turkish 
representatives, Panagiotis Pipinelis and Taha Carim respectively, replied that they 
were at the disposal of the Council.
223
 
 Soon afterwards Pipinelis pointed out (with Carim‟s concurrence) that for a 
considerable time, long before Greece and Turkey joined NATO, the two governments 
had been trying to improve their relations with Yugoslavia and to bring that country 
into the orbit of their own defence efforts. He then analyzed the reasons why Greece 
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considered cooperation with Yugoslavia of great importance. Those were political and 
military, local, regional, and European. Locally, concerning the defence of Greece, the 
improvement of relations with Belgrade and, if possible, Greek-Yugoslav military 
cooperation, was vital. Not only was the Greek northern frontier too long and very 
difficult to be held against Soviet-bloc aggression, but also the Greek-Yugoslav 
frontier (contrary to the Greek-Bulgarian and Greek-Albanian ones) was not 
mountainous; from there the Greek positions of defence along the whole northern 
Greece could be easily outflanked by advancing enemy motorized forces.
224
 
Pipinelis assessed that Yugoslavia constituted a significant bastion for the 
defence of the Straits, the Near East and the Adriatic. No attack based on Bulgaria and 
directed southwards could be mounted so long as the Yugoslavs could threaten its 
flank, while Yugoslavia also represented a threat against any attack directed towards 
Italy.
225
 Pipinelis also emphasized the importance of Yugoslavia, within the wider 
southern „fortress‟ consisting of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, for European 
defence. He also referred to the political importance and the broader implications of 
the Titoist heresy in its breach with communist orthodoxy.
226
 
At this point it should be mentioned that in April 1952 the newly-appointed 
Yugoslav military attaché in Athens declared to General Grigoropoulos that, in the 
event of military threat against Greece from the Eastern bloc, the Greeks could expect 
the Greek-Yugoslav frontier to be covered by the Yugoslav forces, because the 
Yugoslavs were determined to defend their country. The Greek Chief of the General 
Staff of National Defence responded that he was happy to hear this, but believed that 
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bilateral (or even tripartite, with Turkey‟s participation) military discussions should 
take place to establish common plans or at least useful exchange of views.
227
 
In any case, despite the consistent efforts made by the Greek Government, 
progress in the Greek-Yugoslav and tripartite Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav talks had not 
gone much beyond generalities, for various reasons. The Yugoslavs appeared very 
hesitant to initiate formal military discussions, and informed the Greeks and the Turks 
that the first step for the initiation of military talks should be made by the Greek or/and 
Turkish side. Apparently, Tito was not in a position to start military talks with the two 
pro-Western neighbouring states. Although Athens and Ankara were ready to assume 
the initiative, it was definitely not easy for the three parties to proceed fast with the 
commencement of military negotiations.  
There were two primary reasons for Tito‟s hesitation. The first was the 
ideological and political gap between Yugoslavia on the one hand, and Greece and 
Turkey on the other. The second was the Greek-Yugoslav distrust, going back to the 
Greek Civil War, which could not be easily overcome. Greek suspiciousness was 
further fuelled because Tito and his regime, and especially circles in the province of 
Yugoslav Macedonia, had, in the second half of the 1940s claimed Greek Macedonia, 
while even after 1948 they continually raised the issue of an alleged existence of a 
Slav-speaking minority in Northern Greece. Thus, the Yugoslav indirect claims in 
Greek Macedonia, though not to the same extent as during the 1946-8 period, had not 
ceased. However, despite continuous Greek suspicion towards the Yugoslavs, Athens 
believed that Tito and his federal government would never allow the local authorities 
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in Skopje to provoke the Greeks to such an extent as to cause a failure of a bilateral 
(and probably tripartite) rapprochement.
228
 
In any case, the most serious problem posed by a tripartite defence pact was 
the extent of the obligations that Greece and Turkey should undertake towards 
Yugoslavia. The fact that Greece and Turkey were NATO members complicated 
things, since a Greek-Turkish commitment to provide automatically help to Belgrade 
in the event of war with the Eastern bloc would indirectly expand NATO obligations to 
Yugoslavia. This would not be a problem in the case of Bulgarian and Soviet 
aggression in the Balkans, or of a general conflict in Europe and the Near East. 
However, an automatic Greek-Turkish guarantee could entangle Athens and Ankara, 
and probably NATO, in a localized conflict between Yugoslavia and a Soviet satellite 
other than Bulgaria (probably Hungary), or even a Soviet attempt to overthrow Tito. 
Last but not least, Greece and Turkey did not seek to form a tripartite alliance which 
would include an automatic guarantee against any aggressor, because this would 
frustrate the Italians as long as the Trieste question remained unsolved.
229
  
Athens and Turkey wanted a tripartite defence pact aiming at Bulgarian 
aggression which would also associate Yugoslavia with NATO‟s Southern Flank. 
Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia had reasons to fear Bulgaria: due to its geographical 
position it could threaten all three countries; moreover, it was the most reliable Soviet 
ally and had the better equipped, and probably the better trained army in the region.
230
 
The Yugoslavs, for their part, were particularly interested by the summer of 1952 in 
engaging in military talks provided that Turkey was prepared to participate in the 
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„positive defence‟ of Thrace, something that both Turkey and Greece were fully aware 
of, and in broad agreement.
231
 
How did NATO and its most significant members view a potential Greek-
Turkish-Yugoslav military agreement? In early 1952, Greece and Turkey requested 
Washington to press Yugoslavia to commit itself to mutual defence. However, the US 
Acting Secretary of State, James Webb, refused to intervene. The Americans were 
unwilling to push for Yugoslav military cooperation with the Greece and Turkey, and 
preferred that the Greeks and Turks lay through their own means the groundwork for 
staff discussions. On the one hand, the United States did not want to discourage any 
Greek and Turkish efforts to establish closer relations and develop greater cooperation 
with Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Americans were unwilling to participate 
themselves in staff conversations with the Yugoslavs. In addition, the fact that the 
Greeks and the Turks lacked knowledge of NATO military planning would probably 
limit the usefulness of any tripartite staff discussions at that stage.
232
    
Meanwhile, as Belgrade asked for western military aid in 1952, the three 
Standing Group powers were ready to initiate contingent planning discussions with 
Yugoslavia in autumn 1952. The Americans proposed to the British and the French 
that Italy, Greece, and Turkey should be assured that they would be kept informed 
insofar as matters directly concerning their national interests were involved.
233
 
However, on the insistence of the Defense Department and the JCS the Italians, the 
Greeks and the Turks would not participate in the talks.
234
 The British believed that, 
though welcomed, the Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish discussions should keep in step with 
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„the more important‟ US-UK-French discussions which General Handy was to conduct 
shortly with the Yugoslavs. Those talks would aim to explore ways of filling the gap in 
Western defences in general. Although the idea of a common defence plan between 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey would be surely discussed, this would not constitute 
the central theme of those talks.
235
 The reason for the exclusion of Greece and Turkey 
(as well as Italy) from the military talks with the Yugoslavs, at least in the initial phase, 
was that the participation by those countries would probably render it more difficult to 
lay a favourable groundwork for the military cooperation of the West and Yugoslavia. 
Particularly, it would give a NATO colour to the allied approach; this might jeopardize 
the success of the whole effort, given Belgrade‟s aversion to any formal military 
alliance with the West at that time.
236
    
Moreover, Rome was not enthusiastic about the prospect of military contacts 
between Yugoslavia and the West. The Italians claimed that military cooperation 
should be first and foremost based on mutual trust and common faith, which was not 
the case in Italian-Yugoslav relations at that point. As regards the Balkans, a military 
agreement alone, without the establishment of a political agreement as well, would not 
be enough for the strengthening of the area. Therefore, Italy remained adamant that as 
long as the Yugoslavs were unwilling to seek an accommodation of the controversy 
over Trieste, any coordination of efforts between Yugoslavia and NATO, 
irrespectively of the formal aspects that such cooperation could take, would prove 
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impossible. Under the existing circumstances, such coordination would definitely meet 
the firm opposition of the Italians.
237
 
The Italian military even stressed the danger of overestimating the Yugoslav 
sector as a consistent and firm defence line between NATO forces of Central Europe 
and those of Greece. They believed that if Yugoslavia were attacked it would probably 
establish a defence position in the south-west mountainous area instead of defending 
the access to Italy and Greece, i.e. the Ljubljana Gap and upper Vardar (Axios) Valley 
respectively; if not attacked, Yugoslavia would probably only secure its borders, but 
remain, at least initially, a neutral observer, without pinning down any Soviet bloc 
forces.
238
 
Then, in December 1952, the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 
Alcide De Gasperi, raised in the NAC ministerial meeting the Trieste problem and its 
continuing impact on Italian-Yugoslav relations as well as on the issue of common 
defence. He also noted that Italy had supported the supply of aid to Yugoslavia in 
1951-52 and had missed no opportunity to relieve tension with Yugoslavia; conversely, 
he claimed, Belgrade did not make any gesture of goodwill towards Italy for the 
improvement of bilateral relations and collaboration in common defence. 
Consequently, circumstances hindered the possibility of Italo-Yugoslav cooperation. 
The Greek Defence Minister, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, and the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Fuat Köprülü, underlined the strategic importance of Yugoslavia for the 
defence of south-eastern Europe. However, they recognized that the establishment of a 
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Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish frontier would not occur at the expense of Rome‟s „legitimate 
interests‟.239  
Until late 1952, Tito had been interested only in an informal tripartite Balkan 
understanding to enhance Yugoslavia‟s defence position in the Balkans in the face of 
the threat of Soviet aggression but also as a response to „the eventual return of Italy 
into the Balkans‟.240 However, in December 1952 the Yugoslavs adopted a new policy 
and publicly declared their willingness to reach a formal accord with Greece and 
Turkey. This was due to fears that the Italians, who were about to launch their own 
„diplomatic offensive‟, might convince the Greeks and the Turks to slow down their 
rapprochement with Belgrade (in 1952-3, Italian-Yugoslav relations remained tense 
due to the Trieste question).
241
 In addition, in November 1952 the US-UK-French 
delegation under the US General Thomas Handy (the „Handy mission‟) arrived in 
Belgrade to negotiate with the Yugoslav leaders the prospects of military aid to 
Yugoslavia and hold talks on the possibility of military cooperation. However, those 
discussions were considered as preliminary by the Standing Group powers, while the 
Yugoslavs were impatient for the conclusion of an agreement. At Belgrade‟s dismay, 
no definite security arrangements could be established between the West and 
Yugoslavia. Therefore, the Yugoslavs made plain that they would not release any 
information on their defence plans, unless the Standing Group powers would be 
prepared to enter in more concrete talks.
242
 Soon afterwards, the Yugoslav leader 
                                                          
239
 NATO/C-R(52)39, 17-December-1952. 
240
 Ibid, p.1329; also New York Times, 2-September-1952. 
241
 Iatrides, Balkan Triangle, pp.96-97. 
242
 FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, pp.1335-6; also Beatrice Heuser, Western ‘Containment’ Policies in the 
Cold War: the Yugoslav Case, 1948-53 (London, New York: Routledge, 1989) pp.170-1. 
119 
 
 
 
turned to Greece and Turkey and initiated talks with them in early 1953 about joint 
defence of the Balkans.
243
  
After a period of hesitation, in late 1952 – early 1953 the US and UK 
governments encouraged the conclusion of some form of Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish 
agreement to cooperate in the event of Soviet aggression.
244
 In late 1952 Acheson, 
who was about to leave his post, claimed that Washington should encourage rapid and 
concrete progress in military planning in Greek-Yugoslav and Turkish-Yugoslav 
military talks. This was conditional on the Greeks and the Turks bearing the 
limitations imposed upon them by their membership of NATO and their not 
undertaking too many obligations towards Yugoslavia. Moreover, Acheson did not 
favour any commitment of forces, at least at that stage.
245
 Therefore, US diplomats 
served as channels of communication between the three Balkan states and offered their 
diplomatic intelligence to give a crucial push towards the establishment of a political 
pact. Nevertheless, the US and UK actions were of secondary importance. The 
initiative definitely lay in the three Balkan states.
246
 As the US Ambassador in Turkey 
George McGhee emphasised, „with little advice or encouragement from the Western 
powers, [the] three countries have on their own made commendable progress in 
worthwhile project‟.247  
In December 1952 Greek-Yugoslav military talks took place in Athens. They 
included intelligence information exchange and a detailed, though still general, 
discussion on defence problems of common interest. Furthermore, the psychological 
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purpose of the visit should not be overlooked: the aim was to demonstrate to both the 
Greeks and the Yugoslavs that the ideological gap and recent enmity between the two 
states could be overcome and that political and military cooperation was feasible.
248
 
During the same month further Greek-Yugoslav and Turkish-Yugoslav military talks 
took place in Belgrade.
249
 The three governments, through bilateral – not yet tripartite 
– negotiations, had achieved to reach the general outline of a mutual entente.250 So 
long as this remained an entente, and not a formal alliance which would complicate 
NATO planning, Washington, London and Paris supported the tripartite Balkan 
rapprochement. 
However, until that point, Greece had been very anxious and reluctant to 
proceed quickly to the conclusion of a formal pact with Yugoslavia so long as the 
Italian-Yugoslav dispute over the Trieste question was continuing, since Athens was 
also seeking to revive its relations with Italy. During his visit to Athens in mid-January 
1953 the Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi publicly said that Italy would 
favour „any defensive agreement which, within the framework of NATO, might 
increase the effectiveness of the free world to preserve peace‟.251 This could be 
considered as a green or at least amber light, and when Athens soon agreed on 
tripartite negotiations, the Greek Foreign Minister Stefanos Stephanopoulos stressed 
that „in particular, our [tripartite] entente should not frighten Italy‟.252 In fact, the 
deadlock was broken by Turkish initiatives: in late January 1953 Köprülü visited 
Belgrade and Athens and proposed that the issue of the formal alliance and of 
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automatic guarantee should be evaded for the moment by the conclusion of a treaty of 
friendship, instead of one of alliance. Greece and Turkey hoped that Yugoslavia might 
even join NATO in the future, and therefore the issue of the automatic guarantee 
would be resolved.
253
 For his part, Tito admitted that a regional tripartite agreement 
should be in conformity with Greek and Turkish obligations to NATO and that this 
was a very delicate issue which should be handled properly by Athens and Ankara.
254
  
When Köprülü visited Athens, Admiral Carney, CINCAIRSOUTH Schlatter, 
and COMLANDSOUTHEAST Wyman, also visited the Greek capital. Carney insisted 
that the visit of the NATO commanders was „purely coincidental‟ with Köprülü‟s, but 
admitted that he was kept informed of Greek-Yugoslav military talks. The following 
day CINCAFMED Admiral Lord Mountbatten also paid an unexpected visit in Athens 
to hold talks with the Greek leadership and the other NATO commanders. In absence 
of archival sources, an accurate hypothesis on a possible role played by NATO 
commanders for the rapprochement of Yugoslavia with Greece and Turkey cannot be 
made.
255
  
Surely, the Americans viewed positively the proposed form of tripartite 
collaboration. The establishment of a strong, anti-Soviet security system in all parts of 
the world – including the Balkans – was one of the primary goals of US policy. The 
conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship would bypass many difficulties that might 
otherwise arise if Greece and Turkey extended any specific commitments to 
Yugoslavia. The Turkish formula seemed well calculated to encourage tripartite 
military planning in the near future. It contributed to the defence of the southern 
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Balkans without at the same time expanding the obligations of the other NATO 
members. Therefore, provided that the eventual form of a Balkan accord would not 
involve extra commitments, the State Department did not consider that the submission 
of the treaty to NATO bodies was necessary (although it was assumed, and regarded 
desirable, that Athens and Ankara would inform the NAC). Another very welcome 
development was the declared willingness of the three countries to leave the door open 
to Italian adherence at a later stage, should Rome be interested. Of course, the 
possibility of eventual Yugoslav admission to NATO was a different issue, and if 
raised would be a matter for the accord of all NATO members.
256
 
The US Ambassadors in Athens and Ankara, John Emil Peurifoy and George 
McGhee respectively, were in favour of a quick conclusion of a Balkan Pact (as was 
their colleague in Belgrade, George Allen). They doubted whether it was realistic to 
believe that the military staff talks would not tend to create implicit obligations among 
the three parties, since obviously the next step was to plan for joint operations in case 
of war. If the United States, Britain and France would attempt to stop that evolution, 
their policy would probably backfire. Tito‟s suspicion, evident during the Handy talks, 
that the West would not assist him in a future war, would be revived. Furthermore, the 
Greeks and the Turks would feel that their goal for a regional defence pact would have 
been „reduced to an empty gesture along lines of ineffective Balkan entente‟. Both 
countries, „relatively isolated from Western Europe and with less possibility for 
receiving assistance in the event of war, might find difficult to understand resistance 
                                                          
256
 FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, p.615.  
123 
 
 
 
by their NATO allies to a step they consider desirable from general NATO viewpoint 
and vital to their own security‟.257 
 On the contrary, it was argued that should Yugoslavia be attacked by the 
Soviet bloc (including Bulgaria), it would be in the interest of effective NATO and US 
defence that Greece and Turkey come to Belgrade‟s help. Not only this seemed to be 
the only option for successful Balkan defence, but it was acknowledged that it would 
be highly unlikely that the West would treat an attack against Yugoslavia as an 
isolated war, just like another Korea (in contrast to the view expressed by General 
Handy during his talks with the Yugoslavs in November 1952, which had disappointed 
the latter). Therefore, it would be preferable to demonstrate clearly western resolve to 
react to Soviet-bloc aggression against Yugoslavia and deter the Soviets (rather than 
actually defend Yugoslavia in case of war). Moreover, the NATO military authorities 
could benefit from conversations to associate Belgrade with NATO strategic planning. 
NATO, or at least US military officers should maintain very close liaison with the 
Greek and Turkish negotiators to coordinate tripartite planning with NATO plans and 
ensure that the Greeks and the Turks would not go „farther than they intend‟ and 
infringe their NATO obligations.
258
 
However, the State Department remained reserved. The new Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, emphasised that he preferred that Greece and Turkey would 
only commit to consult on common contingency measures with Yugoslavia. It was not 
advisable for the time being to extend commitments to lend assistance in wartime, 
especially through an „automatic‟ guarantee, which would create „a serious problem 
for all NATO members‟.    Nevertheless, Western reservations on the actual form of 
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the treaty did not mean disapproval of the tripartite political and military collaboration 
itself.
259
 If the guarantee was automatic, it would entail the expansion of the NATO 
guarantee to Yugoslavia. But if in that case some Europeans allies (most likely the 
Scandinavians or the Dutch) declared that they did not recognise the „new‟ obligations 
that NATO was indirectly assuming towards Tito, this would cause the serious 
weakening of NATO as a whole.  
Meanwhile, on 20 February the Chief of the US Army Staff, General Lawton 
Collins, urged, on behalf of the JCS, that no time should be lost in preparing for 
further military discussions between the Standing Group representatives and the 
Yugoslavs. The US, UK and French representatives should make recommendations on 
future courses of actions and submit those proposals to their respective governments 
for approval. The British officials concurred.
260
 Obviously, the Americans and the 
British wished to regain the initiative and shape future developments in the region 
irrespective of possible progress towards a Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav accord, because 
Balkan developments could create problems to NATO. 
Indeed, on 17-20 February 1953, military talks between high-ranking officers 
of the Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav General Staffs were held in Ankara. The 
Yugoslavs tried to achieve the provision of some kind of automatic guarantee, but this 
was rejected by both the Greeks and the Turks. However, this did not prevent the three 
countries from reaching an accommodation during tripartite talks in Athens, leading to 
the conclusion of the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav Pact of Friendship and Collaboration. 
This was formally signed in Ankara on 28 February by the Foreign Ministers of the 
three states, Stephanopoulos, Köprülü, and Popović. Although the three signatories 
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declared their determination to defend their independence and territorial integrity and 
to step up their efforts to make common defence more effective, for the time being the 
Pact of Ankara was an entente, not an alliance. But even so, the Pact‟s conclusion, and 
the prospect of future military cooperation directly influenced the regional correlation 
of forces; particularly, since the Pact of Ankara was implicitly directed against the 
common regional enemy, Bulgaria. In any case, it was apparent that the conclusion of 
a formal tripartite military alliance would be the next logical step.
261
  
The US policy makers preferred that any future contingent Yugoslav-Greek-
Turkish military planning should be cleared with NATO military authorities, as being 
consonant with NATO military planning. Furthermore, it was apparent that State 
Department officials considered that the heart of the problem of Yugoslavia‟s relations 
with the West was the Trieste issue. The continuing Italian-Yugoslav dispute 
hampered any effort for the coordination of NATO-Yugoslav planning for joint 
defence of the Ljubljana Gap.
262
 In any case, for many US (and other NATO) policy 
makers, the tripartite Balkan cooperation was a positive step. When Dulles met in late 
April the Greek Defence Minister Panagiotis Kanellopoulos during the NAC 
Ministerial Meeting, he expressed his great satisfaction with the conclusion of the 
Ankara Treaty. He then recommended the continuation of Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav 
military discussions.
263
   
Meanwhile, in February 1953 Popović claimed that a renewal of the talks 
between Belgrade and the United States, Britain and France on a military basis was 
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desirable and should precede any political agreement. This development complicated 
matters. It was difficult to hold useful military discussions without disclosing and 
discussing NATO plans for the region. But this was SACUER‟s responsibility and 
could not be done on a tripartite (US-UK-French) basis. However, disclosure of 
NATO plans required the approval of the member countries of the alliance, and some 
of these (particularly Italy) might not agree. The COS argued that disclosure of NATO 
plans would not contribute in a positive way to the military talks with the Yugoslavs, 
because NATO‟s actual inability to defend the Ljubljana Gap would be revealed.264 
Therefore, it seems that initially the British military were not as eager as the JCS (or at 
least Collins) to resume US-UK-French-Yugoslav military talks. This did not affect 
UK-Yugoslav political relations and in March 1953 Tito officially visited London to 
hold discussions with the British leadership. The latter endorsed the signature of the 
Balkan Treaty and the progress made on tripartite military cooperation, but laid great 
emphasis on the need for the normalization of Italian-Yugoslav relations.
265
  
The importance of Yugoslavia‟s formal, or at least informal, association with 
NATO‟s military planning in the Balkans was deemed necessary to the Greeks in 
particular, but to the Turks as well, for the defence of their common frontier in Thrace, 
and Greek eastern Macedonia.
266
 The main reason was that in the 1950s Greece and 
Turkey did not have the potential to repel a probable invasion against the above 
regions, to the direction of the Aegean Sea and the Straits, while geography did not 
help as well. And, most importantly, NATO itself could not do much either by direct 
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intervention or by supplying its new members with such war materiel and financial aid 
to enable them to strengthen adequately their defence capabilities.
267
 
Indeed, the sole senior NATO official who attributed great significance to the 
defence of Thrace and the Straits was the deputy SACEUR, Field Marshal 
Montgomery. In May and September 1952, during his two visits in Turkey and Greece, 
he stressed that in case of a general East-West war in Europe and the Near East, loss of 
the Straits, and especially of the plateau of central Turkey, would prove crucial. He 
also advised the Turks to move forward their main forces closer to their north-eastern 
(Asiatic) frontier, and suggested that the measure could possibly be applied to the 
north-western (European) frontier as well. Indeed, especially during his first visit in 
May, Montgomery claimed that „Thrace could and should be held‟ and that „not an 
inch of Turkish or Greek territory should be given up without the fiercest resistance‟. 
These views had a most heartening effect on the Turkish political and military 
leadership
268. Montgomery‟s public insistence that the whole of Turkish territory 
should be fought for, his eagerness on helping the Turks deal with the practical issues 
of their integration into SHAPE, and, particularly, his refraining from raising the issues 
of the Mediterranean and Middle East Commands had one single aim: to remove 
doubts about the sincerity of British support for Turkey‟s inclusion into the European 
Command and eliminate „the poison‟ which remained from 1951 – early  1952, when 
Britain appeared to be blocking Turkey‟s inclusion in NATO.269 According to the 
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British embassy in Ankara, Montgomery‟s views and behaviour did „a lot to put us 
back on the map in Turkey and to dispel the harm which was done last year‟.270 
In June 1952 Köprülü argued that a NATO decision to defend Thrace would 
give Yugoslavia sufficient confidence to proceed with military cooperation with 
Greece and Turkey. On the contrary, if the Soviets could advance and break through to 
the Aegean within a few days, the moral effect not only on Greece but on the whole 
Eastern Mediterranean area would be disastrous; the strategic consequences would 
obviously be significant. But if NATO opted to defend Thrace, this would constitute a 
decisive deterrent against possible Soviet aggression. Furthermore, once Turkey‟s 
western front had been secured, the Turks would be able to play their full part in 
Middle East defence.
271
  
Montgomery recommended to the Greeks as well to move their main forces 
forward to Eastern Macedonia. However, he admitted that under the given 
circumstances, Western (Greek) Thrace could not be defended, although its probable 
loss would not matter much to the outcome of a conflict.
272
 Of course, this remark 
could not soothe Greek insecurity. After all, loss of Western Thrace would entail that 
the physical contact of Greek and Turkish land forces would be broken, thus seriously 
affecting Turkish position in Eastern Thrace. 
Here lay the reasons of Montgomery‟s pessimism. According to the British 
COS, in the event of conflict in 1952 the Soviet bloc was likely to deploy 
simultaneously 16 divisions and 900 aircraft against Turkish Thrace and 10 divisions 
and 450 aircrafts against the Greek territories of Western Thrace and Eastern 
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Macedonia; possibly one-third of these divisions would be armoured or mechanized 
and the aircraft were estimated to be modern jets. Although the total strength of the 
Greek and the Turkish Armed Forces were 12 divisions and 120 aircrafts, and 21 
divisions and 350 aircrafts respectively, the armies of both countries were ill-equipped 
and greatly inferior in firepower and mobility to the Soviet-bloc divisions, while their 
weak air forces possessed only obsolete piston-engine aircrafts. Therefore, the Greek 
and Turkish forces would be no match to the Soviet-bloc ones.
273
 For their part, the 
Greeks estimated that the Soviet-bloc forces in the Balkans (Albanian, Bulgarian, 
Romanian and Hungarian) were roughly equal in numerical strength with the Greek, 
Yugoslav, and Turkish forces. However, they also declared that the Soviet-bloc forces 
enjoyed considerable supremacy in artillery, armour, and tactical air force, and they 
would also have the advantage of initiative.
274
 
Even more disheartening was the fact that, in essence, NATO and allied 
support in general would be very limited, if it ever could come at all. As other NATO 
land and air forces would be fully committed elsewhere, some help could only be 
provided from CINCSOUTH‟s Fast Carrier Task Forces. However, these forces would 
be heavily committed to the fighting in northern Italy and they could grant limited 
support to the NATO‟s Balkan front.275 Meanwhile, the Turks, and especially the 
Greeks, had greatly and unrealistically overestimated the capabilities of those NATO 
forces available for the defence of the area.
276
 Yugoslavia might be able to defend 
effectively the Vardar Valley, or more possibly, the Monastir Gap deeper south-west, 
thus freeing some Greek forces for Thrace‟s defence. At any rate, according to the 
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COS, „even with air parity, any attempt to hold Thrace would involve the major part of 
the Greek and Turkish armies. With the overwhelming superiority in armour that the 
Russians are likely to possess added to their probable superiority in the air we do not 
consider a successful defence of Thrace to be practicable. Any serious attempt by the 
Greeks and Turks to defend Thrace in the foreseeable future could only result in a 
military disaster. In addition, it is likely that any defence of the Middle East would be 
gravely jeopardized‟.277  Obviously, by mid-1952 the COS and Montgomery had 
somewhat divergent views over the issue of the defence of Eastern Thrace, since the 
latter regarded the British approach as „out of date and under the new conditions ill-
conceived‟.278 
The Americans also reacted to Montgomery‟s proposals, since SHAPE could 
not offer any additional naval and air assistance to Turkey (and Greece) because the 
US forces in Europe were overstretched. Moreover, McGhee made plain that additional 
equipment to the Turkish Army could obviously not be given by the US Mutual 
Defence Aid Programme (MDAP) which had already been fixed for 1952 (the contrary 
was probable, a reduction might occur due to cuts by US Congress). Furthermore, there 
were not any additional ground troops available to strengthen the defence of Eastern 
Thrace, unless Turkey was going to weaken its position on its Eastern frontier, which 
was not desirable either to the Americans or the British.
279
  
In fact, there had been a verbal amendment on S.G.13/24 – the draft document 
on NATO‟s new strategic guidance, prepared by the Standing Group – which 
emphasized more the defence of Thrace. But this amendment was inserted clearly 
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„with the object of overcoming Turkish and Greek political objections to the proposed 
abandonment of Thrace‟. As British officials admitted, the new wording proposed by 
the Standing Group conceded the minimum necessary to meet the Turkish and Greek 
point of view, and it was also expressed in such broad terms that was unlikely to 
influence SACEUR‟s planning for Greek and Turkish defence.280 NATO was supposed 
to pursue „an aggressive defence in Southern Europe with particular regard to the 
holding of as much as possible of the broad territorial zone of the Southern Balkans 
and Anatolia which can be used as an operational base for offensive operations in the 
future‟.281 But this was only in theory. Greek and even Turkish military capabilities 
were inadequate to repel a Soviet or Soviet-bloc attack and successfully implement 
forward defence without the grant of substantial NATO support (both in peacetime and 
wartime); apparently, the defence of the Balkan frontier constituted one of SACUER‟s 
lowest priorities.
282
 
The US and British views on Balkan defence were finally reflected in the late 
1952 report of NATO‟s Military Committee on the alliance‟s new strategic guidance, 
M.C.14/1(Final). Concerning the defence effort in the Southern Flank, and especially 
the Balkan frontier, it was acknowledged that the coastal zone of the northern Aegean 
Sea which links Greece and Turkey – and especially Greek Thrace – was very exposed 
and lacked strategic depth for effective defence. Moreover, since it was expected that 
Turkey will be attacked simultaneously from several directions (the main efforts 
launched from the north-west, i.e. Turkish Thrace, and north-east, i.e. the Caucasus), 
NATO adopted the following strategy: Turkey should be defended „as far to the North 
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and West as possible, provided the defence of Anatolia and the denial to the enemy of 
the Dardanelles and Bosporus, are not thereby jeopardized‟. Every effort should be 
made to retain as much of Eastern Thrace in allied hands as possible, at least by the 
hold of the fortifications of the area (Çatalca-Demirkapi). As in the case of Greek 
(Western) Thrace, it was stated that, the defence lines should be moved forward „when 
practicable‟.283  
It can be therefore concluded that NATO‟s strategic aims regarding the 
Southern Flank area had crystallized as follows: First, emphasis would be given to the 
defence of north-eastern Italy, while north-eastern Greece and a significant portion of 
north-western Turkey would remain virtually undefended. This was partly because 
north-eastern Italy was less exposed and could be defended more easily by Italian and 
NATO forces, contrary to Thrace (Italy did not border with any Soviet satellite state); 
but probably, it is likely that this was due to greater Italian importance and leverage 
within NATO and the West in general. Second, although the defence of Turkey was 
deemed necessary, much more attention was granted to the bolstering of defence of 
eastern Turkey as part of the Middle East defence, and, next, to the defence of the 
Straits area, than to Thrace. Obviously the main Turkish roles in West‟s (not strictly 
NATO‟s) military planning was its considerable contribution to Middle Eastern and 
not Balkan defence, and its use as a platform for the launch of strategic air offensives 
against the USSR and the Soviet bloc.   
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iii) The eastern frontier: attempts to coordinate NATO planning with the Middle East 
defence 
Although the Balkan frontier, both concerning its defence and the proper command set-
up, fully occupied NATO, this was apparently not the issue for the Middle East in 
1952-3. Of course the British remained fully committed to establish a Middle East 
defence pact (by mid-1952 called MEDO instead of MEC) and US-UK negotiations 
kept going to resolve the issue.
284
 However, during 1952 the Middle East defence was 
separated from NATO politics (although NATO channels were still used for talks on 
Middle Eastern affairs by the interested powers). This was due to several reasons: the 
failure of the MEC project; the Southern Flank‟s reorganization and definition of 
commands and subcommands which led to the final incorporation of the Greek and 
Turkish land and air forces to CINCSOUTH‟s command; and the British failure to 
place all allied naval forces in the Mediterranean under a British CINCMED 
responsible to the NATO Standing Group. 
Furthermore, although the defence of the eastern frontier of the Southern 
Flank was directly influenced by the situation in the Middle East (or at least by the 
position of certain countries, like Iraq, Iran and Syria) NATO was always divided on 
the Middle East. The allies never agreed on the priorities and interests they could 
promote in the region. The United States was reluctant to support wholeheartedly the 
British initiatives for the formation of a Middle East defence pact (the MEC and 
MEDO projects), while the British and the French were trying to maintain a 
considerable degree of independent national policy. In addition, although NATO was 
supposed to defend the member-states‟ assets and interests in the Mediterranean as 
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well, most European allies were unwilling to commit themselves to the defence of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, let alone the neighbouring Middle East. Therefore, NATO was 
unable to devise an integrated vision and strategy on the Middle East, while a 
connection to the Mediterranean never materialized.
285
    
The three major NATO powers kept holding discussions for the coordination 
of their policy in the region and the establishment of a defence pact. The French were 
still attached to the Ottawa proposals of September 1951 and were not willing to accept 
any formula which did not provide that MEDO should be under the direction of the 
Standing Group representatives wearing different hats. The British agreed with the 
French on the importance of unity of strategic direction between NATO and MEDO 
and favoured the idea of Standing Group control. However, the Americans refused to 
give the Standing Group any role in MEDO, probably because they were unwilling to 
let the French have a say in the control of global strategy. The British intended to 
provide „qualified support‟ to the French in the hope of reaching a compromise 
solution, but believed that the French would not withdraw from MEDO if they would 
not receive satisfaction on their point, and admitted that Britain could not risk losing 
US support for MEDO, and would have to accept the US views.
286
 
After Turkey had secured its final incorporation to SACEUR‟s and 
CINCSOUTH‟s commands in the summer of 1952, it expressed the desire in late 
September 1952 to become a member of MEDO. It also proposed that the organization 
be established in some part of Southern Turkey, instead of Egypt or Cyprus (which the 
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COS preferred).
287
 Apparently, the Turks felt more confident after the incorporation of 
their forces in NATO structures, while the deteriorating situation in Iran might have 
prompted them to seek a more active role in Middle Eastern defence.
288
 Turkey‟s 
policy on that matter had changed to such extent that in late 1952 the Turkish General 
Zeki Okan maintained during an informal discussion with the Chief of the Air Staff 
(CAS), Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, that although Turkey was in NATO, it 
was also part of the Middle East and therefore Turkey and the Middle East were not 
separate entities. Okan also favoured a British forward stockpile in South-east Turkey 
since „Turkey was the main bastion of the Middle East‟. He finally pointed out that 
since the British and the Turks were in general agreement on Middle East defence 
strategy and on the importance of the Turkish „bastion‟, he hoped that Britain would 
give its full support to the Turkish requests for assistance under the NATO 
infrastructure programme.
289
 Obviously, Turkey sought to play the cards of its 
geographical position and large army to enhance its leverage both within NATO and 
the Middle East and to secure additional military aid.  
For their part, the British COS were eager to drive the Turks towards a more 
active military role in the Middle East; this would be in line with British requirements 
in case of war with the USSR. Of particular concern was the lack of mobility of the 
Turkish Army which could prove important in a Middle Eastern war. This, combined 
with Turkish conceptions of national defence, would most likely prompt the Turks to 
fight only on their soil, but not beyond their borders. The British, however, wanted to 
persuade them fight outside Turkey and move towards the Caspian Sea, thus 
threatening the flanks of any Soviet advance towards the Persian Gulf. To this aim, the 
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closest cooperation between the HALFSEE and the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East 
(and MEDO when set) should be established. Ridgway agreed in principle with this 
idea, but made clear that he could not officially take any specific steps without 
instructions and the approval of the Standing Group, since the Middle East was outside 
the NATO area. He promised to use his influence to persuade the Turks review their 
conception and fight outside their territory, further east.
290
 In any case, the Americans 
had not yet envisaged a comprehensive strategy on the Middle East, but rather had a 
quite general and vague concern for the area; this changed only after the Eisenhower 
administration came to office in 1953, when it adopted a „northern tier‟ strategy.291 
The Turkish President, Çelal Bayar, claimed that since Turkey was admitted 
to NATO it should pursue a more active policy in the Middle East. Both Bayar and the 
Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Nuri Yamut, believed that in the event of a 
Soviet advance towards the Persian Gulf and/or Suez, no Soviet commander could 
reasonably expect to bypass Turkey without first attempting to defeat or neutralize it. 
Turkey could not afford to be flanked by Soviet-controlled states to its south and east. 
A Soviet invasion of Iraq and/or Iran would almost certainly involve Britain and 
probably other NATO countries as well. Therefore, „Turkey would legally carry out its 
NATO obligations‟. But Menderes noted that if the NATO allies did not react to a 
Soviet thrust in the Middle East, it would be useless for Turkey to react alone.
292
 In 
other words, the overall picture was far from clear. Judging the prospect of real and 
effective Turkish contribution, the problem of inadequate mobility, firepower and 
logistics of the Turkish Army would remain unresolved for many years. Thus, from the 
military point of view it seems doubtful that it could successfully perform the role 
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expected by the British (an essentially offensive one, which would require that the 
Turkish forces fight far from their bases) against powerful mechanized and armoured 
Soviet forces with superior firepower and, possibly, local air superiority in a Middle 
Eastern war which would be fought in great and open spaces, with the elements of 
speed and mobility assuming a crucial role.  
Italy and Greece also wanted to participate in MEDO.
293
 However, the British 
and the Americans did not favour this. As for the Greek case in particular, London and 
Washington were in agreement that Greece should not form part of MEDO since it 
could make no effective contribution to the organization and its participation would 
only complicate negotiations. The Greeks would only be kept informed of MEDO 
developments, normally through NATO channels.
294
 Of course one could claim that 
the exclusion of Italy and Greece from MEDO was corollary of the fact that none of 
them were Middle Eastern states, contrary to Turkey. But that exclusion was also a 
clear display that from that point on, not only the British but also the Americans 
acknowledged that Turkey was expected to be the main allied foothold in the Middle 
East. Thus Turkey‟s leverage within NATO and particularly the US-UK planning for 
the Middle East continued to rise.  
In late 1952, Admiral Carney had requested permission from SACEUR 
General Ridgway to send a planning team to Egypt for follow-up planning talks with 
the British military due to begin in late January.
295
 The British officials favoured the 
holding of staff talks between the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle 
East (BDCC, ME), and CINCSOUTH‟s staff, since it was considered that „the arrival 
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of American or other NATO officers for conferences in Canal Zone may indeed be 
useful from our [the British] point of view, as demonstrating to the Egyptians the 
community of Western interest in Middle East defence‟.296 Ridgway‟s Chief of Staff, 
General Gruenther, advised against this meeting on political grounds (he thought that 
such discussions would have repercussions on the „delicate‟ Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations on the future of the Suez base), and suggested that the case be referred to 
the Standing Group.
297
 Indeed, Ridgway considered it would be inadvisable to hold 
military discussions between AFSOUTH and BDCC Middle East staff officers in the 
Suez Canal Zone; these had to take place in Naples. After some hesitation, the British 
finally concurred that the first series of staff talks should take place in Naples.
298
 The 
situation was so delicate and complicated, that the Anglo-Americans, the NATO 
commanders and the British Cs-in-C Middle East could not agree even where to hold 
discussions to coordinate NATO-Middle East defence. 
 The above mentioned staff talks were finally held in late February 1953. It 
was agreed that future talks should include the British Cs-in-C Middle East Land and 
Air Forces (the CINCMELF and the CINCMEAF), the NATO 
COMLANDSOUTHEAST and COMAIRSOUTH, and the Turkish Army and Air 
Staff.
299
 The COS proposed that the British Cs-in-C Middle East be authorized to 
disclose on a „need to know basis‟ such plans and intelligence as were necessary for 
the integration of NATO/Middle East planning and the establishment of links with 
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AFSOUTH. For its part, the Standing Group approved the disclosure to the Cs-in-C 
Middle East of any relevant NATO plans and intelligence at future talks.
300
  
Meanwhile, US-UK-French discussions continued on the best possible link 
between the NATO Standing Group and the so called MEDO ad hoc Group. So long as 
MEDO remained only a prospect, the French wished to appoint as representative to the 
MEDO ad hoc Group their representative in the NATO Standing Group, particularly if 
the British did the same; and they anticipated that the latter would accept the US 
proposal that the Standing Group should be able to consult the ad hoc Group to 
consider problems concerning the Middle East.
301
 Indeed, the British advocated such 
an arrangement, because they believed that „the efficiency of the proposed 
arrangements would be improved by such an overlap between the memberships of the 
two Groups‟.302 Obviously, at that point the British and the French favoured the 
integration of allied Middle East policy to the overall strategy which was formulated 
by the Standing Group.   
The United States, Britain and France agreed that during peacetime, the 
MEDO Planning Group should make plans to coordinate operations of allied forces in 
the Middle East with the operations of the adjoining NATO Mediterranean Command 
and LANDSOUTHEAST headquarters; in wartime, one of SACME‟s main tasks 
would be the protection of SACEUR‟s (that is, CINCSOUTH‟s) right flank, as well as 
Turkey‟s southern flank.303 The British emphasized that the defence of the Middle East 
formed part of the Anglo-American global strategy. It was considered that in Soviet 
global strategy the Soviet campaigns in the Middle East would be of secondary 
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importance to those in Western Europe. The initial aims of a Soviet advance would be 
the improvement of the air defence of the southern USSR by the rapid destruction of 
Allied air bases, and the occupation of the Dardanelles/Bosporus area. Additional aims 
might be the diversion of allied forces from the NATO area of operations and the 
denial of Middle Eastern oil to the West. Those goals could be accomplished by the 
occupation of Greek and Turkish Thrace on the one hand, and Anatolia, Iraq and Iran 
on the other. However, though complimentary, the above operations were not 
interdependent. In any case, it was considered that the Soviet forces – some 18 
divisions – would be able to advance deep in Turkey to the Iskenderun-Aleppo line, 
with the possible support of 950 tactical aircraft and 135 naval aircraft.
304
 The British 
military believed that Soviet naval forces or submarines would not operate in the 
Mediterranean until the Straits were occupied by the Soviets. However, Greek Thrace 
was likely to be captured within six days or earlier, so fast Soviet-bloc patrol boats 
might be shipped overland and begin to operate in the Aegean. Submarines could also 
be sent in the Mediterranean and return to Albania or Thrace upon, or soon afterwards, 
the outbreak of hostilities. Generally, at least initially, the only considerable threat to 
NATO naval forces would be restricted to Soviet air attacks. The latter would not pose 
a serious threat for allied shipping for at least six weeks after the outbreak of 
hostilities, because they would be mainly preoccupied with the land campaign in the 
Balkans and Asia Minor; still, the ports of the region might constitute a target. It was 
anticipated that as the campaign against Italy, Greece and Turkey developed, the 
bombing of allied shipping would intensify.
305
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Conclusion 
The constant and intense negotiations concerning the reorganization of the Southern 
European Command and the establishment of a sound command set-up, which took 
place after the final and definite Greek and Turkish admission to NATO and their 
inclusion under SACEUR‟s jurisdiction in February 1952, aimed also, or even mainly, 
to serve political considerations. These negotiations continued to occur mainly between 
the Americans and the British, both within and outside NATO. The Americans, aware 
of their preponderance in the Eastern Mediterranean, pressed for the incorporation of 
Greek and Turkish land and air forces into CINCSOUTH‟s Command, and wanted the 
naval Mediterranean Command to be subordinate to him as well. The Greeks and the 
Turks strongly favoured the US view, since for political, military and prestige reasons 
they wanted to be under a US-led command, and not under a British-led new South-
eastern command linked with the Middle East or even a sub-command under an Italian 
General; indeed, once they succeeded on their admission to NATO, Greece and Turkey 
strongly opposed any other settlement than their inclusion to CINCSOUTH‟s 
command. For their part, the British remained firm on their effort to orient the Greek-
Turkish sector more towards the Middle East, but had no option but to concede to the 
final placement of Greek and Turkish forces to CINCOUTH. They also had to 
compromise on the Mediterranean Command issue. The French and the Italians did not 
want or could not do much to shape the developments; Greece was too weak but also 
too satisfied to intervene; but Turkey again undertook an active policy to make plain its 
views and defend its interests. In any case, the US views prevailed since no one, the 
British not least, could risk losing American support.   
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However, from the very beginning NATO faced paramount problems in its 
effort to make a substantial military contribution on the defence of the Southern Flank, 
on its Balkan and eastern sectors in particular. Apart from the maritime aviation of the 
US Sixth Fleet, NATO did not have any real potential to help Greece and Turkey, and 
Greek and Turkish forces were incapable of defending effectively against an Eastern 
bloc attack. The prospect of cooperation with Titoist Yugoslavia offered a chance of 
redressing the unfavourable balance to some extent, but even so the major NATO 
countries did not have identical interests and aims with Greece and Turkey and were 
sceptical about the consequences of a Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav alliance on NATO 
obligations. In fact, although the issue of a Middle Eastern command organization did 
not occupy NATO to considerable extent after early 1952, the Middle East had much 
more gravity regarding global strategy and defence planning both for US and British 
policy-makers than South-eastern Europe.  
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3. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO, 
1953-1954 
 
In January 1953, Dwight Eisenhower assumed office as President of the United States. 
His closest associate on the formulation of a new US grand strategy (which obviously 
influenced NATO strategy) was the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. 
Eisenhower and Dulles were eager to adopt a new strategy which would put more 
emphasis on economic rather than military strength by slowing down the pace of 
conventional rearmament.
306
 However, the Eisenhower administration had to review 
for several months the US national security and containment policy before it would be 
able to devise a new, comprehensive strategy. In May 1953, the first step was made by 
proceeding to a thorough investigation of various courses of US national security 
policy.
307
 Moreover, in June Eisenhower appointed new service chiefs: General 
Matthew Ridgway and Admiral Robert Carney left their NATO commands and were 
appointed Army Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) respectively, 
while General Nathan Twining became Air Chief of Staff and Admiral Arthur Radford 
Chairman of the JCS. General Gruenther replaced Ridgway as SACEUR, while 
Admiral William Fechteler, the former CNO, became CINCSOUTH.
308
 Finally, in 
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January 1954 Lieutenant General Paul Kendall replaced Lieutenant General William 
Wyman as COMLANDSOUTHEAST.
309
  
Alfred Gruenther‟s appointment as SACEUR was not unexpected. Having 
served as SACEUR‟s Chief of Staff under both Eisenhower and Ridgway for two and 
a half years, he was familiar with NATO issues. It was also known that Eisenhower 
always wanted Gruenther to succeed him. Moreover, in mid-1953 the general context 
was different from that of early 1952, and Gruenther appeared more suitable for the 
post than Ridgway: the latter was an outstanding and inspiring field commander, and 
his role was primarily to boost European morale when Cold War was at its peak, 
bolster NATO defence and press the Europeans to rearm themselves. However, he 
lacked diplomatic abilities. Stalin‟s death and the end of the Korean War led to a 
relative, gradual relaxation of East-West tension, and the fear of an immediate general 
war was relatively weakened. Furthermore, the pace of rearmament was losing its 
tempo in most allied European countries, and Ridgway overdid it by „putting relentless 
pressure‟ on them to achieve the Lisbon goals. Since Eisenhower himself was moving 
towards the adoption of a US strategy which downgraded the role of conventional 
forces, the time was ripe for the removal of Ridgway and the appointment of 
Gruenther. The latter had not been a field commander but was an excellent planner and 
possessed considerable political-diplomatic skills. He therefore appeared more suitable 
than Ridgway to deal with such thorny issues as the development of multinational 
strategy, the settlement of national and multinational force levels – and therefore 
                                                          
309
 DDEL/Gruenther/NATO series/SACEUR, Box 4, 6-January-1954. 
145 
 
 
 
defence spending – and the introduction of West German forces into the Western 
defence establishment.
310
   
By 1953-4 the command structure and setup of the Southern Flank area had 
been finalised, and NATO, the United States and Britain placed much emphasis on 
organising its defence by devising operational plans, taking into account the evolving 
US and NATO strategy, the Italian, Greek and Turkish military (and financial) 
potential, and the estimates on Soviet bloc capabilities. Overall, it appears that during 
that period the situation in the Southern Flank was not satisfactory, while it is highly 
questionable if allied forces could mount a successful defence against Soviet bloc 
aggression. Nevertheless, the heavy reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, though 
controversial, in conjunction with the establishment of the Balkan Alliance during 
1954, offered for the first time the opportunity for mounting a vigorous defence 
against a Soviet bloc advance in the Balkan frontier. Even more significant, these 
developments added considerable credibility to allied deterrence in the area. On the 
political field, in 1953-4 the Southern Flank reached its peak: after the strains suffered 
over command issues during 1951-2, the US-UK relationship had been fully restored, 
while Greek-Turkish cooperation expanded further, managing to link indirectly 
Yugoslavia with the Western defence system.    
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i) The evolution of NATO strategy and its application on the Southern Flank 
NATO strategy underwent considerable change from late 1953 until late 1954. Both in 
Europe and the United States the cost of rearmament had bred domestic political 
resistance to the build-up of conventional forces. A significant gap existed between 
NATO conventional force requirements and the forces that the allies were able, or 
willing, to raise. Most European allies were reluctant to subordinate their economic 
recovery to rearmament.
311
 A concurrent development was innovations in the military 
technological field: first, the invention of the hydrogen (thermonuclear, or fusion) 
bomb, which was a thousand times more powerful than the fission bomb, and second, 
the introduction and growing availability of tactical nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons 
small enough to be used at the battlefield and not for strategic bombing). The advent 
of the thermonuclear era meant that so long as the United States enjoyed a significant 
technological lead both in those weapons themselves and the delivery means (initially 
the strategic bomber) over the USSR, then the Soviets were expected to be deterred by 
the US strategic „sword‟. Furthermore, the development of tactical nuclear weapons in 
Europe under US control and their integration with NATO planning and forces was 
expected to compensate for continuing NATO inferiority in conventional land 
forces.
312
 
However, even in this new era NATO conventional forces continued to play a 
very significant role in NATO planning. If the US strategic arsenal constituted the 
alliance‟s „sword‟, substantial and highly-trained conventional forces in-being would 
be the „shield‟. The latter would, first of all, provide a cushion of time to allow the full 
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mobilization of NATO‟s potential. Secondly, they would force the Soviet bloc to 
mobilize and concentrate its land forces before launching an attack against Western 
Europe, thus providing not only a warning period to the allies, but also lucrative 
targets for NATO‟s tactical nuclear arsenal. The masses of Soviet armoured, 
mechanized and artillery formations had become increasingly vulnerable to allied 
firepower of unprecedented destructiveness. Therefore, the requirements for active 
land forces in NATO remained more or less the same as those agreed at the Lisbon 
meeting. Only the number of reserve forces was considerably cut (though not in the 
Southern Flank). It was justifiably argued that tactical nuclear weapons would 
supplement conventional forces, but not replace them. Consequently, the West 
Europeans could not expect to make savings on their defence spending, and were 
being pressed by Gruenther – although with more finesse than by Ridgway – to 
achieve the alliance‟s goals for active units by raising more forces, extending their 
conscription periods and bearing the cost of rearmament. Nevertheless, the new 
SACEUR was not more successful than his predecessor in convincing the West 
Europeans to continue their defence effort.
313
  
The new NATO strategy, as described in the MC.48 document, was finally 
and officially approved in December 1954 by the NAC. According to MC.48, the most 
important factor in a future general war would be superiority in strategic and tactical 
weapons and their delivery systems. To deter and, if necessary, defeat Soviet 
aggression (even a conventional one), NATO would have to resort to the use of 
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Analysis of the new NATO doctrine and of the 
argument that it triggered (such as the problem of NATO turning nuclear and the role 
of European allies, SACEUR‟s authority to launch nuclear weapons in case of 
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emergency, or estimates that the new strategy might actually require more troops and 
greater expenditures to be effectively implemented) is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Here it should be mentioned that the new NATO strategy, placing emphasis on all-out 
response to an all-out aggression, appeared to offer, at least initially, a more credible 
deterrence against possible Soviet aggression, and most importantly, a realistic chance 
for the implementation of a truly forward defence.
314
  
Under certain prerequisites, it was expected that SACEUR would be able to 
stop a Soviet advance on West German soil. It is important to make clear that the 
forward defence strategy was adopted for the Central Region of NATO, since 
defending Western Europe was not only the top priority of the United States and 
NATO, but was also regarded as feasible for military as well as geographic reasons (to 
name two, the existence of modern allied forces and of strategic depth). However, the 
situation was quite different as regards the defence of the southern region, particularly 
Greece and Turkey: despite the incorporation of those two countries into the western 
defence system, the establishment of US bases on their territory, the flow of US 
economic aid and the supply of military hardware to their armed forces, no forward 
defence was adopted in the Balkan sub-theatre for political, military and geographical 
reasons. In effect, even prompt support by the Sixth Fleet to Greek and Turkish forces 
at the outbreak of a possible conflict was not at all guaranteed.
315
 Furthermore, Italy‟s 
defence remained problematic due to lack of cooperation with Yugoslavia to cover 
effectively the Ljubljana Gap, and from mid-1953 onwards virtually no Atlantic 
initiative was undertaken to ensure the defence of the Middle East, or at least its 
linkage with the Southern Flank. The above bleak situation was ameliorated by the 
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conclusion of the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav pacts of 1953-4 which redressed the 
regional military balance and offered the prospect of a more forward defence. 
Nevertheless, the Balkan Alliance was a short-lived project, and in any case no 
coordination with NATO was ever achieved. Finally, it is interesting to note that 
Greece and Turkey were the only member-states that vigorously pursued their 
rearmament effort. Unfortunately, they did not possess the necessary economic-
industrial potential to sustain effectively their effort, and US aid was never sufficient 
enough to fill that gap. Greece soon had to cut down its force levels to avoid an 
economic breakdown, while Turkey was never able to achieve its force goals and 
modernize its armed forces; moreover, the combination of excessive defence 
expenditure with the mismanagement of the Turkish economy from 1954 onwards, 
drove the latter into a serious crisis. Therefore, it should be stressed that the countries 
which were less able to rearm themselves were the only ones within NATO that put in 
every effort to meet that end, while the Western Europeans (including Italy) who had a 
considerable economic-industrial capability lacked the will to bear the cost of 
rearmament. 
NATO made an early effort to implement in the Southern Flank area the 
emerging new strategy which relied heavily on the US retaliatory capability, and 
increasingly on tactical atomic weapons. In the spring of 1953 the NATO and US 
Commanders in Southern Europe considered the use of nuclear weapons to defend 
Thrace during talks with Greek and Turkish officials. Those defence plans were 
correlated with the mission of the Sixth Fleet and its ability to bomb enemy targets, 
thus providing „atom aid‟ to Greece and Turkey. However, no pledge was made by 
Admiral Carney or other NATO or US official, since the CINCSOUTH did not enjoy 
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such authority; only the SACEUR could release specific information on the usage of 
nuclear weapons, although a small group at HALFSEE had been working on the issue 
for a long time.
316
 It should be mentioned that until mid-1953 the atomic stockpile was 
nearly completely under civilian control. Only at that point did President Eisenhower 
make some atomic weapons immediately available to the military by transferring a 
considerable number of such complete devices for deployment afloat and ashore.
317
 
Just a couple of months before the official adoption of a new strategy by 
NATO as envisaged in the MC.48 document in November 1954, the alliance approved 
a Capabilities Plan for Allied Command Europe (ACE), prepared by SHAPE. That 
plan (SHAPE/330/54, enclosed in SGM-600-54) was based upon the employment of 
allied major force units in the numbers estimated to be available in mid-1957. 
Generally, the same applied for the intelligence assessment and estimate of Soviet bloc 
strength and capabilities, covering the period 1954-8. The NATO capabilities plan 
analysed nine campaigns which NATO or the Soviets were likely to undertake in case 
of war. Three of them dealt with the arrest of Soviet land advance in Italy, Greece and 
Turkey. Although each case was different and will be analysed below, some common 
aims and patterns existed: any Soviet advance into a position capable of severing 
allied communications in the Mediterranean should be prevented; to that end, the 
Soviet advance should be held, or at least delayed for a significant period, as far North 
as possible on Italian, Greek and Turkish territory. This could only be accomplished 
by the prompt and extensive use of air ground and missile delivered tactical atomic 
and thermonuclear weapons against Soviet bloc forces and lines of communications.318 
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The above doctrine remained valid at least until late 1957-early 1958, when it was 
modified following the adoption of M.C.14/2 and M.C.70 documents. 
In the case of Italy, a defence position should be established in the Northeast 
to channel the Soviet attack through the few narrow passes across the Alps, which 
constituted a perfect natural barrier, and the wider Ljubljana-Gorizia Gap. Attacking 
forces would thus have to concentrate to cross those passes, providing lucrative targets 
for allied tactical nuclear weapons. Another positive factor was that the Soviet forces 
would first have to overrun Austria and north-western Yugoslavia to enter Italy; 
therefore early warning of enemy moves would be obtained to disrupt Soviet advance 
and give Italy the opportunity to start its mobilisation. However, negative aspects 
existed as well. The Italian forces would need about thirty days to mobilise, while the 
centre of mobilisation was the densely populated and highly industrial Northern 
region; this was vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack which could paralyse the whole 
Italian defence effort. It was also expected that the Soviets would also deliver atomic 
strikes against war sustaining facilities (thirteen allied airfields and five Italian ports). 
In addition, particularly during the crucial initial period of the conflict the Soviets 
would probably enjoy significant superiority over allied (mainly Italian) forces, both 
on land and in the air. It was assessed that the Soviets could deploy twenty divisions 
(including four armoured and six mechanised with a total of 2,600 tanks) and 1,200 
aircraft (though only 600 would be actually assigned to the campaign). Finally, no 
defence coordination had been achieved with Yugoslavia to form part of the Italian 
(and Western) defence system. In any case, if Soviet advance and penetrations 
threatened to sever the Mediterranean air and sea lines of communication, „maximum 
allied effort employing land, air, naval and amphibious forces, with all forms of 
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atomic support‟ would be directed against those penetrations. The primary NATO goal 
was the defence of the Italian peninsula and Sicily. Should they fall, the Soviets would 
cut the allied lines of communication (LOC) in the Mediterranean theatre, isolating 
Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, they could also project power on North Africa and 
even outflank the central region from the South. At any rate, NATO military officials 
assessed that the primary objectives with regard to Italian defence (that is, prevention 
of a deep Soviet advance which might sever the Mediterranean LOC and disrupt 
Italian mobilisation) could be achieved.
319
  
The situation on the Balkan frontier appeared bleaker, at least before the 
conclusion of the Balkan Alliance. NATO military authorities acknowledged that 
Greek Thrace and eastern Macedonia were virtually indefensible. The Greek and 
Turkish defence positions in Thrace were adjacent, but not dependent on one another 
for land support – a telling indication of the low level of integration between Greek 
and Turkish forces, which would characterize the entire history of the Southern Flank. 
NATO officials hoped that successful delaying action (mainly by launching nuclear 
strikes against advancing enemy forces most probably on Greek soil, unless sufficient 
warning period was offered) would permit completion of the mobilisation to prevent a 
Soviet advance southwards. As mentioned the primary aim was to oppose the 
establishment of a strong Soviet foothold on the Northern shores of the Mediterranean. 
In the Greek case, the numerous coastal islands could serve as re-fuelling bases for 
Soviet submarines, if they fell into enemy hands. Furthermore, the security of coastal 
sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in this area was extremely important; in 
wartime, 40 per cent of the support for forces in Northern Greece should use coastal 
sea lift, because of the limited road and rail capacity. However, the unsatisfactory air 
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defence situation made this task extremely difficult, as was the task of defending 
Greek territory in general. As already mentioned, geography was unfavourable, and 
the most critical factor would be the close cooperation with Yugoslav forces. Should 
Soviet-Bulgarian forces (with a considerable tank and mechanised element) advance in 
Southern Yugoslavia, they could easily turn southwards via the Monastir Gap and the 
Vardar Valley outflanking the main Greek defence position along the Struma River, 
then sweep across Greece and quickly destroy its ability to fight. Only if Yugoslavia 
combined its efforts with Greece had the latter a chance to resist for some time a 
combined Soviet-Bulgarian attack, which would be possibly comprised of fifteen 
divisions and around 600 aircraft, thus being significantly preponderant over Greek 
(and other NATO) forces. Nine airfields and two ports (Piraeus and Salonika) would 
constitute potential targets for Soviet nuclear strikes, but it was estimated that the 
Soviets would probably prefer to seize them intact to sustain future operation in the 
Mediterranean theatre.
320
  
If it was implicitly acknowledged that mainland Greece was probably 
indefensible, NATO considered that a significant portion of Turkish territory could 
and should be defended and held. Three were the focal points: the Straits, which 
constituted the only outlet to the Black Sea and a natural barrier, the central Anatolian 
Plateau, which at a later stage could constitute a platform for the launch of an air and 
even land counteroffensive against the USSR itself, and the Iskenderun area in South-
eastern Turkey, where a threat towards the flank of any Soviet advance through Iran or 
Iraq should be established. However, the main Turkish industrial and economical 
centres (for example Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa) as well as military facilities and LOCs 
(bases around the Straits, the Izmir port and the Çiĝli air base complex) lay in North-
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western and Western Turkey. Therefore, this area should also be protected from a 
Soviet deep penetration or nuclear neutralisation, otherwise the whole defence effort 
would be jeopardised. Still, the NATO planners did not regard the whole of the 
Turkish territory as defensible. Although geography was much more favourable in the 
Turkish sub-theatres comparing to the Greek frontier (mainly due to the existence of 
significant strategic depth and the nature of the terrain), the defence of Turkey would 
demand a huge effort. The Soviets were expected to commit significant land, air, 
naval, amphibious and airborne forces to their campaigns against Turkey, and would 
probably strike at various fronts: Turkish Thrace and the Straits, the area east of the 
Bosporus, the northern Turkish coast, and north-eastern Turkey. Soviet (and 
Bulgarian) forces might comprise of thirty-one to thirty-three divisions with 3,300 
tanks, and around 2,500 aircraft, while they would probably expend tactical nuclear 
weapons against Turkish forces, the allied air complex in Turkey and the three major 
ports (Izmir, Mersina and Iskenderun), particularly if it appeared that the Soviet 
campaign against Turkey was about to fail. At any rate, once again the cornerstone of 
NATO strategy was the extensive use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet bloc 
forces concentrating in Bulgaria and the Caucasus and advancing in Eastern Thrace 
and North-eastern Turkey, and against Soviet beachheads established by amphibious 
or airborne forces on the northern coast; in addition, a major allied interdiction 
campaign against Bulgarian facilities and communication centres would be undertaken 
to disrupt Soviet bloc logistics.
321
    
Nevertheless, it is highly doubtful whether the NATO strategy described 
above could be implemented successfully and bear some fruit, at least during this 
period. First of all, as analysed below, in the mid-1950s the military establishments of 
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the Southern Flank countries had numerous weaknesses, lacked equipment and 
training, and could not meet NATO standards. A huge qualitative gap existed between 
Italian, Greek and Turkish units and Soviet or even Soviet-bloc ones. Secondly, it was 
obvious that NATO would face a very grave situation in the air around the Southern 
Flank area, at least at the crucial initial period of a conflict: the Italian, Greek and 
Turkish air forces were no match to Soviet bloc ones, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, while the few US aircraft stationed in Italy and Turkey could only make 
a modest contribution at the early stages of a war. Last but not least, the Sixth Fleet 
aircraft would probably offer some relieve only in Italy, since US planning provided 
for its concentration in the Western Mediterranean upon the outbreak of a conflict. At 
any rate, the Sixth Fleet‟s 150-160 aircraft could not suffice to come to Italian, Greek 
and Turkish rescue, particularly since the Sixth Fleet‟s primary missions were 
different: the interdiction of the Soviet build-up and support of forces and SLOC, and 
the inhibition of Soviet attacks on allied shipping, convoys, and naval forces.  
Moreover, NATO‟s heavy, if not exclusive reliance on tactical nuclear 
weapons, to check a Soviet advance does not appear to have been well-founded. On 
the one hand, it seems that the United States and NATO never managed to devise a 
solid operational plan for the use of those weapons on the battlefield. Indeed, the 
results of exercises and simulations soon demonstrated that the notion of „limited‟ 
nuclear warfare was illusionary, and that the extensive use of tactical nuclear weapons 
would cause unprecedented damage.
322
 On the other hand, the new NATO strategic 
concept did not provide for the actual equipping of allied forces with tactical nuclear 
weapons; for the time being, only US, and, subsequently, UK forces all stationed at the 
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Central Front had those weapons at their disposal.
323
 Until after the mid-1950s, Italian, 
Greek and Turkish forces virtually had no warheads and delivery means to implement 
the MC.48 strategy. In other words, it could be argued that the new NATO doctrine of 
MC.48 really applied to the „more‟ crucial Central Front, and rather ignored the 
Southern one, or at least a great geographical part of it. Therefore, as the military 
usefulness of the tactical nuclear weapons remained ambiguous, at least in the 
Southern Flank region, their primary importance seemed to lay on their deterrent effect 
as an additional element of the US nuclear shield. Despite all those deficiencies, it 
should be noted that the Southern Flank, or at least the Balkan frontier, would never be 
stronger than in 1954: Greek-Turkish cooperation and friendship had reached its peak, 
while the establishment of the tripartite Balkan Pacts created a continuous, solid front 
in the region. This was particularly important for Greece, the most exposed Southern 
Flank member, which would be able to put up a version of forward defence.     
 
                  
ii)  The political and military posture of the Southern Flank countries 
From now on material of the NATO Annual Reviews will be used to give a relatively 
detailed account of the military situation of the three Southern Flank countries. The 
aim is to see how the NATO authorities assessed Italian, Greek and Turkish 
capabilities and weaknesses and how the Southern Flank defence position (or actually 
that of each separate member, rather than of the Southern Flank as an integral whole) 
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developed from 1953 to 1959. Until now, such an analysis does not exist. At this point 
we will discuss the vents of 1953-4. 
It has already been demonstrated by prominent scholars of Cold War Italian 
history, that Italian policy-makers, and particularly the military, relied heavily on close 
cooperation with the Americans to secure not only protection against external threats 
(either the Soviet bloc or Titoist Yugoslavia), but also domestic stability. The Italian 
General Staff was sceptical towards any European security project, and considered any 
plans for the creation of a European force, such as the European Defence Community 
(EDC), as a second best option compared to NATO and US participation in European 
defence.
324
 In the long term, Italy hoped that NATO would develop into a US-guided 
political partnership. Moreover, from late 1953 until the spring of 1954, a debate on 
the future evolution of Western defence took place among senior Italian policy-makers 
and diplomats. While some advocated a more pro-European stance (emphasizing a 
quick ratification of the EDC Treaty), others were pessimistic about the EDC‟s 
chances and opted for the strengthening of NATO and of US-Italian ties.
325
 For their 
part, the Italian military adopted very quickly the new course of the „New Look‟ 
doctrine of the Eisenhower administration and advocated the idea of the deployment of 
US tactical nuclear weapons in Italy.
326
  
However, Italy not only relied on US preponderance, but also sought to 
pursue independent action within the framework of that preponderance, particularly 
from 1954 onwards. The so called „Neo-Atlanticist‟ agenda included extended 
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consultation among NATO allies, intensified economic cooperation within NATO, 
and the promotion of Italian economic and commercial interests in the Arab world. 
Regarding the latter, Rome claimed that since it had ceased to be a colonial power 
(contrary to Britain and France), it could act as a mediator between the West and the 
Arabs and thwart the increasing Soviet influence in the Middle East and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The Italians hoped that, at best, Neo-Atlanticism might establish a 
stable link between Italy‟s participation in NATO and Rome‟s policy in the Middle 
East.
327
 Despite its aspirations, Italy remained more or less confined to the 
Mediterranean, which was only a peripheral theatre, both politically/diplomatically 
and militarily; Western Europe remained the focal point of NATO and US policy.   
As regards its attitude towards NATO, Italy was less concerned than most 
other western allies (not to mention Greece and Turkey) about the Soviet military 
threat. The Italians were very reluctant to increase their military spending to meet the 
agreed force levels.
328
 From the second half of 1952 onwards, Rome‟s interest in 
defence issues decreased significantly. Several reasons explain this: Italy did not have 
common borders with the Soviet bloc and did not feel an imminent threat (with respect 
to Yugoslavia, although Italian-Yugoslavian relations remained tense until 1954, a 
bilateral conflict did not seem very likely any more). In addition, the Italians felt that 
Washington and London did not support a favourable resolution of the Trieste issue, 
and that the West did not attribute to Italy the appropriate international status and 
recognition. Within NATO, Italy had expressed since February 1952 deep reservations 
about the feasibility of the rearmament effort agreed at the Lisbon meeting. The Italian 
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government was preoccupied mainly with financial and economic problems rather 
than military ones, and General Alfred Gruenther publicly described Italy as „the weak 
link‟ in the alliance. This trend continued after August 1953 and in subsequent years, 
when Giuseppe Pella, Amintore Fanfani and Mario Scelba succeeded De Gasperi in 
the premiership. Moreover, Rome was aware that in case of general war, Italy could 
not defend itself against a major Soviet invasion and preferred to rely exclusively on 
NATO for its defence; the Italian leadership was much more concerned about a 
possible internal threat on behalf of the Communist Party (PCI). Last but not least, the 
Italian military did not play a significant role in the formulation of Italian grand 
strategy, partly due to the Army‟s low esteem and its poor record of performance in 
the past.
329
 
  The Italians were annoyed at NATO‟s lack of consultation with Italy on the 
Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish entente and military talks.
330
 Moreover, during the 1954 
negotiations with the Americans on the issue of the establishment of US bases in Italy, 
Rome took a very hard line: the Italians were unwilling to grant any military facilities 
to US forces unless the dispute with Belgrade over Trieste was resolved in Italy‟s 
favour. They tried to justify their attitude claiming that without a positive resolution of 
the Trieste issue (which obviously could only come with strong US support) the 
parliament would not ratify any agreement on military facilities or bases. Such 
development might result in the collapse of the pro-western centre-right government, 
and that might put US and NATO strategy in Southern Europe at risk. Of course, these 
arguments regarding that alleged weakness contradicted Rome‟s aspirations for great-
power status. The Americans were initially frustrated by that attitude, but there were 
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not any serious repercussions for the US-Italian relations and Italy‟s position within 
NATO. The Italians soon granted bases to the United States, the Trieste issue was 
resolved, and the Eisenhower administration gradually acknowledged some of the 
benefits of the Neo-Atlanticism (notably, the promotion of a greater American 
presence in the Mediterranean and the potential for a more balanced burden-sharing in 
NATO).
331
  
On the military field, the situation in the Italian Armed Forces was not 
considered as satisfactory by the NATO experts, although Italy spent nearly 6.5 per 
cent of its GNP on defence. There were two major problems: the general shortage of 
equipment which reduced the efficiency and combat readiness of the Italian armed 
forces, and the critical situation in the Italian Air Force, which suffered from serious 
shortfalls in interceptor day-fighters (IDF) – a NATO-wide problem – and all-weather 
fighters (AWX) existed. Those shortfalls were particularly serious because large 
deficiencies in maritime aircraft already existed in the Mediterranean, and therefore 
Italy should take urgently the necessary steps to achieve efficient operation of 
maritime aircraft. The Italian Air Force‟s shortages in aircrafts could not be remedied 
until 1955-56, when new aircraft would be available. Thus Italy had to be prepared for 
the transition from obsolete and obsolescent types to modern ones. In addition, there 
was a shortage of electronic equipment in all three services: tracking radars for anti-
aircraft defence in the Army, radar for the air control and early warning (AC&W) 
system in the Air Force (which was underdeveloped), and general electronic 
equipment for the Navy.
332
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The NATO goals for late 1953 regarding the numerical strength of the Italian 
Army were six infantry, one mountain and two armoured divisions at M-Day rising to 
ten, two and one-third and three respectively at M+30, bringing the total forces to 14 
and a half divisions. The situation in the Italian Navy was considered more or less 
satisfactory. The air force was reported to have almost 490 aircrafts, though many 
obsolete types were included. The NATO authorities believed that the Italian defence 
effort was somewhat below the NATO average. Since there were already signs of 
considerable stabilisation and recovery of the Italian economy, the NATO specialists 
claimed that Italy should be able to increase somewhat its defence expenditure and 
also activate some of the available but still idle production capacity of the Italian 
industry which would be suitable for defence equipment. This would also contribute to 
the relief of unemployment which remained extremely high. The acquisition of the 
IDF and AWX, the electronic equipment and transport vehicles was set as the first 
priority. In any case, the NATO authorities believed that a reduction in the Italian 
defence effort, as was the aim of the Italian government for 1954-55, could and should 
be avoided. Last but not least, the Staff recommended the continuance of financial 
assistance by the United States.
333
   
By the end of 1954 the Italian NATO command forces would consist of eight 
divisions and two mountain brigades on M-Day and also 410 aircraft and few vessels 
(the main units were three cruisers, two destroyers and two submarines). Except for a 
shortfall of two fighter squadrons (an interceptor day-fighter and an all-weather fighter 
one), those forces were in conformity with the force goals set in Lisbon. NATO drew 
attention to the need for substantial increase in the numbers of long-service officers 
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and NCOs in army D-day units. A reorganisation plan had been recently approved 
aiming at the improvement of the effectiveness of the Air Force and of M-day Army 
forces and at increasing the generally poor training status of the Italian reserves. The 
Italians also devised a new construction programme for the Navy for a moderate 
increase and modernisation of their fleet in the next few years. However, the most 
critical deficiencies (as the comprehensive operation of the AC&W system) were not 
addressed. Finally, despite considerable progress in the number of aircrews, the 
training standard remained low, due to limitation on flying hours to save aviation 
fuel.
334
 
Adherence to the Atlantic community did not ease the Greek defence 
problem. During the 1950s, Greece was the most vulnerable point of NATO‟s 
southern area. Until the spring of 1954 the land forces numbered over 140,000 men 
(Greece had a population of about seven million people in the early 1950s) and the 
Greek Army enjoyed a fine reputation due to its performance during the Second World 
War, the Greek Civil War and the Korean War. However, its equipment was obsolete 
and they possessed no medium or heavy tanks and only a few artillery pieces. The 
Greek naval and air forces were also very weak. Consequently, the combination of 
military weakness, unfavourable geographic landscape and lack of strategic depth, 
meant that the Greek Armed Forces would be in deep trouble in case of a general or 
local war. 
 The Conservative Prime Minister and former Commander-in-Chief, Marshal 
Alexandros Papagos, stressed in Parliament in March 1953 that the Greek army‟s 
primary task was to deal with a Korea-style sudden attack to cover the completion of 
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mobilization. Papagos favoured the adoption of a forward strategy but Greece lacked 
the means to implement it (armoured and mechanized forces and an adequate number 
of jet planes – the first F-84s began to arrive only in 1952-53) and US aid would not 
address those deficiencies. The Greek forces did not have the capability to repel on 
their own a Bulgarian attack.
335
 The Greek political and military leadership was very 
anxious to acquire some armoured units, specifically two or three tank regiments, 
since actually no armour was allocated to the Third Corp, which defended Greek 
Macedonia. The 239 obsolete Greek light tanks were kept in strategic reserve. Despite 
the urgent Greek demand and the hope that Greece would receive some US tanks, 
these were not forthcoming.
336
 In late 1954, during talks on the reorganisation of the 
Greek Armed Forces, NATO officials proposed the formation of an additional M-day 
division which would include „armoured elements‟. The Greeks preferred the creation 
of an armoured division (and asked for the relative equipment). Nevertheless, the 
NATO authorities did not agree; the division would be an infantry (though „special‟) 
one.
337
 
The only alternative for the adoption of a more active defence policy (as 
compared to the option of mere retreat and abandonment of north-eastern Greek 
territory) was regional cooperation with Turkey and Yugoslavia. Such development 
would redress the Balkan military balance and lessen the Bulgarian threat.
338
 That idea 
was not new. Despite recent Greek-Yugoslav enmity in 1944-48, Greece and Serbia 
had cooperated very successfully against their regional opponents during the Balkan 
Wars of 1912-13, while Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey were among the signatories of 
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the 1934 Balkan Pact which was essentially directed against Bulgarian revisionism. 
Despite the Greek-Turkish concurrent adherence to NATO and the placement of their 
forces under common NATO headquarters, their defence coordination did not seem 
initially possible. Turkey was reluctant to commit significant forces to Eastern Thrace, 
unless Yugoslavia would pledge to defend Yugoslav Macedonia, thus enabling the 
formation of a common front against Bulgaria. In 1952 the conditions were ripe for the 
initiation of military talks among the three states on a bilateral basis, while the 
conclusion of the first Balkan pact (the Ankara Treaty) in February 1953 paved the 
way for tripartite military talks and coordination of planning.
339
  
Notwithstanding the above developments, in the short-term the Greek defence 
effort was undermined due to the country‟s inability to keep so many men under arms. 
In 1953, Greece was spending 6.5 per cent of GNP for military expenditure (53 
percent of the country‟s budget was devoted to defence expenditures), and, though 
somewhat reduced in comparison to 1951 and 1952, the cost was huge for the second 
poorest NATO member.
340
 When in opposition, Papagos had criticised the previous 
Centre government for its intention to reduce the strength of the army. Until the 
summer of 1953 his government insisted that the Greek forces would be maintained 
intact and if necessary even increased – a position which met with US approval. 
However, soon he had to acknowledge that Greece could not bear such a burden.
341
 A 
disastrous earthquake which hit the Ionian Islands in August 1953 exacerbated the 
problem, while the Greek government was determined to pursue its public investment 
program to generate economic recovery. Furthermore, the service period in the Greek 
Armed forces was one of the longest in NATO (24 months for the Army and even 
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more for the Navy and Air Force) and posed further burdens on Greek economy and 
society.
342
 Only additional US economic aid could solve the issue. Meanwhile, the 
deputy SACEUR, Field-Marshal Montgomery, visiting Greece in September 1953, 
implicitly advocated the reduction of the Greek Army to six divisions of full strength 
and the maintenance of a powerful, well trained reserve force. Other NATO officials 
like SACEUR Gruenther, and JUSMAGG, disapproved the prospect of such a radical 
reduction.
343
 General Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the US Army and former SACEUR, 
pointed out that a reduction in the Greek Armed Forces programme would have wider 
implications, because it would have an adverse effect on NATO in general: it might 
„initiate a downward revision in other member nations‟ forces‟.344  
The NATO force goals for the end of 1953 provided for an army of nine 
infantry divisions, one-third of an armoured division (equipped with the light tanks) 
six light infantry regiments at M-Day; at M+30 the infantry divisions would be risen to 
twelve. The Air Force would consist of 200 aircraft in December 1953 and 225 the 
following year. However, Greece was facing numerous problems regarding its defence 
effort. The NATO officials pointed out that there was inadequate training of reservists 
(their call-up was impossible due to the harsh financial situation of Greece in the post-
Civil War period), lack of NCOs and other technically skilled specialists, and little and 
ineffective support units. Therefore, during 1953 a moderate reorganization of the 
Army was agreed and begun to be implemented, aiming at the actual reduction in the 
total number of combat units to enable the formation of support ones. Generally, there 
was a huge shortage of firepower both in terms of modern equipment and numbers. 
There were no medium or heavy tanks, almost no modern and heavy artillery, anti-
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aircraft defence was very weak, warships were few and obsolete, and the 
modernisation of the air forces had just begun. Other major problems were the 
existence of a primordial air control and warning system, of antiquated airfields and 
other facilities, and of a general shortage of vehicles, equipment and electronics.
345
 
Essentially, though, the main Greek defence problem was the country‟s weak 
economy, which could not sustain the burden of the defence budget. Therefore, an 
effective programme of quick modernization and reform was out of question. 
The situation in the Greek Navy was also very unpleasant and seemed to 
deteriorate. Greece is a maritime power and has hundreds of islands. Therefore, the 
role of the naval forces is crucial in any defence planning and effort. Even at a time, as 
in 1950s, when there could actually be no direct threat to the Greek islands, a 
relatively strong Navy was essential not only to support the Army but also to enable a 
smooth mobilization. However, the Greek Navy possessed few vessels -its main units 
were a cruiser, three destroyers and four submarines. Most importantly, many of them 
were obsolescent and were being maintained at a very low standard. The Greek 
authorities emphasized the importance of those ships and pointed out the need for their 
maintenance at affordable standards of readiness, although the Greek budget could not 
provide for their modest modernization. Consequently, the NATO authorities agreed 
to consider the issue.
346
  
In 1953 the Greek Air Force was mostly comprised of Second World War 
piston-engine aircrafts, particularly Spitfires and Helldivers. By the end of 1953 six 
squadrons of F-84 jets had arrived, while in 1954 the Greek Air Force also received F-
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86s. On the one hand, a considerable effort was made to build new airports and 
facilities suitable for the operation of the jet planes, and there was also an increase in 
ground crews. On the other, there were still deficiencies in vehicles, refuelling units, 
electronics, operational reserves and spare parts.
347
 Furthermore, training programmes 
were severely handicapped by lack of adequate facilities and equipment. No AC&W 
existed, but at least plans had been prepared (and approved by COMAIRSOUTH) for 
setting up such a system.
348
      
The NATO International Staff made recommendations on the broader Greek 
defence problem in 1953, admitting that the Greek defence effort in relation to the 
country‟s GNP was among the largest of the NATO states. It also recognised that the 
Greek economy had been subjected to a continuous series of strains and therefore the 
NATO specialists did not wish to add further burden on Greece.
349
 Although the 
monetary and financial reform initiated in spring 1953 proved successful, the situation 
remained delicate.
350
 Therefore, the NATO authorities recommended the continuance 
of external financial assistance by the United States, since that help had been a sine 
qua non precondition for the maintenance of the Greek balance of payments; 
moreover, the US aid was expected to facilitate the Greek economic development 
which would enable, in the long run, Greece to bear unaided its own defence effort.
351
  
Key figures of the Greek government initially indirectly, and then directly, 
raised the problem of the country‟s defence burden to US and NATO officials from 
the summer of 1953 onwards. By early 1954 the Greek leadership had concluded that 
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the army strength could and should be reduced by 35,000 men, unless the Americans 
or NATO would pay to keep it intact. One could argue that to some extent, the 
tendency within the alliance itself was for smaller and better equipped land forces, and 
Papagos agreed to have the issue discussed in NATO. However, from late February 
until April 1954 the Greeks pressed the Americans to provide additional economic aid, 
but to no avail. Then, in early May 1954 Papagos decided unilaterally to reduce the 
strength of the army to 105,000 men; this decision was announced before the 
conclusion of the relevant NATO discussions. The Americans were embarrassed and 
taken aback, but the Greek Prime Minister made plain that if Washington did not 
provide additional help in 1955, he would then cut down the Greek land forces even 
more, to 70,000 men, claiming that this further reduction might be necessary to avoid 
financial collapse and meet NATO requirements on infrastructure works.
352
 
Meanwhile, the NATO specialists, after consultation with SACEUR, acquiesced to the 
army‟s reduction, but stressed that its mobilisation structure should not be destroyed. It 
was necessary to keep the active army at least at 105,000 men (comparing with the 
total of 133,900 on active duty in late 1953) to retain its ability to provide some 
defence of the Greek territory by mounting a delaying action. In addition, when 
possible, some increase was desirable to occur in the Navy and the Air Force.
353
 
Finally, the Americans agreed to grant additional funds of $10 million and the army 
strength was maintained at 105,000 men.
354
 
In late 1954 the NATO experts set as Greek priorities the enhancement of 
anti-aircraft defence, the development of training programmes for the reservists and 
the NCOs and the increase of ammunition and petroleum reserves in all the services. 
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Moreover, the Staff called the Greek, NATO and US authorities involved to discuss 
and decide on the reorganization of the Greek Army and on force goal requirements 
for the Greek Navy. Finally, the NATO authorities emphasised the need for the 
establishment and maintenance of an effective AC&W system.
355
    
Another development was the signature of a bilateral US-Greek agreement 
for the establishment of US bases (or „military facilities‟) in Greece on 12 October 
1953. The procedure was put in motion in the spring of 1953, when the Americans 
encouraged Greece to offer officially the use of its territory by US military forces. The 
Papagos government, which sought to strengthen US-Greek ties as a complementary 
move to Greek accession to NATO, responded quickly and asked President 
Eisenhower for the establishment of US bases in Greece. Moreover, he and his 
ministers were careful not to link that issue with Greek desire for the provision of 
additional economic help by the United States. When negotiations started in August 
1953, it only took few weeks for the two parties to reach an agreement.
356
  
According to the bilateral agreement, the Americans would construct and use 
military facilities utilized by US forces to implement NATO strategy. Thus virtually 
the sole restriction on the function of the US bases was that they should operate only 
within the NATO area and for NATO purposes. Other than that, US forces would be 
free to move on Greek soil, sail on territorial waters and fly in Greek airspace, while 
US personnel would enjoy extraterritoriality, meaning that they could not be tried and 
prosecuted in Greek courts of justice. Although a considerable imbalance existed, 
Greece wanted to grant the bases as a means to ensure US commitment in Greek 
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defence in the event of Soviet-bloc invention, hoping that US personnel would act as a 
trip-wire mechanism. The US-Greek agreement provided for the construction of four 
major facilities (two for the USAF, in Hellenicon near Athens and in Herackeion, 
Crete, one in the Suda Bay, Crete, for the USAF and the USN, and one in Nea Makri 
near Athens for communications), plus other minor ones.
357
 However, as we will 
discuss in the following chapter, the project of the establishment of a main NATO 
(and not US) base in the Aegean fell through.    
As regards Turkey, it is only possible to give a rough estimation of Turkish 
potential and defence spending for that period, due to the lack of Turkish archival 
material and consequently of a substantial relevant bibliography. The force goals for 
the Turkish Army were 19 infantry divisions and 6/3 armoured divisions at December 
1953, rising to 25 infantry divisions and two armoured divisions in 1954. The Turkish 
Air Force was estimated to possess 304 aircraft in late 1953, rising to 354 in 1954. It 
was also estimated that until late 1953 the Turkish Army would be capable of raising 
six more infantry divisions after M+30. In 1953-4 the Turkish defence expenditure 
appeared to be something less than 9 per cent of the country‟s GNP.358 
The Turkish armed forces did not lack manpower, the defence budget was 
very high and the country‟s leadership had as top priority the enhancement of Turkish 
military capabilities (as will be shown, to serve wider political and geopolitical aims 
not only within NATO but also in the Middle East). Nevertheless, the Turkish military 
establishment suffered from various flaws. The Turkish military production capacity 
was very limited, and virtually the total of the equipment needed had to be obtained 
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through end-item aid. In addition, much of the arms and material of the Turkish forces 
was either obsolete or obsolescent; thus an extensive programme of re-equipment was 
required and the only source of funding could be external (namely US) aid.
359
 Indeed, 
although the US Ambassador to NATO, William Draper Jr., remarked that the 
SACEUR and the CINCSOUTH naturally were concerned with the Turkish military 
capabilities], he pointed out that any planning on the Turkish force levels would be 
performed between JAMMAT and Turkish officials, taking into account both Turkish 
capabilities and US ones to provide materiel. Therefore, on Turkish demands to 
receive more end-item aid from the „pool of NATO equipment‟, the Americans made 
clear that Turkey should not expect any aid other than the US assistance programme 
carried out through JAMMAT.
360
  
Another serious problem was the considerable shortfall of trained and skilled 
personnel to operate, but also maintain, current and future – more advanced – 
equipment. An equally critical deficiency was the shortage of NCOs. Therefore, the 
main problem and challenge of the Turkish Army was that of improving the quality of 
existing forces and particularly of the M-Day units.
361
 To resolve those problems, the 
Turks established additional training camps and centres and commissioned increasing 
number of regular officers and NCOs. Therefore, the 1953 NATO Annual Review 
stated: „if the personnel improvement programmes of the Turkish Army are fully 
realised by the end of 1953 Turkey should be militarily capable of operating and 
maintaining effectively by the end of 1953 the total amount of equipment required to 
meet the 1953 Army force goals [set] in this paper at the levels recommended by 
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SHAPE‟.362 This fact – and the subsequent positive comment made by the 
International Staff – was not the usual case for the NATO members during this period. 
Therefore, the Turks believed that despite the Eisenhower administration‟s tendency to 
cut US aid to allied states, American help would continue to flow to their country. The 
reason for the above conviction was the Turkish impression that US aid to Turkey had 
shown more results than in the case of any other state which had received similar 
assistance.
363
 This Turkish claim was not unjustifiable. Many US officials, particularly 
within the State and the Defense Department, considered since the late 1940s that 
„funds spent to support the Turkish armed forces accomplished more than aid spent 
anywhere else‟.364 
Concerning the Turkish Air Force, the supply of the aircraft required to meet 
the NATO goals was being seemingly ensured by the delivery of end-item aid. 
Nevertheless, an effective training problem existed and was estimated that there was a 
shortfall of about 4.000 men. Besides this, the weak point of the Turkish Air Force 
was the inadequate AC&W system. The NATO military authorities were pressing for 
the establishment of a complete and fully operational AC&W system by 1955, while 
urgent steps had been taken to ensure efficient cover of important areas as early as 
1954. The NATO planners stressed to the Turks the need to raise significantly the 
standard of the forces in being and make the necessary arrangements for ancillary 
facilities (ammunition reserves and POL, navigational aids, and instrument flying 
aids). Only then would further military equipment be granted.
365
 Finally, as was the 
case for the Greek Navy as well, no force plan had been finalised for the Turkish 
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Navy. Discussion with the NATO military authorities had not been concluded. The 
Turks insisted that the build-up or even maintenance of their naval forces needed for 
defence was impossible with national resources alone. NATO considered the 
reconditioning of certain old Turkish ships and, if possible, some reinforcement of the 
Turkish fleet, probably by the addition of torpedo boats.
366
 
The Turkish defence effort represented a remarkable achievement for the 
country with the lowest standard of living within the alliance and the International 
Staff acknowledged that fact. A considerable strain was put on Turkey‟s financial 
stability and on the balance of payments by the burden of military expenditure and the 
internal investment programme. The allocation of additional funds to defence was 
inadvisable; the Turkish government had nevertheless planned on its own initiative an 
increase of about 30 per cent for 1953-54.
367
 It is interesting that while the Turks 
appreciated the considerable US aid given until that point, by mid-1953 they tended to 
believe that although the NATO commanders favoured a significant increase in 
Turkish force levels, failure to implement this was caused mainly by US unwillingness 
to provide additional assistance.
368
 As was often the case with Greece as well, the 
Turks seemed to fail to make a distinction between NATO and US views and took it 
for granted that these two were fully coordinated, which was not always the case, at 
least in regard to the Southern Flank. For their part, the NATO authorities suggested 
that the US authorities continued their financial assistance and end-item aid to Turkey, 
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which alone would enable those programmes to be fulfilled.
369
 However this did not 
necessarily mean that the Americans would act on that recommendation. 
By the end of 1954 Turkey had a substantial part of its Army and 439 aircraft 
on D-day under NATO command, although many of them were obsolete piston-engine 
aircraft of almost no value. At that point no Turkish naval forces were allocated to 
NATO in peacetime, but remained under national command. Although the Turks 
managed to make considerable progress in correcting shortages of technically trained 
personnel and in improving the training facilities of the military establishment, the 
level of equipment and operational reserves and the combat readiness remained 
inadequate and below NATO standards. Therefore, the military authorities of the 
alliance advised that the Turkish main effort should be directed towards the 
improvement of the status and readiness, effectiveness, and efficiency of the forces in 
being in all services and not towards the increase of the size of the Turkish Armed 
Forces, which was Ankara‟s wish. Until late 1954, the Turkish authorities had failed to 
meet the requirements of the qualitative standards of the Army units, which had been 
set as priority by the NATO officials a year before.
370
 
The Turks agreed to defer the further build-up of the Army and Navy 
(original programmes provided for a sizeable build-up for which no known source of 
supply existed) but insisted on their plan for an increase of the Air Force. Indeed, 
Turkey was generally expected to meet the goals for 1954 and 1955 of 441 aircraft – 
although until 1955 obsolete Spitfires would remain in service – and the Turks were 
proposing a quite ambitious build-up: 540 aircraft in 1956, 630 in 1958 and 772 in 
1960. Of course, such plans were not realistic. Substantial progress had been achieved 
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in the Turkish Air Force in converting from piston-engine to jet type aircraft and in 
increasing the training status of the technical personnel and aircrews, but there still 
remained a lot to be done on that field. During the first six months of 1954, only 51 
per cent of the aircraft on hand were in commission and just an average of 25 per cent 
was combat ready, while the minimum acceptable goal according to NATO standards 
was 70 per cent. The NATO specialists therefore emphasized to the Turks the need to 
raise the qualitative status of their air forces in being and to defer any expansion of the 
Air Force until 1955; and last but not least, the AC&W system had to be expanded.
371
  
The wider political-economic situation remained more or less the same as in 
the previous years. Ankara directed its main defence effort to the build-up of the Army 
and the Air Force. It also sought to increase the defence budget for the next few years, 
but those plans were based on the continuation of US economic aid on a level of $75 
million per year. Turkish capacity to produce arms and munitions was very limited and 
the main mass of the Turkish defence expenditures (65 per cent of the total) related to 
personnel; another 15 per cent related to civilian public works, such as the 
development of the communications network. Therefore, the procurement of necessary 
equipment and ammunition was almost entirely depended on future MDAP 
programmes. A serious maintenance problem of equipment (especially aircraft) 
existed and foreign technical aid was requested for the training of manpower and for 
the construction of appropriate installations. Expenditure on military constructions was 
also very low, and the Turks claimed that certain projects (particularly naval bases), 
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which could not be undertaken due to lack of funds, should be financed under the 
NATO common infrastructure programme.
372
  
The NATO officials also worried about the continuing disequilibrium in the 
Turkish balance of payments. They believed that large and expanding defence outlays 
combined with the pursuit of a vigorous investment programme would strain Turkish 
resources to the limit, notwithstanding continued foreign aid. Indeed, during 1954 the 
situation of the Turkish economy started to deteriorate, until it reached a breaking 
point in mid-1958. The International Staff set as immediate priorities for the Turkish 
Armed Forces the attainment of qualitative improvements of existing forces to reach 
the NATO standards. Care should be taken that the planned scale of the Turkish 
defence effort would not add to the strains of the Turkish economy.
373
 However, 
during the following months the problem of the shortfall in the Turkish defence budget 
remained and immediate action was needed. The US Ambassador in Ankara, Avra 
Warren, urged his government in February 1954 that it stop dealing with the above 
issue on an „annual ad hoc basis‟. A viable, long-term solution should be found, and 
the Turks along with the Americans had to work together to devise a plan to enable the 
Turkish economy to become sound, so that military self-sufficiency could be attained 
„at a prospective date‟.374  
In any case, at that point the Americans were fully aware that Turkey‟s 
defence effort placed a heavy strain upon its economy which could not yet support the 
military effort. Therefore, the provision of substantial US aid was necessary. 
Significantly, Washington intended to support Turkey to meet the NATO force goals, 
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even by increasing the approved military assistance programme; this was a notable 
exception, given the trend of the Eisenhower administration to reduce foreign aid to 
most US allies. The US-Turkish cordial cooperation expanded on other fields, beyond 
the framework of NATO but not irrelevant to the mission and strategy of the alliance. 
One issue was that of the establishment of US military facilities – particularly for the 
SAC – on Turkish territory. The Turkish leadership, when approached by the 
Americans in early 1953, was very positive at the above prospect. The Americans 
preferred that any bilateral agreement should be kept secret to avoid a possible Soviet 
reaction.
375
  
 
   
 iii) The Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav Alliance: redressing the military balance in the 
Balkans 
While the three Southern Flank states were establishing their military and political 
stances, a new development on the Balkan frontier opened up a possibility for wider 
cooperation in the region. In the aftermath of the signature of the Treaty of Ankara the 
issue of the tripartite political and military collaboration was complicated by Stalin‟s 
death in March 1953 and the subsequent change of policy which was proclaimed by 
his successors (the policy of „peaceful co-existence‟). Athens and Ankara, which did 
not consider this new policy as „sincere‟, were anxious that Tito might accept the 
conciliatory gestures of the new Soviet leadership or that the West might sacrifice the 
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project of the Balkan Pact in exchange for gains elsewhere.
376
 In any case, the 
prospects of further development of the Balkan accord remained unaffected. In June 
1953 tripartite staff talks were resumed in Athens. During those long and detailed 
discussions, the defence of Thrace and Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia against attack 
by, or through, Bulgaria was the focal point. Ways and means of offering combined 
integrated resistance to any possible Soviet-bloc attack were assessed, while the 
possibility of the creation of a joint high command for the coordination of planning 
was briefly considered, but finally not adopted. Overall, substantial progress was 
made and general agreement was reached by the three delegations.
377
 It should be 
stressed that Admiral Robert Carney, who had just been appointed CNO and was 
about to leave its post as CINCSOUTH, visited Athens and was kept informed about 
the content of tripartite talks. He gave some guidance to the Greeks and Turks, 
emphasising the necessity of close cooperation between NATO‟s Southern Flank and 
Yugoslavia.
378 
On 15-20 June the Greek Prime Minister, Field-Marshal Alexandros Papagos, 
and the Foreign Minister, Stefanos Stephanopoulos, visited Turkey to hold bilateral 
negotiations with their Turkish counterparts. During these talks it was decided that the 
time was not convenient for the conversion of the Ankara Treaty into a full military 
alliance.
379
 Belgrade and Athens had just restored full diplomatic relations with the 
USSR, while the major NATO allies were reluctant to encourage a formal Balkan 
military alliance. The Greek and Turkish governments would support Yugoslav 
admission to NATO and continue cooperation with Yugoslavia, though not at a fast 
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pace. Soon afterwards, on 24 June 1953, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey issued an 
official joint communiqué, aiming to demonstrate that Soviet tactics in the aftermath 
of Stalin‟s death had in no way weakened the links formed by the Treaty of Ankara. 
At that point, maintaining international unity and collective defence arrangements 
remained vital.
380
 NATO and the major western powers did not play any role to those 
developments, since they did not encourage the transformation of the Treaty of Ankara 
to a Balkan Alliance. Then, on 8-11 July 1953 the Balkan Pact Council of Foreign 
Ministers held its first meeting in Athens; they declared their will to continue their 
military cooperation and respond jointly to Soviet (or Soviet-bloc) peace overtures.
381
  
Another parallel, but essentially separate process of bringing Yugoslavia 
closer to the western defence system was taking place. In late May 1953 the US, 
British and French representatives reached agreement on the resumption of tripartite-
Yugoslav military talks „on a covert basis‟. SACEUR General Ridgway was consulted 
and his views were taken into consideration. Moreover, Ridgway was invited to send 
secretly to Washington American, British and French officers of his staff to advise the 
Tripartite Military Representatives on SACEUR‟s views. Nevertheless, those NATO 
officers would not attend the discussions themselves, while the Yugoslavs would not 
be informed of their presence.
382
 It can be therefore argued that NATO was not 
completely and properly integrated to those talks.  
On 16 July the United States, Britain and France invited Yugoslavia to send a 
military delegation to Washington to discuss various defence matters, including joint 
planning in the Balkans. The primary aim of that gesture was to consider ways to 
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integrate Yugoslavia into Western defence planning and encourage Tito to reject the 
Soviet „peace offensive‟.383 One could also justifiably assume that the three major 
NATO powers sought to regain the initiative, or at least considerable control, over 
Balkan defence developments.
384
 The Yugoslavs sent a military delegation in late 
August, and another round of US-UK-French-Yugoslav military talks took place. 
Those talks‟ goal was to secure „a closer integration of Yugoslav defence planning 
with Tripartite [US-UK-French], and ultimately NATO, defence planning for the south 
flank of NATO‟. Some of the subjects discussed were strategic concepts, Yugoslav 
defence plans in the event of war, future action to be taken on planning and assistance 
required by the Yugoslavs. Among others, the representatives of the Standing Group 
countries recommended that arrangements should be made soon to enable appropriate 
NATO Commanders conduct operational discussions with the Yugoslav military.
385
 
Furthermore, on the one hand the US-UK-French representatives informed the 
Yugoslavs that the Standing Group countries considered the defence of Yugoslavia of 
great importance to the defence of South-eastern Europe; on the other, no political 
guarantees were given, and despite the exchange of information, no NATO plans were 
disclosed.
386
 When the discussions were concluded, it was clear that Belgrade‟s 
admission to NATO was out of the question. However it was clear that the Yugoslavs 
favoured the coordination with NATO military planning.
387
   
Then, in the autumn of 1953 the situation was further complicated, due to the 
exacerbation of the dispute over Trieste. The Americans judged that they had to make 
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a generous gesture to augment the Italian Christian-Democrats and the new Pella 
government. The United States and Britain decided to sideline the French and proceed 
alone. NATO (and even less Belgrade) had not been consulted or even informed about 
the US-UK decision to withdraw their troops from Trieste and hand control of zone A 
to the Italians. When the above intention was declared on 8 October 1953, Yugoslavia 
reacted vociferously: a solution which would favour one-sidedly Italy at Yugoslavia‟s 
expense could not be accepted.
388
 Yugoslav troops were moved into position, while for 
some time Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish talks experienced a setback and the Yugoslav 
military reduced considerably the flow of information to their Greek and Turkish 
counterparts for fear it might reach the Italians via NATO.
389
  
Furthermore, the crisis soon involved NATO. Belgrade warned that should 
Italian troops enter zone A, they would be attacked. Therefore, an issue arose if Italy 
would be entitled to invoke Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. All NATO 
members were clearly unwilling to be entangled in such a conflict, not least the United 
States and Britain who had sparked the crisis. Technically, though, Rome would be 
entitled to call for allied help in case of a Yugoslav attack against Italian troops due to 
a possible Italian stationing or advance in zone A. US-UK policy had backfired in a 
rather awkward manner. Suddenly NATO itself was in a collision course with 
Yugoslavia, a prospective valuable ally in the Balkans.
390
 The situation remained tense 
until December 1953. The Americans and the British did not transfer administrative 
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control of Zone A to Italy, and in December both Yugoslavia and Italy withdrew their 
troops from the border.
391
 
A corollary of the above crisis was a definite and distinct change of Tito‟s 
priorities: the Yugoslav leader sought to conclude a regional tripartite military pact as 
a means to enhance its leverage towards the West – and particularly Italy – as well as a 
means of protection against the Soviet bloc.
392
 After some delay caused by the October 
crisis over Trieste, a third round of Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav staff talks took place 
from 10 to 20 November 1953, this time in Belgrade. The main topic was the 
preparation of a specific military plan for combined military action in case of 
aggression in the Balkans. Indeed, a tripartite emergency plan was adopted as a basic 
document, providing general directives for the coordination of Yugoslav, Greek, and 
Turkish land and air forces to defend Thrace and Macedonia; those directives would 
be supplemented in the future. It seems that the above general plan had previously 
been referred to CINCSOUTH, Admiral William Fechteler, by the Greeks, who were 
always anxious to keep informed the NATO and US officials.
393
 The plan did not 
provide for automatic action (largely due to Greek unwillingness to accept an 
automatic guarantee, not least for fear that this might lead to the deterioration of 
Greek-Italian relations) and, for the time being, that plan was to remain an 
understanding among the three General Staffs.
394
 Generally, Athens was quite 
reluctant to proceed with the establishment of a formal tripartite military alliance. 
Greece was the weakest country and apparently more sensitive than Turkey to Western 
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reservations. In any case, one more significant step towards tripartite cooperation was 
achieved. 
Tripartite military talks continued in early 1954. In early March 1954 the 
Chief of the General Staff of Yugoslav People‟s Army, General Peko Dapčević, paid 
an unofficial visit to Athens and met General Stelios Kitrilakis, Chief of the General 
Staff of National Defence. The two officers had an exchange of views while Kitrilakis 
made various proposals for future bilateral and/or tripartite collaboration, mainly on 
technical issues. Furthermore, the fourth round of tripartite staff talks was held in 
Ankara from 24 March to 1 April.
395
 An attempt was made to improve the flow of 
information between Yugoslavia and Greece and Turkey, but only a partial solution 
was reached. NATO (namely, Greek and Turkish) and Yugoslav planning could be 
coordinated only after a lengthy and quite ineffective procedure of information 
exchange. This was compatible with NATO  planning and function. In addition, other 
issues remained unsolved, notably that of a common supreme Balkan command to 
coordinate effectively tripartite planning. Despite constant proposals of the Greek 
military to establish a supreme command, the Yugoslavs refused, arguing that such 
measure would place indirectly their armed forces under NATO.
396
     
Therefore, Belgrade‟s position remained flexible, pursuing the establishment 
of a formal tripartite military alliance which would not be closely associated with 
NATO. Soon the Yugoslav leadership assumed the initiative. Tito and Popović visited 
Ankara in mid-April 1954. On 15 April the Yugoslav and Turkish leaders declared 
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their intention to transform the tripartite treaty of collaboration into a formal binding 
military alliance containing „mutual military obligations‟.397 Athens was not only 
surprised and embarrassed (since it had not been previously consulted), but was also 
„shocked and hurt‟: the impression had been created that Greece played no part in the 
decision to conclude a military alliance and that Greece would be only a junior partner 
in such a pact. The Greek political and military leadership felt resentment particularly 
against the Turks. Although Greece was placing much more emphasis in developing 
military cooperation with Yugoslavia, it had also been more apprehensive about US, 
Italian and NATO doubts and concerns and had not pressed for an early conclusion of 
a tripartite military alliance. Turkish tactics however made Greece appear less friendly 
to Yugoslavia.
398
 
Still, once the announcement had been made, the Greeks decided that they 
had no other option but to go along with the idea of a military pact. Therefore, the 
above incident could not impair either Greek-Turkish relations or the prospects of the 
signature of a military alliance. Meanwhile, the three Standing Group powers were 
alarmed at a possible provision of the prospective Balkan alliance for automatic 
mutual assistance in case of war. The obvious Italian reactions and possible strong 
reservations expressed by other NATO members, particularly the Scandinavian states 
but also Portugal and the Benelux countries, would have to be taken into account. 
Those countries did not wish to become entangled in a crisis or war in South-eastern 
Europe and also viewed that Yugoslavia could not be trusted to behave sensibly.
399
 
Their reactions could vary from objecting to the conduct of any planning between 
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NATO commanders and the Yugoslav military to declaring that an attack on Greece 
and Turkey triggered by the workings of the Balkan alliance would not constitute a 
casus foederis for the invocation of article 5 of the NAT. Of course, such an action 
would severely undermine NATO‟s cohesion and credibility. The Americans, the 
British and the French acknowledged that in fact any Soviet-bloc attack on Yugoslavia 
would probably spark a general conflict.
400
  
The Standing Group powers worried that if the prospective Balkan alliance 
provided for a „full‟ automatic guarantee, then Yugoslavia might be given the benefit 
of receiving implicit NATO commitments for its defence, without undertaking a 
commensurate obligation towards Greece and Turkey in the event of becoming 
belligerents as a result of their membership to NATO. Nevertheless, it was understood 
that if automatic action under the Balkan alliance was limited to an attack on one or 
more of the three countries by, or through, Bulgaria, the extension of NATO‟s 
commitments would not be great and would not justify a request to Yugoslavia to 
assume far-reaching reciprocal obligations, especially as regards the Ljubljana Gap.
401
 
The allies and the Americans in particularly believed that the conclusion of the Balkan 
alliance was inevitable. Nevertheless, they tried to slow the process and gain some 
control of the situation without much success. 
Indeed, the Greek and Yugoslav governments brushed aside requests by the 
United States, France, West Germany and Italy to delay the signature of an alliance.
402
 
Meanwhile, in June a tripartite US-UK-French Balkan Alliance Group was formed and 
held in London. The Standing Group powers acknowledged that a Balkan alliance, if 
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certain requirements were fulfilled, would considerably strengthen the defence of the 
West. The Americans considered that NATO‟s approval of such an alliance was highly 
desirable, and therefore wanted the Greeks and Turks to inform NATO of the terms of 
the proposed alliance sufficiently in advance of the signature of the treaty.
403
 The 
British recognised that despite possible complications, it was to the advantage of the 
West to bring Yugoslavia into the Western camp, and a Balkan military alliance would 
serve that end. Any Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav military accord should nevertheless be in 
conformity with NATO planning for South-eastern Europe.
404
 At the political level, it 
was essential that the other NATO members should not be faced with a fait accompli, 
but at least „an appearance of consultation‟ should take place.405 Finally, the British 
believed that coordination between the Balkan alliance and NATO should be created 
by a step by step process. For their part, the French indicated they would favour a 
rapid conclusion of such an arrangement, rather than a gradual procedure.
406
    
At any rate, in late June Dulles acknowledged that in essence, a Greek-
Turkish-Yugoslav alliance had become inevitable, and in any case a Balkan military 
alliance would serve US and NATO interests, so long as it would not cause conflict 
with the latter. Therefore, the State Department discouraged the application of UK and 
French pressure to the Greeks and the Turks, arguing that any US-UK-French or UK-
French move would probably turn unproductive: the Greeks and the Turks knew their 
responsibilities with respect to NATO, while the Standing Group countries ought to 
wait until they would be able to make coordinated and concrete suggestions „based on 
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knowledge of proposed terms of alliance‟.407 Therefore, by late June-early July the 
three Standing Group powers had accepted that the conclusion of a Balkan military 
alliance was imminent. Their goal was to ensure that the above alliance would be 
accepted by Italy and the junior NATO allies; to that end some lobbying to achieve a 
consensus of opinion to the NAC should be done by the Greeks and Turks (with 
discreet US, UK and French support). Moreover the Balkan alliance should make „a 
positive contribution to the political unity and military strength of the West‟ through 
practical cooperation with NATO.
408
 However, the three major western powers did not 
hold identical views: the Americans were deeply concerned about the provision of an 
automatic action in case of Soviet aggression against one or more of the signatories. 
The British acknowledged the risk inherent in accepting automatic guarantee to 
Yugoslavia, but argued that since the West sought to forge links with Belgrade, any 
objection of principle to some automatic action would prove counterproductive; such 
action should nevertheless fit to NATO plans. For their part, the French were more 
interested in developing political, rather than military links between NATO and 
Yugoslavia. They also worried that Greek and Turkish commitments to Yugoslavia 
were asymmetrical.
409
  
Meanwhile, a series of developments taking place in the Balkans rather than 
in Washington, London and Paris led to the final conclusion of the Balkan Alliance. 
Tito visited Athens in early June and found himself in agreement with Papagos on the 
basic issues of a military accord. Upon Tito‟s return to Belgrade, Adnan Menderes, 
accompanied by the Foreign and Defence Ministers Fuat Köprülü and Ethem 
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Menderes, flew from Washington directly to Athens (in CINCSOUTH Fechteler‟s 
private aircraft). The Greek and Turkish leaders tried to coordinate their policy taking 
into account their NATO membership and obligations, particularly regarding the issue 
of the guarantee. Both Athens and Ankara were aware of US preferences. Another 
aspect should be also noted: Papagos tried to raise the Cyprus issue (the Greek Prime 
Minister had already decided to appeal to the UN against the British), but the Turks 
refused to discuss the matter.
410
  
Soon afterwards, the three governments decided to set up a committee 
composed of diplomatic and military experts to draft the military pact. The three 
parties agreed to reach a new military agreement, which would be supplementary to, 
but independent of the Ankara Treaty.
411
 At that point, the nature of the guarantee 
given and the commitment undertaken by the three signatories had to be decided.
412
 
Yugoslavia insisted on the adoption of an automatic guarantee against any aggressor, 
while the Greeks favoured the adoption of an automatic guarantee only against 
Bulgarian aggression; in the event of aggression from the USSR or another satellite, 
the three allies would consult and react accordingly. The Yugoslavs and the Turks 
rejected the Greek proposal, justifiably claiming that such a formula would emasculate 
the alliance.
413
 It should be noted that the provision of an automatic guarantee against 
Bulgarian aggression constituted the most realistic option, since Bulgaria was the only 
Soviet-bloc which bordered with all three states and a traditional common enemy. 
However, even such a quite limited provision for automatic military reaction 
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contradicted, at least if seen in a legal rather than strategic context, Greek and Turkish 
obligations to NATO. 
Negotiations continued during June and July. Greece and Turkey were in 
close contact with US and NATO officials. The Greeks in particular were very 
receptive of US-UK-French points and eager to inform the major allies of any 
developments on the Balkan negotiations.
414
 Initially Athens and Ankara sought to 
avoid any binding commitment to assist Yugoslavia if attacked by a Soviet satellite, 
unless they would have first secured full NATO support, but soon accepted a provision 
which, according to the Standing Group powers contained a tight commitment for 
automatic action. Therefore, the need for coordination of tripartite Balkan and NATO 
planning was imperative, because NATO would extend indirectly its commitment to 
Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Greeks tried to persuade the Yugoslavs to accept the 
principle of automatic assistance in case of Greek and Turkish involvement in a war 
by virtue of their NATO obligations.
415
 However, the Yugoslavs abruptly rejected the 
Greek proposal (which had Turkish support) stating that no such Yugoslav guarantee 
„was acceptable or even necessary‟.416 If such guarantee were provided, Belgrade 
would undertake all responsibilities of a NATO member, without enjoying any 
advantages: in essence, Yugoslavia would be obliged to declare war in case of Soviet 
aggression against any NATO member which would activate article 5 of the NAT, 
while it would not have any say in the NATO decision making process and could 
realistically expect Greek-Turkish support only in case of Bulgarian attack.
417
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Furthermore, the Yugoslavs stiffly refused to include an article in the treaty 
providing for cooperation with NATO. This was the most unsatisfactory feature of the 
prospective alliance. Although Western officials understood the Yugoslav will to 
avoid any hint of becoming subordinate to NATO, persistence to reject the principle of 
cooperation with NATO was not only illogical from the military point of view, but 
also likely to backfire at the discussion in NAC. Clearly, due to Greek and Turkish 
obligations to NATO, no effective assistance could be given to Yugoslavia, unless 
NATO and the Balkan alliance would be able to work together successfully; to that 
end, coordination of plans was necessary.
418
 In any case, upon Yugoslav insistence the 
Greek-Turkish side soon had to drop the suggestion for the provision of official 
NATO-Balkan alliance cooperation. For their part, the Yugoslavs reassured Athens 
and Ankara that when the time came, some sort of NATO-Balkan pact unofficial or 
„backdoor‟ military talks should take place to achieve some coordination, without 
provoking the Soviet bloc.
419
  
In early July, the Standing Group powers made a last effort to slow the 
process for some weeks, in an attempt to give more time for consultation among the 
NATO allies. Rome also clearly indicated it would accept more easily a Balkan 
alliance if the latter were signed after, and not before, a solution of the Trieste issue, 
and urged Washington and London to use their influence with the Greeks and the 
Turks in that sense.
420
 The Turks initially made plain that there was no question of 
postponing the final conclusion of the Balkan alliance.
421
 However, and at a time when 
everyone expected that the signature of the alliance was imminent, Ankara proposed to 
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delay the final conclusion of the pact to allow Italy to become a founding member of 
the Balkan alliance. This ill-advised Turkish initiative enraged the Yugoslavs, whose 
suspicion towards Italy and the major western powers was exacerbated. For some 
days, the Yugoslavs believed that the Turks (and possibly the Greeks), were „not 
playing straight‟, attempting to involve the tripartite negotiations with the Trieste 
issue. The Greeks were also very annoyed since, once again, they had not been 
previously consulted or even informed by the Turks, and tried to calm the Yugoslavs. 
Athens even hinted that should the tripartite negotiations eventually collapse, it would 
seek to conclude a bilateral military agreement with Belgrade.
422
 On 15 July Papagos 
sent letters to Tito and Menderes and publicly urged for the signature of the Treaty of 
Alliance as soon as possible.  
Finally, the situation was eased very soon, since it was more a 
misunderstanding rather than a real issue: Turkey did not mean to cause any problems 
for the negotiations, but had only tried to ensure that the Balkan Alliance would be 
received favourably by Italy and NATO; particularly since the Americans had 
underlined a month ago that the value of a Balkan military alliance would have been 
much greater if the Trieste issue had been settled previously. However, the Standing 
Group powers and Ankara acknowledged that even if Italian-Yugoslav relations had 
been cordial, at that stage it would have been impossible to bring Italy in the alliance 
as a founding member.
423
 Therefore, the road for the signature of the Balkan Alliance 
was opened. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia had accepted an amendment to Article 2 of the 
Treaty: it did not provide for an automatic guarantee in case of attack, but provided for 
consultation between the three states before they would commit their armed forces. 
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The above amendment satisfied the Americans, the British and the French, and 
ensured that the treaty was approved by the NAC, on 29 July.
424
 
Therefore, on 9 August 1954 the Treaty of Alliance, Political Co-operation 
and Mutual Assistance was signed in Bled, Yugoslavia, by the three Foreign Ministers 
(and became known as the Treaty of Bled). The primary aim of the new treaty was to 
safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of the three signatories. In 
an attempt to allay Bulgarian, Soviet, and even Italian fears, it was declared that the 
pact might prove „beneficial‟ for those countries of the region which were similarly 
dedicated to the „cause of a just peace‟.425 Whatever those declarations and the evasive 
wording of the treaty regarding the issue of common reaction in case of external 
aggression, the Bled Treaty was important for regional balances. Albania became 
completely isolated; Bulgaria was militarily in a disadvantage; and tripartite Balkan 
military cooperation could offer chances of effective defence of Greek and Turkish 
Thrace, mitigating to some extend the lack of a NATO forward defence in the region. 
Most importantly, the Soviets would have to undertake a major campaign and commit 
significant land and air forces if they wanted to advance to the Western and Southern 
Balkans in the event of local or general war. This was crucial in the context of the new 
NATO strategy (as finally envisaged in MC.48): as the Soviet bloc would now have to 
concentrate significant forces (since a surprise attack with inadequate forces would not 
suffice any more), valuable warning time would be offered to Greece and Turkey to 
mobilise their reserves. Of equal importance, NATO and the United States would be 
given the time and chance to launch tactical nuclear weapons against enemy 
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formations at a very early stage of the campaign, and not deep on Greek and Turkish 
territory.  
As regards the extent to which the Balkan pact was in conformity with 
NATO, one can compare Yugoslavia‟s position and strategic value to the Southern 
Flank with that of Sweden, a non-NATO member, to the Northern Flank. The latter, 
the British commented, had „not plucked up enough courage to have an alliance‟. 
However, it was acknowledged that if Sweden were attacked, Norway and Denmark 
would certainly want to assist it and would expect NATO to follow.
426
  Yugoslavia 
was much more important for the defence of the NATO area, because it could 
contribute significantly to the defence of the Southern Flank, both on the Italian and 
the Balkan front.  
Nevertheless, it is true that the thorny issue of the cooperation and planning 
coordination between NATO (SHAPE, AFSOUTH or HALFSEE) and the Balkan 
alliance remained unsolved. Before the conclusion of the latter, US and British policy 
makers had justifiably claimed that the Balkan alliance should add something more 
than „merely not conflict with NATO‟, but „make a positive contribution to the 
political unity and military strength of the West‟.427 In mid-September 1954, the 
deputy SACEUR, Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, paid a brief „private‟ visit in 
Yugoslavia to meet Tito. Montgomery publicly dismissed suggestions that his 
intention was to confer with the Yugoslav leadership on defence arrangements 
between Belgrade and the West and emphasized the private nature of his visit. 
However, he had been authorized by the COS (and possibly NATO) to persuade Tito 
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that political disagreement with Italy should not defer progress towards the 
coordination of military planning between Yugoslavia and the Balkan alliance and 
NATO.
428
 
At any rate, despite the conclusion of the Balkan alliance in August 1954, 
very little effective cooperation with NATO on military or other matters had taken 
place by late 1954. Not even the three Standing Group countries could agree on 
specific military arrangements between NATO and the Balkan alliance to tie 
sufficiently Yugoslavia with the Western defence establishment. Washington, London 
and Paris agreed only on generalities but could not devise a concrete policy: their 
military interest lay chiefly in the defence of Northern Yugoslavia to cover Italy (and 
not to the defence of Thrace and Greek Macedonia), and their aim could be best served 
by direct planning with Yugoslavia rather than by coordination of plans through the 
Balkan alliance. Things were further complicated due to the continuation of Italian-
Yugoslav hostility: the British argued that NATO-Yugoslav cooperation should 
initially take place via SACEUR, and only at a later stage with CINCSOUTH and 
CINCAFMED who were the local commanders and thus the most appropriate for that 
duty, but whose staffs included many Italian officers. Another problem which had to 
be addressed was the formulation of a common plan for the supply of military aid to 
Belgrade.
429
  
However, Tito proved reluctant to proceed with actual cooperation and 
coordination of planning with NATO. Therefore, it can be argued that from 
Yugoslavia‟s perspective, the conclusion of the Bled Treaty was possibly a manoeuvre 
to enhance its leverage vis-à-vis Italy, NATO, and the Soviet bloc, as well as a means 
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to bolster its defence against Soviet aggression, an indeed constantly diminishing 
threat from mid-1953 onwards.  
 
 
Conclusion 
During 1952-54 the pattern of NATO strategy for the defence of the Southern Flank 
was finalised. However, this strategy was quite contradictory. Official NATO strategy 
as early as 1952 envisaged that „full advantage must be taken of the special 
opportunities which exist in Southern Europe for conducting an aggressive defence‟, 
one of the main assets being „the existence of an important mass of Greek-Turkish 
forces on the spot‟.430 However Greece and, partly, Turkey were considered as capable 
of mounting only limited defence of their own territories against Soviet-bloc invasion, 
while „aggressive‟ or forward defence, was more wishful thinking rather than a 
realistic option.  
At least until after the mid-1950s, even the actual military value of the tactical 
nuclear weapons in defending the Southern Flank, was highly questionable. No 
nuclearization of Italian, Greek and Turkish forces occurred during this period, and the 
only powerful nuclear element in the region was the Sixth Fleet and the relatively few 
US aircraft operating from US bases, which obviously would not be able to support 
effectively land, air, naval and amphibious campaigns in the three different frontiers of 
the Southern Flank. In addition, heavy reliance on nuclear weapons for the defence of 
the area in case of war would most likely lead to a nuclear holocaust: not only would 
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the Soviets retaliate, but at least as regards the campaigns in Greece and Turkey, part 
of allied nuclear bombing would take place on Greek and Turkish soil. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the main usefulness of overreliance on tactical nuclear weapons was 
their obvious deterrent effect to the Soviets, rather than their military utility. 
After the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance which redressed the regional 
correlation of power in favour of the West, NATO and the United States could have 
sought to enhance their forces in the region so as to build a position of strength able to 
deter or withstand Soviet bloc aggression and, equally important, to threaten the flank 
and rear of any Soviet major campaign against Western Europe and the Middle East. 
However, due to the lack of adequate forces no action to that direction was 
undertaken, and thus CINCSOUTH‟s top priority remained the control and command 
of the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the main responsibility for overall defence of 
the area had rested mostly, if not exclusively, on the general US nuclear deterrent, and 
particularly on the US Sixth Fleet. Consequently, in case of conflict in the Southern 
Flank region, NATO ground forces would be limited to Greek and Turkish troops 
without any other NATO contribution to the land campaign – at least at the crucial 
early phase – while the air forces would also be inadequate. NATO leaders evidently 
were reluctant to reinforce the flank in the event of crisis or war because that would 
have led to an emasculation of the defence of the Central region of the Alliance.
431
 
Therefore, the alliance did not provide Greece and Turkey with any realistic 
possibilities for effective defence against Soviet-bloc aggression if deterrence failed, 
and to a lesser extent the same applied for the Italian case as well. 
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However, the tripartite Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish cooperation greatly 
enhanced the Greek, and to some extent, the Turkish defence situation. This finally led 
to the conclusion of a military alliance, indirectly linking, though not integrating, 
Yugoslavia with the Western defence system. The Balkan alliance redressed the 
regional balance, led to the creation of a continuous and solid front in the Balkan 
Peninsula, completely cut off Albania, brought Bulgaria in a difficult position, and 
made the application of forward defence possible. Of course, the Balkan Pacts had also 
significant flaws: Italian-Yugoslav relations remained hostile; the major western 
powers failed to coordinate their concurrent but distinct military talks with Yugoslavia 
with the ones held by the Balkan countries; they also frustrated Tito due to their policy 
on Trieste; and the Yugoslavs refused the establishment of any link between the 
Balkan Alliance and NATO, which inevitably reduced the effectiveness of the former. 
Moreover, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia managed to cooperate and form an 
alliance so long as the Soviet threat was acute and seemed imminent. As the 
international and regional environment changed after the summer of 1954, their 
rapprochement proved short-lived and ill-fated, in spite of the fact that, ironically, 
Italian-Yugoslav relations were restored in late 1954. Those flaws notwithstanding, the 
conclusion of the Balkan alliance was a major military asset for the West and its three 
signatories. Never before or after 1954, was the Southern Flank of NATO so strong.  
NATO and the major western powers did not oppose the establishment of 
close and formal tripartite military bonds, despite fears about possible tangles 
particularly with regard to Italy. Eventually, they played a secondary role. Initiative 
lay on Athens, Ankara, and Belgrade. Of course, NATO offered an appropriate 
environment for the furtherance of Greek-Turkish cooperation, while both countries 
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kept their allies informed on Balkan developments to ensure that the latter would be in 
conformity with NATO. Moreover, Greek and Turkish participation into NATO 
arguably made them more valuable allies for Yugoslavia. In any case, it can be argued 
that the alliance proved more able, and perhaps willing, to act as a political stabilising 
factor, enhance the international standing of the Southern Flank members, and protect 
the Southern Flank by extending the US nuclear deterrence, rather than provide the 
means necessary to mount an effective defence should war actually erupt.   
Finally, a quick reference can be made to the Middle East defence situation. 
Even when the MEDO project was terminated in 1953 and in 1954 the procedure for 
the establishment of the Baghdad Pact was set in motion, the latter was not linked, 
even indirectly, with the Southern Flank of NATO. Once more no coordination of 
planning between (American) NATO commanders and the British Cs-in-C, Middle 
East, proved feasible. From now on, US and UK strategies on the Middle East became 
completely independent from NATO politics and strategy. The pursuit of „political 
stability in depth‟ in the Middle East proved even more unsuccessful than that of a 
regional defence scheme. Therefore, as analysed in subsequent chapters, during the 
following years the Soviets were able to take advantage of the power vacuum in the 
area and extend gradually their activity there, posing a steadily increasing threat to the 
Southern Flank‟s right flank. 
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4. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOUTH-EASTERN FRONTIER, 
AUTUMN 1954 - SUMMER 1956 
 
Almost immediately after the adoption of the M.C.48 document in November 1954 
which provided for high reliance in US nuclear retaliatory capacity, doubts were 
raised, particularly by the European allies, over the wisdom of the new NATO 
strategy. There were growing concerns about such issues as the usefulness of tactical 
nuclear weapons on the battlefield and the approaching strategic parity between the 
two superpowers; the latter would inevitably undermine the credibility of US nuclear 
deterrence and commitment to its European allies. Furthermore, very soon it became 
apparent that the new NATO strategy offered little relief to national budgets, since it 
did not contemplate any significant reduction to existing force levels (but only to 
reserve ones, or to forces that were to be formed in the future). Consequently, by late 
1955 it was evident that the Western Europeans (with the exception of West 
Germany, which joined NATO in May 1955 and started to rearm) were reluctant to 
maintain their defence expenditures at existing levels to raise their conventional 
forces as envisaged in MC.48. This attitude stemmed from the „Geneva spirit‟ of 1955 
which brought hope for an ease in Cold War tensions, and from Khrushchev‟s 
decision for a unilateral reduction in Soviet conventional forces, which led to a 
relative soothing of the perception of threat in Western Europe.
432
  
Concurrently, the European allies started from autumn 1955 onwards to press 
the United States to provide them with tactical nuclear weapons. This development 
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was not unexpected, since NATO strategy placed so great emphasis on nuclear 
deterrence and called for the build-up of forces with integrated atomic capability. 
However, only the US forces in Europe had such capability, and the Americans 
remained unwilling for some time to provide tactical nuclear weapons to their allies. 
They feared that the West Europeans would defer their conventional rearmament 
effort, particularly since Washington and the SACEUR were pressing their allies to 
increase their defence budgets and reinforce their conventional forces, while the 
United States itself was clearly reluctant to do the same.
433
 In addition, nuclear 
sharing was precluded by the McMahon Act of 1946, and despite its modification in 
1954, the dominant interpretation of the Act remained that US nuclear weapons and 
forces could not be controlled by non-US commanders. 
As regards the Southern Flank, Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated 
significantly after the violent disturbances in Istanbul and Izmir – against the Greek 
minority, and the Greek officers serving in HALFSEE, respectively. That rupture 
soon slid into an open dispute between the Greeks, the Turks, and the British, as the 
Cyprus crisis was exacerbated further, and proved to be the key development during 
that period. During 1956-58 there were occasions when the two states considered that 
a war between them was not improbable; however, it is difficult to claim that they 
reached the brink of armed conflict during the second half of the 1950s: Turkey 
verbally threatened Greece for the first time in the summer of 1956, but as analysed 
below neither the Turks nor the Greeks had the means to conduct successfully 
military operations against the other. In addition, as the defence posture of the 
Southern Flank remained weak, the Soviet and the Bulgarian threat could not be 
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overlooked, at a period when the Balkan Alliance had been virtually dissolved, while 
Greek-Bulgarian and Turkish-Bulgarian relations remained strained.  
Nevertheless, the Greek-Turkish rupture of the mid-1950s should not be 
underestimated: the traditional mutual distrust and enmity was revived and military 
cooperation between the Greeks and the Turks, either within the framework of the 
Balkan Alliance or NATO, was suspended. This development came as a severe blow 
to the defence posture of the West in the area. From 1946-7 onwards, Greece and 
Turkey were regarded as a strategic whole and this was the reason why both were 
admitted to NATO simultaneously. Thus, from the beginning of the Cold War 
Western strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean depended heavily on two pillars: close 
Greek-Turkish political and military links and Anglo-American cooperation. As we 
have seen in the previous chapters, the latter was not without strains, and US-UK 
relations reached their lowest ebb upon the outbreak of the Suez Crisis in the autumn 
of 1956. However, that „special relationship‟ was restored very quickly, while Greek-
Turkish relations never returned to full normalcy, let alone to the cordial cooperation 
of the early 1950s. Furthermore, tripartite political and military cooperation in the 
Balkans was also terminated, not only due to the Greek-Turkish crisis but also 
because the Soviet openings to Yugoslavia in the post-Stalin era succeeded in 1955. 
Last but not least, both Belgrade and Athens disagreed with Ankara on other issues, 
such as Turkey‟s Middle Eastern policy. Indeed, the Balkan Alliance was virtually 
dissolved and tended to be substituted by a bilateral, but rather loose, Greek-Yugoslav 
military cooperation. 
NATO‟s failure to mediate between Greece and Turkey led to the first 
manifestation of discord within the alliance. Furthermore, circumstances demanded a 
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persistent and firm intervention of both NATO and Washington for the resolution of 
the Cyprus issue to break the stalemate and restore stability in Eastern Mediterranean. 
Nevertheless, no such initiative came and NATO proved unable to solve intra-allied 
disputes which could even lead to open conflict between member-states. The NATO 
allies did not manage to expand the scope of the organization from a purely military 
alliance dealing with an external threat, to a multilateral forum of political discussion 
and crisis management. No appropriate mechanisms were devised to prevent future 
crises and ruptures on issues like the situation in the Middle East, nuclear strategy and 
sharing, and, increasingly, Greek-Turkish antagonism.  
Therefore, this chapter aims to show how several factors, intra-allied and 
„out-of-area‟, as well as political and military ones, intertwined from late 1954 to mid-
1956 to emasculate the Southern Flank (and mainly the Balkan and eastern frontiers), 
which had reached its peak in 1953-4. It will be also argued that the UK-Greek and, 
especially, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus demonstrated early on in NATO‟s 
history (well before the crises over Suez and De Gaulle‟s challenge) the Alliance‟s 
inherent weaknesses on the political level. NATO historians have not dealt thoroughly 
with the fact that the Cyprus issue caused the first serious intra-allied crisis. 
Moreover, while historians have written about the Cyprus issue, the Italian or Greek 
defence problems, developments in the Middle East and Yugoslav position after 1954, 
no comprehensive work exist on their combined influence on the Southern Flank 
posture. Furthermore, once again emphasis is also given on the Southern Flank as a 
defensive strategy, which is virtually absent from historiography.     
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i) The Balkan Pact in decay: the eruption of the Cyprus dispute and the Soviet-
Yugoslav rapprochement. 
Almost immediately after the signature of the Bled Treaty in August 1954 which 
signalled the apogee of Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish cooperation, the situation started to 
deteriorate due to the emergence of the Cyprus issue. At least from 1950 the Greek 
Cypriot majority was pressing Britain (and Greece) for union (enosis) with the latter. 
From 1953 and increasingly by 1954 the Papagos government was asking for a 
bilateral UK-Greek accommodation, which would provide for the application of the 
principle of self-determination in Cyprus.
434
 This would obviously lead to the latter‟s 
union with Greece, and in exchange Athens was willing to lease bases to the British 
on Cyprus and Greece. In London, Churchill, the COS, the Foreign Office and 
naturally the Colonial Office were unwilling to consider such proposals. The 
maintenance of full control over Cyprus was deemed necessary if Britain were to 
demonstrate its willingness and ability to fulfil its treaty obligations in the Middle 
East; a possible retreat would probably undermine the whole British position in the 
region. In addition, the Suez base issue and the final British withdrawal had 
discredited the idea of leased bases in the minds of both the military and civilian 
policy-makers.
435
  
Facing British intransigence, Papagos decided to recourse to the United 
Nations, despite Turkish indications that Ankara opposed any change of the status 
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quo. The appeal was eventually submitted to the UN on 20 August 1954.
436
 In mid-
September 1954 Churchill wrote to Eisenhower explaining the UK position on the 
Cyprus issue and warned about the danger of significant deterioration in UK-Greek 
and Greek-Turkish relations if the Cyprus issue were discussed at the United Nations. 
Specifically, he pointed out that during the recent NATO „Keystone‟ manoeuvre, 
„Greek and Turkish officers could scarcely be brought to speak to each other‟.437    
In December 1954, the Greek appeal to the United Nations for the 
application of the right of self-determination in Cyprus was discussed and defeated in 
the General Assembly. The British and the Turks strongly opposed the prospect of 
any change of the status quo at the island. The Americans in principle were more 
sympathetic to the Greek case, but had consistently, though secretly, discouraged the 
Greek leadership from appealing to the UN; such an action would allow the USSR 
and the Soviet bloc to get involved in an intra-NATO issue. Even the Yugoslavs 
disagreed with the Greek move, for fear it might weaken the Balkan alliance 
(Belgrade eventually supported Greece during the UN discussion). Therefore, the 
appeal to the UN was an ill-fated decision which disregarded the unfavourable 
international environment. Consequently, the General Assembly decided not to 
discuss the Greek appeal „for the present‟ (the last phrase added at US insistence as a 
face-saving formula for the Greeks), and all NATO members except Iceland voted 
against the Greek item. This infuriated the Greek public opinion, who felt particular 
resentment for the US attitude in New York and Greece‟s „betrayal‟. Large 
demonstrations against the Western powers took place in Greece. The first seeds of 
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anti-Americanism in Greece were sown during that period, since another thorny issue, 
the „extraterritoriality‟ of US personnel in Greece, was also coming to surface.438  
A concurrent development was the Turkish veto of the project of the 
establishment of a main NATO base in the Aegean, on Leros island. Specifically, 
after careful study CINCMED‟s staff selected the Greek island of Leros in South-
eastern Aegean as the most appropriate place to construct a base for fast patrol 
vessels. The NAC held on 18 December 1953 had authorised the construction of 
underground storage for POL and ammunition on the island. The project was 
approved by all member countries.
439
 Initially Turkey had tried to have the base built 
on its own coast, but then, in 1954, opposed the project of the Leros base on the 
grounds that it would violate the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty – of which Turkey was not 
a signatory member – which afforded the Dodecanese islands to Greece, but also 
provided for their demilitarization. Therefore, in the Turkish view, the fortification of 
Leros might initiate a Greek policy of fortifying the rest of the Dodecanese islands, 
thus raising an additional security concern for Ankara. The main reasons for Turkey‟s 
reaction were, first, Turkish deep-seated resentment that almost all the Aegean islands 
(which were populated by Greeks but once had been Ottoman territory and some are 
in close proximity to Asia Minor coast) were now Greek; and second, this reaction 
came as a counteraction to the Greek demand for the application of self-determination 
in Cyprus, which could lead to the latter‟s unification with Greece.440 Indeed, in the 
autumn of 1954 the Turks approached the British seeking London‟s understanding 
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and support, and the Foreign Office „had some sympathy with Turkey with regard to 
the relation of Cyprus to the question‟.441 SHAPE authorised the Standing Group to 
re-examine the issue from a political angle, but NATO military planners insisted that 
Leros was indeed the most appropriate location. Nevertheless, at the NAC session of 
December 1954 Turkey vetoed the Leros base project. The United States and Britain 
feared that the whole issue would cause serious damage to Greek-Turkish relations 
and that the political repercussions would outweigh the obvious military advantages 
of the project.
442
 Therefore, in effect they initially suspended and, as we will see in 
subsequent a chapter, finally cancelled the whole project, although Gruenther insisted 
that Leros was the most, if not the only one, appropriate place for the construction of 
the base. For its part, the Defense Department annoyed at the whole issue, 
characterised Turkish objections as „utter nonsense‟.443 
While the Southern Flank‟s political cohesion had begun to deteriorate, the 
situation was further aggravated by Yugoslav unwillingness to establish a stable 
cooperation with Yugoslavia in the military field. Belgrade also tended to downgrade 
the military aspects of the Balkan Alliance. The Soviets were seeking a 
rapprochement with Belgrade and it was therefore considered important to undertake 
positive steps to ensure the continuation of Yugoslav ties with the West. In late 1954-
early 1955 the Standing Group powers wished the reopening of defence talks with 
Belgrade. In the spring of 1955, the Yugoslavs responded that political discussions 
dealing with the general international situation and specifically with future Soviet 
intentions should precede any talks for coordinated planning. Specific technical 
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military talks to arrange details regarding western military aid to Yugoslavia were 
also desirable. For their part, the Western powers did not wish to get involved in 
detailed discussions before some general questions of military cooperation between 
Yugoslavia and the Western defence system were addressed.
444
 Obviously, the 
Yugoslav leadership did not deliberate to establish a link with either SHAPE or 
AFSOUTH. Therefore, it was necessary for the West to convince Belgrade that 
military coordination was essential and that a channel for discussion should be 
opened.  
For their part, the COS concluded that since defence planning could not be 
carried out through NATO channels, the second best method would be by 
quadripartite (US-UK-French-Yugoslav) meetings. Of course, the Yugoslavs ought to 
be aware that, inevitably, the Western powers would be influenced by NATO 
planning in the Southern Flank. If the Yugoslavs preferred to use the Greeks and the 
Turks as intermediaries to achieve military coordination under the cloak of the Balkan 
Alliance, the allies should accept it; this was considered as the least satisfactory 
option from the military point of view. According to the COS, the Western powers 
should discuss with Yugoslavia its role in a hot war, with particular reference to its 
plans for the defence of northern Yugoslavia – again the West placed emphasis on the 
Italian, rather than Greek or Turkish defence. Furthermore, there was the hope that 
Yugoslavia might be eventually convinced to discuss ways to achieve some measure 
of coordination of its defence plans with CINCSOUTH. In any case, the Western 
officials should ensure that they would acquire some knowledge of Yugoslav military 
planning. Last but not least, the COS advised that Yugoslavia‟s prior commitment to 
proceed with coordinated defence planning should not constitute a precondition for 
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the grant of military equipment by the West. The supply of equipment could be used 
to keep Tito away from the Soviets, and it would be a tactical error to try to impose 
any conditions on the Yugoslavs.
445
 
Indeed, when in February 1955 Georgi Malenkov was removed from the 
Soviet Union‟s leadership and the party‟s hierarchy, the USSR distanced itself even 
more from Stalin‟s legacy.446 The way for better relations with Tito was cleared, 
particularly since Molotov – Tito‟s last Soviet foe – was also becoming increasingly 
isolated. Consequently, by early 1955 the Yugoslav leaders and the press explicitly 
denied the existence of any link between the Balkan Alliance and NATO, in contrast 
to previous comments made during 1954. Moreover, they put emphasis on the need 
that Belgrade, Athens and Ankara pursue wider common goals, like economic and 
cultural cooperation, and played down the military ones (although, evidently, the 
Balkan Pacts had focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the tripartite military 
cooperation).
447
 In the spring of 1955 those views were reiterated by Tito, Vice 
President Kardelj, Foreign Minister Popovic and the Yugoslav press. In May 1955, 
during his meeting with Kardelj, Adnan Menderes, expressing the views of both the 
Turkish and Greek governments, raised serious doubts about the optimistic Yugoslav 
belief that the international situation – and especially the Soviet aims – had changed 
fundamentally since the previous year. The Turkish Prime Minister considered the 
Balkan Pact still very important for regional security, and though positive to the 
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prospect of economic and cultural cooperation, stressed that the politico-military 
aspects of the alliance should not be downgraded.
448
 
Then, in May 1955 the Soviet „peace offensive‟ towards Belgrade 
culminated. It was soon announced that a Soviet delegation comprised of top state and 
party officials headed by Khrushchev and Bulganin would visit Yugoslavia the 
following days.
449
 The Yugoslav government informed the Greek, Turkish, and the 
other Western governments only after all arrangements for the visit had been set. 
Belgrade tried to allay fears that a major shift of its policy and orientation was 
imminent, but soon started to deemphasise the political and military character of the 
Balkan Alliance once again. Indeed, the Soviet opening proved successful. The Soviet 
leadership in effect recognised Tito‟s deviation, and the Yugoslavs wished to appease 
Moscow by keeping distance from their Balkan allies and the West. That attitude 
alarmed Greece, since a possible Yugoslav return to the Soviet bloc would make the 
Greek military position desperate. However, when King Paul visited Belgrade in 
September 1955, Tito assured him that Yugoslavia would not change course; but he 
also declared that he did not place any significance on the military aspects of the 
Balkan Alliance.
450
 So, evidently the latter became a dead letter.   
It should be stressed that despite the considerable improvement of bilateral 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations during 1955, particularly on the political and economic 
fields, this development was not matched by commensurate improvement of relations 
between Yugoslavia and the Soviet-bloc countries, particularly Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Financial negotiations held between 
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Yugoslavia and Hungary failed, while problems over the question of frontier 
markings still existed. Moreover, Tito criticised the Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and 
Romanian leaderships.
451
 Last but not least, the Macedonian question and past mutual 
enmity and distrust continued to poison Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations. 
Naturally, from mid-1955 onwards the NATO allies were increasingly 
concerned over how to deal with Yugoslavia. From the military viewpoint, Belgrade‟s 
attitude to NATO, the United States and Italy was unsatisfactory. The Yugoslavs 
appeared unwilling to engage in military planning with the West and could be hardly 
regarded as a reliable collaborator by the Western powers. The JCS proposed that the 
US government should review the military aid programme for Yugoslavia, since Tito 
was not cooperating either with the United States or with Greece and Turkey in 
coordinated defence planning.
452
  
Moreover, some US officials, particularly of the Defense Department, 
considered that Tito should not be further encouraged to follow his course of 
neutralism, for fear that US allies might be spurred to follow a similar path. However, 
according to other views (like Dulles‟) Tito‟s value was mainly political: Yugoslavia 
was the only deflected ex-Soviet satellite, offering the West „the only effective 
leverage we can use to split the Soviet bloc‟. According to this view, the country‟s 
present status between the West and the East held immense attraction for the satellites 
of the USSR. If any satellite detached itself from Moscow, it should find benefits 
available from the West. In any event, the West would suffer a major political disaster 
if Yugoslavia fell back into the Soviet bloc. The US policy makers decided that the 
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rate of US aid to the Yugoslavs should be slowed down to some extent. It should be 
noted that the Western attitude could not be easily adjusted because a dilemma existed 
whether Tito was trying to double-cross the western allies or he just felt compelled to 
adopt an increasing neutralist position and improve his relations with the USSR 
mainly for home consumption.
453
  
Until then, other developments overshadowed the virtual dissolution of the 
Balkan Alliance. In the aftermath of Greece‟s defeat in the UN in December 1954, 
Papagos himself fell seriously ill in March 1955. Soon, a struggle for his succession 
erupted between the two vice premiers, Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos and 
Defence Minister Kanellopoulos, at a time when the Greek Cypriots of EOKA 
(National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) started their insurgency against the British 
in the island (on 1 April 1955). Therefore, effectively no one could direct and 
coordinate Greek foreign policy.
454
 Meanwhile, despite failure in December 1954, the 
Greek officials had decided to bring the Cyprus issue to the next UN General 
Assembly. The US Ambassador in Athens Cavendish Cannon had been advising 
Papagos to avoid committing Greece irrevocably to any specific course of action. 
Dulles himself advised caution, but to no avail. The Americans believed that it would 
be better for Greece to keep a rather flexible position and maintain its 
manoeuvrability; in such a case, Athens would be able to take advantage of changing 
circumstances that might develop in the near future. Dulles stressed to the Greek 
Ambassador in Washington, George Melas, that Anthony Eden had just replaced 
Churchill in the premiership: the latter was adamant to preserve the Empire, but the 
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Greek Government should give a „breathing spell‟ to Eden to enable him take over 
and then deal with the Cyprus issue.
455
  
It was soon proved that Eden shared Churchill‟s aim for the preservation of 
the British position in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. For their part, the 
COS once again insisted on the need for the retention of full sovereignty over Cyprus, 
since the island was the last site remaining for the function of the Middle East 
Headquarters. The CIGS Field Marshal Sir John Harding stressed that those 
headquarters constituted the centre of UK military influence with friends and allies 
(referring specifically to the Turks) in the Middle East during peace and the focal 
point for the defence of the region in wartime.
456
 The military also argued that the loss 
of British facilities in Cyprus might result to the complete breakdown of all plans for 
the development of any Middle East defence scheme and would prevent Britain from 
fulfilling its obligations towards Iraq and Jordan.
457
 Moreover, the COS emphasised 
that considerable arguments from the military point of view existed against the usage 
of leased bases in Cyprus. They deemed necessary to have full user rights of all the 
island‟s transportation and communication utilities in peacetime and full control of it 
in wartime. Indeed, recent experience in Egypt, but also in Iraq – where the facilities 
agreement eroded gradually due to the rise of nationalism – had demonstrated British 
inability to maintain treaty facilities in the face of local opposition.
458
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ii) The watershed: the September 1955 anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir, the 
resurrection of Greek-Turkish enmity and NATO’s (non-)response. 
In June 1955 the British tried to outmanoeuvre the Greek and Greek Cypriot pressure 
by inviting Greece and Turkey to a tripartite conference in London dealing with 
security issues in the Mediterranean, „including Cyprus‟. After much consideration 
the Greek government decided to attend the conference which opened in late 
August.
459
 Meanwhile, the intransigent Turkish attitude towards the application of 
self-determination or even self-government in Cyprus was demonstrated by 
statements made by Menderes and the new Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, 
before and during the Tripartite Conference. The former publicly argued on 24 
August that „if there is any question of a change in the status quo this must be based 
not on ethnic considerations but on much more important realities and criteria. Our 
delegation goes to London to defend the maintenance of the status quo as a minimum 
condition‟. For his part, Zorlu, who headed the Turkish delegation, used even more 
inflammatory language. On 1 September he declared that „if there is any question of 
altering the status of Cyprus... the Turkish Government will demand a return to the 
status prior‟ [to the transfer of sovereignty from Turkey to Britain by the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923]. He also added that „the application of the principle of self-
determination... clashes with the right of Turkey to ensure her own security‟.460  
The details of that conference‟s work are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, on 6 September extensive violent anti-Greek riots took place in Istanbul 
and Izmir. Those events had been planned by the Turkish authorities as a mean to 
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bolster Turkey‟s position during the London Conference. Passions ran very high in 
the Turkish public: first, Turkish officials had been referring to „information‟ that the 
Greek-Cypriots were planning a massacre of Turkish-Cypriots; second, the Turks 
organised a pretext and planted a bomb in the Turkish Consulate in Salonika (the 
Consulate had once been Kemal Atatürk‟s home).  The spearhead of the riots and the 
ensuing destruction were groups of extreme nationalists, particularly the „Cyprus is 
Turkish‟ Association, and probably the local organization of the governing Democrat 
Party itself. However, the Turkish government lost control of events: as the security 
forces remained inactive, many members of the Greek minority in Istanbul were 
physically attacked or humiliated, while the mob inflicted heavy damage on Greek 
properties. The Ecumenical Patriarchate did not escape either. In HALFSEE in Izmir, 
serious incidents against Greek officers and their families occurred, while the Greek 
flag was also offended and the Greek consulate was burned down.
461
  
During the night of 6-7 September the Greek officers and their families were 
sheltered in HALFSEE‟s buildings. The local Turkish authorities dispatched 
additional guards at the residences of the Greek officers and at HALFSEE. 
Furthermore, in order to restore order in Istanbul and Izmir the Turkish Government 
proclaimed martial law shortly after midnight.
462
 Meanwhile, both countries sent 
reinforcements at their common border in Thrace.
463
 Those dramatic events and the 
rapidly deteriorating situation in Cyprus was a watershed in Greek-Turkish affairs and 
in NATO‟s policy and strategy in the Southern Flank. Military cooperation and 
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coordination between Greece and Turkey within the framework of became extremely 
problematic, because Turkish actions were directed not only against civilians, but also 
against the Greek officers serving in Izmir. 
The September events in Istanbul and Izmir had serious repercussions not 
only on Greek-Turkish and UK-Greek relations, but also on US-Greek and NATO-
Greek relations. The Vice Premier and Defence Minister Panayiotis Kanellopoulos 
informed SACEUR Gruenther that Greek units would not participate in any NATO 
exercises scheduled for September which provided for direct or indirect cooperation 
with Turkish units.
464
 Greece got little, if any, support from the other NATO members 
and officials. Gruenther expressed his understanding for the Greek decision not to 
participate in NATO manoeuvres but urged that the Greek forces soon resume their 
full participation in the NATO military effort. Moreover, he preferred to modify the 
programme of the exercises rather than cancel them.
465
 For his part, Gruenther‟s Chief 
of Staff Lieutenant General Cortlandt Schuyler informed Ismay that he viewed that 
„following the incidents of the night of 6-7 September, the NATO military authorities 
at Izmir rendered timely and appropriate assistance to the Greek officers at 
LANDSOUTHEAST and have since done all in their power to insure against a 
recurrence of such incidents and to aid in obtaining moral and material reparation for 
the damage caused‟.466  
The NAC held a similar view in mid-September. Secretary General Lord 
Ismay, argued that the Greek reaction constituted the first rift within NATO and asked 
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whether Greece could reconsider its decision as a result of recent Turkish promises to 
prevent further disturbances, punish the guilty and offer compensations to the victims. 
The representatives of the other members acknowledged that the issue was a delicate 
one but expressed their hope that Greece would soon carry out all its commitments to 
NATO. Turkish actions received virtually no condemnation. The Greek representative 
Georgios Exintaris assured the Council that his government wished to fulfil all its 
duties, but public opinion in Greece was so strong on the subject of events in Istanbul 
and Izmir that any government would be overthrown if Greek forces participated in 
NATO manoeuvres.
467
 Obviously, the NATO members (the Americans and the 
British not least) and the institutions of the Alliance were not at all ready and prepared 
to deal effectively with intra-member state disputes. 
The feeling of abandonment and „betrayal‟ from the West, first experienced 
by the Greek public and the press in December 1954, was exacerbated and was now 
shared even by the pro-Western opposition parties and leaders (Sophocles Venizelos‟ 
party, whose leader had achieved Greece‟s admission to NATO in 1951-2, asked for a 
re-examination of the country‟s foreign policy). Voices calling for a possible re-
orientation of Greek foreign policy were raised even by deputies of the governing 
conservative Rally party, who wondered „on which side of the Iron Curtain there 
existed more guarantees for freedom and security‟. The Greek press unanimously 
blamed Britain for the tension in Greek-Turkish relations and attributed the anti-
Greek manifestations in Turkey to the „ruthless British policy of “divide and rule”‟.468 
 The worst was to come very soon. Until that point, Greek resentment had 
been confined mainly to the British and Turkish attitude, and to some extent to 
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NATO. In an effort to ease tension and restore NATO‟s normal functioning at the 
Southern Flank, Gruenther ordered CINCSOUTH Admiral Fechteler to visit Athens 
on 19 September. The latter was supposed to smooth Greek anger against the attacks 
made on Greek officers and their families in Izmir and to coax Greece into resuming 
its participation in NATO manoeuvres. On the other hand, the planned visit of deputy 
SACEUR Field-Marshal Montgomery was cancelled due to the rise of anti-British 
sentiment in Greece.
469
  
Those gestures did not have any positive impact, though, due to two ill-
judged US actions. On 18 September Dulles sent identical letters to Papagos and 
Menderes urging for restraint and asking to compromise their differences to preserve 
NATO solidarity. In effect, he put Greece and Turkey in the same position, seeming 
to attribute equal responsibility to both countries for the recent outrages in Turkey, 
and this created an outcry in Greece. Moreover, on 21-23 September the second 
Greek attempt to put Cyprus on the agenda of the UN General Assembly failed, since 
the Western powers, headed by the United States (and Britain), voted against the 
Greek claim – in sharp contrast to the USSR, Poland and Egypt.470 Those 
developments inflamed passions further, and Greek opposition leaders of the Right 
and Centre (and of course the Left) attacked openly the government and NATO, and 
pressed for a reconsideration of the country‟s system of alliance or even for a policy 
of „equal friendship‟ towards the West and the East. The press, conservative and 
liberal, mounted an all-out vicious attack against the government and NATO; 
expressions like „traitors‟ and „Quislings‟ referring to the Greek ministers, and „Holy 
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Alliance‟ and „bonds which have proved to be chains‟ referring to NATO, were used, 
even by newspapers which were pillars of Greek conservative opinion. The country 
should therefore revert to isolationism, because „Hellenism no longer had friends‟.471   
Greece‟s situation was desperate. Papagos was dying and the conservative 
government was headless and demoralised, since the two deputy premiers, 
Stephanopoulos and Kanellopoulos, effectively were destroyed politically (at least for 
the short-term) due to the events of September 1955. At that time the Centre-Liberal 
opposition was weak and fragmented into many parties and factions and could not 
offer a viable alternative. Furthermore, the Greek public and the press felt humiliated 
and were extremely bitter towards Britain, Turkey, the United States and NATO; 
therefore, there were voices calling for the adoption of a more neutralist policy. The 
Balkan Pacts had been virtually dissolved as well. Only King Paul could guarantee 
some sort of stability and provide a solution. In the aftermath of Papagos‟ death on 4 
October, the King appointed Konstantinos Karamanlis, a successful minister of the 
Greek Rally who had not been embroiled in the formulation of Greek foreign and 
defence policy, as Prime Minister. Karamanlis kept for himself the Ministry of 
Defence replacing Kanellopoulos, while Spyros Theotokis replaced Stephanopoulos 
as Foreign Minister.
472
  
The new Greek leadership, in an effort to appease the public and demonstrate 
its bitterness to its NATO allies, affirmed a previous decision that the Greek forces 
would not participate in the NATO manoeuvre „Red Trident 110‟ and any other 
NATO manoeuvres planned for October. In addition, the Greek expeditionary force 
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was recalled from Korea.
473
 It should be mentioned that, at the same time, and despite 
the wave of anti-Western spirit sweeping the Greek public, the new Greek 
government appeared negative to the Soviet policy of „slackened tension‟ and the 
prospect of detente, and remained a staunch support of the Atlantic Alliance. 
According to Athens, the Allies ought to remain strong and united, while effort should 
be made to convince the public opinion of the NATO members for the need for 
continuing economic sacrifices to sustain the rearmament effort. Furthermore, 
Exintaris asked that NATO should also expand its scope and deal with economic 
issues as well.
474
 
Meanwhile, UK-Greek relations had received a serious blow, and that had 
implications in NATO policy as well. After the fiasco of the London Conference and 
the September events in Istanbul and Izmir the British policy makers initially 
considered „to tackle the Greeks on the subject of their cooperation with NATO‟ even 
by proposing the cutting off of NATO infrastructure funding.
475
 However, they soon 
recognized that they „should do everything [they] could to avoid making worse the 
present split with the Greeks‟.476 One reason was that the UK delegation in NATO 
informed the FO that „it would be bad tactics to promote a gang-up against Greece‟, 
since Britain should not „bank too much on the unqualified acceptance of the British 
case by all members of NATO‟ (not least by the Americans).477 The other reason was 
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that since the new Karamanlis government had recently taken over in Greece, it 
seemed wise to „give it an easy ride‟.478 
 In any case, the British position in Greece, dominant from 1830 to 1946 and 
still significant until 1954-5, virtually collapsed. The Greeks explicitly expressed their 
wish that the British Naval Mission, stationed there from 1913, be withdrawn. Both 
the British Embassy in Athens and the First Sea Lord Admiral Earl Mountbatten 
agreed that the Naval Mission should be withdrawn. But that would constitute a break 
of a traditional link with Greece, and if possible the door should be kept open for the 
return of the Mission when bilateral relations improved. Indeed, it was acknowledged 
that although from the military point of view the Mission‟s withdrawal was unlikely 
to have any serious repercussions, it might nevertheless be important in the wider 
political context of UK-Greek relations that the Mission remained in Greece, if at all 
possible.
479
 Finally, the Greeks insisted and the British Naval Mission left Greece on 
14 October.
480
      
On 13 October Karamanlis met General Lawton Collins, US representative 
in NATO‟s Military Committee and the Standing Group. The former expressed his 
dissatisfaction with what he considered as excessive US aid to Yugoslavia and 
especially Turkey which upset the regional balance of power. Apparently, the Greek 
policy makers feared that in the near future, the growing Turkish military might 
would be directed against Greece. For sure, the Greek leadership was resentful of the 
growing role of Turkey in western military and political plans – especially in 
connection with the Middle East. Relevant to that was the feeling that the United 
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States might not fully recognize Greece‟s strategic importance and reliability, despite 
past solidarity of the Greek people with their western allies. In addition, Karamanlis 
insisted that recent events in Istanbul and Izmir were considered by the Greeks as 
„slap in face‟, while the provocations against the Greek officers serving in HALFSEE 
had to be considered as an insult to NATO itself. In any case, Greece was seeking its 
allies‟ help to persuade Turkey to undertake all necessary measures to restore Greek-
Turkish relations.
481
  
General Collins replied that a powerful and friendly Yugoslavia was to the 
benefit of Greece, since the latter would be able to implement a more forward 
defence. As regards Turkey, he said that US military help to each NATO member was 
taking into consideration NATO requirements for common defence and each 
member‟s specific needs and obligations. Therefore, in essence Collins admitted that 
NATO and the United States had assigned different tasks to Greece and Turkey and 
recognised the latter‟s growing significance and. Nevertheless, he tried to reassure 
Karamanlis that the Americans fully appreciated Greece‟s importance to NATO and 
the West. As for the potential Turkish threat against Greece, Collins stressed that he 
considered that a war between Greece and Turkey was „unthinkable under any 
conditions, present of future‟. He pointed out that the Turkish Air Force and Navy did 
not represent a danger because they were not much stronger than the Greek respective 
services, while the Turkish Army would never be able to break the main Greek 
defence line lying along the Struma river (here one could justifiably argue that it 
would pose a danger to Greek Thrace and Eastern Macedonia, east of Struma, if of 
course the Turks disregarded the Bulgarian threat, which was highly unlikely in the 
1950s). Interestingly, Collins tried to allay Greek fears by stating that NATO 
                                                          
481
 FRUS, 1955-7, XXIV, p.548. 
222 
 
 
 
members had „jointly agreed to come to the defence of any member nation no matter 
what quarter attack may come from‟.482 However, that was his personal 
interpretation.
483
 NATO had no explicit provision for the invocation of article 5 in the 
event of an armed conflict within the alliance.
484
 
Meanwhile, the Greek policy makers insisted on the need for moral 
rehabilitation and economic compensation by Turkey.
485
 Indeed, the Turkish officials 
understood that they had lost sympathy within the alliance. CINCSOUTH Fechteler 
admitted during his confidential address to the allied military commentators that the 
riots had been well organised and that the Turkish authorities knew that they were 
going to occur; however, those riots got completely out of hand and the Turks tried to 
blame the Turkish Communists for the extensive damage, although evidently 
communist influence was minimal in the Turkish public.
486
 The Turkish government 
sought to satisfy the Greek demands, at least those which had only short-term 
implications. Therefore, on 24 October 1955 an official ceremony took place in Izmir; 
the Greek flag was raised in the new building which was granted by Turkey to house 
the Greek consulate, and Greek and Turkish military contingents honoured both the 
Greek flag and the national anthem. The COMLANDSOUTHEAST, General George 
Read, Turkish officials and the Greek Ambassador in Ankara Ioannis Kallergis were 
also present, while the Turkish government promised to compensate the Greeks of 
Istanbul for any damage suffered by the mob and guaranteed the safety of the Greek 
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minority and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
487
 The Greek officers had been already 
compensated by Turkey in early October.
488
  
Then, Greece decided to resume its participation in NATO exercises and at 
the NAC meeting held on 25 October 1955 Spyros Theotokis reaffirmed Greek 
attachment to NATO.
489
 However, it should be noted that by autumn 1955 Turkey 
began chasing Greek fishermen. Greece responded by sending naval units in the 
eastern Aegean to patrol and confront such actions. Moreover, in effect the Turks 
procrastinated and, despite Greek pressures, did nothing to compensate the thousands 
civilian victims of the September riots in Istanbul.
490
 At any rate, the Greek minority 
in Istanbul and the Patriarchate would soon face more pressures. Consequently, the 
Greek-Turkish rupture proved deep and wide, and not just a temporary crisis which 
would be overcome soon or easily. Despite this, NATO failed to comprehend fully the 
significance of this development. In contrast to the post-1964 period, when the Greek-
Turkish split widened and NATO was periodically reviewing the status of bilateral 
relations (for example, through Secretary General‟s reports/„watching briefs‟ on 
Greek-Turkish relations), in mid-1950s NATO did not give serious consideration on 
the developing split between Greece and Turkey. 
Therefore, in mid-December 1955 Karamanlis made clear that under the 
existing circumstances the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Balkan Alliance 
could not be convened, as scheduled. Turkey had not undertaken any specific 
measures for the payment of indemnities to the victims and to the Greek community 
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of Istanbul for damages inflicted to its schools, churches and cemeteries, the 
protection of the minority, the punishment of the offenders and the settlement of the 
dispute on fishing rights. Greece considered the introduction and implementation of 
such measures as a token of Turkish sincerity and as a precondition for the 
normalisation of Greek-Turkish relations.
491
 Yugoslavia tried to intervene but since it 
sided with Greece on the question of compensation, it had caused Turkey‟s 
suspiciousness. Moreover, Belgrade and Ankara were at odds on the Middle East 
affairs, since the former did not endorse Turkish policy in the region and the 
formation of the Baghdad Pact (on the contrary, Tito decided to visit Nasser, a move 
which annoyed the Turks).
492
 Therefore, the hard reality was that in September 1955 
the Balkan Alliance suffered the final „death-blow‟.493 
The defence posture of the Southern Flank of NATO had been seriously 
undermined. Italian-Yugoslav relations were normalised in autumn 1954 when the 
Trieste issue was finally settled, but this could not compensate for the dissolution of 
the Balkan Alliance and the rapid deterioration in UK-Greek and particularly Greek-
Turkish relations. From the onset of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey had been firm 
allies and western strategy in Eastern Mediterranean had been based on that premise. 
By late 1955, NATO and Washington could not count on the existence of a solid front 
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans but had to keep a delicate balance 
between Athens and Ankara. London, on the contrary, did not keep any balance at all 
and at least until late 1958 adopted a clearly pro-Turkish policy. Without the shield of 
the Balkan Alliance, Greece‟s defence problem was exacerbated. The country was not 
in a position to repel a Bulgarian or Soviet attack, particularly since the possibility of 
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Turkish aggression, however remote, could not be excluded. Turkey, although could 
feel more confident about the security of its eastern frontier due to the conclusion of 
the Baghdad Pact, could not oversee that the situation had deteriorated at its Balkan 
frontier. The regional correlation of forces had been redressed in Warsaw Pact‟s 
favour, and Turkey could easily be cut off from the West if Greece fell. 
Meanwhile, the Americans tried to find means to limit the damage inflicted 
on US-Greek relations and bolster the position of the Karamanlis government. State 
Department officials acknowledged that the latter was essentially a friendly, pro-
Western government which was trying to subdue the anti-American emotions of the 
Greek public and gradually rebuild Greek-Turkish relations. It therefore deserved „full 
[US] support‟. Thus, it was argued that the United States should make a gesture of 
goodwill by removing the thorny issue of the revision of the US-Greek Base 
Agreement and particularly the „extraterritoriality‟ issue; negotiations with the Greek 
government should be initiated „as rapidly as possible‟. Of course, it was 
acknowledged that the Americans should seek to retain the maximum measure of US 
jurisdiction in criminal cases involving American military personnel in Greece and 
return only civil jurisdiction to Greece. In any case, the State Department asked the 
Department of Defence to consider the matter. Then, officers of the two Departments 
should send instructions to the US Embassy in Athens.
494
 In any case, the issue was 
virtually deferred until the autumn of 1956.
495
 
Another seismic event for the Southern Flank was recorded in March 1956, 
when the British deported the Greek-Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios from 
Cyprus and sent him into exile to the Seychelles. In May the British started the 
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executions of EOKA fighters. UK-Greek relations now were in ruins. Large 
demonstrations took place in most big Greek cities, the anti-Western sentiment rose 
significantly, and Greek-Cypriot leaders asked for Greek withdrawal from NATO. 
The Greek government also withdrew its Ambassador from London, and for a whole 
year (until Makarios‟ release in April 1957) it was not represented by a full 
ambassador in one of the most important capitals of NATO. 
496
  
Those dramatic events constituted a watershed in the Cyprus dispute and in 
British policy. Gradually, London decided that irrespective of potential dangers 
regarding Greece‟s position towards NATO and the West, Greek and Greek-Cypriot 
needs and views were not to be considered. Whitehall and the Foreign Office claimed 
that the Greek threats to leave NATO and adopt a neutralist foreign policy were 
essentially a bluff. At any rate, soon the British policy makers seemed eager to accept 
even the scenario of a neutralist Greece, because from mid-1956 onwards they 
regarded partition of the island as the only way to break the deadlock and satisfy their 
most significant regional ally, Turkey. As regards the Turkish position, Ankara 
opposed any NATO role in Cyprus, at least during 1956, because it feared that any 
NATO mediation would sooner or later lead to enosis. Officially, the Turks argued 
that NATO mediation would merely inflame the issue and cause significant damage to 
the prestige of the alliance. In addition, the Turks justifiably believed that they could 
better and more effectively communicate their views and interest directly to Britain 
and the United States, rather than if NATO was interposed itself between them.
497
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After the deportation of Makarios, Greece urged that some form of 
settlement acceptable to all three parties be reached, emphasizing the „capital 
importance of not allowing Greco-Turkish relations to be further impaired‟. In April 
1956 the Greek Permanent Representative in NATO, Michael Melas, invited the NAC 
to offer its good offices in promoting –secret- negotiations.498 On the US part, while 
State Department officials urged John Foster Dulles to intervene actively to „save‟ 
Greece for the West, the Secretary of State viewed that the Cyprus problem should be 
solved in Cyprus; NATO might have a peripheral, supportive role of secondary 
importance. Consequently, Cyprus was left off the agenda of the NAC meeting in 
Copenhagen in May 1956.
499
 Generally, during 1955-6 the US policy makers tended 
to regard the Cyprus problem mainly as an Anglo-Greek issue and downgraded the 
Turkish interest. Partly for this reason, State Department diplomats had been 
somewhat suspicious that Whitehall had used Turkey as a stalking horse on that 
matter.
500
 
One could justifiably argue that all interested parties were afraid that NATO 
mediation in the Cyprus dispute would not lead to a solution. In particular, if one 
party did not get what it regarded as its right as a result of NATO mediation, it might 
find itself subject to domestic pressure to stop actual cooperation with NATO or even 
leave the alliance; then, the passion generated by the Cyprus problem would be 
directed against NATO itself.
501
 Apparently, it was Greece which was facing mostly 
this danger, since it feared that it would not find a sympathetic audience to the NATO 
allies and did not want to prejudice in any way its appeal to the UN. In addition, 
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NATO did not have a mechanism suitable to solve inter-allied disputes, and took (and 
still takes) decisions based on the rule of unanimity. Regarding the Cyprus problem, 
either Britain or Turkey or Greece could veto a NATO decision, thus straining the 
alliance to a significant extent. 
Meanwhile, some of the European allies expressed their opinions in 1956. 
Italy appeared more sympathetic to the Greek views, since Rome regarded British rule 
in Cyprus as a colonial anachronism in the Eastern Mediterranean.
502
 In spring 1956 
the Italians informed the British that they would welcome a discussion of Cyprus in 
the forthcoming NAC ministerial meeting, although it would take no initiative to that 
end; such initiative could come from another party, for example the Belgian Foreign 
Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. The Italian Foreign Ministry had some sort of formula for 
a provisional agreement, based on the stationing of NATO troops in Cyprus on the 
model of Malta.
503
 For its part, West Germany feared that the Cyprus dispute could 
cause considerable damage to NATO. After his visit in Athens in May 1956, the 
German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano expressed his concern over the 
consequences the Cyprus dispute might have in the near future; mainly, the danger of 
Greece turning neutralist – probably if the Karamanlis government fell and the 
Opposition leaders „were tempted to embark on a short-sighted policy of neutralism‟. 
Furthermore, he understood Turkey‟s strong interest in Cyprus and the dangers in 
disregarding that interest; however, he also foresaw that „the Turkish aspect of the 
problem might in the long run prove one of the most difficult things to handle‟. 
Brentano viewed that it would probably be extremely difficult to reach a final solution 
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satisfactory to both the Greeks and the Turks.
504
 The Germans were cautious to avoid 
becoming critical towards the British or intervene in the matter and had no 
suggestions to offer for a possible solution. They nevertheless expressed the view that 
if no viable solution was found shortly, „the whole Western position in the Eastern 
Mediterranean would be hopelessly compromised‟. Indeed, the UK bases in Cyprus 
would be useless if Greece was in unfriendly hands, while Turkey would also become 
isolated.
505
  
The other allies were generally unwilling to intervene or even express a 
specific view. During the NAC meeting in April 1956 the representatives of Belgium 
and Norway thought that some form of NATO intervention might be useful, if only to 
keep the issue away from the UN.
506
 It also seems that Canada considered that NATO 
might be brought in to break the deadlock. The Canadian Foreign Minister Lester 
Pearson thought that the alliance could help the Cypriots „to swallow a constitution‟ 
which would retain internal security, foreign affairs and defence to British hand. He 
then pointed out that Cyprus was an issue with which NATO was concerned as it 
might affect the alliance‟s cohesion. To this remark the British responded that, for the 
time being, NATO might only be brought as a guarantor of the security of Cyprus, but 
in any case they believed that such an arrangement would complicate things even 
further.
507
 
Concurrently, the British had decided that at any cost they should not 
displease Turkey, which was their main regional ally in the Middle East. During June 
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1956 the Foreign Office was even concerned about the fact that the Turks had done 
little to express widely their strong interest and their views on Cyprus both in NATO 
forums and in Washington. Since this had proved „a serious handicap‟ for the British 
–friendly governments had perceived that London overrated the Turkish interest- 
instructions were sent to the UK embassies in allied capitals to „do anything possible 
to secure a better understanding of the Turkish position‟ and help Turkish diplomats 
when the latter took action to that direction.
508
 
As regards Yugoslavia, Belgrade generally supported Greece over Cyprus, 
particularly in the UN, and from 1955 onwards the Yugoslavs stood much closer to 
Greece than to Turkey. However, the Yugoslavs appeared quite moderate when 
criticising British policy and its repercussions on regional political and military 
cooperation. Therefore, the British Embassy in Belgrade appeared somewhat critical 
to FO directives and argued that in pursuing the British (and Turkish) views, it should 
avoid provoking the Yugoslavs; the latter might then openly blame London for the 
virtual dissolution of the Balkan Alliance and ask for a quick settlement of the Cyprus 
problem. Furthermore, the Yugoslav leaders were not at all ready to condemn 
EOKA‟s „terrorism‟ since they themselves were not Western bourgeois politicians but 
former partisans who had assumed their power by the conduct of unconventional-
irregular warfare.
509
 
In June-July 1956 Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated significantly and the 
threat of war was aired in the atmosphere. The documentary evidence is not 
comprehensive but strong indications exist that, in an effort to force a settlement of 
the Cyprus issue on favourable terms, or at least prevent a UK-Greek compromise 
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settlement, Turkey contemplated military operations against Greece and threatened 
the latter. On 3 July Menderes gave an interview to the Daily Telegraph. He argued 
that a change of the status quo in Cyprus would affect Turkey‟s security, and 
therefore would not be considered as an isolated incident; rather, Turkey would link it 
with a general reconsideration of the Lausanne Treaty, and might raise issues in Greek 
Thrace and the Dodecanese islands. In addition, as Vice President Richard Nixon 
informed the NSC after his return from Turkey, the Turks „had a positively 
pathological attitude on the Cyprus problem‟ and did not hesitate to imply that they 
might resort to war to prevent enosis.
510
  
Greece remained calm but asked for US intervention to restrain Turkey and 
informed the Americans that it would not be impressed by Turkish threats: if attacked, 
Greece would respond appropriately.
511
 The Greek government made gestures of 
goodwill by bringing fresh proposals for an escape from the Cyprus impasse; these 
proposals took into account Turkish security anxieties, and, interestingly, gave NATO 
a role in fixing the date for the application of self-determination in Cyprus; this 
however was unacceptable to the British, and the proposals were ignored.
512
 The 
Greek leadership also tried to bolster the country‟s position, met Tito in Corfu and 
discussed recent developments in Cyprus, the Middle East and the defence of the 
Balkans. For the first time, the possibility of a bilateral Greek-Yugoslav cooperation, 
substituting the Balkan Alliance if the latter‟s revival became impossible, was 
implied.
513
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Meanwhile the Greek-Turkish crisis escalated. In August the Greek embassy 
in Ankara was ransacked and several documents, some of them on defence matters, 
were taken. That episode was not insignificant because it is probably related with 
fresh Turkish plans to launch a sudden attack against one or more of the large islands 
in the Aegean Sea as a means to demonstrate Turkish resolve for a favourable 
settlement in Cyprus. It appears that Greece was ready to pick up the gauntlet; its 
army would try to advance in Eastern Thrace, while the Greeks, facing such dramatic 
situation, might even ask for help from „any party that might be interested to see 
Turkey removed from the Straits‟.514  
Of course, the feasibility of both the Turkish and Greek military plans can be 
easily questioned. In 1956 neither Turkey possessed the means to carry out 
successfully a combined-arms amphibious and aeronautical operation, nor was the 
Greek Army equipped with armour, artillery and motors to undertake any significant 
offensive operation. Most important, neither country could seriously contemplate 
military operations against the other, so long as the Bulgarian (and Soviet) armed 
forces could launch a successful attack against the flanks and rear of Greek or Turkish 
advancing forces in Thrace. Last but not least, the Turkish threat for a general 
reconsideration of the treaties arranging the status quo and „security issues‟ in the 
whole area, might eventually backfire: if the Turks opened the Pandora‟s box by 
forcing a change in the status quo, the Soviets or the Bulgarians would also find an 
opportunity to achieve revisions to their advantage, particularly at the Straits area, 
since the latter obviously influenced Soviet and Bulgarian security.  
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iii) The defence of the Southern Flank, and the Middle East connection 
On 10 May 1955, the NATO Ministerial Meeting discussed the situation in the 
Middle East. The Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the British 
Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan dealt with the possible effects of the Turco-Iraqi 
Pact (to which Britain had acceded) on NATO. It was acknowledged that Britain had 
not undertaken any further commitments by adhering to the Turco-Iraqi Pact, since 
London was already bound to support Turkey under the NAT and Iraq under the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. If, however, action should be taken in connection with 
the Turco-Iraqi Pact which would affect NATO, the NAC would be informed in 
advance.
515
  
During the meeting Zorlu gave an account of the circumstances which led to 
the conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Turkey had made continuous efforts to 
convince the Arabs that the real danger was the USSR, but Egypt showed 
considerable hostility towards the conclusion of any defence agreement. Cairo tried to 
prevent the other Arab states, including Iraq, from entering into an agreement with 
Turkey or any Western power. Zorlu reassured his colleagues of Turkey‟s goodwill 
towards all the members of the Arab League, arguing that any cleavage among the 
Arab countries would be contrary to Turkish and NATO interests. He stressed that 
Turkey had an experience of five centuries in dealing with the Arabs and asked for the 
full support of the other NATO members, or if this was not possible, at least that none 
of the NATO allies create difficulties to the Baghdad Pact project. Finally, Zorlu 
called his colleagues to consider the Turco-Iraqi Pact in its global framework, and not 
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merely in the limited picture of the Middle East, because the accession of Pakistan 
would complete the line of defence formed by NATO and SEATO.
516
  
John Foster Dulles gave full support to the Turkish initiative. He reiterated 
his belief that the cornerstone of the defence of the Middle East was the „Northern 
Tier‟ countries which were more concerned about the Soviet threat and much less 
preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Americans could thus provide 
material aid to those states more easily. Macmillan emphasised the importance of 
buttressing the right flank of the southern region of NATO and hoped that the Turco-
Iraqi Pact and British accession to it would constitute the basis for the development of 
a general Middle East defence pact which would prove a deterrent to aggression and 
would contribute to the stability of the Middle East. He claimed that such 
development would increase the overall strength of NATO and was therefore in the 
interest of all NATO members.
517
 It should be noted that the US leadership was well 
aware that the British objectives regarding a possible Anglo-American joint defence 
effort in the Middle East were mainly two: Britain sought to hold command 
responsibility in the area in the event of crisis or conflict; and it „expected the United 
States to foot the bill required to place the area in some posture of defence‟. 
Therefore, in view of those designs, the Americans avoided entering in discussion 
with the British on the military level, and confined bilateral talks on the Middle East 
to a purely political level.
518
 
Other allies seemed more restrained on the Baghdad Pact‟s prospects. The 
French Foreign Minister, Antoine Pinay, argued that although nobody could question 
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the importance of the Middle East to NATO, the problem how to organise an effective 
defence was not an easy one. He expressed his full sympathy with the aims of the 
Turco-Iraqi Pact but claimed that it had not simplified the situation. France would 
remain outside for the time being, trying to retain the delicate balance in the area. 
Paris was preoccupied with the situation in Western Mediterranean and North-eastern 
Africa.
519
  
For his part, the Greek Permanent Representative to NATO Georgios 
Exintaris expressed once again Greece‟s wish to participate in any Middle East 
defence scheme; the country‟s geographical position („at the gates of the East‟) 
justified such participation, while Greece had also many cultural and economic ties 
with the region. Exintaris viewed that the Arab public opinion needed patient 
preparation for cooperation with the West and implied that Greece could contribute 
accordingly by having friendly relations with the Arab world. Furthermore, he 
expressed the belief that the Turco-Iraqi Pact had added confusion and tended to 
revive traditional anti-Turkish and anti-Western suspicions in the area. Greece, he 
continued, would not take any step which might prejudice its relations with the Arab 
world. It felt that unity among the Arab nations was a political necessity, and on this 
basis would do anything possible to safeguard thus unity and, if possible, bring the 
Arab League nations into association with the Baghdad Pact signatories. The Greek 
government nevertheless believed that this would be a lengthy task which could only 
be accomplished in an atmosphere of calm and under no compulsion on behalf of the 
West (or Turkey).
520
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Evidently, even before the September 1955 rupture, Turkey and Greece had 
adopted a different approach to the issue of the defence organisation and political 
stabilisation of the Middle East. Ankara had a policy similar to the British one, 
essentially anti-Nasser, and was pressing relentlessly for the formation of an anti-
Soviet military pact even if circumstances did not favour the admission of most Arab 
countries to it. Athens believed that Arab unity should be preserved, that the West 
should be patient with the Arabs (including Nasser) and that any pro-Western defence 
organisation would take much time to materialise and be a success. France, 
preoccupied as it was with the Algerian War abstained from the Baghdad Pact, while 
the Americans, despite their verbal endorsement of the project, carefully avoided 
joining it and establishing any link between NATO and the Middle East.    
Meanwhile, other regional developments, this time in Europe, affected the 
situation at the Italian frontier. On 15 May 1955 the Austrian State Treaty was signed 
among the United States, Britain, France, the USSR and the Austrian government. It 
came into force on 27 July 1955 and provided for the neutralisation of the country and 
the withdrawal of Soviet and Western troops. Therefore, the SACEUR made 
recommendations to the Standing Group for the redeployment of US units to offset 
the adverse effects of allied withdrawal from Austria to the defence of North-Eastern 
Italy. Gruenther recommended that a combat ready force with the most modern 
capabilities be established in Northern Italy. A portion of the US units withdrawn 
from Austria should be redeployed to Northeast Italy to form the nucleus of this force. 
Those forces would be reorganised in order to obtain a nuclear capability. 
Furthermore, Gruenther emphasised the need for implementing, as scheduled, the 
Italian plan for the reorganisation of the Italian Armed Forces; the so-called 
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Mancinelli Plan put emphasis on the reduction of the total number of divisions and on 
the increase of the number of D-day divisions and of the overall readiness of the 
Army. Both the Standing Group and Italy concurred with SACEUR‟s 
recommendations. The United States agreed, provided that the Italian Government 
ratified the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to complete the US-Italian 
arrangement concerning the status of US forces in Italy.
521
 
In early September 1955 the Standing Group approved the above 
recommendation and completed an estimate of the military situation arisen by the 
conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. Any appraisal of the situation had to be 
considered as tentative, since many unknown aspects, as the realignment of Soviet 
forces, the future strength of the Austrian armed forces and the posture and orientation 
of Austria itself, were not clear. Generally, the Austrian State Treaty had little 
significance on Soviet military capabilities and a limited effect upon overall NATO 
defence plans, particularly on the Central Sector. The defence planning pertaining to 
the Southern Flank (especially Northern Italy), might be adversely affected to some 
extent, if Austrian neutrality was violated in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. 
Although the withdrawal of Allied forces from Austria would deny to NATO the 
ability to fight a delaying action on Austrian soil, a Soviet land advance would be 
delayed by the time required to re-enter and cross Austria and the increased 
opportunities for Allied interdiction operations. Furthermore, although the strength of 
CINCSOUTH‟s command would be initially reduced somewhat, his command would 
be soon strengthened when US forces with a ground tactical atomic capability were 
positioned in Northern Italy. Therefore, the main adverse influence of the Austrian 
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State Treaty might be on Yugoslavia‟s defence planning. So long as Allied forces 
occupied western Austria, the Yugoslav northern flank was not exposed to a Soviet-
bloc invasion. Since after the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Austria this 
condition would no longer apply, an increased probability existed that the Yugoslavs 
would withdraw to South-western Yugoslavia in case of Soviet-bloc aggression. Such 
course of action would leave exposed the critical Ljubljana gap approach into North-
eastern Italy. Consequently, it was assessed that the most serious repercussion of the 
Austrian State Treaty was the possible removal of an inducement for securing 
Yugoslavia‟s collaboration with NATO defence plans.522 
Overall, the NATO military officials seemed quite confident that the 
Austrian State Treaty would not have significant repercussions on the defence of 
Italy. The Italian political and military leadership was nevertheless much concerned 
over the severance of CINCSOUTH‟s ties with NATO‟s Central region. After the 
conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty the Italian Defence Minister Paolo Emilio 
Taviani had asked for the establishment of a new, powerful NATO command 
including at least three allied divisions which would be stationed in north-eastern 
Italy. Evidently, the Italian policy-makers wished the presence of significant US land 
forces in that sector for political, military and psychological reasons.
523
 Of course, 
such demand was chimerical in the era of the „New Look‟ when reduction in US land 
forces was contemplated and occurred.  
Soon, however, the US-Italian negotiations on the stationing in Italy of a US 
ground task force with atomic capability succeeded. By October this new unit, the 
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Southern European Task Force (SETAF) was officially deployed around Verona and 
Vicenza. It was placed under COMLANDSOUTH‟s command, the Italian NATO 
commander responsible for the land forces defending northern Italy. SETAF was soon 
comprised by two battalions equipped with Honest John atomic rockets and two 
battalions with Corporal atomic missiles, plus additional support units, a total of 
almost 10,000 troops. The former had limited range and could be used almost as 
conventional field artillery, but the latter had a range of about a hundred miles and 
could be used for interdiction of Soviet forces massed or advancing deep in Austrian 
or Yugoslav territory, if war erupted.
524
  
The arrival of SETAF with its integrated atomic capability signalled the 
transformation of Italian strategy and the army‟s doctrine. SETAF‟s tactical atomic 
weapons, perhaps in conjunction with Sixth Fleet‟s nuclear-capable aircraft, should be 
used to interdict the Soviet forces during their concentration outside Italy before the 
Soviet invasion and during their advance through the Alpine passes; therefore, crucial 
time would be gained to enable Italy to mobilise its forces. Moreover, the Italian 
Army should be transformed in order to be able to fight both a nuclear war (mainly in 
the initial stage of a Soviet attack) and a conventional one.
525
 Consequently, the 
Italian frontier was significantly reinforced by the formation of a NATO – that is, US 
– task force with integrated atomic capability. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons 
manned by US units was very high, but even if deterrence failed, the 
COMLANDSOUTH could count on SETAF‟s firepower to mount an effective 
defence against a Soviet offensive. However, the COMLANDSOUTHEAST did not 
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enjoy such advantages either on the Greek or the Turkish frontiers, which remained 
very exposed in the event of a Soviet-bloc offensive.  
The Italian Government was satisfied with the transfer to Venetia of part of 
the US troops stationed in Austria and expressed the hope that this represented a first 
step to the full recognition of the importance of the Mediterranean theatre. During the 
NAC held in October 1955 the Italian Defence Minister Taviani tried to stress the 
importance of the Southern Flank sector, where new challenges had emerged, and 
urged for close attention by the NATO members and the alliance‟s military 
authorities. He argued that the Soviets seemed to follow a more active policy in the 
Middle East and in North Africa. If they decided to launch a sudden attack, they 
would probably choose the Mediterranean, since such an operation from the Northeast 
would find very favourable conditions in the Middle East; local countries antagonised 
one another and lacked military preparedness. Taviani underlined that a Soviet 
advance towards the Mediterranean would have disastrous effects.
526
   
Indeed, the British, the second most significant power in the region, lacked 
means in that theatre. They were experiencing a shortage of amphibious vessels and 
maritime aviation. In late 1955, Major General Philips, Chief of Amphibious Warfare, 
visited the Mediterranean to review points arising from exercises conducted in 1955. 
He also sought to obtain the views of CINCSOUTH Admiral William Fechteler and 
CINCAFMED Admiral Sir Guy Grantham on the part that amphibious operations 
might play in a war against the Soviets. The findings were rather disappointing. There 
were very few likely assault beaches in the Mediterranean at which an L.S.T. could 
discharge its load of vehicles within wading depth. In addition, although according to 
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the view of the above NATO commanders, amphibians had a primary importance in 
the Mediterranean, only thirteen of them were in place at that time. Most significantly, 
in 1955 no British or other troops trained for such operations were assigned to 
CINCAFMED and no amphibious operations were planned. In any case, due to lack 
of appropriate means and manpower and the negative political developments with 
regard to Greece, Turkey and North Africa the conclusion of the training programme 
for 1956 appeared highly doubtful.
527
  In the spring of 1956 the British were even 
unable to assure the commission of at least one carrier in the Mediterranean (because 
either the Ark Royal or Eagle would be refitted). The Admiralty proposed that the 
availability of one carrier with a full air group fit for service in the Eastern 
Mediterranean should never be allowed to exceed ten days so as to be able to deal 
with any possible contingency.
528
 
During NATO defence planning discussions on the organisation of allied 
naval forces, the Greek and Turkish representatives, Admiral Spanides and General 
Erdelhun respectively, emphasised the need for allied control of the Straits and, if 
possible, denial of the Black Sea to Soviet naval forces. In case of war the latter 
would support the land campaigns of the Red Army towards the Straits and the 
Aegean and would probably also seek to violate the Straits and send submarines and 
fast patrol vessels in the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Therefore, NATO should be 
able to engage the enemy in close waters before the Soviets had time to deploy their 
naval forces. For that aim, Greece and Turkey should be given the means (that is, 
modern vessels) to make use of their trained reserves and fulfil the tasks assigned to 
them. Until then, the Greek and Turkish navies had been unable to undertake an 
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effective modernisation. Lack of funds was one, though not the only or even the main 
problem, since a lot of money had being spent on maintaining ships which were 
obsolete. SACEUR Gruenther agreed that the Greek and Turkish navies should be 
strengthened although he was quite vague on how that would be accomplished.
529
 It is 
highly interesting that despite the significant deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations, 
the two countries continued to act jointly when asking for NATO support to defend 
their territory and for allied military aid to strengthen their defence establishments. 
On 29 February 1956 Admiral Spanides stressed how far behind Greece was 
in the application of modern techniques and how weak the NATO shield was in 
Greece and the Balkan front. The Greek Army in particular was facing a Bulgarian 
Army equipped with modern weapons (heavy artillery plus 120 heavy tanks and 1,023 
medium tanks). The navy‟s situation was dire, and only the air force was in a better 
condition due to considerable aid given by the United States and Canada in the 
provision of modern fighters. Therefore, Spanides concluded that it was natural for 
the enemy to attack „in full strength‟ against the weakest point of the alliance and 
„Greece was perhaps that weak point‟. The Greek military representative expressed 
his government‟s hope for the provision of additional help by its allies and for 
protection offered by the US nuclear arsenal; he also expressed the persistent Greek 
anxiety „whether these weapons would be available or whether they would be 
available in time‟. He stressed that each country should rely, first and foremost and to 
the extent possible, on its own forces. But the Greeks felt that they were wasting both 
money and time by allocating funds to the maintenance of obsolete weapons. On the 
contrary, if they were given more modern equipment they would be able to support 
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increasing quantities of it for the same expenditure – for the foreseeable future, 
Greece would not afford to purchase new weapons. Furthermore, the Greeks favoured 
the standardisation of equipment; such development would facilitate replacement of 
obsolete or obsolescent materiel.
530
    
In addition, the Greek leadership felt quite uneasy with the prospect of the 
relative detente of the Cold War and emphasised in NATO forums that the Soviet 
military threat retained its absolute priority; despite the „superficial‟ change of Soviet 
tactics, Greece claimed that Stalinist principles were still honoured in the USSR, so 
the defence effort should not be relaxed, „even if it were supposed that a real change 
in Soviet policy was likely‟. In the political field, NATO activities towards the USSR 
should be well concerted and the Soviets should always be aware that they were 
dealing with an enduring solid alliance. A permanent Greek (and Turkish) argument 
and proposal was the extension of the scope of the alliance to the political-economic 
field as well; to meet the new trends in Soviet policy, the most developed NATO 
countries should contribute to the economic development of the underdeveloped 
countries (meaning basically Greece and Turkey) which were making heavy sacrifices 
in the name of joint defence.
531
 
Indeed, by mid-1956, the Soviets had launched an impressive „peace 
offensive‟ on Greece in an effort to take advantage of the rift in Greek-NATO 
relations because of the Cyprus question.
532
 The spearhead of the Soviet gesture was 
the offer of economic cooperation with beneficial terms to Greece. Concurrently, 
Moscow tried to convince Greece that it did not face any danger from the Soviet bloc 
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countries, describing Greek fears as „psychosis‟ which did not justify the maintenance 
of the size of the Greek Armed Forces. In the summer of 1956 the new Soviet Foreign 
Minister Dmitri Shepilov paid an unofficial visit to Athens – he was the first Soviet 
high-ranking official visiting Greece since the Bolshevik Revolution. Shepilov 
suggested that Greek-Soviet trade relations should be expanded, offered help in 
carrying out industrialisation projects and underlined that the USSR would neither try 
to obtain „any political influence in Greece through this work‟ nor ask the country to 
leave NATO. Last but not least, Shepilov said that his country would continue to 
support the application of the principle of self-determination to Cyprus. The Greek 
leadership declared its willingness for closer economic and trade ties with the USSR 
provided that Greek sovereignty and political orientation to the West were 
respected.
533
 Although Greece tried to exploit the Soviet overture to gain support for 
the Cyprus issue at the UN and develop commercial relations with the USSR and 
other Soviet-bloc states (virtually with all except Albania), it was very cautious to 
avoid becoming dependent on the Eastern market.
534
  
Turkey also appeared reluctant to accept Soviet proposals for the promotion 
of disarmament and control of armaments, including nuclear weapons. The Turkish 
leadership was not impressed by unilateral Soviet reduction in conventional forces 
and implied that they constituted a shift in military potential and priorities (to nuclear 
weapons, missiles and airpower) rather than real disarmament. In any case, Ankara 
viewed that such reductions were useless unless they formed part of a comprehensive 
international set of arrangements which would provide for effective controls, 
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inspection and protection against surprise attack.
535
 Moreover, in the May 1956 NAC 
meeting the Turks worried about the continuation of political instability in the Middle 
East which could result in Soviet intervention. Once again Turkey tried to capitalise 
on its contribution to the Baghdad Pact, claiming that it „was at present the only 
instrument of defence against Russian penetration‟ in the Middle East. Ankara 
repudiated charges or doubts that the Baghdad Pact in fact caused more tension in the 
region and argued that it was the consequence and not the cause of regional tension. 
As expected, the Turks were backed by the British who were determined to make a 
success of the pact.
536
    
On the military field, by late 1955 the NATO specialists were pointing out 
that Turkey had generally met the force goals in all services, at least quantitatively. 
Although some qualitative improvements had been made in the army and the air force 
since 1953-4, significant effort was required to reach adequate effectiveness. The 
most problematic fields were the AC&W system, logistic support of existing army 
units and the problem of warship replacement. The Turks contemplated a further 
increase of their existing forces (particularly of the air force). However, the NATO 
military authorities and the International Staff recommended that it was of outmost 
priority to bring existing units to complete effectiveness. Furthermore, they viewed 
that Turkey was unable to sustain simultaneously a considerable qualitative and 
quantitative improvement of its military establishment; at this point, quality should 
prevail over quantity. They also recommended that since the Turkish economy was 
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facing serious difficulties, Ankara should review its economic policy to ensure that its 
defence effort would be supported by a sound economic base.
537
 
Meanwhile, a debate was taking place within the US government regarding 
the structure and size of the Turkish Armed Forces. By May 1956 Turkey‟s economic 
and financial situation had deteriorated significantly, because the Menderes 
government had failed to pursue simultaneously the vigorous rearmament and 
economic development programmes. Twice during the spring of 1956 the Americans 
had to bail out the Turks economically to enable the latter to supply oil and spare 
parts. John Foster Dulles and the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, viewed that 
the whole question of US military aid programmes was in need of thorough review. In 
the recent past, the extensive military assistance was justified in the light of Soviet 
pressure applied to Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Iran. However, it seemed that 
priority should be given to the building of economic – rather than purely military – 
strength around the periphery of the Soviet bloc. The current US military assistance 
programmes would strain the economies of such allies like Turkey. Therefore, a 
dilemma existed: either the Americans would have to commit and offer increasing aid 
to Turkey (and perhaps to other allies as well) for the middle or long-term, or else the 
Turkish military establishment should be cut down significantly. Of course, as 
Eisenhower and the Secretary of Treasury, George Humphrey, noted, it would have 
been difficult to convince the Turks to accept a reduction of their forces; Ankara was 
constantly pressing the Americans for additional military and economic assistance in 
order to raise more forces.
538
 However, an increase in the size of Turkish Armed 
Forces would not only raise the cost of the US assistance programme, but would also 
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impose significant a burden on the Turkish economy. No decision could be reached 
during the following months and the debate continued in Washington. 
As regards Italy, and in sharp contrast with its much poorer allies (Greece 
and Turkey), considerable shortfalls existed in the M-day and D-day forces of all 
services against the force levels envisaged in M.C.48. Only in the Navy the situation 
was relatively good. As in Greece and Turkey during the same period, Italian civilian 
and military leadership were undertaking a review of the country‟s defence 
programme. The most serious weaknesses in the Italian armed forces were shortages 
in materiel and inadequate logistic support. The Italian defence expenditures had 
remained below the level required to cover all the needs arising from the planned 
force goals. According to NATO officials, a considerable increase in the national 
defence budget appeared necessary to improve the effectiveness of the Italian forces. 
However, economic development should not be hampered and social stability should 
be maintained. Consequently, a limited increase might be possible. The Italians had to 
address many weaknesses of their military establishment. The most critical were the 
improvement of the air control and reporting system, the increase of jet fuel reserves, 
the further build-up of army M-day units and the implementation of the navy 
construction and modernisation programme. If substantial progress was not achieved 
in those (and other) fields, the NATO experts viewed that it would be impossible to 
maintain the Italian forces at combat ready status.
539
  
 
 
                                                          
539
 NATO/C-M(55)101, II, Annual Review 1955 – Italy, 26-November-1955; NATO/C-M(56)132, II, 
Annual Review 1956 – Italy, 5-December-1956. 
248 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
From late 1954 to the autumn of 1955 the whole defence posture of NATO‟s Southern 
Flank declined sharply; this deterioration continued until early 1959. The signature of 
the Bled Treaty in August 1954 and the normalisation of Italian-Yugoslav relations 
after the settlement of the Trieste issue in October 1954 seemed to foreshadow 
positive developments; a further strengthening of the Southern Flank at the Italian and 
Balkan frontiers could be expected. Things, however, evolved differently. Yugoslavia, 
facing a Soviet „peace-offensive‟, preferred to normalise its relation with the USSR 
(though not with many satellites) and gradually distanced itself from the Balkan 
Alliance. Much to the Western powers‟ annoyance, it also avoided engaging in any 
military talks with NATO or US-UK-French officials. Therefore, the situation did not 
improve at the Italian frontier and it deteriorated significantly – as compared with 
1953-54 – at the Balkan frontier, one of the most vulnerable fronts of NATO.  
Of course, other cataclysmic events overshadowed these developments. The 
watershed in the decline of the Southern Flank and its ensuing destabilisation was the 
revival of the Greek-Turkish dispute, mainly due to the eruption of the Cyprus issue. 
When the Greek leadership, facing the intransigence of both the Churchill and Eden 
administrations, decided to apply pressure by bringing the issue at the UN, it had fully 
failed to take into account the strong Turkish interest. In essence, the Greek decision 
to internationalize the UK-Greek dispute on the future of Cyprus was ill-judged and 
proved ill-fated. Nevertheless, Turkish reaction to the application of the principle of 
self-determination which would inevitably lead to union with Greece was primarily 
based on „security‟ concerns. Until September 1955, the Greek policy makers had 
failed to notice and anticipate the extent of Turkish anxiety and reaction – partly 
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because Turkey had accepted the incorporation of the Dodecanese islands to Greece 
in 1947. 
However, things had changed by 1955. After Stalin‟s death, the end of the 
Korean War and Khrushchev‟s ascendancy into power, Cold War tensions had 
somewhat eased. Consequently, Ankara felt it could adopt a more „Turkish‟ foreign 
policy, taking advantage of its increasing leverage within the Western powers, 
particularly Britain, due to recent developments in the Middle East. By 1955, Turkey 
appeared to be the cornerstone of defence both of South-eastern Europe and the 
Middle East: it was member of NATO, the Balkan Alliance and the Baghdad Pact, 
seemed internally stable, and was solidly pro-Western and firmly anti-communist, 
with an expanding military establishment. The Menderes government sought to 
capitalise on this growing Turkish importance even at sacrifice of the Greek-Turkish 
cordial cooperation. Perhaps when Turkey‟s potential and leverage vis-á-vis Greece 
increased, the Turks felt strong enough to revive gradually their antagonism with the 
Greeks. Unfortunately, due to lack of Turkish archival material the above argument 
cannot be proved. It is nevertheless true that from late 1954 onwards Turkey not only 
opposed Greek claims on Cyprus, but also raised other issues like the status of the 
Muslim minority in Western Thrace and Greek fishing rights in the Aegean. 
Furthermore, the Greek community in Istanbul was used as lever to press Greece, 
while even threats of war were voiced. 
The Turkish attitude was encouraged not only by Greece‟s inability to 
confront the Anglo-Turkish alliance on Cyprus, but also because the United States 
and NATO failed to mediate timely and effectively. Of particular importance was 
NATO‟s unwillingness to condemn Turkey for the events of September 1955 in 
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Istanbul and Izmir. On the contrary, although the allies and NATO officials expressed 
their „understanding‟ for the Greek reaction after the September outrages, they also 
pressed Athens to give way and resume as soon as possible its full participation in 
NATO activities. The demonstration of NATO‟s unwillingness and unpreparedness to 
intervene in the ensuing Greek-Turkish dispute had serious short and long-term 
repercussions. Therefore, the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations continued until 
1958, while serious crises would unfold between the two countries in the following 
decades. This proved to be the first rupture within the alliance, and a persistent open 
soar. Furthermore, NATO not only failed to solve this inter-allied dispute, but was 
also unable to devise appropriate mechanisms to avoid future intra-NATO crises 
which eventually undermined the cohesion of the alliance. Last but not least, a 
corollary to the above events which undermined stability in the Eastern Mediterranean 
was the rapid decline of the traditional British-Greek friendship (in essence, bilateral 
relations would never again be the same, even after British withdrawal from Cyprus), 
and the end of „the golden era‟ of US-Greek relations. From 1955-6 onwards, a 
significant portion of the Greek public remained critical of US attitudes and policy, 
and, to some extent, doubtful of the benefits of participation in NATO. The seeds of 
anti-Americanism in Greece were sown exactly during this period.
540
 
Despite the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations and the relative 
relaxation of Cold War tension, both Athens and Ankara continued to place great 
emphasis on the maintenance of NATO solidarity, on the military preparedness of the 
alliance and on cooperation between NATO members on the political and economic 
fields. In spite of their huge defence effort and the continuing US aid, Greece and 
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Turkey were unable to raise and maintain adequate forces to achieve a sufficient 
degree of security from Soviet-bloc aggression in case of war. The two countries fell 
short particularly in qualitative standards. Moreover, the dissolution of the Balkan 
Alliance and the rise of their antagonism redressed the local correlation of forces in 
Warsaw Pact‟s favour. Once again, no forward defence could be implemented at the 
Balkan frontier, and the Greeks and the Turks could merely depend on the US nuclear 
retaliatory force. However, no US or NATO forces with integrated atomic capability 
arrived in Greece or Turkey. On the contrary, the Italian front was reinforced 
considerably in 1955-6 due to the creation of SETAF. Consequently, Turkey hoped 
that the Baghdad Pact had enhanced the defence of its eastern borders, while Greece 
sought, and soon achieved to some extent, to replace the tripartite Balkan Pacts with 
a, de facto, bilateral military cooperation with Yugoslavia.       
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5. CONTINUING CRISIS AND NEW CHALLENGES, AUTUMN 1956 - 
AUTUMN 1957. 
 
The period between the autumn of 1956 and the autumn of 1957 proved a turning 
point in NATO history. At the political level, the NAC had authorized in May 1956 a 
committee on political cooperation and consultation within the alliance. This was 
comprised of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Norway and Italy, Lester Pearson, 
Halvard Lange and Gaetano Martino respectively (who represented different political 
ideologies and geographic regions and had significant experience) and soon became 
known as the Committee of the Three Wise Men. The deteriorating situation in 
Cyprus and particularly in the Middle East (especially after the Suez crisis October-
November 1956), in conjunction with the concurrent outbreak of the Hungarian 
revolution which aggravated East-West tension, provided a considerable spur to the 
work, and significance to the final proposals, of the Committee. NATO faced new 
challenges, experienced serious strains and had to reconstruct allied solidarity and 
cohesion. Although some steps were undertaken towards non-committal political 
consultation regarding „Consultation on Foreign Policies‟ (outside the NATO area) 
and „Peaceful Settlement of Inter-member Disputes‟, the United States as well as 
Britain and France opposed the idea of obligatory procedures for political consultation 
which would limit their freedom of action, particularly in the Third World. 
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Furthermore, the Americans opposed any expansion of NATO into the economic 
field, for fear they might have to undertake additional burdens.
541
  
In any case, the idea of some form of consultation for the settlement of intra-
NATO disputes was given – temporarily – some impetus in 1957, and Cyprus was an 
issue for such an initiative: the Secretary General, Lord Ismay, tried to offer his „good 
offices‟ to conciliate between the three parties directly involved in the Cyprus dispute, 
while Spaak pursued more actively a stronger NATO role in decision making, but to 
no avail.
542
 As for consultation on foreign policy matters, despite detailed discussion 
of the situation in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Suez and Syrian crises in 
1956 and 1957, the alliance failed not only to implement, but even to form and adopt 
a comprehensive strategy – and this did not escape from Turkish notice. Interestingly, 
although literature on NATO has dealt to some extent with the alliance‟s effort to 
broaden its scope to cover the political-economic field, tackle out-of-area problems 
and devise mechanisms for the solution of intra-NATO disputes, little has been 
written on the role of NATO in the Cyprus dispute, and even less, on NATO and the 
Middle East. But these issues affected to a significant degree the defence posture and 
the cohesion of the Southern Flank during this period.     
On the military level, NATO was still unable to raise sufficient conventional 
ground forces to provide credible deterrence against a Soviet invasion in Western 
Europe or the Southern Flank. Obviously, the alliance could not rely exclusively on 
nuclear weapons. As the military theorist Sir Basil Liddell Hart wrote in March 1957, 
those made „sense as a deterrent, but not as a defence – for put into use it means 
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suicide‟.543 Therefore, a revised NATO strategic concept was agreed in April/May 
1957 (the M.C.14/2), which recognized the possibility of Soviet aggression with 
limited objectives; those should be dealt without recourse to nuclear weapons, if 
possible. Nevertheless, M.C.14/2 was the product of a compromise among various 
views, and, most importantly, could be interpreted differently.
544
 Although there was 
an implicit recognition of the need for considerable conventional forces to retain 
NATO‟s flexibility in every contingency, mainly Britain but also the United States 
envisaged further cuts in their conventional forces. As regards the Americans, in 
response to the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons they decided to reorganize 
their army units. This entailed a reduction in the numerical strength of their existing 
divisions (through the introduction of „pentomic‟ divisions). Therefore, they managed 
to withdraw some troops from Europe.
545
  
The Southern Flank was not affected by these developments, but naturally 
the US leadership wished to follow the general trend towards cuts by curtailing the 
military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey; thus, it considered that a significant 
reduction of the Greek and Turkish force levels was both desirable and sensible. 
However, US aid towards those countries was not reduced during this period, partly 
due to the recommendations of SACEUR and NATO officials, and partly because a 
reduction in US assistance would cause considerable damage to US-Greek and US-
Turkish relations at a time when the strains of the Cyprus dispute were extremely 
strong. But even the flow of US hardware and funds was not sufficient to enable the 
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Greeks and the Turks to modernize their obsolete equipment and at the same time 
expand their forces to reach the NATO-approved force levels. Even Italy, which had a 
stronger economic and industrial basis, was consistently unwilling to raise additional 
forces. In 1956-7 the three countries undertook military reforms and reorganisation 
programmes to improve the quality of forces in being and enhance their combat 
readiness, but it was obvious that their security problems were too complex to be 
addressed by military means alone. Moreover, we shall see how during this period 
several parallel developments (including out-of-area ones) contributed to a further 
emasculation of the Southern Flank and affected its political cohesion and military 
strength. 
 
 
i) Regional developments in the Balkan frontier 
After the effective dissolution of the Balkan Alliance in 1955 the Greeks had been 
eager to maintain close cooperation with Yugoslavia on both the political-diplomatic 
and the military field. For their part, the Yugoslavs wanted to keep open channels 
with NATO and the West, and the best way to achieve it was by the establishment of 
a bilateral relationship with Athens.
546
 Before the deterioration of the international 
situation in the autumn of 1956, Tito had been seeking to revive the Balkan Pact, at 
least in its non-military aspects. But Yugoslav-Turkish relations remained strained 
because Yugoslavia opposed the formation of military pacts in the Middle East 
(where Turkey had played a leading role) and favoured the application of the principle 
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of self-determination on Cyprus, while Ankara disapproved of Yugoslav neutralist 
orientation. Consequently, and gradually, the Yugoslavs understood that the most 
realistic policy was to establish a bilateral Greek-Yugoslav entente and in effect 
abandoned every effort for the revival of tripartite cooperation. In July 1956, during 
his visit in Corfu, Tito invited Karamanlis to pay an official visit to Belgrade.
547
 The 
Soviet invasion in Hungary and the subsequent rise of tension in central and Eastern 
Europe alarmed Tito and gave an impetus towards a further development of Greek-
Yugoslav relations. Although for about two years the Yugoslav leadership was 
experimenting with peaceful coexistence, the rapid deterioration of the international 
climate revived the sense of uneasiness. Furthermore, the Yugoslav leaders were 
publicly chastised by Moscow, and most sharply by Bulgaria and Albania, for the first 
time since 1953. Therefore, the establishment of a bilateral Greek-Yugoslav accord 
was desirable. This would serve as a tangible link with NATO and the western 
defence system.
548
 
Karamanlis and the Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, 
visited Yugoslavia from 4 to 7 December 1956. This was the first visit of a Greek 
Prime Minister to Yugoslavia in the post-war period. The US government entrusted 
Karamanlis to explore Tito‟s views and intentions on significant international issues. 
Both the Greeks and the Yugoslavs stressed their close bonds and declared that their 
partnership was based on mutual respect and on the recognition of the territorial status 
quo. Furthermore, the two countries noted the feasibility of cordial cooperation 
between states with different political and socio-economic systems.
549
 Karamanlis 
blamed the Turkish attitude for the „stalemate‟ in the Balkan Alliance. He expressed 
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the hope that tripartite cooperation would soon revive, but, if not, the bilateral Greek-
Yugoslav relationship would remain strong and solid. The Yugoslav leaders stressed 
the need for the revival of the tripartite Balkan cooperation, but for the first time 
explicitly and publicly expressed their strong political support to Greece and their 
„sincere sympathies‟ for the „just demands of the population of Cyprus‟.550  
Then Tito said that he desired the establishment of „very close (political and 
military) bonds‟ with Greece and Averoff assured him that „the Greek Government 
considered the Balkan Pact to be still in force between their two countries‟.551 In 
principle, Greece preferred the reactivation of the tripartite Balkan Alliance, but 
Turkey had shown that it was not prepared to contribute to this end. The Yugoslav 
leadership recognised that Turkish participation was desirable but not a prerequisite 
for Greek-Yugoslav cooperation, which in any case should proceed.
552
 Indeed, 
Karamanlis and Averoff placed emphasis entirely on bilateral relations with no 
particular reference to any Turkish role; thus the Balkan Alliance emerged even 
weaker and Turkish officials expressed their disappointment and displeasure at the 
bilateral Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement.
553
 As regards the situation in the Middle 
East, both the Greek and the Yugoslav leadership criticised Turkish (and UK-French) 
policy and agreed that the Baghdad Pact had been a negative development and a 
destabilising factor: it caused additional tension in the region and was exacerbating 
division between the Arab countries.
554
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The Greek government tried to take advantage of its emerging „special 
relationship‟ with Yugoslavia to counterbalance Turkey‟s weight (so clearly 
demonstrated in the affairs of the Middle East) and enhance its own position within 
NATO. During the NAC Ministerial meeting held in mid-December 1956, Averoff 
informed the allies on Yugoslavia‟s wish to uphold its independence and establish a 
„very close‟ bilateral partnership with Greece. He further said that Greece regretted 
that, with regard to Turkey the Balkan Pact was now in abeyance, but that state of 
affairs could not be remedied until a solution had been found to the Cyprus problem. 
Menderes reacted and said that the mention of the Cyprus issue by Averoff as, „at 
least partly‟, propaganda. Moreover, the Turkish Prime Minister was annoyed at 
Turkey‟s marginalisation and alienation from the Balkan Pact.555 He was also anxious 
to learn whether during recent Greek-Yugoslav talks the possibility was discussed of 
retaining the Balkan Pact on a bilateral instead of tripartite basis. Averoff responded 
that if the current difficulties in Greek-Turkish relations were removed, then the 
Balkan Pact could be revived in its tripartite form.
556
 The other NATO members 
avoided intervening and once again no effort was made to reconcile Greek-Turkish 
differences. 
In any case, the tripartite Balkan accord was not to be re-established. From 
early 1957 Greece and Yugoslavia formed a special bilateral partnership which 
included both political and military cooperation (which lasted until 1961). The 
Yugoslav Vice-Presidents Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo and Edward Kardelj visited 
Athens and held discussions with the Greek leadership in April and October 1957 
respectively. During those meetings, the cordial bilateral relation was confirmed. Not 
                                                          
555
 NATO/C-R(56)70, 11-December-1956. 
556
 NATO/C-R(56)71, 12-December-1956. 
259 
 
 
 
even the resurrection of such a delicate issue as the Macedonian question by the 
British press (according to which, in the aftermath of a Khrushchev-Tito meeting 
which led to the ease of Soviet-Yugoslav tension, the Soviet General Staff had 
prepared a plan for the establishment of a unified Macedonia – incorporating the 
whole Greek, Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia – and its annexation to Yugoslavia) 
could damage the close Greek-Yugoslav partnership. The Yugoslavs immediately 
reassured Greece that Belgrade respected Greek territorial integrity. The Greek and 
the Yugoslav press condemned the „British machinations‟.557 In any case, it seems 
that the whole story was exaggerated; there were no signs either that the Soviets tried 
to woo Tito by offering him Greek Macedonia or that the story was an official plot on 
behalf of the Foreign Office to impair the Greek-Yugoslav partnership. The latter was 
quite strong and also had a military dimension: in June and October 1957 military 
delegations of the two countries exchanged visits.
558
 Greece informed the NATO 
allies on those discussions and about Yugoslav views on various issues of the Cold 
War agenda. Thus Athens sought to reassure the NATO allies in the face of recent 
Yugoslav conciliatory gestures to the USSR, explaining that Belgrade wished to 
maintain good relations with Moscow without departing from its complete 
independence from the two blocs.
559
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ii) NATO and the Cyprus imbroglio.  
As from late 1956 onwards the Greeks were attempting to consolidate their position in 
the Balkans, the NATO Secretary General and the NAC meetings were preoccupied 
with an issue which continued to undermine the Southern Flank‟s political stability 
and defence posture: Cyprus. Indeed, NATO had not much focused on the Cyprus 
problem before December 1956 when its ministerial meeting discussed it at length.
560
 
Apparently, the fact that, in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, an extensive debate took 
place on the Middle East situation, and on the design of a NATO mechanism for the 
peaceful resolution of intra-allied disputes, played a significant role. Soon afterwards 
Lord Ismay undertook an initiative for the first time. Ismay‟s successor, Paul-Henri 
Spaak sought to intervene more actively and during the summer and the autumn of 
1957 tried to mediate to achieve a compromise solution. He proposed a plan for a 
settlement based on guaranteed independence of the island under the auspices of the 
interested parties and NATO. However, only Greece accepted the Spaak proposals in 
principle. In the face of Turkish and British opposition to his initiative, Spaak decided 
not to pursue it any further and made plain that that he would not engage NATO‟s 
reputation in any attempt to find a solution until he was confident that the attempt 
would be met with success.
561
 
During the NAC Ministerial meeting held on 11 December 1956, the Cyprus 
issue was raised, first by Averoff. Then Menderes asked Averoff whether Greece 
wanted the Council to discuss that problem; in such a case, Greece would have to 
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withdraw it from the UN agenda. Averoff responded that for both political and 
psychological reasons, it was difficult to withdraw the Cyprus problem from the UN. 
Greece was ready to discuss the issue in the NAC (indeed, as early as April 1956 
Greece had appeared eager to solve the Cyprus problem „on a friendly basis‟ within 
the Council); but this should not be conditional on its withdrawal from the UN 
agenda, since appealing to the UN was the only remedy left to the Greek Government. 
For his part, the British Foreign Secretary, John Selwyn Lloyd, argued that it was 
probably preferable to discuss the Cyprus issue in NATO than in the UN but 
considered that the time was not appropriate to bring it up; discussion should take 
place only after the new British initiative, the Radcliffe Plan
562
 (which provided for 
the introduction of self-government), had been submitted and examined by the Greek 
and the Turkish leadership. Selwyn Lloyd also said that although Britain had a record 
of granting self-government and independence to its colonies for which it was „justly 
proud‟, he insisted that Cyprus was a special case, due to its strategic position, which 
was „not only of importance to NATO, not only of importance to the Baghdad Pact, 
but Cyprus is really for Turkey an offshore island covering the approaches to her 
southern ports‟.563  
The other NATO members appeared quite reluctant to get involved in the 
Cyprus question. For various reasons they believed that discussion on Cyprus should 
be postponed. The Canadian Foreign Secretary Lester Pearson believed that, in the 
aftermath of the Suez Crisis the NAC should demonstrate the cohesion and solidarity 
of the alliance, and any adverse signs might have serious repercussions on the public 
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opinion of the West. John Foster Dulles argued that the Cyprus problem was one of 
those highly complex ones (as was also the Baghdad Pact) which needed thorough 
study and expert advice; since most NATO delegations, including the US one, lacked 
such advice, it would have been unwise to try to solve such matters during that 
meeting. Apart from that, Dulles did not endorse too frequent consultation in NATO 
or excessive coordination on matters affecting friendly countries outside the NATO 
area, because that could impair friendly relations with those countries on some 
occasions.
564
 The substance of Dulles‟ view was that the United States as well as 
Britain and France and other NATO powers were not willing to lose the independence 
of their national foreign policy by authorising a NATO body to coordinate allied 
policy outside the European theatre.
565
 Indeed, even when other NATO members 
appeared to promote the idea of regular political consultation for out-of-area 
problems, they usually refrained from actually practicing it.
566
   
For his part, the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak suggested that a 
method of consultation in NATO regarding out-of-area problems should be devised 
before the alliance dealt with such issues like Cyprus. In any case, he felt that the 
alliance should „take a lively interest‟ in any problem of importance to one or more 
state-members. Time should be allowed to see the effects of the Radcliffe proposals, 
and if Britain, Greece and Turkey continued to be unable to reach a satisfactory 
solution, then NATO, and not the UN, might be an appropriate forum for further 
discussion. Finally, the NAC‟s Chairman of the NAC, Gaetano Martino, suggested 
that after the Council had examined the procedure for the settlement of inter-member 
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disputes proposed by the Committee of Three (The Three Wise Men submitted their 
report on political consultation on intra-allied disputes during this NAC meeting), the 
Cyprus problem could be brought up in NAC, if the three interested parties agreed. 
Obviously, most representatives were far more preoccupied with the deteriorating 
situation in the Middle East rather than with the dispute over Cyprus (for example, the 
French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau did not even mention Cyprus and focused 
exclusively on Suez, Egypt and the Middle East). It should also be stressed that 
several NATO members did not have any particular interest in the region and did not 
have any specific Middle Eastern or Mediterranean policy.
567
 This is something one 
should always bear in mind, and that indifference of many European allies affected 
the Southern Flank‟s course in the 1950s.     
During the following weeks, the Cyprus problem deteriorated further. The 
Radcliffe Plan indeed provided for prompt introduction of self-government, and for 
the application of self-determination in the future. Nevertheless, the British formula 
was essentially promoting partition, since in a unique innovation it granted the right of 
self-determination separately to the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots as two 
distinct communities and not to the entire population as a whole or to specific districts 
(the population throughout the whole island was mixed, and no area had a Turkish-
Cypriot majority). The British delegation informed NATO that „in any eventual 
exercise of self-determination the Turkish Cypriots, equally with the Greek Cypriots, 
would have the right to decide their own future. Consequently, partition must be 
included among the eventual possibilities‟. This made partition, decided by a vote of 
the minority, as the most likely solution of the problem. Naturally, the Turks 
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expressed their support for the plan, while the Greeks regarded the plan as a 
constitutional fiction which could not serve even for a provisional solution.
568
 
Meanwhile, on 14 December 1956 the NAC Ministerial Meeting had adopted 
a resolution on the peaceful settlements of disputes and differences between NATO 
members. The resolution empowered the Secretary General to „offer his good offices 
informally at any time to governments involved in a dispute and with their consent‟. 
On 15 March Lord Ismay sent identical letters to the Permanent Representatives of 
Britain, Greece and Turkey inquiring informally whether their governments would 
welcome his good offices. If the three interested governments responded positively in 
principle, the next step would be an exchange of views as to procedure. He proposed 
to invite three distinguished men from NATO countries other than Britain, Greece and 
Turkey but acceptable to them, to form a „Commission of Good Offices‟. That 
commission would suggest a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, which would 
be acceptable to the three governments concerned. Ismay also asked London, Athens 
and Ankara to contribute to the creation of a favourable atmosphere, if his proposal 
was approved.
569
 It should be noted that, at British insistence, the Ismay initiative was 
an effort of conciliation, not arbitration.
570
 Finally, Lord Ismay added that „cessation 
of terrorism would be a prior condition for the exercise of NATO good offices‟.571 
By March 1957, the three countries directly concerned with the Cyprus 
problem seemed to have reversed positions: Britain and Turkey advocated a NATO 
intervention, while Greece rejected it. The other NATO allies favoured Ismay‟s 
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initiative and Greece appeared isolated during the NAC meeting of 22 March on 
Cyprus. Indeed, the Greeks emphasized the need for the release of Makarios from 
exile and the resumption of direct negotiations between the British and the Cypriots. 
To most allies, the Ismay proposals were not only fully compatible with any British-
Cypriot negotiations, but also would probably promote and facilitate them. In any 
case, the Ismay initiative should not be overestimated. The Secretary General himself 
emphasized the limited nature of his effort, as „he had not opened the door but simply 
turned the key in the lock‟.572  
Britain and Turkey were in close contact, cooperation and mutual 
consultation to coordinate their tactics and to isolate Greece. The British and Turkish 
acceptance of Ismay‟s proposal was a tactical manoeuvre: no solution could come 
from NATO at that stage. When the US leadership exerted significant pressure to the 
new British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, to release Makarios, the British 
decided to do so. They expected that such a move would put Athens under strong US 
and allied compulsion to show more flexibility and moderation and accept Ismay‟s 
proposal.
573
 But even if Greece rejected it as expected (admittedly, the cards were 
already heavily stacked against Greece in any NATO forum, as the British Colonial 
Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, acknowledged), the blame for blocking Ismay‟s 
initiative would lie „squarely on the Greeks‟. This was the real British (and Turkish) 
motive for supporting Ismay‟s proposal: „our main objective is to establish the fact of 
Greek intransigence in the face of British conciliatory gestures, so as to show that 
there is nothing doing on the lines of the Radcliffe proposals and that the only hope is 
to get on to partition as soon as possible. In these circumstances continued Greek 
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obduracy about the NATO procedure really suits us… When we do reach the partition 
stage it may well be that we should find a more real use for NATO‟. The Foreign 
Office also stressed that Britain should do nothing to discourage Ismay‟s intervention 
for one additional reason: that was the first case of application of the Three Wise Men 
procedure; if it was to break down, this should not seem to be a Britain‟s fault, 
particularly since „we have administered some shocks to NATO lately and it would be 
a pity for us to be responsible for any more‟.574 
 At any rate, Greece politely turned down Ismay‟s offer and tried to 
circumvent the dilemma of either accepting a proposal of the (British) Secretary 
General for a NATO solution which would probably bring partition closer, or simply 
reject it, which would again mean that partition remained the most likely, if not the 
only, solution. Indeed, the Greeks sought to appear as unable to accept the Ismay 
proposal only „in the present circumstances‟ and the NAC chose not to interpret the 
Greek negative reply as „slamming the door against NATO arbitration‟.575 Averoff 
argued that until recently Greece had favoured the submission of the Cyprus problem 
to NATO, while in December 1956 he had asked for the appointment of the 
Committee of Three as arbitrators. Nevertheless, NATO had refused to deal with 
Cyprus and then Greece proceeded with taking the issue to the UN; so Greece now 
felt it would be improper to refer the problem to a different body (that is, NATO). In 
essence, the Greek government believed that a NATO initiative on Cyprus would not 
take into consideration the Greek position, or at least it would be less sensitive to 
Greek views than the UN; all NATO members had consistently voted against Greece 
in the UN, and therefore the Greeks could hardly regard NATO as an impartial body. 
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Furthermore, the Greek leadership feared that any negative – for Greek interests – 
policy adopted by NATO would exacerbate passions and anti-western sentiments in 
the Greek public and would complicate matters further.
576
  
In contrast, Turkey‟s Permanent Representative Nuri Birgi tried to show that 
his country was concerned about – and worked for – the unity, cohesion and strength 
of the alliance, but reiterated Ankara‟s position that the Turkish Cypriots should be 
given the opportunity to exert the right of self-determination separately.
577
 Obviously, 
this would lead inevitably to partition after extensive communal discord and violent 
transfer of population, since nowhere in Cyprus did the Turkish Cypriots constitute 
the majority. Meanwhile, the release of Makarios had a serious and unexpected 
repercussion: it infuriated the Turkish government and inflamed the Turkish public. 
The Turks were not ready to accept the prospect of resumption of negotiations 
between the British and representatives of the Cypriots, particularly Makarios. No 
plan envisaging the independence of Cyprus to the exclusion of partition would be 
acceptable to the Turks, who made plain that „the time has arrived that the only 
possible solution was immediate partition‟. This could be ultimately achieved through 
tripartite UK-Greek-Turkish consultations.
578
 UK-Turkish relations deteriorated 
significantly, and the Turkish Press described the British attitude as „betrayal of the 
Turkish cause on Cyprus‟.579 On the one hand London did not want to endanger the 
Anglo-Turkish cooperation, but on the other Ankara pulled back its support for self-
government and asked for prompt partition. Thus, Britain‟s promises had been 
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misinterpreted and misused by Turkey, and the UK policy of full reliance to, and 
alignment with, Turkey, had eventually backfired: by mid-1957 the Greeks, Turks, 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots all demanded British withdrawal from 
Cyprus.
580
 
At the same time, Greek-Turkish relations reached a crisis point once again. 
Makarios arrived in Athens on 17 April and received an impressive welcome by the 
Athenians. In Turkey anti-Greek feelings soon culminated in the heavy criticism of 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate by the Turkish press and Menderes‟ accusations against 
Greece and Makarios. Turkey also handed a Note to the Greek government protesting 
at the official reception of Makarios in Athens; this was rejected as unacceptable. 
Simultaneously, fears were expressed over the eventual fate of the Greek minority in 
Istanbul and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
581
  
Indeed, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, and Birgi informed the Greek 
charge d‟ affaires in Ankara, and the NAC respectively, that the Turkish government 
„could not restrain the rightful indignation and misgivings of the Turkish people in the 
face of Makarios‟ welcome in Athens‟, and ominously disclaimed „all responsibility 
for the consequences on Turkish public opinion‟. Most representatives of the NATO 
members and Ismay himself interpreted the above Turkish communication as a clear 
warning to Greece and the alliance that the Turkish authorities would not restrain the 
mob from violent anti-Greek riots. Therefore, Ismay summoned an emergency private 
meeting of the NAC and the NATO permanent representatives pressed „impartially‟ 
both Turkey and Greece to show moderation. Nuri Birgi and the Greek Permanent 
Representative, Michael Melas had an emotional exchange. Finally, the NAC 
                                                          
580
 Hatzivassiliou, Britain, pp.106-7. 
581
 The Times, 18 & 20-April-1957. 
269 
 
 
 
authorised Ismay to send an immediate message to both countries urging restraint.
582
 
Moreover, on 21 April Washington expressed its deep concern about the Turkish 
attitude towards Greece. Fearing that Menderes was about to ask for the removal of 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate from Istanbul, the Americans advised caution. In a 
formal demarche, the US government invited the Turks to facilitate a peaceful 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute.
583
    
So long as the Cyprus problem was not resolved, the real British motives 
became increasingly clear to the others and therefore London‟s position was gradually 
weakened.
584
 On 14 May Paul-Henri Spaak officially succeeded Lord Hastings Ismay 
as NATO Secretary General and tried to mediate for a compromise settlement of the 
Cyprus dispute. Spaak was more sympathetic to Greek and Greek-Cypriot views than 
Ismay and tried to allay Greek fears rather than satisfy Turkish demands.. In essence, 
the new Secretary General had similar views with the Americans on a possible 
compromise solution of the Cyprus problem, based on some form of guaranteed 
independence as the middle ground between enosis (union) and taksim (partition). In 
any case, Spaak was acting on his own, having in mind a settlement similar with the 
establishment of independent Belgium in 1830, and was not inspired or induced by 
Washington.
585
 The Greek government, and Averoff in particular, also encouraged 
Spaak to find a solution somewhere between union and partition.
586
 It seems that 
Spaak was worried that Britain might soon get fed up with the impasse in Cyprus and 
decide to disengage in a hurry, regardless of the consequences (as it did over India 
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and Palestine in 1947 and 1948 respectively), leaving the Greeks and the Turks to 
decide the outcome. He therefore preferred to reach an accommodation as soon as 
possible.
587
 For their part, the British were quite suspicious of Spaak‟s intentions. 
Their primary fear was that the Secretary General, who planned to visit Ankara and 
Athens during the summer, might reach an understanding with the Turks and the 
Greeks and present the British with a fait accompli. Spaak, however, reassured the 
British that his talks would be of a purely exploratory character.
588
  
Spaak‟s initiative did not generate much support and in the face of the Syrian 
crisis of August/September 1957 as well as British and Turkish opposition to his basic 
idea, he suspended his action until November 1957. Then he resumed his action and 
proposed a plan providing for an independent Cyprus guaranteed by Britain, Greece 
and Turkey, but also by the United States and NATO. Cyprus would become a 
member of the Commonwealth and its independence would be restricted by various 
guarantees of its international status and its internal institutions. Spaak also envisaged 
the appointment of a NATO High Commissioner with significant powers of 
intervention.
589
 Furthermore, the status of the protection of the Turkish Cypriot 
minority would be agreed by a special international accord and Cyprus could become 
a NATO member. However, the Spaak proposals did not find much support. Only 
Greece appeared ready to accept such a solution. The British rejected the Spaak 
proposals because Cyprus‟ guaranteed independence within the Commonwealth 
would create numerous difficulties – such unprecedented arrangement would be 
embarrassing in relation to other members of the Commonwealth: „the very concept 
of Commonwealth membership envisages a completely independent status under 
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which the member country has the right to secede without conditions‟.590 In addition, 
the British were unwilling to recognise Makarios as the leader of an independent 
Cyprus. Until 1959 they thought that a solution based on „guaranteed independence‟ 
was the worst of all possible outcomes – worse even than enosis: the FO argued that 
any form of independence would not be a permanent solution but would serve as a 
first step towards enosis, might lead to communist control of the island by AKEL (the 
strong left-wing Cypriot party) and, perhaps most significantly, would be 
unacceptable to the Turks.
591
 Therefore, Britain opposed any actual NATO 
interference in Cyprus. Should NATO intervene, it would be almost certain that some 
form of „guaranteed independence‟ would emerge.592 For their part, the Americans, 
though sympathetic to the solution of independence, did not favour a US or NATO 
permanent entanglement in the island.
593
 
By autumn 1957 the situation in Cyprus had deteriorated further, while the 
British were facing a desperate situation and tried to find a way out. High ranking 
Foreign Office officials started to take a very hard line, arguing that NATO‟s unity 
over Cyprus was a desirable but not essential prerequisite for a solution, since „we 
might have to force through a solution that would risk driving either the Greeks or the 
Turks out of NATO‟.594 It was evident that Whitehall was seeking a solution which 
would satisfy Turkish requirements and that if an ally would be driven out of NATO, 
this would be Greece. Other voices even claimed that an active NATO mediation 
should be avoided, because if it took place, it would probably halt „the advantage of 
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bringing about that confrontation of the Greeks and Turks which is what we desire‟.595 
The continuation of Greek-Turkish antagonism would prevent a compromise between 
Athens and Ankara over Cyprus (which would probably lead to the end of UK 
sovereignty). Therefore, by autumn 1957 the British were eager to follow a policy of 
brinkmanship which might not only push Greece on the political periphery of the 
western world, but also jeopardise NATO‟s political cohesion and the Southern 
Flank‟s defence posture.   
For their part, the Americans were much more concerned about the 
Alliance‟s cohesion. Alarmed by opinion polls demonstrating that neutralist 
sentiments in the Greek public tended to become persistent, they grew nervous about 
a breakdown over Cyprus. American officials considered that a US gesture might be 
necessary to „save‟ Greece for the West.596 However, the British sought to prevent a 
possible US intervention in Cyprus, replaced Governor Field Marshal Sir John 
Harding (who had failed to crack EOKA) with a political figure, Sir Hugh Foot, and 
prepared another plan for the settlement of the dispute. Subsequent developments will 
be analysed in the following chapter. Thus, by autumn 1957, NATO faced a fully 
fledged crisis over the Cyprus problem which threatened the solidity of the Southern 
Flank. As we shall now see, its military strength was already being undermined by 
defence costs. 
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iii) The military-economic aspect of the Southern Flank’s defence 
The NATO military situation in the Southern Flank remained problematic, 
particularly since the Italian, Greek and Turkish armed forces fell significantly behind 
the western qualitative standards, while Greek-Turkish cooperation had virtually 
terminated. Each country faced its own difficulties. For instance, in sharp contrast 
with its much poorer allies, Greece and Turkey, Italy was quite reluctant to undertake 
a major defence effort. Dulles had characterised Italy as the most elusive ally on 
military burden sharing, and complained that Rome led the way to turn NATO „into 
an economic organization which can probably extract a little more money from the 
United States‟.597 For their part, NATO experts did not fail to notice that Italy could 
do more, allocating additional funds on defence and taking advantage of its industrial 
capacity.  
In late 1956 considerable shortfalls still existed in the M-day and D-day 
forces of all services against the force levels envisaged in M.C.48; only in the Navy 
was the situation relatively good. As in Greece and Turkey during the same period, 
Italian civilian and military leadership was undertaking a review of the country‟s 
defence programme. The most serious weaknesses in the Italian armed forces were 
shortages in materiel and inadequate logistic support, and the ineffectiveness of the 
AC&R system. The Italian defence expenditures had remained below the level 
required to cover the whole of the needs arising from the planned force goals. To 
improve the effectiveness of the Italian forces, a considerable increase in the national 
defence budget appeared necessary. However, the NATO officials recognised that 
Italian economic development should not be hampered and social stability should be 
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maintained. Consequently, only a limited increase might be possible. In any case, the 
Italians had to address many weaknesses to maintain the effectiveness of the Italian 
forces.
598
 In assessing Italian attitude, one could justifiably argue that the transfer of 
US land troops in northern Italy and the subsequent establishment and activation of 
SETAF with its integrated atomic capability in 1955-6, reassured the Italians. Never 
really eager to undertake a major rearmament bid, they found the opportunity to relax 
their defence effort.  
In a January 1957 letter to the US Defense Secretary, the Italian Defence 
Minister asked for US land and air forces to be stationed in the Mediterranean, and 
particularly in Italy; possible new US land forces could be deployed in the Southern 
Italian peninsula, Sicily, or Sardinia.
599
 Apparently, the reasons behind Taviani‟s 
proposal were the growing Soviet influence in the Middle East and the intensifying 
tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, the reassuring experience with US forces 
already stationed in Italy, and, last but not least, Rome‟s desire for a stronger, direct 
bilateral relationship with Washington.
600
 Despite the implementation of the Italian 
reorganisation plan (the Mancinelli Plan) which aimed primarily at improving the 
effectiveness of M-day ground forces, there was a growing realisation that the Italian 
defence budget could not support the equipment and modernisation of all three 
services. It seems that the situation was relatively good in the air force, which at the 
end of 1957 totalled 438 aircraft, while its re-equipment with modern jet types was 
almost complete. The C&R system was still not fully effective though, despite serious 
effort to solve that issue. The NATO authorities recommended that Italy, with careful 
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management, should be able to increase its defence expenditures, since it had already 
managed to expand substantially its economy. A greater proportion of those 
increasing funds would have to be devoted to the provision of equipment, while 
maintenance and operation cost had to be maintained at current levels. Specific 
instructions referred to the need to continue the improvement of the AC&R system, to 
complete the personnel and equipment army build-up (with priority given to M-day 
units), to increase air force combat readiness, to improve D-day readiness of naval 
forces and implement their modernisation programme.
601
 
Greece‟s and Turkey‟s cases were different. By late 1956, the Greek Army 
had managed to reach the NATO force objectives set in M.C.48 in terms of number 
and organisation, but not in terms of quality: there was a serious shortage of weapons 
and other material, of technicians and even of adequate number of regular soldiers and 
NCOs, while much of the equipment was obsolete. Moreover, ground forces-in-being 
provided only one-third of wartime strength and therefore Greek defence was largely 
dependent on the rapid and smooth mobilisation of the reserves; however, no effective 
training programme for the reserves existed to meet wartime strength requirements. 
The air force was slightly below the force goals but significant progress had been 
made in that service. Naval forces however were considerably weaker and most 
vessels were either obsolete or obsolescent; indeed, NATO experts acknowledged that 
one of the most serious and complex problems were the modernisation and 
replacement of obsolete naval units. Last but not least, the air control and reporting 
system remained inadequate. As a result of this situation, the Greeks reviewed their 
defence plans in consultation with the NATO military authorities to make the existing 
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pattern of Greek forces more effective in view of the fact that M.C.48 force goals 
could not be fully achieved due to lack of equipment and adequate resources.
602
 
During 1956-7, the Greeks continued to press the Americans for the 
provision of more military aid, particularly heavy equipment. During Karamanlis‟ 
visit in Washington in mid-November 1956 the Greek prime minister stressed that 
Greece‟s importance was not recognised adequately by the Americans and NATO, 
while the Turkish role was overemphasised. After Greece was admitted to NATO the 
country‟s defence position was improved due to its participation in a collective 
security pact, but from the strictly military point of view little progress had been 
made. Under existing conditions, in case of war the Greek Army would have to 
withdraw before advancing Bulgarian forces.
603
 As the Chief of JUSMAGG admitted, 
in the face of much superior Bulgarian tank and combat air capability the Greeks 
could only put up a static defence in the event of war, and would therefore become a 
„sitting duck‟ and suffer certain defeat.604 Thus the Turkish forces defending Eastern 
Thrace and the Straits would be left without cover and would be outflanked by 
powerful Soviet bloc forces which would cut off any connection between Turkey and 
the Western powers. The collapse of the Balkan frontier would also affect seriously 
the defence of Eastern Mediterranean (and possibly the Middle East). It was therefore 
essential that a forward defence should be adopted in the Southern Balkans as well.  
LANDSOUTHEAST military authorities had been talking with the Greeks 
from spring 1956 onwards about a more forward strategy, which could be 
implemented only if the Greek army‟s armour, firepower and mobility were 
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strengthened substantially. For instance, JUSMAGG‟s chief claimed quite accurately 
that „Greece‟s real need is the capability of staging counterattacks‟, since „both the 
equipment and the terrain preclude any responsible military acceptance of “forward 
strategy”... to defend Thrace and Macedonia‟.605  Indeed, a constant Greek demand 
was the formation of a Greek armoured division plus the delivery of sufficient number 
of modern anti-tank guns, and also the reinforcement of the Greek Navy by the 
provision of modern naval units. After all, those requests had been approved or 
proposed by SHAPE, while until that point Greek armed forces had successfully 
absorbed US military hardware (particularly in the air force). Finally, the Greeks 
explained that if the above requests were fully met, the additional maintenance and 
training cost was estimated at $13 million per year. Since increasing the Greek 
military budget was out of the question, Greece would need additional aid if new 
hardware finally arrived. The American officials acknowledged the heavy burden of 
the Greek defence effort and indicated that at least some of the Greek requests needed 
to be fulfilled.
606
 The US Embassy in Athens also judged that the Greeks were making 
a respectable effort to improve their military establishment; in essence, no difference 
of opinion existed between US and Greek military as to the need for more armour in 
northern Greece; it was just „a question of how much and how readily any given new 
equipment can be assimilated‟.607 
In February 1957, the Greek leadership in consultation with NATO military 
experts and officials decided to undertake military reform. A redeployment of forces 
occurred, the numerical strength of M-day divisions was raised through divisional 
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reorganisation and a modest manpower increase. The Greek divisions stationed in 
northern Greece were reinforced with additional tank, artillery, infantry and support 
units, while their operational readiness increased. In addition, the air force and anti-
aircraft defence was strengthened by the construction of new radar installations. The 
reform took place partly due to reports that the operational readiness and combat 
capabilities of the Bulgarian armed forces had increased considerably during the 
previous months. Perhaps more alarming was the fact that Bulgarian facilities and 
installations were greater in number and bigger than justified by the needs of the 
Bulgarian forces; apparently, they were designed to support additional, probably 
Soviet, forces, in case of conflict.
608
  
During the following months, as the delivery of military hardware (especially 
M-47 tanks, and artillery) by the Americans was increased, the Greek Army was able 
to form, for the first time, an armoured division (the XX). It should be noted that by 
US standards the XX division was not an armoured division, but rather an armoured 
brigade. Nevertheless, its formation, and the 1957 reform in general, constituted a 
turning point in Greek defence policy, since the actual defensive power of the army 
was almost doubled, while for the first time the country obtained the – minimal – 
means to counterattack.
609
 In regard to the reinforcement of the Greek Navy, CNO 
Arleigh Burke informed the Greek leadership during his summer 1957 visit in Athens 
that the Americans would grant two destroyers, two submarines and some other minor 
naval units.
610
 Although from the military point of view those developments should 
not be overestimated, the effect on morale was disproportionate; the Greek political 
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and military leadership and the press appeared much more optimistic about Greece‟s 
ability to confront Bulgaria in case of conflict.
611
  
At any rate, despite the increase of military potential and preparedness of the 
Greek Armed Forces, the Greek security problem remained unsolved. In March and 
August 1957 US experts viewed that although Greece‟s primary NATO mission in 
case of war was to provide maximum forward defence against Soviet attack and assist 
in defending the Straits, Greek forces would only be able to provide limited defence 
against a satellite (that is, Bulgarian) attack, but just „a relatively brief delaying action 
against a joint Soviet-satellite attack‟. The Greek defence effort had been remarkable 
and it was acknowledged that the country‟s contribution to NATO‟s defence was 
beyond its ability to pay, since the country devoted 5 to 6 per cent of its GNP, or 30 
per cent of its annual budget, to defence. In spite of those efforts and considerable US 
military and economic aid, the flaws of the Greek military establishment persisted.
612
 
The most serious problem was the inadequacy of command communications. That 
was a „critical weakness‟ which „prejudiced the entire national defence system‟ and 
the Greeks had asked for international financing of their installations. Progress had 
been made in the stocking of ammunition, the replacement and modernisation of light 
armament, the effectiveness of M-day forces; in addition, a modest increase of the 
navy‟s strength and a further advance of the air force‟s capabilities took place. It was 
estimated that by 1960 the Greek reorganisation programme would further increase 
the power and flexibility of the land forces. To that end, and to remedy the existing 
qualitative and quantitative deficiencies (such as the improvement of the air defence 
and the command and communications systems, the readiness of the naval forces and 
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the further build-up of M-day land forces) the NATO military authorities viewed that 
Greece would have to increase its defence expenditure. US military aid should be 
therefore increased, otherwise serious difficulties would ensue.
613
   
For their part, however, and as NATO strategy evolved and increasingly 
placed emphasis on quality instead of quantity, in late 1957 US officials started to 
consider a reduction in NATO-approved Greek force levels (mainly in the army). The 
creation of a smaller but more effective military establishment might be possible, 
particularly with the prospect of the introduction and integration of „advanced 
weapons‟ (including tactical atomic ones) in the Greek armed forces. Emphasis 
should be given to the improvement of the latter‟s combat effectiveness, whether a 
reorganisation and reduction took place or not. The ultimate goal was to encourage 
Greece to assume a larger share of its total military budget and gradually move 
„toward a greater degree of military self-sufficiency‟, especially as the country‟s GNP 
grew. It was estimated, though, that such a development was not visible or possible in 
the near future, as it was highly unlikely that the Greek government could increase the 
country‟s own defence expenditures.614  
Athens however was seeking to speed up its economic development 
programme and secure increased US military aid. Finally, in August 1957 
Washington decided to support the approved Greek force levels for 1958. In addition 
to the provision of conventional equipment, the US authorities would also consider 
delivering atomic-capable weapons systems, „predicated upon [Greek] desire and 
ability to absorb, train with and maintain such systems... and, if applicable, upon the 
granting of atomic storage rights to the United States‟. Furthermore, the possibility of 
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achieving a reduction in the country‟s NATO-approved force levels would be 
reviewed in the future, in phase with the effective integration of „advanced weapons‟ 
in the Greek Armed Forces.
615
 However, as recent literature has already revealed, the 
overall US assistance to Greece (economic and, particularly, military aid) rose 
significantly in 1957-60 – truly, the country was treated quite favourably by the 
United States when compared with other NATO members, partly as a means to 
contain increasing anti-western sentiments due to the Cyprus problem.
616
  
As regards Turkey, at the end of 1956 Turkish land and naval forces 
generally met in terms of numerical strength the M.C.48 goals. Air force goals fell 
short, though. The NATO officials acknowledged that Turkey was making a 
substantial effort. Nevertheless, despite the progress already made, the Turkish armed 
forces suffered from serious deficiencies. The most critical was the inadequate air 
control and reporting system and national communications network. In addition, the 
Straits defence system remained weak, most naval units were obsolescent or obsolete, 
serious shortage of equipment reserves in all three services existed, while the number 
of regulars serving in the army was insufficient. A reorganisation programme was 
designed to improve the quality of forces in being, and expand the air force.
617
 The 
NATO military authorities recommended that, if the Turkish defence plans were to be 
fully implemented, further increases in the national defence budget would be required. 
However, Turkey was already devoting significant resources to its military effort and 
the Turkish economy experienced a balance of payments deficit; thus any increase in 
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defence expenditures should be limited to a level consistent with monetary stability.
618
 
Therefore, the Turkish and the Greek armed forces were facing analogous challenges, 
suffered similar deficiencies and had to address comparable problems. 
Meanwhile, a debate was taking place within the US government regarding 
the structure and size of the Turkish Armed Forces. From the mid-1950s, the Turkish 
economy was facing increasing difficulties due to the pursuit of vigorous but 
unorthodox development policies (in conjunction with relentless defence spending).
619
 
In March 1957 the Defense Secretary, Charles Wilson, claimed that, in view of the 
increasing difficulties of the Turkish economy and of the American unwillingness to 
offer additional aid, the Turks might be better off with a smaller, „elite‟ force. Of 
course, as both Eisenhower and the National Security Advisor, Robert Cutler, pointed 
out, it would be almost impossible to achieve the creation of an elite force in Turkey 
due to the low level of education there. In any case, Eisenhower stated that the Turks 
should take certain steps to stabilise their economy, or else future US aid would be 
futile. General Nathan Twining, the USAF Chief of Staff, thought that the Turks 
would be able to proceed with only a slight reduction of their existing forces. The 
NSC envisaged that if changes in Turkish force levels were to be contemplated, they 
would have to be negotiated through NATO channels. Then, Twining was authorised 
to ask SACEUR Norstad to try to convince the Turks to accept lower force levels for 
their armed forces; this could be combined with a possible incorporation of „advanced 
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weapons‟ (Nike-Ajax A/A missiles, F-100 fighters and Honest John tactical nuclear 
rockets) to the Turkish armed forces.
620
  
The stationing of a US ground task force with an atomic capability in Turkey 
(as well as in Greece) to augment sense of security in those two countries was also 
considered from spring 1957 onwards. The atomic weapons involved would be 
defensive (i.e. Honest John and Corporal), but any such deployment would have 
various political implications. Before any final decision was taken, the social and 
economic impact in Turkey and Greece should be appraised, and the effect on the 
other NATO allies and on the Soviet attitude should be assessed. Particularly, if the 
USSR perceived such deployment as offensive in nature and reacted by staging Soviet 
troops in Bulgaria, this might offset the advantages of the proposed US 
deployment.
621
 In any case, the debate within the US administration and NATO 
continued for many months, and we will deal in detail with this matter in the 
following chapter.  
For his part, Norstad was aware that NATO had somewhat different security 
requirements and diverse priorities than Washington. He therefore answered to the 
JCS that he did not consider as practicable or desirable, at least for the time being, to 
propose a reduction of NATO-approved Turkish force levels; such a proposal would 
have repercussions on the military, political and psychological fields. Admiral Arthur 
Radford, Chairman of the JCS, concurred with Norstad, and claimed along with John 
Foster Dulles that US assistance to Turkey was „one of the better bargains for our 
money‟. Eisenhower and Wilson did not deny that, but were still worried about the 
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incurring costs and viewed that Turkey might get along better with a smaller and more 
efficient force. Finally, the Americans decided to support the NATO-approved 
Turkish force levels for the time being, but left the door open for their revision in the 
future.
622
   
In December 1957 NATO concluded, that „notwithstanding Turkey‟s 
allocation of so large a part of her national budget to defence and the generous scale 
of aid which she has received, particularly as regards equipment, it is difficult to see 
how available financial resources can keep pace with the constant rise of operating 
costs as efforts are made to modernise her armed forces‟. The Turkish Army‟s 
personnel situation remained unsatisfactory, especially regarding the shortage of 
technicians and specialists; considerable deficiencies in equipment and a lack of 
reserves in ammunition and POL also existed. The Turkish Navy (comprised of 26 
major and 36 minor vessels at the end of 1957) had improved to some extent the 
training and manning levels. However, it suffered from inadequate communications 
and electronic capabilities and inefficient logistic support, while many ships were 
obsolete. As regards the Turkish Air Force, in late 1957 it consisted of 459 aircraft. 
During 1957 the aircraft combat readiness rate had improved, but shortages in officers 
and technicians existed, and the C&R system was inefficient. NATO officials did not 
envisage a further increase in Turkish military effort because that might cause 
undesirable economic consequences. Despite this, the Turkish leadership planned an 
increase in the three services, but that seemed unrealistic, unless the US aid expanded 
considerably. On the contrary, the trend was that Turkey could hardly maintain its 
existing level of forces and bring them to the required qualitative standards. The 
International Staff recommended that the Turks should focus primarily their effort on 
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improving the efficiency of the AC&R system and the command communications 
network, on developing a joint and effective defence system for the Straits area and 
on building up personnel and equipment in army M-day units.
623
 The low level of 
education and technical training in the country continued to impede the absorption of 
additional and modern materiel. The United States finally decided to provide 
„advanced weapons‟ to Turkey which were considered as essential to accomplish the 
latter‟s NATO mission; nevertheless, Turkey‟s limited technical capabilities to absorb 
such weapons was taken into consideration.
624
 
Taking the above into consideration, one can argue that during this period the 
Turkish leadership had adopted a specific national security policy, which was not 
always in full conformity with NATO priorities: notwithstanding the mounting 
economic strains, the expansion of Turkey‟s military establishment should be 
achieved at any cost (pleading its NATO role and „NATO force goals‟), and a 
vigorous, active policy should be implemented in the Middle East to strengthen the 
Baghdad Pact. The ultimate goal was to improve Ankara‟s status as an ally of the 
United States and Britain, both in the Middle East rather than in NATO context. Thus, 
the Menderes government aimed at extracting additional US financial and military aid 
and securing firm UK political support to Turkey both in Cyprus and the Middle 
East.
625
  
Turkish policy achieved some success, since Ankara‟s potential significance 
and influence on certain Middle East countries was recognised by Washington. 
Meanwhile, after the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957, the 
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Turkish policy makers saw an additional opportunity to receive additional US military 
and economic assistance. In March 1957 Menderes stressed that although his country 
was „not trying to get lion‟s share‟, he viewed that the United States „should look to 
[assist] declared friends first‟ in its effort to enhance Middle Eastern security. 
Moreover, he once again called for US adherence to the Baghdad Pact. Turkish 
expectations were generally not met, although a squadron of modern F-100 aircraft 
was granted by the Americans as first step towards the modernisation of the Turkish 
Air Force, enabling it to expedite transition to modern interceptor types.
626
 
As the US and NATO strategy evolved and tended to rely increasingly on 
nuclear weapons (particularly tactical nuclear ones), paving the way to the adoption of 
the M.C.70 document (which will be analysed in the next chapter), Eisenhower 
remained adamant that the Turkish military establishment should be reduced in the 
near future and place emphasis on quality. This time he was supported by Radford. 
The President argued to Norstad that the Turkish Armed Forces had to accomplish the 
same task as in the early 1950s; nevertheless, despite their modernisation and the 
protection afforded by NATO and the US nuclear umbrella, Turkey‟s force levels had 
increased considerable. Eisenhower believed that this represented „an illogical end 
result which requires careful reappraisal‟. US resources should be applied in such a 
fashion as to achieve the greatest possible security for least cost, and the Americans 
should „insure that our military assistance programs measure up to the facts of life‟. 
Eisenhower openly questioned the wisdom of keeping conventional forces of such 
size in Turkey and other countries with similar problems (like Greece), whose 
maintenance demanded extended US support. Highly expensive and complex modern 
                                                          
626
 FRUS, 1955-57, XXIV, pp.711-2. 
287 
 
 
 
equipment should not be granted if the recipient country was not capable of its 
employment and maintenance. Eisenhower therefore insisted that a reappraisal of 
US/NATO policy might be possible, if not essential, leading to a reduction of allied 
indigenous forces supported by the US aid. These allies (like the Greeks and the 
Turks) whose economies could not sustain their current military establishments 
should be persuaded to rely more on the US nuclear capability to protect them from 
attack. Then, phased force reductions should follow, and smaller, yet more effective 
armed forces, should be developed. On the other hand, the United States and NATO 
should not let the prosperous European allies to reduce their own defence effort to 
raise adequate conventional forces; NATO had to be able to apply limited force 
effectively „to avoid local hostilities broadening into general war‟.627 Norstad replied 
that a reduction in Turkish force levels might be possible in the following years, but 
explained that Turkey would not be able to support its military establishment by its 
own means in the foreseeable future.
628
 
Therefore, during 1957 the Eisenhower Administration envisaged a reduction 
of the Greek and the Turkish force levels. The US officials did not want to support 
indefinitely the defence establishments of Greece and Turkey. The two allies were the 
poorest in NATO, yet both were frontline states which had undertaken substantial 
defence spending, sometimes in sharp contrast with many advanced allies which were 
unwilling to bear the burden of rearmament. In any case, Eisenhower was probably 
right in his conviction that in the long-run the creation of a sound economic basis was 
essential to sustain a prolonged defence effort, and that the Turks and the Greeks 
should become self-sufficient in the short or middle term; the Americans would soon 
                                                          
627
 FRUS, 1955-57, XXIV, pp.728-9; the draft letter was prepared by Admiral Radford and can be 
found in NARA/RG218/E.UD50, Box 17. 
628
 FRUS, 1955-57, XXIV, pp.731-2. 
288 
 
 
 
be unable or unwilling (particularly the Congress) to support extensively the Turkish 
and Greek armed forces, at least regarding the provision of economic aid. The 
problem was more acute for Turkey, because not only was the Menderes government 
constantly pressing for more military and economic help and pursued relentlessly a 
vigorous rearmament programme, but also because the Turkish economy was facing 
enormous difficulties. It is interesting to point out that due to those difficulties 
(largely caused by huge defence expenditure) Turkey became more susceptible to 
Soviet offers for economic cooperation and trade agreements. Of course, by 
entertaining the possibility of a Soviet-Turkish detente, the Turkish leadership also 
sought to take advantage of the relative relaxation in East-West tension to increase 
Turkey‟s manoeuvrability and bargaining power with the United States.629  
In any event, irrespective of US views and NATO needs, the Turkish 
political and military leadership was definitely unwilling to change the country‟s 
military system which provided for universal conscription, long period of service and 
an emphasis in the size of the armed forces. The Turkish Armed Forces should be 
large enough to be able to cope simultaneously with a two or three-front offensive 
developed on two or even three major theatres of operations (Eastern Thrace, north-
eastern Turkey, and perhaps south-eastern Turkey as well). Apart from the military 
considerations, national service and universal conscription also served important 
political purposes: there was an educational aspect (many young Turks were illiterate 
and had the opportunity to remedy this failing and even acquire some technical skills 
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during their military service); the integrative function (particularly regarding the 
Kurdish population) was equally significant.
630
  
However, Eisenhower‟s views were somewhat contradictory. On the one 
hand, he requested a US and NATO policy reappraisal towards Turkey and Greece, 
claiming that the two countries should be convinced to rely primarily on the US 
nuclear deterrence. On the other, he emphasised that the other European allies should 
not loosen their defence effort, because NATO should be able to deal with local crises 
without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, except for West Berlin, the most 
vulnerable part of the alliance was the Greek and Turkish territory, Thrace in 
particular. This is why Turkish and especially Greek officials were so worried about 
the defence of their territory in case of a local or international crisis. Without 
sufficient conventional forces, the Warsaw Pact forces could quickly break through 
Greek or Turkish positions. Then, the Americans and NATO would either not dare to 
support actively their allies, or have no option but to cross the nuclear threshold by 
launching tactical nuclear weapons on Greek and/or Turkish territory to stop the 
advance of Soviet forces. Therefore, it was obvious that Greece and Turkey were the 
allies who needed most desperately powerful conventional forces to deter, or defend 
themselves against, a Soviet attack.  
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iv) A new frontier in the South-east? The Suez Crisis, the rise of ‘positive neutralism’ 
in the Middle East, and the Syrian Crisis, October 1956-November 1957 
The Suez crisis of 1956 created unprecedented difficulties for intra-alliance relations 
in NATO, principally between the United States, Britain and France, but it also had 
significant ramification for the Southern Flank. Amid the crisis the United States did 
not hesitate to take military measures as well. Following the eruption of the Suez 
Crisis, the US Sixth Fleet, comprised of its main units (the carriers Randolph and 
Coral Sea, plus cruisers and destroyers) sailed eastwards midway between Cyprus and 
Suez and then stood off the Egyptian coast. The primary aims of the Sixth Fleet were 
the following: it should be ready to undertake action in case the crisis expanded into a 
major conflict, help in the evacuation of American citizens from Egypt and Israel, try 
to restrain the actions of the belligerents (particularly Britain, France, and Israel), and 
keep the Soviets away. Indeed, the Sixth Fleet proved an effective stabilising factor 
without interfering actively, although it was obvious that it would take action should it 
become necessary. The US naval aviation could have easily assumed air superiority 
against either the British-French-Israelis or the Soviets. Therefore, the Sixth Fleet 
proved a valuable and flexible asset serving US diplomacy which finally managed to 
control the situation.
631
 This was the first time that the US Sixth Fleet undertook what 
was later called an „out-of-area‟ operation. Until the fall of 1956 its duty was to 
support the right flank of US forces in Europe, deter Soviet aggression in the 
Mediterranean and, to the extent possible, contribute to the defence of Italy, Greece 
and Turkey. However, the 1956 crisis initiated a period when the Sixth Fleet became 
involved increasingly in the affairs of the Middle East, intervening actively in the 
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Lebanon civil war in 1958 and the Arab-Israeli Wars of the Six Days in 1967 and 
Yom Kippur in 1973.  
The Suez Crisis sparked a significant increase of anti-western sentiments in 
the Arab world and created a deep, though rather temporary rift between the 
Americans, on the one hand, and the British and French, on the other. The Soviets 
began to intervene actively in the politics of the Middle East presenting themselves as 
a staunch supporter of the forces of decolonisation and anti-Western nationalism.
632
 
They were ready to help left-leaning nationalist regimes and sought to enhance their 
diplomatic, economic and military position, particularly in Syria and Egypt. Soviet 
presence and influence in those countries meant that the USSR might find an 
additional route to threat the Southern Flank of NATO, through Syria which bordered 
with Turkey or through the stationing of Soviet naval and air forces in the eastern 
shores of the Mediterranean. From late 1956 NATO officials began to consider and 
assess the extent of this possible new threat to the Southern Flank. 
Naturally, Turkey was highly concerned about the trends and policies of the 
USSR in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis the Turks officially 
asked NATO to examine the situation in the region „in a continuous manner‟, assess 
any repercussions on the alliance‟s defence plans and „make the necessary 
adjustments‟ to them. Ankara focused on developments taking place at its south-
eastern borders, in Syria. In early December 1956 the Turkish Acting Foreign 
Minister Ethem Menderes submitted a memorandum to the NAC, calling NATO‟s 
attention to the Soviet aim to „encircle and out-flank the South Eastern NATO area‟. 
According to the Turks, the situation in Syria was deteriorating; although the arms 
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delivered by the USSR had been fewer than was initially estimated, Ankara believed 
that the military build-up would continue and that Soviet influence would rise 
significantly. The Turks proposed the establishment of an appropriate link between 
NATO and the Baghdad Pact, and the latter‟s reinforcement to the maximum 
extent.
633
  
In any case, Ankara was not alarmed mainly at the thought of existing Syrian 
military potential or of immediate threat of war, but at the possibility of Syria 
becoming an advance post for Soviet might in the Middle East. The US, UK and 
French representatives concurred with this estimate; NATO could not disassociate 
itself from developments occurring in non-NATO areas. Italy expressed its concern 
about recent events in the Eastern Mediterranean while Greece hoped that differences 
between NATO members throughout the Middle East would be solved.
634
 During 
conversations with US officials, the Turkish leaders appeared worried that the Soviets 
aimed at encircling Turkey and executing a pincers movement through Thrace, the 
Caucasus and Syria. They argued that the main Soviet intention was to descend into 
the Mediterranean and interdict or cut allied lines of communication.
635
 
 In December 1956, the first of a series of Standing Group reports on the 
issue was written. It argued that the stocks of military equipment built up until that 
point in Syria and Egypt were meant to be used only by the Syrian and Egyptian 
forces. Those forces did not present any military threat to NATO, although that could 
change in the future if the trend continued, particularly if along with increased arms 
and equipment the Soviets sent also a force of „volunteers‟. The latter was considered 
                                                          
633
 NATO/C-M(56)139, Memorandum by the Turkish Delegation on the Soviet Threat to the South 
Eastern Flank of NATO in the Middle East, 10-December-1956. 
634
 NATO/C-R(56)61, 1-December-1956. 
635
 FRUS, 1955-57, XXIV, p.700. 
293 
 
 
 
unlikely for the time being, but Soviet advisors were already present in both Egypt 
and Syria. At any rate, direct Soviet intervention in the Middle East by Moscow was 
regarded unlikely. However, the existence in the Middle East of a force equipped with 
Soviet arms and possibly directed by Soviet experts would clearly intensify the 
potential Soviet bloc threat to the Southern Flank by various ways. It would increase 
the vulnerability of NATO lines of communication in the Mediterranean and enable 
the Soviets to establish military bases in the region, thus outflanking NATO. 
Moreover, if the USSR managed to deny Middle Eastern oil to the West, it would 
deliver a severe blow to the overall NATO military potential.
636
 
Meanwhile, in November 1956 US policy makers were highly concerned 
over the defence of eastern Turkey, particularly over the situation of the air defence. 
Admiral Radford explained that the Turkish radar equipment was obsolete and 
entirely inadequate, while the F-84s of the Turkish Air Force could not intercept late-
model Soviet aircraft flying in high altitude. These flaws were critical, since there 
were unconfirmed reports of Soviet overflights across the Turkish air space. The JCS 
favoured the transfer of USAF fighters into the Adana base in southern Turkey. Radar 
with higher and wider coverage and modern interceptors were needed to enhance the 
air defence of Turkey and other areas of the Middle East. Furthermore, Radford 
pointed out that under existing arrangements the air defence of Turkey had been 
handed over to NATO, and the NATO commander responsible (SIXATAF‟s 
commander) was an US officer. Therefore, Radford implied that the Americans had 
also a moral obligation to reinforce the Turkish air defence. However, State 
Department officials considered that USAF should not undertake additional 
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operations in Turkey. The NAC would be greatly concerned over the prospect of 
NATO assuming additional responsibility for the territorial defence of individual 
member states to the exclusion of national authority. Some member-states would 
probably oppose such a measure, for fear it would lead to action triggered by some 
local situation rather than on an Atlantic-wide issue; if the US military considered the 
placement of additional equipment to Turkey as necessary, this should be done 
through NATO.
637
 Interestingly, the Turks preferred to deal with the Americans rather 
than the alliance. The Turkish Air Force came to an agreement with JAMMATT (and 
not with NATO) on a plan to enhance the Turkish radar equipment and capabilities.
638
 
In any case, both the State and the Defense Department officials agreed that 
hostile overflights should not be interpreted as an act of aggression (as was the 
Turkish point of view) but should be considered simply as a violation of air space.
639
 
For its part, the NAC seemed unable to conclude whether such actions constituted a 
violation of air space or an aggression. Even the NATO senior military authorities 
appeared divided: General Gruenther considered such over-flights as a direct attack 
against Turkey which should be dealt with by the Turkish Air Force; General Norstad 
however, who was about to succeed Gruenther, held a different view. Turkey should 
refrain from acting unilaterally and create a difficult situation for NATO.
640
  
NATO‟s refusal to interpret over-flights of Turkish territory as a reason for 
the invocation of Article 5 of NATO greatly annoyed the Turks. The latter sought 
informally to secure a direct US commitment to help Turkey address the problem of 
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inadequate detection and interception capability. Indeed, it was a customary practice 
of the Menderes government to deal with the Americans bilaterally on any questions 
where NATO (and other multilateral organizations) was involved. US officials 
believed that the Turkish needs for air support or for the improvement of their radar 
equipment and anti-aircraft defence should be given high priority. It was nevertheless 
also stressed that this policy had certain flaws, since „to resort to bilateral 
arrangements of this sort out of the context of NATO would invite other NATO 
countries to request similar bilateral arrangements‟.641 
In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Turkey was alarmed by the (temporary) 
drift between the United States and Britain, the evident inability of the latter to act 
unilaterally in the region, the dire prospects for the Baghdad Pact‟s cohesion and 
strength and the increasing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria. The details of the 
Syrian crisis which unfolded from August until October 1957 fall outside the purview 
of this thesis. However, it is important to note that the Turkish leadership decided to 
harden its policy towards the anti-Western Syrian regime and exert pressure, when by 
August 1957 several indications suggested that Syria might soon turn into a Soviet 
satellite. In September 1957 three Turkish divisions (including an armoured one) were 
deployed along the Turkish-Syrian border – an additional armoured brigade was 
reported to be deployed in early October. However, in the aftermath of Sputnik‟s 
launch on 4 October, Turkish „militancy‟, though understandable by the Americans, 
could lead to an extremely serious situation. Washington believed that no unilateral 
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action should be taken by Turkey, particularly so long as no Syrian aggression was 
evident. In order to calm the Turks, further financial aid could be given.
642
 
During the crisis the Turkish military sought to obtain SACEUR‟s support in 
case that Syrian, Egyptian or Soviet aircraft bombed targets in Turkey after a Turkish 
invasion into Syria. General Tunaboylu, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, stated 
that he would not permit his forces to enter Syria without a guarantee from USAF of 
defence against planes invading Turkey; he considered such a guarantee to be in line 
with NATO commitments. General Norstad however was deeply concerned about 
Turkish initiatives. Although he recognised that the redeployment of Turkish troops 
was a national and not NATO issue, he advised caution. Every effort should be made 
that Turkish activities were not interpreted as provocative. He also pointed out that 
there were no US interceptors stationed in Turkey.
643
 The JCS concurred with 
Norstad. General Nathan Twining, now Chairman of the JCS, provided a rather 
limited support to Turkey in case of retaliation: „if USAF planes were in Turkey at 
bases attacked by Syrian, Soviet or Egyptian planes, those USAF planes would be 
expected to defend against such an attack‟.644 
Meanwhile, after mid-September the crisis escalated. On 21 September a 
Soviet naval squadron visited Latakia in Syria, while in mid-October Egyptian troops 
were sent to the city to enhance Syrian defence and Nasser‟s prestige in the region. 
On 5 October Sixth Fleet vessels arrived in Izmir, and eleven days later Dulles stated 
that if the USSR attacked Turkey, the Americans would not confine themselves to a 
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„purely defensive operation‟.645 As the crisis continued, Norstad became quite critical 
both of Turkey‟s military redeployment in the south-east of the country and of US 
decision to mobilise the Sixth Fleet; those movements had created a bad impression to 
some NATO allies. Furthermore, the SACEUR said that it was „ridiculous‟ to think of 
Syria attacking Turkey. Dulles actually rebuffed Norstad, claiming that the latter 
referred to matters „related primarily not to NATO but to Middle East problems as to 
which probably and naturally he was not fully informed‟. Obviously, Norstad‟s top 
priority was to preserve NATO‟s cohesion, and Dulles‟ main preoccupation to retain 
US credibility to Turkey. Still, the Secretary of State (and the US policy makers in 
general) adopted an ambivalent position as the situation deteriorated during October. 
Although he admitted that Syria did not intend to attack Turkey, he viewed that the 
situation was not simple, because the Syrian crisis caused significant unrest in the 
region. In any event, the deployment of Turkish forces along the Turkish-Syrian 
borders could „cool off Syrian hotheads‟. In addition, Dulles justified Turkish 
opposition to the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime on Turkey‟s southern borders. 
Finally, Dulles concluded that the European allies did not want any significant US 
intervention in the Middle and Far East to avoid troubles in Europe; but he 
characterised such attitude as a „selfish‟ one.646   
Dulles also estimated that the Turkish military leadership‟s main goal was to 
take advantage of the situation to secure more US aid. Eisenhower himself believed 
that US support of Turkey could not be easily rationalised in the absence of any real 
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Syrian provocation.
647
 At any rate, although the Turks could easily beat the Syrians, 
the consequences of a unilateral Turkish action would probably have very serious 
repercussions in the Middle East – „a subsequent period of unending turmoil‟ would 
probably follow, Dulles remarked.
648
 A few days later he concluded that the Soviets 
wished to avoid a confrontation with the West in the Middle East, so it might be 
tempting to force upon them „a serious loss of prestige‟. But in such a case, Dulles 
continued, the Soviets would probably seek to regain their prestige later on another 
occasion, either in the same region or elsewhere, in areas where they enjoyed local 
superiority vis-à-vis the West (and we should always bear in mind that such areas 
included Thrace and West Berlin). Therefore, it would be inadvisable to initiate a 
dangerous „cycle of challenge and response‟ which might lead to general war. Last 
but not least, in the event of a Turkish-Syrian conflict initiated by Ankara, all Arab 
countries would be compelled to support Syria and offer to the Soviets further 
opportunities to increase their influence in the region. Both Prime Minister Macmillan 
and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd agreed with Dulles.
649
 
For their part, the Soviets openly chastised Turkey (and the Americans) for 
having aggressive intentions against Syria. Moscow and Damascus decided to take the 
issue of the Turkish-Syrian crisis to the UN. However, culmination into conflict was 
avoided and the crisis itself was unexpectedly ended by Khrushchev himself on 29 
October when he launched a „peace offensive‟ on Turkey and publicly declared that 
„there was no threat in the Middle East‟ and that the whole issue had been 
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„misunderstood‟.650 After that, the UN General Assembly agreed to take no further 
action, and Turkey and Syria concurred. In assessing the Turkish attitude, it can be 
argued that although Ankara was certainly concerned over the rise of anti-Western 
sentiments and of Soviet influence in the Middle East, the Menderes government 
sought to achieve other goals through the outbreak of a small-scale crisis. The crisis 
bolstered the Democrat Party‟s position in the interior for the forthcoming elections, 
since it distracted the public opinion‟s attention from the critical economic situation. 
In addition the Turks probably favoured an increase of the tension in the region to 
enhance Turkey‟s bargaining power with the United States. Last but not least, if 
Turkey had more leverage in Middle East affairs it might convince the Americans to 
grant further military and financial aid to Turkey and could establish a closer, more 
direct US-Turkish relationship.
651
  
Both the civil and military authorities of NATO dealt with the situation in 
Syria in particular, and the Middle East in general, and the alliance tried to devise a 
coherent strategy. We already saw Norstad‟s attitude and views during the crisis. 
Spaak judged that the Soviets would push their policy in Syria or anywhere else in the 
region to the extent of provoking a war.
652
 The problem of Soviet political infiltration 
in Syria was also examined and assessed by the Permanent Representatives of the 
member-states. They expressed almost identical views, and agreed that the Syrian 
leadership had adopted a pro-Soviet rather than pro-communist position – Syria had 
become „the pawn of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East‟.653 Soviet activities did 
not seem to constitute a very serious problem for the time being, although the 
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possibility of an inadvertent conflict could not be excluded. In the long run the danger 
of Soviet penetration might become significant, and NATO should therefore devise a 
policy to prevent the extension of Soviet influence to other countries of the region. 
NATO countermeasures could include the build-up of the military establishments of 
the pro-Western governments of the area and the provision of economic aid for the 
Middle East countries (perhaps including Syria as well). Such aid had been already 
granted by the United States and Britain within the framework of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact, but the question remained if other NATO members 
were ready to participate in those efforts.
654
  
The discussion in the NAC demonstrated that although a general consensus 
of views existed on the interpretation of recent developments in Syria, no agreement 
was reached on specific collective action. Soon the Permanent Representatives agreed 
on a very vague course of action: the NATO countries should not only seek to 
counteract Soviet moves and advances, but also aim at pacification and stability. As 
regards the military feature of NATO‟s reaction, any extension of Soviet military 
influence and presence in the Middle East – particularly the establishment of bases 
and Turkey‟s encirclement – should be opposed and Soviet threats and accusations 
against Turkey should not be left without reply by the allies. The establishment of a 
military liaison between NATO and the Baghdad Pact was also considered as an 
additional step.
655
 However, this proposal did not generate much support. In 
November 1957, the Standing Group remarked that Soviet-bloc penetration of Syrian 
and Egyptian land forces was „well-nigh complete‟, since they had been extensively 
re-equipped with Soviet type arms and material. Moreover, Soviet influence was 
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extended by the presence of military technicians and advisors in Syria and Egypt and 
by the training of Syrian and Egyptian personnel in Soviet bloc countries. Soviet 
penetration of the Syrian and Egyptian air forces was considerable, while some 
influence in their navies was also apparent.
656
  
But all those findings and notes did not mean much, so long as NATO failed 
to form a coherent strategy and undertake specific actions. Therefore, Turkish fears, 
however exaggerated, could not be allayed. Apparently, within NATO only the 
United States, Britain and Turkey were concerned significantly over the rise of 
neutralist feelings and probable Soviet influence in the Middle East. The other allies, 
particularly the smaller European countries, did not attribute much account to such 
developments and certainly the Middle East situation did not constitute a priority for 
them. Notably, Italy and, quite naturally, Greece did not endorse Turkish militancy. 
The Italians disagreed with Turkey‟s determination to deal with the threat by military 
means. Generally, Rome did not consider the application of force in the Middle East 
as the proper response to rising challenges; it believed that a multilateral plan of 
economic aid would be more appropriate and beneficial, and would widen the scope 
of NATO into the economic field – the latter was Rome‟s set goal from the mid-
1950s.
657
 During the crisis the Greek press suggested that the country should not help 
Turkey in case of war. Of course, it was quite unwise to express such views publicly; 
Greece would not gain if allied solidarity and cohesion were diminished.
658
 So, in the 
aftermath of the Syrian crisis the Turkish leadership made plain to the Americans that 
„Turkey had no illusion about NATO‟s abilities to be helpful in the Middle East‟. 
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NATO was divided; and according to Ankara, US policy should nevertheless continue 
to be strong in the area. Menderes was gratified by the way the United States had 
stood by his country during the recent crisis.
659
 Indeed, during the subsequent period 
the Turkish political and military leadership persistently sought to convince the 
Americans over the necessity for US-Turkish bilateral planning („outside of NATO‟) 
and action in Syria and the Middle East, to foil Soviet and Nasser‟s plans.660 For 
many Turkish officials, in matters affecting Turkey‟s security interests, the existing 
reality was a US-Turkish bilateral alliance, rather than NATO. Overall, the 
deteriorating situation in the Middle East and the rise of Soviet influence in Egypt and 
especially Syria started to pose additional security challenges to the waning Southern 
Flank, and particularly to Turkey. 
 
 
Conclusion 
From autumn 1956, NATO‟s Southern Flank was troubled by parallel 
developments and a combination of factors, some of which were born of UK-Greek 
rivalry and Greek-Turkish antagonism, others which grew from problems with 
strategy and finance, and yet others which related to tensions in the Middle East. 
Historians have dealt with some of these events (for example, the Cyprus problem and 
the Middle East crises of 1956-7) and to some extent, with the Italian and Greek 
military situation (but not the Turkish one). However, most studies do not provide a 
NATO (and especially a Southern Flank) perspective, while a comprehensive account 
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on the effect that those challenges had on NATO‟s Southern Flank has been absent. 
Furthermore, some aspects have not yet studied at all, as, for example, NATO 
assessments on the threat posed by the rising Soviet military penetration of the Middle 
East. The connection between the Southern Flank defence and economic reality has 
also received inadequate attention.   
As this chapter has shown, Greek-Turkish antagonism over Cyprus (but also 
on topics like the Balkan Pact and the situation in the Middle East) was soon 
conveyed to the NATO bodies. Despite this, essentially none of the three countries 
directly concerned actually wished for full NATO intervention and arbitration. 
Indeed, the Greeks were aware that they could find little, if any, support from their 
NATO allies, since most of them were unwilling to become entangled in an escalating 
conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean; in addition, Greece was the weakest party and 
soon understood that it had fewer cards to play in comparison with Turkey and 
Britain. Moreover, Greece favoured a settlement reached between the Cypriot people 
and the British; in any such agreement the reality of Greek Cypriot predominance in 
the island would inevitably decide the outcome on – more or less – favourable terms. 
As regards Turkey, it never took the initiative in provoking discussion in the NAC, 
although regularly it responded to Greek arguments. The Turks did not favour NATO 
intervention because they understood that western and world public opinion was 
generally sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot cause (even when NATO members voted 
against it at the UN), while Washington was unwilling to support partition. Therefore, 
Ankara preferred to seek a favourable solution through a tripartite UK-Greece-
Turkish international agreement; close cooperation with the British would ensure 
Greek isolation and the conclusion of an agreement leading probably to future or 
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immediate partition. Therefore, the Turks envisaged a possible role for NATO as a 
stabilising factor only after a basis of agreement had been reached between the three 
interested countries.  
Britain did not wish to discuss the Cyprus problem in NATO forums, at least 
initially. By early 1957 it appeared to prefer some discussion „in the restricted forum 
of NATO than in the public stage of the United Nations‟ as part of a process which 
would end in isolating the Greeks. In any case, the British repeatedly emphasised their 
unwillingness to accept any NATO arbitration in the Cyprus dispute. They insisted 
that some of British requirements in the island derived from purely UK interests in the 
Middle East (particularly the Baghdad Pact) which were not of direct NATO concern. 
Only if and when a basis for a settlement was agreed between the three interested 
countries, could NATO play a useful role as arbitrator. As already mentioned, the 
other NATO members generally avoided to raise the Cyprus problem, although there 
had been a growing conviction, shared mainly by West Germany and Italy, but also 
by Norway and Belgium, that the dispute could not be kept out of NATO indefinitely. 
It is interesting that France, a colonial power itself involved in the Suez Crisis and 
preoccupied with the Algerian War, remained silent. As for the US position, until late 
1956 the United States pressed the British, the Greeks and the Turks to moderate their 
aims, and was anxious not to bring the Cyprus dispute into NATO forums. By early 
1957, Washington endorsed UK-Greek-Turkish talks inside NATO (in conjunction 
with the resumption of British and Cypriot talks in the island) and backed in principle 
the Ismay and Spaak initiatives. During this period all NATO members (including 
Britain, Greece, Turkey, the United States and the other allies) appeared reluctant to 
discuss the Cyprus dispute in NATO, sharing an equal desire not to add difficulties 
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and further complicate the issue. No one wished to project into the alliance the severe 
strains existing in the relations between the parties concerned, and NATO itself did 
not want to press for a solution which might lead to a probable Greek, or, significantly 
less likely, Turkish defection.
661
 
The Suez Crisis proved a watershed because it delivered a fatal blow to 
British prestige and Britain‟s position in the Middle East, initiated a period of 
increasing political and military Soviet infiltration in the area and caused the rise of 
anti-western sentiments in many Arab countries. Although the United States fully 
replaced Britain as the dominant western power in the Middle East, the Soviets began 
to penetrate the area posing a new threat to the Southern Flank of NATO from the 
South-east. Soviet political, military, and, later on, naval presence increased in 
subsequent years and US and NATO planning was preoccupied with this new threat at 
least until the mid-1970s. The issue was thoroughly discussed in NATO forums, 
particularly during and after the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, but once again the 
alliance failed to decide on a specific strategy and way of response. The United States, 
Britain and Turkey were much more concerned over negative developments in the 
Middle East than the majority of the member-states. At the very peak of the Syrian 
Crisis, even the American officials tried to keep a balance between retaining NATO 
cohesion and affirming US credibility (particularly to Turkey). Surely, NATO was 
persistently facing serious difficulties to agree and act on challenges not pertaining to 
its core (that is, Western Europe and Northern Atlantic). Not until well after the end 
of the Cold War period, and under completely different circumstances, was NATO 
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able to decide and implement policies to deal with „out-of-area‟ challenges and even 
undertake military operations. 
As regards the military aspect of the situation in the Southern Flank, two 
distinct cases existed: on the one hand, Italy appeared reluctant to assume a burden-
sharing commensurate to its economic and industrial might and potential. The Italian 
defence effort was modest. Rome‟s immediate fears of external threat had been 
soothed significantly by the normalisation of Italian-Yugoslav relations, the relaxation 
of East-West tension in Europe and the presence of US troops in northern Italy; 
moreover, Italy did not border with the Soviet bloc. For all these reasons, the Italian 
leadership put more emphasis on the transformation of NATO from a purely military 
alliance to an organisation dealing also with political and economic problems by 
promoting cooperation in these fields.  
On the other hand, although Greece and Turkey favoured closer intra-NATO 
political and economic cooperation (primarily as a means to receive additional 
military and economic aid), they continued to put emphasis on the military aspect of 
the alliance as well. Both countries were frontline states bordering with the Soviet 
bloc or the USSR itself, and felt obliged to raise powerful defence establishments and 
maintain their armed forces in the maximum state of readiness. Nevertheless, the 
Greek and Turkish security problems could not be solved by military means alone. 
Despite their huge defence effort and the substantial US military and economic aid, 
Greece and Turkey did not have the potential to raise, modernise and maintain their 
armed forces to such extent as to achieve the force goals envisaged by themselves and 
NATO. In the absence of a sound economic and industrial basis, both countries lacked 
the necessary resources to sustain effectively their defence establishments. The 
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Americans were the first to understand this reality and toyed with the idea of force 
reductions in the Greek and Turkish armed services (particularly in their land forces); 
however, for the time being they hesitated to officially ask for, and implement, cuts 
on the Greek and Turkish force levels and on US aid, because at the same time 
Washington was using its aid as a „carrot‟ to mitigate Greek and Turkish complaints 
about insufficient American support in Cyprus and, in the Turkish case, the Middle 
East.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
308 
 
 
 
6. FROM THE BRINK OF DISSOLUTION TO REVIVAL, AUTUMN 
1957-1959. 
 
From October 1957 to December 1958 NATO faced a series of unprecedented crises. 
The launch of the Soviet satellite, Sputnik, and the Berlin crisis both brought great 
tension on a global level. On a regional level, further deterioration in the Middle East 
(culminating in the June 1958 Lebanon crisis and the concurrent coup d‟état in Iraq) 
added pressures, but the greatest for NATO‟s Southern Flank was that created by the 
escalation of the Cyprus dispute and ever worsening Greek-Turkish relations. By 
autumn 1958, Greek-NATO relations were at their lowest ebb, and a possible Greek 
withdrawal from NATO, and even the fall of the country in political turmoil, could 
not be excluded. In addition, by mid-1958 Turkey‟s economic and financial situation 
had deteriorated seriously, and it escaped bankruptcy (and probable political 
instability) only after the intervention of an international consortium. In exchange for 
this bail-out, the Menderes government had to give up its rigorous development 
programme and instead adopt a draconian stabilisation programme. Turkey also lost 
its last regional ally, Iraq, since by late 1958 the new Iraqi leadership adopted a non-
aligned stance and seemed to lean towards the USSR. By March 1959, after Iraqi 
withdrawal, the Baghdad Pact was virtually neutralised, and despite being renaming 
as CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation), it never recovered a sense of effectiveness.  
Once again, NATO proved more able to adjust its strategy and deal with the 
general Cold War challenges (as was the enhancement of the Soviet strategic nuclear 
capability) than to meet successfully a serious intra-allied dispute, such as the Cyprus 
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problem, or „out-of-area‟ crises affecting its security, such as continuing turmoil in the 
Middle East. Until now, NATO historiography has not dealt with this interesting 
aspect. At any rate, in early 1958 the Alliance modified its strategy, adopting the 
M.C.70 document.
662
 This was supposed to give emphasis on conventional forces, 
because limited war or threats were regarded as more likely than a general war. 
However, in essence the new strategy provided for the nuclearization of NATO 
assigned ground and air forces (that is, NATO „Shield‟ forces, not merely the 
retaliatory ones) which would be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.
663
 
Therefore, it threatened to erode further NATO‟s conventional capabilities, since 
defence budgets would give priority to the procurement of nuclear delivery vehicles 
and the conversion of existing conventional weapons systems, like aircraft, into dual-
capable platforms.
664
 Although the Southern Flank countries, and especially Greece 
and Turkey, would not pay themselves for the new equipment, the M.C.70 
requirements posed several challenges: as regards the Southern Flank region, M.C.70 
called for a quantitative reduction of ground forces, but an increase of the units placed 
under NATO command. However, Italy, and Greece and Turkey in particular, wished 
to retain additional units under national command. Moreover, this strategy, placing 
emphasis on new (or „advanced‟) weapons, modernization of equipment, and a higher 
states of readiness, entailed a considerable increase of defence expenditure, without 
commensurate increase of US economic and military aid. 
Despite those difficulties, the Italian, Greek and Turkish forces continued to 
increase gradually their combat potential, although essentially no significant 
improvement of their defence posture occurred. However, this time NATO‟s primary 
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failure appeared to be its inability to intervene actively in order to stabilise politically 
the explosive situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, in mid-June the NAC 
was preoccupied for the first time to such an extent with the Cyprus issue. The 
situation had become critical because extensive violence flared throughout Cyprus, 
Greece once more decided to withdraw from HALFSEE in Izmir, and the British 
undertook their last initiative for a settlement of the Cyprus problem which met their 
own as well Turkish needs, but totally ignored Greek and Greek Cypriot ones. At the 
same time, the Americans remained passive and unable or unwilling to intervene, and 
the other NATO members were unwilling to be entangled in this mess. Only the 
Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, tried to mediate, but his initiative collapsed in 
late October 1958.   
But then, when everyone feared the worst (for instance, a possible Greek 
drift out of NATO with unforeseeable repercussions), Greece and Turkey managed all 
of a sudden to reach a compromise solution in early 1959, and Britain had no option 
but to follow suit. In essence, although NATO itself had been unable to mediate 
successfully between the three parties directly concerned, it still constituted the major, 
if not the only, link between Greece and Turkey and the West. And if it was obvious 
that Greece would not leave NATO unless a total defeat over Cyprus might render 
Greek withdrawal inevitable, Turkey was becoming increasingly worried about its 
regional isolation, at a time of rising East-West tension. While Greece had formed a 
strong bilateral partnership with Yugoslavia and had established good relations with 
the Arab world, Ankara would be cut off geographically from NATO and the West, in 
case Greece left the alliance. This would be an unacceptable strategic setback, and 
therefore in late 1958-early 1959 the Turkish leadership proved ready to accept a 
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solution which would not entail partition, as Greece and Makarios had been already 
ready to accept a solution which would not lead to enosis. Therefore, it could be 
claimed that indirectly NATO ultimately served as a stabilising factor in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
 
  
i) Regional pressures and NATO’s response: Cyprus, the Middle East, and the 
Balkans. 
NATO faced a combination of regional pressures from late 1957 to late 1958 all of 
which affected the Southern Flank. The first was the ongoing and painful dispute over 
Cyprus. Here, a standoff continued between the Greeks on the one side, and the 
British and the Turks, on the other, which troubled not only relations between these 
three protagonists but also the solidity of the Southern Flank. To break the stalemate, 
the British devised the „Foot Plan‟ in December 1957/January 1958. This proposal 
suggested a seven year period of self government and left the door open for partition 
in the future (since in case of the application of self-determination, this would be 
granted separately to the two communities). In any case, no solution would be 
implemented without the approval of both communities. Thus it still gave a veto to 
the Turkish Cypriots.
665
 Although their new initiative did not provide any political 
role for NATO, the British wanted to keep Spaak fully informed of any developments 
on the Cyprus problem. So they briefed Spaak on the content of the Foot Plan on 9 
January. The Secretary General was not enthusiastic about it, but agreed that he 
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should not intervene for the time being. This would probably occur „if and when‟ the 
Greeks were approached, since Spaak had considerable influence and prestige over 
Athens (but almost none over Ankara, because he opposed partition).
666
  
London chose to inform first the Turks on its new initiative for a Cyprus 
settlement, but failed to generate Turkey‟s support. Despite the prompt offer of a base 
on the island to the Turkish Armed Forces in exchange for the dropping of the 
Turkish aim of partition, at that stage the Turks were demanding partition and 
remained negative towards any settlement that deferred it for the future. They also 
demanded that the base in Cyprus be given to them immediately. After the Turkish 
rejection of the Foot Plan, the British found themselves in a complete deadlock. 
Violence escalated significantly in Cyprus, since the Turks established a powerful 
Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary organisation at the island, the TMT (directly controlled 
by the Turkish General Staff), which now attacked the British security forces trying to 
bring about partition immediately. However, the British could not displease the 
Turkish Cypriots on whose participation in the Auxiliary Police the British drive 
against EOKA depended. Thus, this episode revealed the extent to which the British 
security drive in Cyprus had become depended on the Turkish Cypriots. Then, the 
British suggested another solution: Cyprus would be united with Greece, but Turkey 
would also receive a military base in the island. Although the Greek government 
seemed willing to discuss the idea, it soon fell over domestic matters and elections 
were proclaimed for May; at any rate, the Turks again refused to drop partition.
667
  
Spaak, annoyed at Turkish intransigence, commented that „the time was 
surely past in the West when populations could be uprooted and the economy of a 
                                                          
666
 TNA/FO/371/136388/RGC1072/1, UK Delegation in NATO to FO, No.11, 10-January-1958. 
667
 Hatzivassiliou, Britain, pp.125-31. Holland, Britain and the Revolt, pp.228-235. 
313 
 
 
 
country upset‟ due to partition. Spaak considered that it might be wise to revive the 
idea of calling a conference at which attendance would not be restricted to the three 
countries directed concerned: first, the Turks would probably find it more difficult to 
justify their arguments at such a gathering (to which Spaak, and probably the United 
States and other NATO members could participate) than in the course of the current 
exchanges; second, as Dulles acknowledged, the Greeks might attend a conference, in 
which Spaak would be also present.
668
 The latter had taken into account the Greek 
views and favoured a truly compromise solution. 
However, in spring 1958 the British devised a new initiative which was 
formalised as the „Macmillan Plan‟ in June. It was based on the establishment of a 
tridominium in Cyprus and implicitly included the prospect of future partition. 
Consequently, it was more attractive to Turkey and offered some chance of movement 
on the dispute, even at Greek cost. London sought a way out of the impasse without 
displeasing Turkey due to the latter‟s position in the Middle East.669 The British 
policy makers thought that NATO could eventually play some role. Indeed, no 
discussion had taken place on the Cyprus problem since the May 1957 NAC meeting, 
while the subsequent Spaak initiative had made no progress, an analysed in the 
previous chapter. As the British were ready to announce their new initiative, it seemed 
appropriate to give NATO members advance warning and thus demonstrate „an 
example of [British] respect for the principle of political consultation in NATO on 
matters concerning the whole alliance‟. At any rate, it was doubtful whether the 
ensuing discussion would be of any use; a „slanging match‟ between the Greek and 
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Turkish representatives was expected, while their colleagues would most likely 
remain silent or „confine themselves to cautious platitudes‟.670  
Meanwhile, after 8 June the Turkish Cypriots, at the instructions of Ankara, 
attacked the Greek Cypriots trying to bring partition closer. By that date, as the US 
Consul in Nicosia reported, conditions were approaching „the Palestinian one‟. 
Initially the EOKA‟s leader Georgios Grivas was restrained, but in early July he 
responded and communal violence spread throughout the island. This lasted for 
almost two months and caused an almost complete collapse of the security situation in 
Cyprus.
671
 At the same time, on 9 June the British informed Spaak on the Macmillan 
Plan. The Secretary General reacted favourably and promised to call a special session 
of the NAC on 16 June. It was imperative to bring the present unrest in Cyprus to an 
end because the local situation and the resulting Greek-Turkish strains had become 
extremely grave.
672
 Meanwhile, the Greek permanent delegation in NATO also 
requested a special assembly of the NAC to denounce Turkish Cypriot violence in 
Cyprus.
673
  
The NAC was convened on 10 June and, for the first time, was almost 
entirely devoted to Cyprus. The discussion consisted mainly of „an outspoken 
exchange‟ between the Greek and Turkish Permanent Representatives, Michael Melas 
and Selim Sarper. The former condemned Turkish intransigence and compared the 
recent Turkish Cypriot violence in Cyprus with the 1955 Istanbul riots and warned 
that if this Turkish attitude continued, Greece might „be obliged to reconsider the 
nature of her ties within the alliance‟. On Turkish part, Sarper‟s speech was, as the 
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British noted, „quite unnecessarily violent and tactless‟ and „occasionally downright 
offensive‟, causing irritation to the Council. He claimed that partition should be 
considered as a compromise and as „a final [Turkish] sacrifice in the interests of the 
alliance‟, since the proper solution would be the „return of Cyprus to Turkey‟. 
Interestingly, neither Melas nor Sarper attacked or even criticised the British, and, for 
the first time, permanent representatives of third countries intervened actively 
(especially the Canadian and the Belgian, but also the West German, the French, 
Italian and US ones).
674
 Thus the ground was fertile for the British proposal. NATO 
allies received it very favourably – the American, French, and German governments 
expressed their desire to help – and all pleaded with Greece and Turkey to give it 
serious and sympathetic consideration.
675
  
Discussions continued in NAC during the following days, but nothing 
important or encouraging came out. The Turks insisted on a tripartite conference to 
reach a final settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of partition. Apparently, 
they expected that Greece would refuse to attend, and therefore the road would open 
for a UK-Turkish agreement on partition. However, very soon the Turkish leadership 
started to see the merits of the Macmillan Plan, and specifically that in essence, it 
provided for the introduction of functional separation, or „administrative partition‟.676 
It should be stressed that British policy makers were fully aware that the unilateral 
implementation of the Macmillan Plan might cause serious adverse effects on 
Greece‟s international position and orientation. As an FO minute acknowledged on 24 
June, a Greek withdrawal from NATO could not be ruled out; „even if this is the case, 
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however, it is easier to contemplate with equanimity a neutralist Greece than a 
neutralist Turkey, since the latter is in a key position as the hinge of the Atlantic and 
Baghdad Treaties. However remote the contingency of a neutralist Turkey, it is an 
unacceptable risk. A neutralist Greece, on the other hand, could perhaps even be 
exploited advantageously and assimilated with Yugoslavia as part of a Balkan no-
man‟s land‟.677  
Once again, NATO‟s political cohesion and the Southern Flank‟s military 
effectiveness were jeopardised due to the escalation of the Cyprus crisis and the 
consequent exacerbation of Greek-Turkish tension. The Greek Government, fearing 
that the Turkish authorities would not hesitate to precipitate events similar to the ones 
occurred in September 1955, decided on 14 June to withdraw all Greek officers 
serving in HALFSEE in Izmir, along with their wives and families and any civilian 
employees (approximately 200 people in total).
678
 Greece also warned that NATO 
was in danger due to continuing British intransigence and Turkish provocation. In 
making these moves, Athens sought to press its allies, particularly the Americans, to 
intervene. In any case, Zorlu reacted angrily and accused Greece, and personally 
Averoff, of turning a tripartite UK-Greek-Turkish issue into a NATO problem. Greek 
actions could only harm the alliance‟s solidarity, while Turkey would not be 
influenced by such manoeuvres. Zorlu also noted that, for the time being, Turkey had 
no reason „to hold NATO responsible in the Cyprus question‟ and that so far it had 
„never defaulted from her obligations within NATO‟.679  
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This second Greek withdrawal from HALFSEE caught NATO officials off 
guard once again. NATO authorities had not been advised prior to the Greek move, 
since all arrangements were made directly between the Greek authorities and senior 
Greek officers at NATO.
680
 As might be expected, Greece‟s unilateral initiative did 
not find any support from other NATO members. The situation worsened when the 
Greeks refused to participate in a NATO military meeting held in Athens upon the 
arrival of the Turkish officers. Norstad protested to General Konstantinos Dovas, 
Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff, pointing out that such moves 
threatened seriously the efficiency of the whole allied command structure.
681
 On 27 
June Michael Melas apologised to Norstad for the procedure followed by Greece, 
though not for the actual gesture, and Norstad ordered the CINCSOUTH and the 
CINCAFMED not to get involved themselves with any discussions with the Greeks 
and leave the issue to him.
682
 In any case, Greece insisted on the withdrawal, but 
informed Norstad that its armed forces would participate in the forthcoming NATO 
manoeuvres (provided that there would be no contact between Greek and Turkish 
officers) and would accept direction from HALFSEE. In addition, Melas made plain 
that Greek officers were prohibited from going to Turkey and requested that no 
Turkish officers would be ordered to Greece.
683
 
In an effort to get Greece back into HALFSEE or at least avert more serious 
developments, Norstad visited Athens in late August and held talks with the Greek 
political and military leadership. The visit went well. He discussed Greece‟s defence 
effort and situation, Greek-Turkish relations and the problem of Greek withdrawal 
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from HALFSEE. Norstad expressed his hope for an early return of the Greek officers 
in Izmir, but it seems that he did not press the Karamanlis government on this issue. 
He only proposed a way out through an interim solution, that is, the appointment of a 
Greek General in HALFSEE after obtaining personal assurances from Menderes for 
his treatment; but Karamanlis eventually deferred the whole issue for the time 
being.
684
 As the situation deteriorated further in September, Norstad decided that it 
would be wiser to leave things as they were. Under existing circumstances, another 
Greek-Turkish (or even Greek-NATO) crisis could not be ruled out, and therefore a 
second consecutive Greek withdrawal from NATO‟s integrated command would 
cause more harm to the alliance than the temporary absence from HALFSEE.
685
   
Meanwhile, the Cyprus imbroglio was reaching its peak. From mid-June 
1958 US policy makers feared that if the Macmillan Plan was implemented, Greece 
might be driven out of NATO; contrary to FO assessments, they held that such 
development would deliver a severe blow to the alliance. Therefore, the Americans 
believed that the Macmillan Plan should merely serve as a starting point for talks 
leading to a compromise settlement probably on the basis of guaranteed independence 
(which would inevitably entail the end of British sovereignty). NATO could be used 
to drive Britain away from its current policy.
686
 For their part, British officials were 
suspicious of US intentions and sought to avoid any actual NATO intervention over 
which they would not have full control: „what we want at this stage from NATO, and 
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in particular from Spaak personally, is a continuation of good offices, but not direct 
intervention in the form of mediation‟.687  
After a fruitless intervention from Spaak on 5 August which was closer to the 
Greek views, the British decided that they could not risk losing Turkish support and 
tried to regain the initiative. They put a slightly modified version of the Macmillan 
Plan to Athens and Ankara, only to have it rejected by Greece on 19 August. 
However, Turkey accepted it, while Washington also endorsed it. Moreover, a 
deadline was set: a Greek and a Turkish governmental representative to the Governor 
of Cyprus would be appointed on 1 October. By late August the Macmillan 
government decided that it would proceed with the implementation of the plan only 
with Turkish cooperation, if necessary.
688
 Disaster was looming for the Greeks, who 
were now almost completely isolated. It was now, on 9 September, that the 
Karamanlis government made an almost direct threat of withdrawal from NATO.
689
 
Those developments had created a potentially explosive atmosphere. Just few 
days before the expiration of the British deadline of 1 October, which would bring the 
Macmillan Plan into operation, Spaak undertook action. First, he visited Athens on 22 
September to hold talks with the Greek leadership. At the same time, Makarios, in an 
effort to outflank the British, appeared to be ready for the first time to abandon the 
claim for the application of self-determination, accepting Cypriot independence 
„guaranteed against enosis or partition‟. Although the British remained suspicious and 
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the Turks negative to such a prospect, Spaak believed that Makarios‟ proposal was a 
significant development and that time was ripe for action.
690
 
On 24-25 September Spaak reported on the results of his talks to the NAC 
and put forward his revised plan for NATO mediation. The Secretary General 
proposed an urgent conference under NATO auspices, involving Britain, Greece and 
Turkey as well as representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Under existing 
circumstances, only a provisional solution could be sought. Any such interim solution 
should not prejudice the definitive settlement and should „mark an important step 
forward in respect of possibilities for self-government of the Cypriot community‟; in 
addition it should also „include all necessary guarantees for protection of the minority‟ 
and „equally assure the bases and installations necessary for Great Britain to be able to 
fulfil its international obligations‟. The plan provided for the setting-up of a 
Government Council with Greek-Cypriot majority responsible for regulating affairs 
and of two communal bodies with responsibility for all community matters. Finally, 
the Governor would be British, would retain responsibility for foreign affairs, 
defence, and internal security, and would preside at the Government Council.
691
 
The NAC considered the Spaak proposals and got the opinions of the three 
countries directly concerned, which accepted in principle the idea of calling a 
conference. However, the British and the Turks did not wish to suspend the 
implementation of the Macmillan Plan, while the Greeks sought to place emphasis on 
the Spaak proposals hoping to achieve adjustments to the British initiative, and above 
all, to postpone the appointment of the Turkish representative in Cyprus which would 
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inevitable create new conditions in the island.
692
 Further discussions in NAC on 29 
September proved inconclusive, while the following day Ankara announced the 
appointment of a Turkish special representative in Cyprus.
693
  
On 30 September the British managed to persuade the Americans and Spaak 
to combine the implementation of the Macmillan Plan with a conference under NATO 
auspices to reach a final settlement.
694
 Therefore, any final solution would be 
considered on the basis of the implementation of the Macmillan Plan, which was 
unacceptable to the Greek side. The latter had to reach a decision. Averoff leaned 
towards rejection of the Spaak initiative (arguing that the British would be able to 
steer the conference to the direction they desired), Greek diplomats were divided, 
while Makarios seemed willing to attend. Then Greece decided to go along with the 
NATO procedure and discussions for a conference resumed, but it was soon proven 
that the conference would only discuss and not decide the final settlement. Moreover, 
none of the small NATO countries wished to participate in the conference, since 
everyone wanted to avoid entanglement in the dispute. At this point, fearing the 
prospect of Greek isolation in the conference, Makarios decided not to attend. Then 
Athens felt that a conference without Cypriot participation was useless, and the Greek 
government finally rejected the idea of a conference on 25 October. This 
development, in conjunction with another public threat voiced by Averoff, some days 
earlier, that Greece might leave NATO, infuriated Spaak and the Americans.
695
 
However, even under those occasions, Greece continued to report to NATO on the 
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Greek-Yugoslav military contacts.
696
 This was indicative of the Greeks‟ desire not to 
leave NATO, but also of the confusion of these days. 
The eventual Greek rejection of Spaak‟s conference proposal isolated Greece 
and the Greek Cypriots. At the same time, the Turks had regained de jure presence on 
the island, and could negotiate directly with the Greeks from a position of relative 
strength; British support was no longer necessary.
697
 Then, in early December Zorlu 
approached Averoff during discussion of the Cyprus issue in the UN General 
Assembly and hinted that a compromise settlement on the basis of guaranteed 
independence (excluding both union and partition) could be reached between Turkey 
and Greece.
698
 The reason for that unexpected initiative was the increasing Turkish 
concern and apprehension about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, and 
particularly the course of events in Iraq after the coup d‟état of June 1958. Indeed, the 
new Iraqi regime soon distanced itself from the West, and Turkey not only lost its last 
regional ally in the Middle East, but was facing the prospect of an additional enemy at 
its eastern frontier. Therefore, Ankara could not push Greece to such an extent as to 
risk a possible Greek withdrawal from NATO, which would mean Turkey‟s complete 
isolation and encirclement. Averoff also thought that the revival of Greek-Turkish 
cooperation was a necessary precondition for both countries, and the West in general, 
to confront the dangers in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; anyway a 
Greek-Turkish negotiation was Greece‟s last chance to stop the implementation of the 
Macmillan Plan. Therefore, a definite rather than interim solution should be reached 
on the Cyprus problem, to prevent the continuation or recurrence of Greek-Turkish 
antagonism in the future. Averoff and Zorlu held further talks in mid-December 
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during the NAC Ministerial Meeting. They still had considerable divergence of views, 
but both agreed that they could not proceed with bilateral negotiations for a solution 
on the basis of guaranteed independence, until they received British assurance that 
London would be ready to accept such a settlement.
699
 During the NAC the two 
statesmen also saw Selwyn Lloyd. At that stage, London could do little to oppose a 
Greek-Turkish agreement. Negotiations continued and Averoff and Zorlu met again in 
mid-January 1959.  
With Athens and Ankara still unable to agree, their relations – and the 
Southern Flank – hung by a thread. Admiral Charles Brown, who had just succeeded 
Admiral Briscoe as CINCSOUTH, visited Athens on 27-28 January 1959 and held 
talks with the Greek leadership. He emphasised that the continuing absence of Greek 
officers from HALFSEE was bringing about considerable attenuation to the south-
eastern front of NATO. The Greek side insisted that the officers would return to Izmir 
only if the Cyprus problem was settled and the Greek-Turkish relations improved.
700
 
Finally, after intense but brief negotiations, a compromise settlement was reached by 
the Greek-Turkish and UK-Greek-Turkish accords in Zurich and London respectively 
in February 1959. Once Greece and Turkey had managed to reconcile their 
differences Britain could not oppose an agreement. These agreements provided for the 
establishment of a Cypriot state based on guaranteed independence and a quite 
complex political system.
701
  
Neither NATO nor the United States participated in any way in the Zurich-
London agreements, although both the Greeks and the Turks had agreed in principle 
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on the eligibility of the Cyprus republic to join NATO. The United States appeared 
extremely reluctant to commit itself on any guarantee or to endorse Cypriot 
membership of NATO.
702
   In any case, the settlement of the Cyprus issue paved the 
way for the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and for the normalisation of relations 
between Greece and its NATO allies. Thus, on 21 February 1959 the Hellenic 
National Defence General Staff informed Norstad, through CINCSOUTH Brown, that 
the Greek military personnel of HALFSEE would return in Izmir to undertake their 
duty. The first echelon would arrive on 25 February.
703
 Therefore, political stability 
and intra-allied military cooperation were restored in the Southern Flank area. 
In another part of the region things were equally confusing. NATO did not 
manage to form (if it sought at all) a coherent strategy in the Middle East, and the 
United States eventually took the lead and unveiled a policy of its own.
704
 As we have 
seen developments in the Middle East affected the Southern Flank, and especially 
Turkey. In 1958-59 NATO continued to assess the implications of Soviet military 
penetration of the Middle East and the possible threat posed to the Southern Flank. It 
was acknowledged that in this area it was difficult to separate the Soviet military and 
economic penetration from political penetration by means of subversion. At any rate, 
until the late 1950s only the United Arab Republic (UAR – comprised of Egypt and 
Syria) and Yemen had accepted large scale economic and military Soviet bloc aid 
(including armour, artillery, piston and jet aircraft, various vessels, plus small arms 
and ammunition). In addition, Soviet bloc military training and indoctrination in 
UAR‟s armed forces was extensive. For the time being, the Soviet military activities 
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in the UAR did not in themselves constitute a threat to NATO. The quantity and 
quality of the equipment delivered, and the overall situation of the Egyptian and 
Syrian armed forces, could not seriously threaten the Southern Flank. Nevertheless, it 
was assessed that a potential threat did exist, since the construction of installations 
(including airfields and port facilities) in the UAR could be utilised by Soviet forces 
in case of general war as advanced bases of operations. Furthermore, the increase of 
Soviet influence and presence in the Middle East could threaten NATO indirectly, by 
hampering easy access of the West to Middle Eastern oil.
705
 
Things seemed to become worse by late 1958. Soon after the revolution in 
Iraq and the subsequent regime change, the new Iraqi leadership not only changed 
course, abandoned the country‟s pro-Western orientation and left the Baghdad Pact, 
but also began to receive Soviet military aid. Moreover, an important trade agreement 
was signed between the USSR and Iraq in October 1958, while a Soviet military 
mission arrived in the country in December. Meanwhile, large number of Egyptian, as 
well as some Syrian officers, had been already sent to various Soviet bloc countries 
for military training. Although Syrian forces could not be considered a serious threat 
to NATO‟s Southern Flank, the spread of Soviet influence to Iraq was a significant 
development, because it seriously weakened the defence position of Turkey.
706
 
Indeed, Ankara did not fail to notice this; soon, it felt so vulnerable at its eastern 
frontier, that it reappraised its Cyprus policy and sought a compromise 
accommodation to restore relations with Athens and revive the Greek-Turkish 
partnership.    
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Despite these intelligence assessments and the military estimates on the 
probable Soviet threat on NATO‟s Southern Flank arising from USSR‟s penetration 
in the Middle East, the alliance avoided taking measures to deal with the Soviet 
challenge in the area. During 1958-9, NAC meetings did not consider the Middle East 
at any length and NATO authorities were never seriously preoccupied with the 
formulation of a coherent strategy for the region, as it was formally out of the NATO 
area. It was not the case that NATO had abandoned the Middle East as a potential 
theatre of conflict in the future. One of the few political reports on conditions and 
developments there judged that the West should never totally exclude the possibility 
of future military intervention in the region. This indeed was what the Soviets and 
certain anti-Western regimes feared; at any point, if the delicate balance was upset, a 
vigorous Western (or Israeli) response might follow „with unforeseeable 
consequences‟. It was therefore argued that this vagueness of Western intentions in 
case of crisis had a stabilising influence.
707
   
While NATO was slow to develop a Middle East strategy, the West was 
forced to respond to a specific Middle Eastern crisis in mid-1958. It was then that the 
second „out-of-area‟ operation of the US Sixth Fleet took place. Camille Chamun, 
President of Lebanon, faced with internal political and religious turmoil, asked for 
active US aid to stabilise his position when the coup d‟état in Iraq exacerbated his 
fears. Washington responded rapidly. Eisenhower authorised Operation Blue Bat on 
15 July, and the marine component of the Sixth Fleet was landed on the country under 
cover of maritime aviation and warships. This was the first invocation and application 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine which since January 1957 provided for US intervention 
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upon request of any Middle Eastern country threatened by international communism. 
Very soon, order was restored. Again, the US Sixth Fleet proved not only a military, 
but also an effective political-diplomatic tool.
708
 But this was a unilateral American 
initiative and response, without any consultation with the NATO allies, and once 
again the alliance failed to undertake a collective action and deal with an „out-of-area‟ 
problem in the eastern shores of Mediterranean.  
By 1957-8 the United States was pursuing its own policy in the Middle East, 
and virtually no room was left for any future NATO political role in the region. 
Indeed, while the State Department continued fully to accept the idea of consultation 
it resisted any suggestion that the Council of NATO or any of its members could have 
anything approaching a veto on policy.
709
 It should be noted that the British wished to 
coordinate their views on a Middle East policy with the Americans, if the next NAC 
meetings deal with the problems of that area. The UK diplomacy viewed that it should 
seize any opportunity – if given – to inject its thinking concerning the Middle East 
into NATO and „enlist‟ allied support for British policy there.710 Quite different was 
the Italian and Greek approach to the problems in the Middle East. During his visit in 
Athens in January 1959, the Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani held identical 
views with Karamanlis and Averoff. Both parties agreed that NATO and the West in 
general should adopt a more „realistic‟ policy towards the Arabs – and Nasser in 
particular – to achieve the containment of Soviet penetration of the area.711 The 
Greeks and the Italians held that Nasser could not be won over by the West, but the 
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latter could secure Egyptian acquiescence if it recognised the legitimacy of Nasser‟s 
drive for independence and his neutrality in the Cold War.  
Another impediment to the formulation of an effective NATO strategy 
beyond the eastern part of the Southern Flank was the persistent inability of the 
alliance to coordinate effectively its policy with the Middle East defence schemes, in 
this case with the Baghdad Pact. During 1958 the Baghdad Pact countries, along with 
the United States, took the initiative to seek the establishment of liaison in military 
matters between the Baghdad Pact and NATO (as well as SEATO). In early 1959 the 
Baghdad Pact Military committee favoured the establishment of effective military 
liaison between the two organisations, particularly a joint committee between 
CINCSOUTH and the Baghdad Pact Military Planning Staff.
712
 Nevertheless, most 
NATO members (and principally Canada, Norway and Denmark) were still very 
hesitant to endorse coordinated planning with the Baghdad Pact, because they did not 
wish to get entangled with other defence organisations. Only Turkey (and probably 
Britain) favoured some sort of coordinated planning, while within the Eisenhower 
administration existed both advocates and non-advocates of coordination. Therefore, 
virtually no decision towards the establishment of a military liaison could be taken by 
NAC.
713
      
By the late 1950s the US Sixth Fleet had undertaken two „out-of-area‟ 
operations of power projection, the latter resembling a traditional mission of „gunboat 
diplomacy‟. Certain NATO and US officials fully acknowledged and appreciated its 
deterrent value not only due to its well-known retaliatory capability and force 
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projection capacity, but also because of the term „Sixth Fleet‟ per se (the „brand 
name‟, if one could use this phrase on this occasion). For example, Norstad, during 
discussions with senior US and NATO naval officers (like CNO Admiral Arleigh 
Burke and SACLANT Admiral Jerault Wright) emphasized the need to maintain the 
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and not to substitute it by another US fleet due to an 
implementation of a policy of „rotation by Fleets‟. Norstad stressed that it was of 
paramount importance that the COMSTRIKFORSOUTH (Commander Striking 
Forces Southern Europe) and his staff should be not only as familiar as possible with 
such vital issues as operational plans and areas and the complex organizational 
structure within the Mediterranean area, but also well aware of existing national 
problems and customs and key national figures throughout that region. Norstad 
concluded that „every John Q. Citizen in the countries bordering the Mediterranean 
knows exactly what is meant when the term “Sixth Fleet” is used and they take solace 
in its presence. In my opinion we cannot afford to lose either the term “Sixth Fleet” 
nor can we afford the long period of education which might be required to explain any 
appreciable change in the present order of things‟.714 Eventually, the Sixth Fleet was 
tied to that area and remained in the Mediterranean during the following decades. 
Apart from its power projection role, its primary mission remained the support of the 
Southern Flank and of SACEUR forces in general, as a naval nuclear counter-
offensive striking force.
715
 As NATO manoeuvres in the Mediterranean demonstrated, 
in this theatre the alliance relied heavily on Sixth Fleet carriers for support.
716
 
While the situation in the Middle East remained largely unfavourable for the 
West, things appeared more promising at the Balkan theatre. Greece and Yugoslavia 
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continued to cooperate closely in the political-diplomatic and military levels during 
1958. Both countries, though for different reasons, felt more or less isolated in a 
period of great international tension, and considered each other the only friend in the 
region.
717
 Even so, during the Yugoslav-Greek-UAR meeting in Brioni on 8-9 July 
1958, Greece turned down Nasser‟s suggestion for the formulation of a tripartite 
neutralist axis, and Karamanlis himself made plain that Greece would remain a 
„truthful NATO member‟. Significantly, the Yugoslavs urged the Greeks to remain in 
NATO as Greece‟s value to Yugoslavia lay primarily to the provision of an indirect 
link with the Western defence system.
718
 Indeed, Karamanlis and Averoff were not 
eager to bluff by threatening to withdraw from NATO, although Greek participation 
in the Brioni meeting could be interpreted as a forewarning signal to the NATO allies. 
In 1959 the Greek-Yugoslav entente reached its peak. On 2-6 March, in the 
aftermath of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement which transformed once more the 
regional balance, Tito met the Greek leadership in Rhodes. Apparently, the Yugoslav 
leader wished to find out if Greek policy of cooperation with Yugoslavia would 
change; he did not seem enthusiastic about the Cyprus settlement, fearing that Greece 
might lean towards Turkey in foreign policy affairs. Tito also worried that their 
Greeks would alter their approach towards the Arab world, where Athens and 
Belgrade held identical views at least since 1955-6. For their part, Karamanlis and 
Averoff sounded Tito out on a possible revival of the tripartite Balkan Pacts, which 
was also Turkey‟s strong desire. However, Tito refused: at this stage he attached great 
importance to his neutral position and refused to reactivate the military clauses of the 
Balkan Pacts. But since he was also unwilling to renounce the Balkan Pacts, it was 
                                                          
717
 Hatzivassiliou, Greece, pp.110-11, 113. 
718
 KKA, 3, pp.162, 227. 
331 
 
 
 
agreed that these „should lie dormant for the time being‟.719 Moreover, the Yugoslavs 
were partly influenced in this decision by their suspicions of Turkey which seemed to 
support Albanian irredentism in Kosovo.
720
  
Tito noted that bilateral „excellent‟ relations „should be fostered even 
further‟, and, particularly, „the Staff visits and contacts should continue‟. The Greek 
leadership assured Tito that the Greek-Yugoslav entente was valid, but explained that 
the situation had become more complicated regarding the continuation of bilateral 
military contacts; the Turks were quite nervous because they were excluded from 
regional cooperation and the Greeks appeared sensitive to this, wishing to preserve 
the recent Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Indeed, Tito recognised the substance of 
Greek reserve, agreed that Greece should keep Turkey informed on any future Greek-
Yugoslav military contacts and talks, and declared his willingness to seek the 
improvement of Yugoslav-Turkish relations.
721
 In any case, the Tito-Karamanlis 
meeting confirmed the close cooperation of the two countries, which was 
consummated on 18 June when Foreign Ministers Averoff and Popovic signed in 
Athens eleven technical agreements and one protocol dealing with various issues of 
mutual interest and concern.
722
 
In essence, in 1959 Athens found itself in a central position between 
Belgrade and Ankara and their conflicting views, as the Turks wanted the full revival 
of the Balkan Pact, and the Yugoslavs were unwilling either to provoke the Soviets or 
jeopardise their position in the emerging non-aligned movement; but they were 
equally unwilling to loosen the Greek-Yugoslav de facto special partnership. Thus 
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Greece tried to keep a delicate balance between the two parties, „acquiring as many 
benefits‟ as it could. The military contacts with Yugoslavia (though not at General 
Staff level, in order to minimise Turkish anxiety) continued, and the Greek leadership 
decided to keep the Turks informed and explained to them that the Greek-Yugoslav 
partnership might soon evolve in a tripartite one to include Turkey as well.
723
 Greece 
kept the other NATO allies informed about the content of the Tito-Karamanlis talks, 
while general Dovas continued to inform CINCSOUTH of the military contacts 
between Greece and Yugoslavia.
724
 
In May 1959 Karamanlis and Averoff paid an official visit in Turkey and 
held talks with President Çelâl Bayar, Menderes and Zorlu. Both parties sought to 
revive the Greek-Turkish friendship and partnership. According to the Greeks, the 
Greek-Turkish cooperation appeared to be a „historical necessity‟: both countries 
formed „a small islet surrounded by a vast Slav-communist sea‟. The Greek and 
Turkish leadership discussed various issues, including their position within NATO, 
the future of the tripartite Balkan cooperation and the situation in the Middle East. 
Although they expressed identical views regarding the future of NATO and the need 
for deeper Atlantic cohesion and solidarity, and agreed to keep the Balkan Pacts 
dormant, they interpreted the situation in the Middle East quite differently. At any 
rate, the Karamanlis-Averoff visit in Turkey signalled the resurgence of Greek-
Turkish cooperation.
725
 This caused considerable nervousness to the USSR, which 
decided to exert diplomatic pressure on Greece, on the grounds that the latter was 
ready to accept US IRBMs on its territory. Such development would be considered by 
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Moscow as „a hostile act against the USSR and the preservation of peace‟, and would 
cause significant damage to Greek-Soviet relations. Khrushchev reiterated the implicit 
Soviet threats later in May and in June against both Greece and Italy, which 
responded accordingly and dismissed Soviet accusations.
726
 
 
 
ii) M.C.70 and the Southern Flank countries: military considerations and economic 
reality. 
NATO‟s new strategic posture, outlined in M.C.70 early in 1958, had particular 
implications for the countries of the Southern Flank. The transition to nuclearization 
brought with it a general reduction a general reduction of conventional forces and for 
the three states of the Eastern Mediterranean this meant a significant cutback of land 
forces (from a total of 47 divisions in 1958 to 32 by 1963).
727
 While Italy, Greece and 
Turkey could not reverse this trend, they nevertheless sought to acquire additional 
forces. Greece and Turkey referred to their proven ability to raise significant forces 
(in sharp contrast with most NATO members). This was an undeniable achievement 
but it nevertheless remained true that in most cases NATO qualitative standards had 
not been met. As such, the military integrity of the Southern Flank in the new era of 
M.C.70 remained uncertain.  
Each of the three Southern Flank states continued to have flaws in their 
defence establishments, although considerable progress had been made on this field. 
A detailed account of each country‟s military situation – a topic which has not been 
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covered adequately by historiography – follows. As early as December 1958 Italy had 
informed the NATO authorities that it would be unable to allocate the necessary 
resources to cover fully its needs for the subsequent period. The main problem of the 
Italian armed forces was the existing manpower and equipment deficiencies in the 
majority of the units, particular in the army, as well as the shortage of operational 
reserves and ammunition in all three services. In particular, progress in implementing 
the Italian Army reorganisation programme had been slow, while the combat 
effectiveness of the land forces was adversely affected by the low manning level of 
M-day units and inadequate training of the reserves. In addition, there was a shortage 
of many TO&E equipment items (like non-combat vehicles).
728
 Little, if any, progress 
had been made until the end of 1959, although Italy had recognised that the 
qualitative improvement of its armed forces (especially its land forces) was of 
paramount importance, even at the expense, if necessary, of their numerical strength. 
A very critical shortfall in specialists and regular cadres existed, and this could only 
be alleviated by enlisting more regulars and long service personnel and improving the 
specialist training programmes. Furthermore, although an industrialised country, Italy 
was relying almost entirely on external aid to implement the „badly needed‟ 
modernisation programme of its land forces (conventional weapons and other 
material). Last but not least, NATO assessed that there were inadequate stocks of war 
reserves and insufficient logistics to support the Italian Army in sustained military 
operations. Therefore, it was estimated that the Italian Army had a moderate combat 
effectiveness.
729
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The situation appeared better in the Italian Navy which, despite shortfalls in 
main naval units, was making considerable progress towards meeting the qualitative 
standards. By the end of the 1950s, NATO judged that Italy had a high combat 
potential at sea. Fleet units had reached a satisfactory level of training, while a 
considerable construction programme of vessels, carried out mainly in Italy, was 
being implemented. Indeed, the navy was the only service which could benefit from 
the national armaments-production capacity. Of course, problems still existed, like 
deficiencies in electronic counter measures (ECM) and electronic equipment as well 
as in other material and supplies. Perhaps the most critical flaw was in ASW 
operations (particularly due to shortfalls in patrol craft, medium-range maritime patrol 
aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters). 
As regards the Italian Air Force, despite some rather temporary progress, its 
combat readiness (both in aircrews and aircraft) fell well below NATO standards. 
During the first half of 1959 the average combat ready rate was only 51 per cent, 
seriously affecting the effectiveness of the service. Shortages of regulars and 
specialists still existed but those needs were gradually covered. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of the C&R system should be further improved to meet the desired 
standards and achieve a 24-hour capability. Contrary to the Italian Navy, the Air 
Force was counting heavily on external aid for its aircraft and missiles.  On the plus 
side, by late 1959 the service was making considerable progress towards achieving an 
operational status for the IRBM units, had obtained the facility to train its aircrews in 
the delivery of nuclear weapons and had incorporated three battalions of SAM. 
Overall, it was judged that the Italian Air Force had a moderate ability to carry out its 
336 
 
 
 
mission.
730
 For their part, the Italians indicated to US officials that the Italian Air 
Force should be given modern equipment (particularly supersonic aircraft and radar 
equipment), otherwise it would be unable to accomplish its mission. The US 
authorities recognised those requirements, directing MAP towards achieving a degree 
of modernisation.
731
  
The Italian defence effort cannot be assessed without taking into account 
financial and economic considerations. The Italians were devoting additional 
resources in the defence budget to increase the potential of their forces, while 
additional sources would be made available through structural reforms. Emphasis 
would be given to the army, and then to the air force, but in any case the Italian 
authorities argued that even those increased defence appropriations would not suffice 
to raise the Italian forces to the required level, both in the personnel and the 
equipment field. They viewed that their national effort in the financial field had 
„reached the limit‟ and that, therefore, the fulfilment of their plans depended on a 
substantial increase of external aid over the coming years. In any case, it was 
acknowledged that accumulated shortages of equipment (mainly, though not 
exclusively, in the army) called for an enormous effort, and it seemed unlikely that all 
deficiencies of equipment and shortfalls in personnel could be made good in the near 
future. In essence, despite the rapid progress of the Italian economy, Rome remained 
unwilling to undertake a major defence effort to correct the serious flaws of its 
military establishment. Indeed, the share of the GNP devoted to defence actually 
dropped during this period, and despite the annual increase in the military budget, the 
downward trend would obviously continue in the future due to the considerable rise of 
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the Italian national product. Furthermore, the defence effort placed very little strain on 
the country‟s industry, which had ample capacity, „at present lying idle‟, for the 
production of military equipment. The NATO specialists noted that the proportion of 
Italian resources devoted to the procurement of equipment was among the lowest of 
NATO members with a large armaments-production capacity‟.732  
As we shall see, Greece and Turkey were a different case. Greece initially 
declared its intention to maintain and build up additional land and naval forces which 
were envisaged as necessary for the country‟s defence (particularly in implementing a 
forward defence and protecting sea transport and communication). Of course, another 
ulterior motive, until 1959, was the need to retain a relative balance with the Turkish 
forces (and also keep those additional forces under national command).
733
 NATO 
experts believed that such additional goals would probably exceed Greek capabilities; 
the level of defence spending was so high that it had already approached the limit of 
what Greece could afford, and the budgetary deficit was only being met due to the 
provision of US economic aid. Moreover, any effort to maintain additional forces 
might endanger the quality of NATO-assigned forces. In any case, the Greeks 
reassured the alliance that priority would be given to the attainment of M.C.70 
requirements which would demand a tremendous effort.
734
 
Indeed, by the late 1950s, despite the great effort made and the considerable 
progress achieved, the Greek military establishment still faced significant 
deficiencies. Generally, there was a significant shortfall in regulars (particularly 
specialists and technicians), and thus the Greek government had to take corrective 
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action soonest: more long-service men should be enlisted, since reliance upon 
conscripts could not meet successfully the army‟s expanding needs as more complex 
equipment was being introduced. Moreover, all services were faced with growing 
obsolescence of equipment and shortages in certain categories of supplies, like POL. 
Therefore, despite the priority given to them, the combat readiness and effectiveness 
of NATO forces was inadequate, and greater emphasis should be placed on meeting 
the qualitative standards. The situation was critical in the army, where much of the 
equipment was obsolete (or even lacking) and needed replacement. Modern hardware 
could only come from external aid, since the national defence production facilities 
were confined virtually to ammunition plants. Shortages in tanks and other vehicles 
led the NATO specialists to give priority on equipping the XX armoured division over 
the creation of organic tank battalions within the infantry divisions. Shortages and 
obsolescence of communications and electronics equipment hampered the 
effectiveness of the army‟s command, control and communication system, while 
logistics remained insufficient. Last but not least, low manning levels impeded the 
effectiveness of M-day and reserve units. Overall, the Greek Army was considered to 
have a moderate combat potential.
735
 
The Greek Navy‟s condition seemed to be quite better. Despite persisting 
problems (as the low proportion of regulars – particularly engineers and electronics 
specialists – aboard ships) the situation in personnel had improved, while considerable 
progress had been made in modernising obsolescent vessels; the modernisation 
programme would last until 1963. For the time being, the bulk of naval forces had a 
high combat potential. However, a great effort should be contemplated to solve the 
obsolescent problem, because this would soon compromise seriously the navy‟s 
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effectiveness. Despite the existence of a few shipyards in Greece, these could only 
build small vessels, so the Greek Navy was completely dependent on external aid to 
replace its obsolete main units. Therefore, the NATO authorities did not support an 
increase of the naval forces beyond M.C.70 requirements. As for the Greek Air Force, 
most essential requirements had been met by MDAP, although delays in deliveries did 
not enable the timely formation of all-weather fighter and reconnaissance squadrons; 
the same applied for the one Nike SAM unit which would be activated in, or after, 
1960, due to delays in the delivery of equipment.  The existing air force units had a 
very high aircraft combat readiness, but more effort should be placed on improving 
the aircrew combat ready rate; the latter was affected after a reduction in the annual 
flying hours per pilot took place, due to POL limitations. Finally, as in the other 
services, there was a shortage of regulars, specialists, and other long-service 
personnel. Those flaws led the NATO officials to estimate that the Greek Air Force 
had a moderate combat potential, but the prospect was generally positive.
736
  
In the late 1950s, Greece continued to increase steadily its defence effort, 
devoting almost 6 per cent of its GDP in 1958, or a third of its annual budget. It was 
therefore acknowledged that this proportion compared „favourably with that of most 
members of the Alliance‟. By 1959, that effort was supported, in approximately equal 
measure, by national resources and by external aid. National funds were allocated 
mainly to maintenance and operating expenditures, without being able to cover them 
fully; so, the rest was covered by Mutual Aid, which also financed almost the whole 
of new material and equipment needed for the Greek rearmament. In the near future, 
the Greek authorities intended to increase national defence expenditures in relation to 
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the growth of the GNP. At any rate, the Greeks had always been eager to ensure that 
they were making full use of any material received under Mutual Aid by adjusting 
accordingly their own financial contribution (it can be argued that the obvious reason 
was Greek willingness to demonstrate the country‟s ability to absorb fully, and make 
good use of, US military assistance in order to justify demands for additional aid). In 
fact, it was estimated that implementation of the NATO military recommendations to 
Greece to meet the M.C.70 goals and standards would „inevitably involve a 
considerable increase in national expenditures‟; a significant increase in personnel 
would take place, particularly in the army, while an extensive modernisation and 
equipment programme was necessary in all three services. However, the shortcomings 
were so serious and so many, that they could be dealt with only if a considerable 
increase in the national financial effort, and, more importantly, if a significant 
increase in external aid, took place. But the NATO authorities accurately reckoned 
that „the estimated increase (of external aid) needed is such, that it is doubtful whether 
it could be considered a practical possibility‟. Therefore, it was probably chimerical to 
expect that Greece would be able to meet all NATO requirements.
737
 It can be also 
argued that even the attainment of all M.C.70 goals seemed irrelevant, since Greek 
territory would remain indefensible in case of general war or a combined Soviet-
Bulgarian local campaign towards the Aegean. So, evidently Greece‟s defence 
problem was a complex one and could not be solved by military means alone. The 
same applied to the Turkish case, and, to some extent, to Italy.  
The Turkish financial effort to meet (or even exceed) its defence 
commitments remained significant. Although defence expenditures as a percentage of 
the GNP had dropped somewhat (to 4.8 per cent), even this was regarded as high 
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given the country‟s need for economic development and the low standard of living. 
During this period, Turkey‟s major problems were hyperinflation and a similarly high 
foreign trade deficit, caused by the pursuit of the ambitious development programme 
of the Menderes government, which simply outstripped the ability of the national 
economy to support it.
738
 In 1958 the Turkish economic situation deteriorated rapidly 
and almost got out of control. Faced with bankruptcy, Ankara had no option but to 
agree in late July on a stabilisation programme imposed by a consortium comprised 
by the United States, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, the IMF and the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Turkey had to carry out 
specific economic reforms in return for the rescheduling of its national debts and the 
provision of an aid package of $359 million by the consortium.
739
 Indeed, during that 
period US policy makers considered that the primary challenge in regard to Turkey 
was to persuade the Turkish officials to carry out the necessary stabilisation 
programme and economic reforms. A stable economy (and political system) would 
produce a national budget large enough to support increasing defence expenditure 
(not least for NATO purposes) in the future.
740
 
In spite of those difficulties, Turkey planned to maintain more forces than the 
NATO-approved ones. Developments in 1958 had exacerbated Turkish fears, while 
after the Iraqi revolution Ankara had lost its last regional ally and was surrounded by 
hostile, or potentially hostile, countries. However, since Turkish defence spending had 
virtually reached the limit of the country‟s capacity, the cost of meeting the NATO-
approved force levels would absorb, and probably exceed, any funds available for 
defence. Therefore, any effort to raise and equip supplementary forces would surely 
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overstretch the Turkish economy and affect the qualitative standards of the NATO 
assigned forces. Although the Turks agreed to give priority to M.C.70 units, they 
argued that the supplementary forces should be included in M.C.70 goals.
741
 In 
essence, since the Turkish Armed Forces relied exclusively on foreign aid for 
equipment, Ankara sought to achieve a considerable increase in external (that is, 
mainly US) assistance.   
Indeed, Turkey could hardly meet even the operating costs of its current 
military establishment (allocating there 95 per cent of its defence expenditure). The 
slight quantitative reduction in Turkish contribution to NATO after the 
implementation of M.C.70 did not offset the prospective rise of operating costs in 
subsequent years caused by incorporation of modern hardware and the application of 
higher standards of readiness and training. Consequently, Turkey‟s ability to cover the 
equipment costs remained very limited, and in any case its industrial capacity sufficed 
only for the production of small arms and some types of ammunition. Therefore, the 
NATO specialists acknowledged that an increase in Mutual Aid deliveries would be 
inevitable, if the quantitative and especially the qualitative requirements were to be 
met. It should be also stressed that the Turkish defence budget was financing projects 
which served both civilian and military interests (particularly construction works like 
roads, bridges and port facilities) and were defined as military expenditures by 
Turkish rather than NATO standards.
742
 In any case, JAMMAT emphasised in 
September 1958 that under existing circumstances, a real increase in Turkish military 
capacity could best be achieved by a substantial enhancement of training levels, rather 
than by stepped up deliveries of military hardware (which could not be absorbed and 
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utilised effectively).
743
 Finally, in 1959 the Turks made an important reduction in the 
army numerical strength in order to save some money. 
 By late 1959 the alliance assessed that although the stabilisation programme 
had begun to bear some fruit, serious efforts would still have to be made to strengthen 
Turkey‟s financial stability and achieve a balanced economic development. It was 
therefore concluded that „given the rapid population growth (rising at a rate of 3 per 
cent per annum) and the difficulties still facing Turkey in the development of her 
economy, it would not seem reasonable, at least in the short term, to urge a greater 
effort than this until the results of the present measures of redressment (sic) are 
consolidated‟. The conclusion was that „if the NATO military authorities‟ 
requirements for modernisation and stock levels are to be met on time, there is no 
escaping the conclusion that additional aid must be made available on an 
unprecedented level‟.744 But under existing circumstances, such an increase in 
economic and military assistance was not forthcoming. 
In the late 1950s the Turkish Armed Forces were facing various problems. 
The most crucial were the inadequate C&R, EW, and command communications 
systems, the shortage of POL for all three services and of TO&E equipment and 
ammunition and spare parts in the army and air force. Equipment shortages in all 
services remained one of the major difficulties. The Turkish Army‟s effectiveness was 
affected by shortage of regulars (particularly specialists) shortfalls in modern 
equipment (mainly combat vehicles, artillery and small arms), the low manning level 
of existing material and inadequate logistics, while the reserves lacked training. 
Overall, it was considered that the land forces had a moderate capacity, but it was 
                                                          
743
 FRUS, 1958-60, X, p.762. 
744
 NATO/C-M(59)94, Part II, Report on the 1959 Annual Review – Turkey, 3-December-1959. 
344 
 
 
 
hoped that measures planned for the immediate future would soon increase the army‟s 
combat effectiveness. As regards the naval forces, the NATO officials noted that 
existing units, having reached a satisfactory level of training, had a high combat 
potential. However, the Turkish Navy as a whole had a moderate capability to carry 
out its mission, due to shortage of ships, shortfall in fuel stocks, and deficiencies in 
overall communications-electronics systems. Last but not least, a growing proportion 
of the existing ships was obsolescent and would be taken out of service in 1961, but 
no comprehensive programme existed for their timely replacement sometime in the 
early 1960s. Finally, the Turkish Air Force was in the process of modernisation, and a 
number of F-100 fighter bombers had been received to replace F-84Gs in their strike 
role. In addition, some progress was being made in attaining a nuclear strike 
capability. According to NATO and national planning, from 1960 onwards Nike SAM 
units would be established in the Bosporus, enhancing the A/A defence of Istanbul 
and the Straits. Due to delays in the delivery of F-86D aircraft, Turkey had not been 
able to start the build-up of all-weather fighter forces in 1959. Other deficiencies 
included the inadequate C&R system (partly due to ineffective communications) and 
the unsatisfactory combat ready rate of the aircrews. Therefore, despite the progress 
already made and hopes for a rise in qualitative standards in the near future, it was 
estimated that the air forces had a moderate combat potential.
745
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iii) Nuclear weapons in the Southern Flank: the IRBM and Honest John cases  
On 4 October 1957 the USSR successfully launched Sputnik 1, the first artificial 
satellite, into orbit. This demonstrated that the Soviets had developed an ICBM 
capacity, and constituted a remarkable technological as well as psychological success 
for the Soviet bloc in the course of the Cold War. The Soviet accomplishment had 
serious short-term repercussions, because it came as a shock to the West and tended to 
undermine the entire NATO defence posture. Virtually for the first time, the Soviets 
acquired the capability to threaten directly the US territory with a full-scale strategic 
nuclear strike. Therefore, the validity of US nuclear deterrence, upon which the whole 
NATO security architecture was based (especially under the „New Look strategy), 
was seriously questioned. Consequently, the formation of a European nuclear 
deterrent force or at least the granting of a strong say in nuclear decision-making to 
the European allies, leading to the nuclearization of NATO, seemed imperative for 
security, political and psychological reasons.
746
 In the late 1950s, the initial response 
was the deployment of US IRBMs (Inter-mediate Range Ballistic Missiles) in 
European territory. 
Indeed, Washington sought to reassure as quickly as possible the European 
allies about the US strategic deterrent, since the first US ICBM (the Atlas) would not 
become operational before mid-1959, while the first Polaris SLBM submarines were 
expected to be operational in late 1960. In late 1957, four squadrons of Jupiter IRBMs 
were ready for deployment; hence Eisenhower and Dulles made the offer to deploy 
these missiles during the NATO Heads of Government meeting in Paris on 16-19 
December 1957. Although NATO members unanimously agreed in principle to accept 
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the offer, it was very soon clear that reaching agreements with potential host countries 
was a difficult and rather thorny issue, partly due to formidable Soviet reaction.
747
 As 
we shall see, not all Southern Flank states felt able to become NATO nuclear 
outposts. 
After the decision was taken to deploy US IRBMs in European territory, 
SACEUR Norstad was designated with the task to search for host countries. This 
proved a complex political procedure. Initially the US and NATO military authorities 
were mostly concerned with target coverage, so naturally the obvious position was on 
NATO‟s flanks, in close proximity to Warsaw Pact and Soviet targets. Soon, 
however, political considerations prevailed over the purely military ones. Therefore, 
France and Italy, which after Britain were the most important allies, were placed at 
the top of the list as potential host countries, while the frontline states but less 
influential allies, like Greece and Turkey, followed.
748
  
In late 1957 Italy joined France and FRG into an initiative for research and 
production of „the most advanced weapons‟ (apparently, this wording implied the 
production of nuclear warheads). The Italian entanglement to this short-lived project 
was quite reluctant and limited, and soon after its failure Rome once again 
demonstrated the strong Italian preference for an Atlantic security framework. 
Seeking close bilateral cooperation with the United States and the aggrandisement of 
Italy‟s status within NATO through nuclear-sharing, the Italian government seriously 
considered accepting the deployment of US Jupiter missiles, when approached by 
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Norstad in February 1958.
749
 Domestically, the Centre-Right government was under 
pressure by the Left, which strongly opposed the deployment of the IRBMs, while the 
Italian public appeared divided on the issue. Therefore, in the spring of 1958 the 
Italian policy makers informed the Americans that they did not wish to accept the 
missiles if they were the only Europeans allies doing so. Moreover, in late May Prime 
Minister Fanfani informed Eisenhower that he was interested on the deployment of 
the missiles in Italy, but insisted that any discussions should take place under 
maximum secrecy; the whole issue should not become a political one, but should 
remain a purely military matter. However, the Italians soon raised more conditions, 
mainly the funding of the IRBM deployment exclusively by the Americans and the 
provision of additional US aid for the Italian armed forces.
750
 
After considerable delay and lengthy negotiations, a US-Italian agreement 
was signed on 26 March 1959. This provided for the deployment of two squadrons of 
Jupiter (each comprised of 15 missiles) in South-eastern Italy. The missiles were 
operated under a dual-key system: the Italian Air Force manned the missiles 
themselves, while US personnel controlled the nuclear warheads. The Jupiters were at 
SACEUR‟s disposal to implement NATO strategy both in times of peace and war, but 
the decision to launch them could be taken by him, only in agreement with the US and 
Italian authorities. The missiles became operational in late 1960 and, despite their 
questionable military value – they were becoming rapidly obsolescent and presented a 
vulnerable target – their deployment served significant political aims.751 Italy acquired 
some kind of voice in NATO nuclear decision-making, while the deployment of the 
IRBMs marked the apogee of close bilateral US-Italian partnership. Last but not least, 
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and despite the protracted negotiations between American and Italian officials, Italy 
emerged as a reliable ally faithful to NATO; an ally able to overcome domestic 
pressure from the Left and determined not to yield under Soviet (or Yugoslav) threats 
and protests.  
Generally, the Italian political and military leadership professed a strong 
interest in nuclear sharing. This included nuclear propulsion. By autumn 1959 the 
Italian government officially asked for US assistance to build a nuclear-powered 
submarine (this would not be a ballistic submarine, like the Polaris type, but would 
undertake „conventional‟ operations). When completed, the nuclear submarine would 
be assigned to NATO for use either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. The Italians 
did not want any US financial assistance, claiming that they would appropriate 
additional funds to construct the nuclear submarine. They also appeared determined to 
proceed with the programme even if US technical assistance was not forthcoming, 
because they considered Italian entry into nuclear propulsion field as „most important 
from moral and psychological viewpoint in providing Italian Armed Forces with most 
modern up-to-date equipment‟. They further pointed out that the implementation of 
this programme should not be deferred until all shortfalls in M.C.70 requirements 
were fulfilled, since in that case the programme would „never begin‟.752 The US 
Defense Department asked for Norstad‟s view, and the SACEUR informed that he did 
not justify the construction of an Italian nuclear submarine as a military requirement 
for his command. Italian submarine missions could be accomplished satisfactorily 
with conventional vessels, while the pursuance of the project for a nuclear submarine 
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would inevitably impede attainment of M.C.70 force goals, whose fulfilment should 
constitute the first priority.
753
 
As regards Greece‟s attitude, the situation was a complicated one. Indeed, in 
1958-9 one of the main foreign and domestic Greek policy issues was the debate over 
the installation of nuclear weapons, and particularly IRBMs, in Greece. The evasive 
attitude of the Greek Government soon turned into a heated controversy in the internal 
scene, due to the rise of the Left after the May 1958 elections and the increasing anti-
Western sentiments prevailing in Greek public opinion due to the Cyprus crisis. 
Indeed, the establishment of IRBMs in Greece became an issue of domestic political 
character, rather than a military one, and was linked with other unrelated matters, such 
as NATO attitude towards the Cyprus problem and the extent of US influence in 
Greece.
754
  
On 2 January 1959 Norstad informed Melas and Sarper of his readiness to 
begin formal discussions with Greece and Turkey on possible IRBM deployments. 
SACEUR thought that both allies should be offered the missiles for strategic as well 
as political reasons, since both were frontline states but also regional rivals.
755
 
However, the Greek response was cool, and General Dovas informed Norstad that the 
Greek government was „not opposed in principle‟ to the installation of Thor missiles 
in Greece (according to US plans, Greece would receive Thor IRBMs); the matter 
should be discussed during SACEUR‟s next visit to Greece (although no such trip had 
been planned for the foreseeable future).
756
 Norstad and the US policy makers 
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considered that if the Greeks were unwilling to accept the IRBMs, an additional 
squadron of those missiles should be deployed to Turkey. Norstad had always stressed 
that the Greeks should participate only if they felt that „making this contribution to the 
NATO defence would be helpful to their internal and external interests‟.757 When in 
late January 1959 the newly appointed CINCSOUTH, Admiral Brown, visited 
Athens, the Greek policy makers reiterated their view that the issue of the deployment 
of IRBMs and other nuclear weapons on European territory was primarily a political 
matter: first and foremost, a decision should be taken in NATO that all member states 
should accept in principle the deployment of such weapons on their territory. Only 
then should NATO military authorities decide where those weapons should be 
eventually deployed.
758
 Aware of increasing neutralist sentiments in the Greek public, 
neither Norstad nor the State Department (or the Pentagon) pressed the Karamanlis 
government to accept the IRBMs. 
As State and Defense Department officials struggled to find a solution to the 
lack of adequate funds in order to deploy the IRBMs (the US policy makers had failed 
to estimate accurately the funding needs, and now they anticipated a shortage of MSP 
funds), and as Soviet-bloc pressure peaked once more during late spring and summer 
1959, the Karamanlis government sought to put off talks with Norstad and the 
Americans indefinitely. Then, in June 1959, in the face of Greek deferment, 
Eisenhower himself began to question the wisdom and utility of placing IRBMs in 
Greece. Those missiles were already obsolescent, while their deployment in Greece 
would probably provoke the Soviets without adding much deterrent effect. The 
President sent a memorandum to McElroy on 3 June posing several questions on the 
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virtue of deployment in Greece, a country „both small and exposed‟. McElroy, after 
consultation with the JCS, responded that the total economic cost for that deployment 
would not be significant, that Greece offered promising target coverage, and that 
alternative NATO hosts for that IRBM squadron did not exist – for example, its 
deployment in Turkey was not considered a sound alternative for political as well as 
logistical reasons.
759
 
High-ranking State and Defense Department officials (including McElroy 
and Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon) stressed that it was important not to 
appear reversing course in the face of Soviet threats. Despite this, Eisenhower decided 
that the Greeks should be allowed to decide at a time of their own choosing whether 
to accept the missiles or not. By August 1959, however, the State and Defense 
Departments decided that a final decision should be taken: Greece should either 
accept the squadron in the near future, or this should be deployed elsewhere.
760
 
Norstad took the initiative to break the stalemate and on 31 August informed Michael 
Melas (who strongly advocated the deployment of IRBM‟s in Greece) that the Greeks 
should decide „one way or another within next fortnight‟, or else he would 
recommend that the squadron in question be allocated elsewhere.
761
  
On 3 September Norstad met Averoff in Paris to discuss the issue. Averoff 
explained that his government favoured the acceptance of the IRBMs in principle, but 
wished to postpone a final decision „until such time as internal political repercussions 
could be safely absorbed‟. He noted that the right moment had not been found during 
the previous twenty months, and claimed that at least until the official launch of 
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independent Cyprus in February 1960, Karamanlis felt he could not take additional 
political risks by provoking the Greek public opinion. Thus the Greek government 
appeared to prefer, if at all possible, to continue to stall for indefinite time, but 
Norstad insisted on the need for a prompt decision.
762
 Having no alternative, on 14 
September the Greeks regretfully informed Norstad that they were unable to accept 
the missiles „within the time limits set‟.763 Then, Norstad proposed that the 
construction of the Thor squadron destined for deployment in Greece was cancelled, 
and Eisenhower authorised the decision on 21 October 1959.
764
 
The Greek government agreed to receive two units of Honest John tactical 
nuclear rockets, though. An initial settlement was signed on 6 May 1959 which 
granted launching systems (but not nuclear warheads, yet) to Greece. This was 
followed by the signature of three additional secret agreements (one on 30 December 
1959 and two further on 17 June 1960) for the establishment of nuclear depots in 
Greece, the so called Special Ammunition Storage Sites whose construction would be 
funded by the NATO Infrastructure Fund.
765
 We should bear in mind that, contrary to 
the IRBMs, the tactical nuclear missiles would be used to thwart a Bulgarian (or 
Soviet-Bulgarian) attack, even in the event of a localised war, and not against the 
USSR itself in a general war context (which would certainly bring about the 
destruction of Greece by Soviet nuclear reprisals). In any case, the Greek Armed 
Forces did not acquire a tactical nuclear capability before the early 1960s. 
Turkey, however, was enthusiastic for the deployment of IRBMs on their 
territory. The Turkish ruling elite (including the governing Democratic Party, the 
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military, but also the opposition, mainly the Republican People‟s Party) all accepted 
gladly the deployment of US nuclear missiles. This was considered as a means to 
demonstrate Turkish firm commitment to NATO, secure the continuation of US 
economic and military aid, increase Turkey‟s leverage within NATO and in the 
Middle East, and acquire an effective deterrent to the, perceived as increasing, Soviet 
threat. Therefore, in the absence of any socialist or communist party, a general 
consensus on the desirability of accepting the missiles emerged in Turkey.
766
 As early 
as January 1958 the US policy makers estimated that the Turks would be probably 
eager to accept the IRBMs and provide the sites in order to strengthen „their hands 
with the US in bargaining for aid‟.767 
At the NAC meeting in December 1958 Norstad informed the Turks that they 
would get the missiles and very soon indicated that he was ready to initiate talks with 
them. However, the Defense Department instructed SACEUR to back off for the time 
being, because the Americans had to deal with funding difficulties of the IRBMs‟ 
deployment and an ensuing disagreement between the State and Defense Departments 
(the latter insisted for a quick implementation of the missiles‟ deployment).768 
Another issue was whether the IRBM‟s should be deployed in a remote area, or near a 
major Turkish city (like Izmir or Adana), close to significant military and 
transportation facilities, where large numbers of US personnel were already 
stationed.
769
 This delay caused significant concern and nervousness to Ankara, and 
Sarper was continually pressed Norstad to resume talks as soon as possible. The 
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Turkish policy makers feared that the delay was primarily caused by US willingness 
to avoid provoking the Soviets, but Norstad reassured them.
770
 
Irrespective of the funding issue, some State Department officials continued 
to doubt if IRBMs deployment in Turkey (and Greece) was politically sensible.
771
 As 
regards Turkey, there was a perception that it constituted an aggressive nation, due to 
its demonstrated militancy during the crises over Cyprus, Syria and Iraq.
772
 Moreover, 
concern was expressed about the prospect of an increase in the number of US 
personnel in Turkey since recently there had been „a rash of incidents‟ in Turkey 
involving US personnel (particularly in Izmir, where sailors of the Sixth Fleet were 
causing numerous incidents). Further exacerbation of the community relations 
problem between the Turkish public and the Americans should be avoided.
773
 Finally, 
despite those reservations, the Departments of State and Defense agreed in late April 
to authorise Norstad to resume negotiations with the Turks (and the Greeks) for the 
deployment of IRBMs. 
Then the Turkish leadership indicated to Norstad that they wished to get the 
Jupiters, and in early May SACEUR requested that Washington proceed with the 
necessary bilateral negotiations. Two main issues emerged: the precise estimate of the 
construction cost and the location of the deployment, on the one hand, and the method 
of financing, on the other. During the summer those problems were addressed, while 
the Çiĝli air base, near Izmir, was chosen as site for the missiles‟ deployment (Çiĝli 
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was being already developed to accommodate „sophisticated‟ weapons).774 The US 
Embassy in Ankara was finally authorised to initiate negotiations with the Menderes 
government to reach an agreement on the deployment of IRBMs. The Turks not only 
accepted, once more, the missiles, but appeared eager to sign the agreement as soon as 
possible.
775
 Finally, on 18 September Turkey signed a note agreeing to the 
deployment of a squadron of fifteen Jupiter missiles on its territory. The United States 
ratified the agreement the following month and the missiles would become 
operational in 1962.
776
    
Therefore, Italy and Turkey accepted the IRBMs, while Greece refused to 
give a timely answer. The Italians had chosen to participate energetically in nuclear 
sharing and decision making and strengthen their ties with the United States.  
Therefore, despite considerable domestic pressure from the Left against the 
deployment, they were the first, after the British, who reached an agreement with the 
US government. In any case, Italy was a relatively powerful NATO member and 
Italian aspirations for a potential serious role in allied nuclear sharing seemed 
justifiable. In Turkey, the Menderes government had consistently sought to increase 
the strategic value of the Turkish factor for the West – and the Americans in particular 
– and its decision to accept the US missiles was fully consistent with that policy. 
There was a general domestic consensus on that issue, and in any case, the relatively 
authoritarian Turkish political system and the absence of any left opposition meant the 
Turkish government did not confront any serious imperatives to accept the missiles. 
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The Greek government felt unable to accept the IRBMs. Even after the 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement and the removal of any strains between Greece and 
NATO, a significant portion of Greek public opinion remained suspicious towards the 
alliance and the United States, while the Left had emerged as the major opposition 
political party during the May 1958 general elections and the Soviets were pressing 
relentlessly Athens to reject the deployment of US IRBMs. Overall, Greece had 
undergone a period of extreme internal and external pressures in 1958, and 
Karamanlis (and many of his ministers) apparently judged that both the country and 
the government needed a pause, or breathing spell. Moreover, we should bear in mind 
that most of the senior US and NATO officials (including President Eisenhower and 
SACEUR Norstad) never pressed Greece to accept the IRBMs, quite the contrary. The 
question remains whether Greece‟s refusal to accept the missiles demonstrated that 
the country was a somewhat „evasive‟ or unreliable ally (particularly in conjunction 
with the previous Greek status of „semi-withdrawal‟ from the integrated NATO 
command, since Greece had withdrawn twice its military personnel from HALFSEE 
in Izmir). Although it is difficult to give a definite answer, it is true that most US and 
NATO officials understood that under existing circumstances, Greece could hardly 
accept the IRBMs. Some of them (particularly of the State Department) were never 
fully convinced of the political wisdom of such a deployment, or expressed serious 
doubts for the military utility of those weapons. Nevertheless, it is also true that 
Greece failed to become part of the US nuclear deterrence within the framework of 
NATO. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess whether the Greek refusal had a long-
term negative impact to the State and Defense Departments bureaucracy.    
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Conclusion 
From October 1957 until late 1958 NATO and the West in general, had to deal with a 
series of various challenges and crises on many fields. At the military level, a new 
strategy was devised. This involved a substantial qualitative leap forward, which 
obviously meant increased defence spending. By 1958, the NATO authorities had 
appreciated fully the role of economic and financial factors to the overall military 
effort, and from 1958 onwards the Annual Review reports on each member country 
contained paragraphs not only on military considerations and recommendations, but 
also an analysis on the financial and economic situation. Nevertheless, the new 
strategy as described in M.C.70 could not address the endemic problem of NATO 
members‟ inability to allocate the necessary resources to meet the approved force-
goals. Indeed, the main challenge for any NATO member country, and particularly 
the underdeveloped ones like Greece and Turkey, was how to maintain „a proper 
balance between the essential requirements of economic development and the defence 
effort‟.777 Indeed, only the creation of a sound economic basis and the retention of 
monetary stability would enable a gradual increase of the national defence budget, 
and defence expenditures should be increased commensurately with the GNP; 
otherwise, relentless military spending might endanger financial stability and have 
adverse effects, as happened in Turkey in mid-1958. As regards the Greek case, 
NATO officials accurately predicted that the country‟s prospects to continue its 
economic development and thus bear successfully its defence burden lay in finding 
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better outlet for its exports and in securing „the necessary financial aid through 
cooperation with her NATO allies or European economic organisations‟.778 
Generally, political crises of unprecedented scale in the southern region 
produced a highly flammable mix. First, Turkish insecurity and isolation was 
exacerbated after the coup in Iraq in July 1958, and soon after the Baghdad Pact was 
virtually dissolved. In addition, Turkey faced a major economic and a culminating 
political crisis, which threatened to destabilise it. On this occasion, the major Western 
countries and international economic organisations came to its rescue and imposed a 
monetary stabilisation programme. Second, and most significant, as the Cyprus 
problem reached its peak, the Western allies had to face an explosive fraternal dispute 
in Eastern Mediterranean. Despite Spaak‟s efforts, NATO seemed unable to undertake 
a major political initiative, intervene actively or stabilise the situation before it was 
too late. Indeed, in essence the Cyprus dispute had been turned into a Greek-Turkish 
conflict, while Britain‟s role and position appeared increasingly irrelevant to the core 
of the whole problem (as was demonstrated during the 1959 settlement). As Greece 
was pushed to the corner by Britain and Turkey, Greek withdrawal from NATO 
seemed probable during the fall of 1958. In any case, any Greek-Turkish or even 
Greek-NATO coordination in the military field had ceased from June 1958 onwards. 
Then, in fear that a possible Greek withdrawal would lead to complete regional 
isolation, the Turks proposed a compromise solution. The two parties managed to 
work out a „final‟ settlement, and the British acceded.  
In that sense, NATO had failed to offer any good offices. This was partly due 
to US reluctance to intervene, since naturally the other member countries would 
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expect Washington to take the lead. However, one could argue that NATO proved in a 
sense a significant stabilising factor. Facing the prospect of total isolation (at a time 
when the economic crisis was also undermining political stability), Turkey sought to 
restore Greek-Turkish relations by proposing a compromise over Cyprus. By autumn 
1958 the Turks had reached close to achieve partition of Cyprus. This would 
constitute a significant victory. Nevertheless, under current circumstances, that 
tactical victory could cause a major strategic setback: a possible Greek withdrawal 
from NATO (which might trigger an unforeseeable chain of events regarding 
Greece‟s future posture and international orientation) would cut off Turkey from 
NATO and the West. This was a risk the Menderes Government could not take. After 
all, since 1954-5 the primary Turkish argument against union was the fear of Turkey‟s 
encirclement from a friendly Greece, at a time when Ankara was also forming a 
Turco-Iraqi partnership which constituted the basis of the Baghdad Pact. If in late 
1958 Greece was forced out of NATO, while Iraq was turning neutralist or potentially 
pro-Soviet, Turkey would be surrounded by hostile neighbours. 
NATO and the United States did not constitute part of the Cyprus settlement. 
Had Cyprus become a NATO member, things might have evolved differently in 
subsequent years. Of course Cyprus lay outside the NATO area, but Greece, Turkey 
and Britain were NATO members, while the United States remained the dominant 
power in the Mediterranean. It would have been natural for Cyprus to be admitted into 
NATO and develop strong ties with the West. A possible establishment of a NATO 
base or headquarters on the island would have probably brought a significant degree 
of political stabilisation, particularly in the crucial initial period, and would have 
provided the opportunity for passions to calm and for the complex Cypriot 
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constitution to work. Nevertheless, despite NATO‟s failure to intervene timely and 
effectively in the Cyprus problem, this study argues that during 1955-9, and 
particularly in late 1958, the alliance indirectly and rather inadvertently, solely 
through its existence as the link between Greece and Turkey and the West, did 
provide a shield , a motive and a context for the containment of the Greek-Turkish 
crisis. Of course, this interpretation might be challenged by other scholars, who might 
wish to place more emphasis on NATO‟s evident impotence to solve intra-allied 
disputes.  
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CONCLUSION: 
The Southern Flank – Military Strategy  
or Political Stability in Depth? 
 
This thesis is the first document-based analysis of the Southern Flank in the 1950s, 
dealing with its establishment, military and political conditions and evolution in the 
1950s. Although it does not contrast with what has been written by other NATO 
historians about more specific events (such as the conclusion and the dissolution of 
the Balkan Pacts, Greek and Turkish admission to NATO and the dispute over 
Cyprus), this study seeks to offer a comprehensive account and appraisal of Southern 
Flank politics and strategies, which is still missing from „grand‟ NATO histories.  
The main question that needs to be addressed, as regards the overall history 
of the Southern Flank in the 1950s, concerns grand strategy. What was the primary 
goal of the Southern Flank? Did NATO aim to provide effective military protection to 
Italy, Greece and Turkey, or to achieve a political „stability in depth‟, as Assistant 
Secretary of State, George McGhee, put it in 1951, by integrating them in the Western 
defence system and the Western (or First) World in general?  
From the beginning, NATO failed to develop and pursue a comprehensive 
and effective strategy in the Mediterranean. Several factors account for this. To a 
significant extent, geography determined strategy.
779
 In sharp contrast with the other 
major fronts of the alliance (the Northern Flank, the Central region, and the Atlantic), 
the Southern Flank lacked geographic unity. The Mediterranean Sea constituted a 
unifying factor, but the Southern Flank was compartmentalized in three theatres of 
operations where three separate land and air battles would be fought: Northern Italy, 
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the Balkans, and Eastern Turkey. Furthermore, with the exception of the Italian 
frontier, where the situation was the least critical (at least in the sense that it did not 
directly border on Soviet bloc territory), NATO officials acknowledged that the 
alliance would probably have to deal with additional sub-theatres in the Southern 
Balkans and in Anatolia: for instance, even in case of local war, Greek forces would 
have to withdraw from Western Thrace in the face of Soviet-bloc superiority, thus 
leaving exposed the flanks of Turkish forces defending Eastern Thrace. Therefore, 
almost from the beginning, two separate battles would be fought in the Balkans, one 
in Greek Macedonia and another in Turkish Eastern Thrace and the Straits area. 
Moreover, in Anatolia, Turkish and any other available air or naval NATO forces 
were expected to deal not only with the major Soviet effort against North-eastern 
Turkey, but possibly also with one or two secondary Soviet attacks by amphibious 
and/or airborne troops on the Northern Turkish coast – not to mention an always 
volatile situation in the Middle East, where additional Soviet thrusts could be made.  
However, these inherent difficulties were further exacerbated by the 
establishment of a complicated command structure in the Southern Flank, where two 
commands and ten sub-commands were finally set up in 1952-3. This command set-
up (particularly of the naval forces) was established primarily to serve political 
considerations, while the military/strategic requirements were only partially met. 
Obviously, this led to confusion, and, at an early stage, even to Anglo-American 
competition.
780
 As the first and second chapters have shown, the command 
arrangement in the Southern Flank before and immediately after the Greek and 
Turkish accession to NATO was the result of hard US-UK negotiations and of a 
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subsequent compromise solution close to US positions, taking also into account 
Italian, Greek and Turkish views.  
It should be noted that the final command structure made more sense than 
British proposals to integrate or link Greece and Turkey with a future Middle East 
defence scheme (indeed, every such British-inspired regional defence scheme proved 
ill-fated – MEC, MEDO, Baghdad Pact/CENTO). Still, it appears that at least the 
Greek and Turkish forces were never integrated properly in the overall NATO 
command structure and seemed to function more as national forces rather than as 
allied ones. Indeed, the NATO-assigned land and air forces of Greece and Turkey 
would be commanded by the regional land and air headquarters of the Alliance in 
Izmir (HALFSEE and SIXATAF respectively). However, COMLANDSOUTHEAST 
and SIXATAF‟s commander would have to command and control, but essentially not 
coordinate (although officially, the latter was supposed to be their main task) the 
Greek and Turkish forces. In essence, these forces would fight different battles in 
separate sub-theatres, since, as NATO acknowledged, the Greek regions of Western 
Thrace and Eastern Macedonia were indefensible; hence no contact between Greek 
and Turkish land forces would be maintained. In addition, at least until the late 1950s 
both Greece and Turkey lacked completely the ability to counterattack against Soviet-
bloc forces advancing towards the Aegean and the Straits, and therefore there was no 
realistic possibility to coordinate their forces to launch a concerted counter-attack to 
drive Soviet-bloc forces from Thrace back to Bulgarian territory. 
In any case, after 1955 the problematic command structure and the weakness 
on the military level assumed secondary importance, as Greek-Turkish relations 
deteriorated significantly. Greek-Turkish military cooperation received a severe blow. 
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Thus mutual trust could not be restored easily, while the threat of a repetition of 
similar assault was looming on the horizon each time Greek-Turkish relations reached 
a crisis point over Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey threatened Greece twice with war (in 
1956 and in 1957) and this could hardly contribute to Greek-Turkish military 
cooperation within the framework of NATO. Furthermore, HALFSEE‟s function was 
seriously impaired twice, during September 1955 and particularly from June 1958 
until February 1959, when Greece withdrew its officers from Izmir, and in the second 
case, refused to participate in any NATO activity where the Turkish element was also 
present. It is obvious that the effective Greek withdrawal from NATO‟s regional 
command structure, in conjunction with the subsequent threat to leave NATO in 
autumn 1958, came also as a major political blow to the Alliance. The latter proved 
unable to deal with its first, most persistent and lasting intra-allied dispute.   
The geographic reality, the complex command structure, the competitive US-
UK relations at an early stage, and the subsequent rupture in UK-Greek and Greek-
Turkish relations prevented the integration of Southern Flank national strategies and 
forces. Thus the Southern Flank‟s function appeared problematic on several 
occasions. For example, in 1953-4 Greece and Turkey sought to establish close 
political and military bonds with Yugoslavia to enhance their security, but did not 
coordinate their policy with Italy; similarly, the Standing Group powers did not 
coordinate their own efforts towards Yugoslavia with the concurrent Greek-Turkish-
Yugoslav efforts, and finally alienated Tito who preferred the conclusion of a 
tripartite Balkan Alliance. Moreover, from 1955 until early 1959 Greece and Turkey 
followed national strategies on crucial topics. The former tried and to some extent 
managed to gain Arab support for the Cypriot cause, and gradually forged a bilateral 
365 
 
 
 
de facto „special relationship with Yugoslavia‟. The latter, taking full advantage of its 
focal position on the defence of the Middle East and its greater leverage within 
NATO, collaborated with Britain on the Cyprus question trying to isolate the Greeks, 
and undertook a strongly anti-Nasserite stand in Middle Eastern affairs. In the light of 
all these, the Southern Flank in the 1950s was a political situation rather than a 
military strategy of the alliance. 
Military weakness aggravated the predicament. The Southern Flank was a 
special case during the 1950s as regards the implementation of NATO strategy, 
simply because Greece and Turkey wanted but lacked the economic base to 
implement NATO strategy, whereas Italy, with its sounder economy, preferred to 
concentrate its efforts on development rather than security. For example, the MC.48 
strategy applied only theoretically to this region. On the one hand, it did not provide 
for any reduction in Italian, Greek or Turkish force goals, as was the case for most 
NATO members. On the other, although NATO planning placed great emphasis on 
the extensive use of tactical nuclear weapons to retard or arrest a Soviet-bloc advance 
in Italian, Greek, and Turkish soil, in fact allied nuclear retaliatory capability in the 
Southern Flank was not enhanced. The same applies to a considerable extent to the 
subsequent NATO strategy as envisaged in M.C.70, which provided for an extensive 
modernisation of the Allied armed forces and called for a reduction of conventional 
forces and for a sharp qualitative improvement of NATO-assigned forces. Again, the 
Southern Flank countries were reluctant to accept a reduction of their forces, because 
they wished to keep additional ones under national command for their own purposes. 
They did so despite the fact that they recognised, along with NATO authorities, that 
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even the attainment of M.C.70 standards would require a tremendous effort and that 
no funds existed for the maintenance of additional forces.  
Another central issue was the relative disinterest of most allies (with the 
exception of Washington and London) about the politics and strategy in the 
Mediterranean, and even more on out-of-area areas directly affecting the Southern 
Flank‟s defence posture or political stability (such as Yugoslavia, Cyprus and the 
Middle East). With the exception of the Southern Flank countries, NATO members 
considered as the Alliance‟s first and utmost aim to deter (and if necessary, defeat) 
Soviet aggression against Western Europe. The defence of the Mediterranean 
remained a desirable goal, but, taking into account the burdens of the alliance in the 
crucial Central Region, not a priority. For the majority of NATO members, there was 
little to choose between the Central and the Southern Fronts. 
Indeed, as regards the Southern Flank area, after 1952 the United States 
controlled almost everything concerning the military organisation and preparedness of 
the Italians, and particularly of the Greeks and the Turks. American influence in 
Greece and Turkey had been significant since 1947, not least because of the 
continuing presence of JUSMAGG and JAMMAT (JUSMAT after 1958) and the 
central importance of US economic and military aid to the function of the military 
machine and state apparatus of both countries. Therefore, it was not surprising that in 
the face of relative NATO disinterest towards the Mediterranean, and in the absence 
of any alternative Western power centre which could attract them (for example the 
EEC/EU in the future), Rome, Athens, and Ankara all sought to establish a better 
bilateral relationship with Washington to acquire greater US military commitment and 
get increased economic aid. Therefore, in the 1950s the United States succeeded to a 
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considerable degree in stabilising politically Italy, Greece and Turkey, and in 
deterring a Soviet-bloc aggression, not least through extending US security 
commitment by pressing for, and achieving, their inclusion in NATO. US aid and the 
military effort of the Italians, and especially that of the Greeks and the Turks, 
contributed to a significant increase of their respective military capabilities. However, 
though to a different degree, the Southern Flank countries were still unable to defend 
themselves effectively against a major Soviet-bloc attack. 
NATO aimed and managed to deter Soviet-bloc aggression against the three 
Southern Flank members to an equal degree, and Washington wanted to keep every 
single ally in the Western camp. However, this did not mean that during the 1950s 
those three states were viewed by NATO and the United States as being of equivalent 
status. This was demonstrated vividly on the field of Allied defence strategy. Italy 
was regarded as the most important Southern Flank member. It was a large European 
country with a considerable economic and industrial potential and a former great 
power, and additionally it covered the flank of Western Europe. Moreover, for 
geographical reasons, it was also the most defendable of the three Southern Flank 
countries.  
Greece, on the other hand, was the most vulnerable NATO member because 
it lacked strategic depth and had inadequate forces to mount an effective forward 
defence. Although the Greek defence problem was ameliorated after the signature of 
the 1953-4 Balkan Pacts, these were soon neutralized. Before 1953 and after 1955, 
NATO policy makers acknowledged that Greece would not be able to repel even a 
Bulgarian attack, let alone a determined Soviet bloc attack.
781
 As the Greek military 
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establishment was gradually strengthened, by 1957-8 NATO believed that it could 
retard a Bulgarian attack along the Struma line, and undertake a brief delaying action 
in Northern Greece in the event of a major Soviet-bloc advance in which the Red 
Army would participate.
782
  
Turkey, however, was regarded as partially  defendable, despite the fact that 
as the only NATO country bordering with the USSR, it would most probably by 
attacked by strong Bulgarian and especially Soviet land, air, and even naval forces. 
For this reason its strategic importance to the West was paramount. US and NATO 
strategists believed that due to the existence of significant strategic depth in Anatolia, 
the numerous Turkish forces would be able to absorb the Soviet blows and halt the 
advance of Soviet and Bulgarian forces. Therefore, a large portion of Turkey, 
particularly the central Anatolian plateau, could and should be held, to threaten the 
flank of any Soviet advance in the Middle East and become a platform for the launch 
of NATO air strikes against Soviet forces and on war sustaining resources in the 
USSR.
783
 Essentially, as the Americans explained to the Greek leadership, NATO 
prescribed completely different military roles for Turkey and Greece.
784
 Hence 
between 1952 and 1959 the former received over twice as much US military aid than 
the latter.
785
 
NATO played a significant stabilizing role in the region, though. This was 
perhaps also because NATO nuclear deterrence worked, and thus its flawed military 
strategy was never put to test. As regards NATO‟s stabilising influence, the extension 
of the Atlantic Alliance in Eastern Mediterranean filled a power vacuum and, after 
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Italy (which was a founding NATO member), tied Greece and Turkey with the West. 
This was a major accomplishment, if compared with the course undertaken by many 
neighbouring countries, particularly on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and in 
the Middle East. These states (Egypt, Syria and Iraq during the 1950s) adopted a 
neutralist or anti-western (though not essentially pro-Soviet) position.  
However, NATO‟s effort to stabilise politically the Eastern Mediterranean, 
though generally successful, experienced a serious failure with regard to the Cyprus 
issue. First of all, surprisingly, the Southern Flank‟s success in deterring Communist 
aggression produced an adverse effect. When Greece and Turkey eventually joined 
NATO in 1952 they obtained a strong and definite security guarantee which satisfied 
their primary foreign policy goal. Then, they enhanced further their defence position 
vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc through the conclusion of the Balkan Pacts. After that, they 
felt able to devote their energy to other issues, such as the future of Cyprus. So long 
as Soviet pressure appeared imminent, Greece had not been willing to raise the 
Cyprus question; similarly, in 1947 Turkey had not opposed the incorporation of the 
Dodecanese Islands to Greece. However, in the aftermath of Stalin‟s death and during 
the mid-1950s reduction in Cold War tensions, Athens was ready to press Britain 
relentlessly for the application of the principle of self-determination to Cyprus, while 
Ankara sought to avert such development at any cost, including that of the complete 
disruption of Greek-Turkish partnership.
786
  
In addition, as UK-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated, NATO 
became an arena for a power struggle over an out-of-area issue, particularly as the 
British and the Turks tried to push the Greeks in to a corner and the latter often fell in 
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to a state of semi-withdrawal from the regional command structure. NATO (and the 
United States) did not mediate in good enough time to avert the Greek-Turkish split of 
1955, and in subsequent years no serious effort towards arbitration was taken. No 
NATO country or official (with the notable exception of Secretary General Paul-
Henri Spaak) was willing to intervene. As NATO did not constitute part of the 1959 
Cyprus settlement and the Cypriot Republic was not included into the Alliance, the 
Southern Flank was not extended eastwards to stabilise politically the delicate 
situation to prevent internal collapse, Makarios‟ turn to the non-aligned movement, or 
the revival of Greek-Turkish antagonism in the future.  
Thus, this thesis argues that during the 1950s the Southern Flank (and 
especially the Greek-Turkish fronts) was primarily an exercise in achieving political 
stability in depth and in denying crucial regions and waterways to the Soviets, rather 
than producing an effective military strategy. On the military level, NATO planners 
hoped that Italy could be held (at least, with the same enormous difficulties that 
applied to the Central Region), but Greece could not, and Turkey could only partially 
be defended. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey, the poorest members of NATO, were 
in no position to meet the high qualitative standards that NATO was putting forward. 
Last but not least, NATO and US nuclear deterrence was not enhanced in the 
Southern Flank until after 1959 when tactical nuclear weapons were integrated in the 
Greek and the Turkish armed forces. This meant that militarily the Southern Flank 
remained the weakest spot of the Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, on the political 
level, NATO‟s success was remarkable. Greece and Turkey were secured for the 
West; Cold War deterrence meant that, despite the apparent defence problems, the 
Soviet road to the Mediterranean was blocked, except in the case of total war. Last but 
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not least, NATO membership and western deterrence arguably also played a 
stabilizing role in the relations between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria: in a Cold War 
context it was unthinkable for these states to initiate bilateral conflicts which had 
proved so common in the past. In other words the Southern Flank was a case where a 
defensive alliance scored a major political success.  
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